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We live in the information age. Our world is interconnected by digital devices and electronic
communication. As such, criminals are finding opportunities to exploit our information rich
electronic data. In 2014, the estimated annual cost from computer-related crime was more
than 800 billion dollars. Examples include the theft of intellectual property, electronic fraud,
identity theft and the distribution of illicit material. Digital forensics grew out of necessity to
combat computer crime and involves the investigation and analysis of electronic data after a
suspected criminal act.
Challenges in digital forensics exist due to constant changes in technology. Investigation
challenges include exponential growth in the number of cases and the size of targets; for ex-
ample, forensic practitioners must analyse multi-terabyte cases comprised of numerous digital
devices. A variety of applied challenges also exist, due to continual technological advance-
ments; for example, anti-forensic tools, including the malicious use of encryption or data
wiping tools, hinder digital investigations by hiding or removing the availability of evidence.
In response, the objective of the research reported here was to automate the effective and
efficient detection of anti-forensic tools. A design science research methodology was selected
as it provides an applied research method to design, implement and evaluate an innovative
Information Technology (IT) artifact to solve a specified problem. The research objective
require that a system be designed and implemented to perform automated detection of digital
artifacts (e.g., data files and Windows Registry entries) on a target data set. The goal of the
system is to automatically determine if an anti-forensic tool is present, or absent, in order
to prioritise additional in-depth investigation. The system performs rapid forensic triage,
suitable for execution against multiple investigation targets, providing an analyst with high-
level information regarding potential malicious anti-forensic tool usage.
The system is divided into two main stages: 1) Design and implementation of a solution
to automate creation of an application profile (application software reference set) of known
unique digital artifacts; and 2) Digital artifact matching between the created reference set and
a target data set. Two tools were designed and implemented: 1) A live differential analysis
tool, named LiveDiff, to reverse engineer application software with a specific emphasis on
digital forensic requirements; 2) A digital artifact matching framework, named Vestigium,
to correlate digital artifact metadata and detect anti-forensic tool presence. In addition, a
forensic data abstraction, named Application Profile XML (APXML), was designed to store
and distribute digital artifact metadata. An associated Application Programming Interface
(API), named apxml.py, was authored to provide automated processing of APXML docu-
ments. Together, the tools provided an automated triage system to detect anti-forensic tool
presence on an investigation target.
i
A two-phase approach was employed in order to assess the research products. The first
phase of experimental testing involved demonstration in a controlled laboratory environment.
First, the LiveDiff tool was used to create application profiles for three anti-forensic tools.
The automated data collection and comparison procedure was more effective and efficient
than previous approaches. Two data reduction techniques were tested to remove irrelevant
operating system noise: application profile intersection and dynamic blacklisting were found
to be effective in this regard. Second, the profiles were used as input to Vestigium and
automated digital artifact matching was performed against authored known data sets. The
results established the desired system functionality and demonstration then led to refinements
of the system, as per the cyclical nature of design science.
The second phase of experimental testing involved evaluation using two additional data
sets to establish effectiveness and efficiency in a real-world investigation scenario. First, a
public data set was subjected to testing to provide research reproducibility, as well as to
evaluate system effectiveness in a variety of complex detection scenarios. Results showed
the ability to detect anti-forensic tools using a different version than that included in the
application profile and on a different Windows operating system version. Both are scenarios
where traditional hash set analysis fails. Furthermore, Vestigium was able to detect residual
and deleted information, even after a tool had been uninstalled by the user. The efficiency
of the system was determined and refinements made, resulting in an implementation that
can meet forensic triage requirements. Second, a real-world data set was constructed using a
collection of second-hand hard drives. The goal was to test the system using unpredictable
and diverse data to provide more robust findings in an uncontrolled environment. The system
detected one anti-forensic tool on the data set and processed all input data successfully without
error, further validating system design and implementation.
The key outcome of this research is the design and implementation of an automated system
to detect anti-forensic tool presence on a target data set. Evaluation suggested the solution was
both effective and efficient, adhering to forensic triage requirements. Furthermore, techniques
not previously utilised in forensic analysis were designed and applied throughout the research:
dynamic blacklisting and profile intersection removed irrelevant operating system noise from
application profiles; metadata matching methods resulted in efficient digital artifact detection
and path normalisation aided full path correlation in complex matching scenarios. The system
was subjected to rigorous experimental testing on three data sets that comprised more than 10
terabytes of data. The ultimate outcome is a practically implemented solution that has been
executed on hundreds of forensic disk images, thousands of Windows Registry hives, more
than 10 million data files, and approximately 50 million Registry entries. The research has




A doctoral dissertation is solely undertaken by an individual as many others contribute and
play a role in reaching the final goal. Acknowledgments must therefore be made to the people
who helped me achieve the work presented in this thesis.
A heartfelt thank-you must first go to my parents who have continually supported me, not
only during my PhD candidature, but in every facet of my life. Without their unwavering love
and encouragement I would never have achieved my academic, career and life goals. To my
older sister, Dr. Sophie Laurenson, thank-you for always looking after and inspiring me. To
my partner, Victoria Alogna, we embarked on our doctoral journey together and supported
each other every step of the way. We make a great team, thank-you, you are the best.
To my supervisors, I would like to express my sincere appreciation, firstly to my primary
advisor, Associate Professor Hank Wolfe, for ongoing encouragement throughout my doctoral
studies. Thank-you for letting me choose my research direction and supporting my research
endeavour. My sincere gratitude goes to my secondary advisor, Professor Stephen MacDonell,
for reassuring me during stressful times and for his immense knowledge and guidance on
research methodologies, thank-you for the time and effort in supporting me throughout the
research journey. Without my thesis advisors this PhD would not have been achieved.
I also wish to thank the members of the Information Science department at the University
of Otago. I feel we are a small, perhaps odd, family of researchers with a shared passion. A
special thanks to Professor Peter Whigham, Dr. Sherlock Licorish, Dr. Tobias Langlotz and
other members of staff who all provided something unique to my graduate research experience.
Furthermore, to the Information Science administration staff, whenever I had a problem, you
were there to help. So, thank-you to Gail Mercer, Heather Cooper and Stephen Hall Jones.
To my office mates, thank-you for bringing out the best in my research and both putting
up with me when stressed. Thank-you to Dr. Dax Roberts who shared much knowledge and
stimulating discussion early on in my PhD. To Henry Gee, it was a pleasure sharing an office
with you and great to enjoy the successes we achieved in collaborative work. To my more
recent office mate, Mostafa Alwash, thank-you for the stimulating discussions on work and
life, it was a pleasure. Also, to the all Information Science postgraduate students, thank-you
for providing an interesting research community.
Acknowledgments must also be made to a number of academics and researchers in my
specialist research field of digital forensics as their research and shared passion has provided
me with the enthusiasm and intellectual stimulus. Simson Garfinkel, the research papers,
techniques and tools you have released are second to none, thank-you for always releasing
open source forensic tools and libraries. Alex Nelson, after hours of pouring over your source
code, thank-you for your novel ideas and excellent code documentation. Vassil Roussev, your
advanced and novel research output has inspired me to seek more elegant and comprehensive
solutions. To Eric Zimmerman and Harlan Carvey, thank-you both for creating, documenting
and sharing you excellent research on the cryptic Windows Registry. To all other authors
iii
of papers in the Digital Investigation journal, this publication has entertained, provoked and




1.1 Research Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 System Design and Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Research Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Research Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.6 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 Background 13
2.1 Digital Forensics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.1 Digital Forensic Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.1.1 Identification of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1.2 Collection of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1.3 Examination of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.1.4 Analysis of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.1.5 Reporting of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.1.6 Preservation of Evidence Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.2 Digital Forensic Triage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Digital Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.1 Digital Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.2 Digital Evidence Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.2.1 File System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.2.2 Windows Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.3 Digital Forensic Data Abstractions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.3.1 Forensic Disk Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.3.2 High-level Forensic Data Abstractions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Digital Forensic Research Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.1 Data Volume & Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.2 Case Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.3 Technology Advancement Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.4 The CSI Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Application Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
v
2.4.1 Application Software Life Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.2 Reverse Engineering Application Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.3 Forensic Analysis of Application Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 Anti-forensics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.1 Anti-forensic Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.1.1 Evidence Hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.1.2 Evidence Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5.1.3 Evidence Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.1.4 Evidence Counterfeiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5.2 Anti-forensic Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5.2.1 Data Encryption Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5.2.2 Data Wiping Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5.2.3 Privacy Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.3 The Anti-forensics Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.3.1 Anti-forensic Prevalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.3.2 Anti-forensic Tool Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 Literature Review 43
3.1 Forensic Analysis of Anti-forensic Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.1.1 Evaluation of Counter-Forensic Privacy Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.1.2 Assessing Trace Evidence Left by Secure Deletion Programs . . . . . . 45
3.1.3 An Evaluation of Data Erasing Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1.4 Identifying Trace Evidence from Target-Specific Data Wiping . . . . . 47
3.1.5 Detecting Data Concealment Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.1.6 Anti-forensic Research Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Reverse Engineering of Application Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.1 System Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.2 Differential Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2.2.1 Snapshot Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.2.2 Disk Image and Registry Hive Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.3 Reverse Engineering Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.3.1 Lack of Standardisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.3.2 Experimental Testing Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.3.3 Prevalence of Unrelated Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 Automated Digital Forensic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3.1 File Hashing and Reference Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.2 Advanced Forensic Hashing Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3.2.1 Block Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3.2.2 Approximate Matching and Similarity Digests . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.3 Performance Summary of Forensic Hashing Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
vi
3.3.4 NIST Diskprint Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3.5 Automated Detection of Registry Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.5.1 Windows Registry Analysis Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.5.2 Automated Windows Registry Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.6 Automated Forensic Analysis Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.6.1 Automated Detection Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.6.2 Digital Artifact Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4 Research Methodology 73
4.1 Digital Forensic Research Methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Design Science Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.1 Identify Research Problem and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.1.1 Problem 1: Creating Application Software Reference Sets . . 78
4.2.1.2 Problem 2: Storing Application Software Reference Sets . . . 79
4.2.1.3 Problem 3: Correlating Reference Sets Against Targets . . . 80
4.2.2 Define the Objectives of a Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2.2.1 High-Level Research Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2.2.2 Reverse Engineering Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2.2.3 Reference Set Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2.2.4 Target Data Set Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.2.5 Digital Artifact Matching Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.3 Design and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2.4 Demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2.5.1 System Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2.5.2 System Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2.6 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3 Experimental Testing Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3.1 Operating System Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3.2 Application Software Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3.2.1 CCleaner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3.2.2 Eraser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3.2.3 TrueCrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3.3 Data Set Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3.3.1 Known Content Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3.3.2 Publicly Available Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3.3.3 Real World Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3.3.4 Data Set Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3.4 Effectiveness Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3.4.1 Information Retrieval Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
vii
4.3.4.2 Digital Artifact Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3.5 Efficiency Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 Ethical Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5 System Design 99
5.1 System Design Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 Digital Artifact Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2.1 Digital Artifact Identification Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2.2 Advanced Tool Design: LiveDiff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2.3 Data Collection Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2.3.1 Data Collection: System Snapshots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2.3.2 Data Comparison: Differential Analysis Strategy . . . . . . . 104
5.2.3.3 Data Collection Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.2.4 Tool Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.2.4.1 Dynamic Blacklisting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.2.4.2 Data File Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2.5 Software Development: LiveDiff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.3 Application Profile Data Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.3.1 Data Abstraction Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.3.2 Data Abstraction Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.3.2.1 Digital Forensics XML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.3.2.2 Revised Registry XML Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3.2.3 Application Profile Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3.3 Digital Artifact Metadata Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.3.3.1 Additional Digital Artifact Metadata Properties . . . . . . . 117
5.3.3.2 Digital Artifact Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.3.3.3 Metadata Property Normalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.3.3.4 Compilation of Digital Artifact Metadata Properties . . . . . 118
5.3.4 Software Development: apxml.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3.4.1 APXML API Design Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3.4.2 APXML API Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3.5 Adding APXML Output Support to LiveDiff . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3.5.1 Reporting Results to the APXML Data Abstraction . . . . . 122
5.3.5.2 Handling Special XML Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.3.5.3 Representing Registry Value Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.3.6 Application Profile: Data Abstraction Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.4 Target Data Set Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.4.1 Target Data Set Processing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.4.2 File System Metadata Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.4.3 Windows Registry Metadata Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
viii
5.4.3.1 System Design Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.4.3.2 Windows Registry Metadata Generation Solution . . . . . . . 128
5.4.3.3 Software Development: HiveExtractor.py . . . . . . . . 128
5.4.3.4 Software Development: CellXML-Registry . . . . . . . . 129
5.4.4 Target Data Set Processing Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.5 Digital Artifact Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.5.1 Digital Artifact Matching Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.5.2 Advanced Tool Design: Vestigium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.5.3 Digital Artifact Matching Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.5.3.1 Path Normalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.5.3.2 Available Digital Artifact Metadata Properties . . . . . . . . 136
5.5.3.3 File System Matching Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.5.3.4 Windows Registry Matching Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.5.4 File System Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.5.4.1 Application Profile Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.5.4.2 File System Artifact Matching Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.5.5 Windows Registry Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.5.5.1 Application Profile Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.5.5.2 Registry Artifact Matching Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.5.6 Forensic Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.5.6.1 Log File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.5.6.2 DFXML and RegXML Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.5.7 Software Development: Vestigium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.5.8 Digital Artifact Matching Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6 System Demonstration 149
6.1 Tool Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.1.1 Creating Application Profiles: LiveDiff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.1.2 Processing Application Profiles: apxml.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.1.3 Target Data Set Processing: CellXML-Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.1.4 Digital Artifact Matching: Vestigium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.1.5 System Implementation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.2 Experimental Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.2.1 Virtual Machine Testing Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.2.2 Data Generation: Recreating the Application Life Cycle . . . . . . . . 160
6.2.3 Data Collection: Creating Application Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.2.4 Data Collection: Creating Known Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.2.5 Establishing Data Set Ground Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.2.5.1 Ground Truth Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.2.5.2 Ground Truth: Determining Windows Version . . . . . . . . 165
ix
6.2.5.3 Ground Truth: Determining Anti-forensic Presence . . . . . . 166
6.2.5.4 Ground Truth: Determining Digital Artifacts . . . . . . . . . 166
6.2.6 System Evaluation Metrics: Score Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.2.6.1 Effectiveness Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.2.6.2 Efficiency Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.2.7 Testing Environment Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.3 System Demonstration: Creating Application Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.3.1 Anti-forensic Tool Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.3.2 Overview of Created Application Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.4 Filtering Irrelevant Artifacts from Application Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.4.1 Application Profile Intersection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.4.1.1 Application Profile Intersection Method . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.4.1.2 Application Profile Intersection Results . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.4.1.3 Analysis of Application Profile Intersection Output . . . . . . 175
6.4.2 Application Profile Blacklisting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6.4.2.1 Application Profile Blacklisting Method . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6.4.2.2 Application Profile Blacklisting Results . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.4.2.3 Analysis of Application Profile Blacklisting . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.4.3 Discussion of Data Reduction Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.5 System Demonstration: Recreated Application Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.5.1 Revised Application Profile Generation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.5.2 Overview of Recreated Application Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.5.3 Further Data Reduction: Static Blacklist Implementation . . . . . . . 185
6.5.4 Application Profile Creation Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.6 System Demonstration: Digital Artifact Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.6.1 Overview of Known Data Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.6.2 Experimental Testing Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.6.3 Establishing Known Data Set Ground Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.6.4 Known Data Set Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.6.4.1 Matching Effectiveness: File System Entries . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.6.4.2 Matching Effectiveness: Registry Entries . . . . . . . . . . . 193
6.6.5 Discussion of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
6.6.6 Design Modifications to Digital Artifact Matching . . . . . . . . . . . 196
6.7 Overview of Achieved Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7 System Evaluation 201
7.1 Public Data Set Overview: M57-Patents Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
7.1.1 Overview of M57-Parents Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
7.1.2 Experimental Testing Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
7.1.3 Establishing Ground Truth for the M57-Patents Scenario . . . . . . . 204
x
7.1.3.1 Determining Anti-forensic Tool Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.1.3.2 Determining and Documenting Anti-forensic Tool Artifacts . 206
7.2 M57-Patents Scenario: Effectiveness Testing and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
7.2.1 Detecting Anti-forensic Tools using Vestigium . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
7.2.1.1 File System Matching Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
7.2.1.2 File System Matching Effectiveness Comparison: Hash Sets . 213
7.2.1.3 Registry Matching Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
7.2.1.4 Registry Matching Effectiveness Comparison: Searching . . . 217
7.2.2 False Positive Detection Rate using Vestigium . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
7.2.3 Detecting Residual Digital Artifacts using Vestigium . . . . . . . . . 222
7.2.3.1 Application Profile Creation: XP Advanced Keylogger . 223
7.2.3.2 Testing Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
7.2.3.3 Residual Digital Artifact Detection Results . . . . . . . . . . 224
7.2.3.4 Comparison of Findings to Jones et al. (2015) . . . . . . . . 226
7.2.4 Effectiveness of Path Normalisation Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
7.2.4.1 Path Normalisation Results for File System Entries . . . . . 229
7.2.4.2 Path Normalisation Results for Registry Entries . . . . . . . 231
7.2.4.3 Discussion of Path Normalisation Results . . . . . . . . . . . 233
7.2.5 Effectiveness of the Windows Registry Processing Technique . . . . . . 234
7.3 M57-Patents Scenario: Efficiency Testing and Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
7.3.1 Efficiency Metrics and Testing Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
7.3.2 System Efficiency Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
7.3.3 Improving Vestigium Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
7.3.3.1 Improving File System Metadata Generation Efficiency . . . 239
7.3.3.2 Improving Registry Metadata Generation Efficiency . . . . . 242
7.3.3.3 Improving Digital Artifact Matching Efficiency . . . . . . . . 244
7.3.4 Revised System Efficiency Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
7.4 M57-Patents Scenario: Discussion and Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
7.4.1 System Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
7.4.2 System Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
7.4.3 System Design Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
7.5 Real-World Data Set Overview: Second Hand Hard Drives . . . . . . . . . . . 248
7.5.1 Real-World Data Set Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
7.5.2 Selection Criteria for Real-World Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
7.5.3 Overview of Selected Hard Drives from Real-World Data Set . . . . . 251
7.5.4 Real-World Data Set Experimental Testing Method . . . . . . . . . . . 252
7.6 Real-World Data Set Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
7.6.1 Detecting Anti-forensic Tools using Vestigium . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
7.6.2 System Efficiency Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
7.6.3 System Efficiency Results: Disk Access Method and Analysis System . 256
7.6.4 Discussion and Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
xi
7.7 Overview of Achieved Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
7.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
8 Conclusion 263
8.1 Tool Development Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
8.2 Research Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
8.2.1 System Design and Implementation Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
8.2.2 System Demonstration, Evaluation and Testing Limitations . . . . . . 268
8.3 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
8.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
9 References 273
A Appendix: Research Methodology 287
B Appendix: System Design 291
B.1 Windows Registry Differencing Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
B.2 Comparison of LiveDiff versus Regshot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
B.3 APXML Data Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
B.4 APXML API: apxml.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
B.5 Registry Hive Extraction: HiveExtractor.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
B.6 CellXML-Registry Source Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
B.7 Path Normalisation Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
C Appendix: System Demonstration 319
C.1 Detecting Windows Presence: DetectWindows.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
C.2 Created Application Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
C.3 Application Profile Intersection: APXMLIntersection.py . . . . . . . . . . 326
C.4 Application Profile Intersection Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
C.5 Application Profile Blacklisting: APXMLBlacklist.py . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
C.6 LiveDiff Static Blacklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
C.7 Final Application Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
C.8 Determining Data Set Statistics: FileSystemStats.py . . . . . . . . . . . 346
C.9 Determining Data Set Statistics: RegistryStats.py . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
C.10 Known Data Set Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
D Appendix: System Evaluation 351
D.1 M57-Patents Scenario Data Set Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
D.2 Path Normalisation Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
D.3 Hard Drive Read Speed Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
D.4 Additional fiwalk Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
D.5 Real-World Data Set Sourced Hard Drives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
D.6 Real-World Data Set Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
xii
List of Figures
1.1 Digital forensic volume statistics from FBI RCFL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) process model . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 High-level overview of the system design architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 DSRM process model with links to relevant chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 Digital forensic procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Structure of the Windows Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Application software life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Abstraction levels and layers of an HTML file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1 Fingerprint generation system to detect data concealment programs . . . . . . 48
3.2 Visual representation of block hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3 Throughput for 500 GB hard drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Diskprint analysis workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1 Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) process model . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 High-level overview of the proposed system design architecture . . . . . . . . 82
5.1 High-level overview of the system architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 Visual representation of the snapshot differencing method . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3 Data collection procedure implemented in LiveDiff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.4 Example of a prefix tree populated with file system entries . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.5 High-level overview of target data set processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.6 High-level overview of the file system matching process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.7 High-level overview of the Registry matching process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.1 High-level overview of the implemented system design . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.2 LiveDiff program help menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.3 Vestigium program help menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.4 High-level graphical overview of the application life cycle phases . . . . . . . . 161
6.5 High-level overview of the known data set generation method . . . . . . . . . 164
6.6 High-level overview of the method to establish ground truth . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.7 Summary of application profile intersection results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.8 Summary of application profile intersection results for TrueCrypt . . . . . . 175
xiii
6.9 Averaged application profile counts before and after dynamic blacklisting . . . 179
7.1 Longitudinal detection capabilities for XP Keylogger tool . . . . . . . . . . 227
7.2 Overview of actual paths versus normalised paths matching results . . . . . . 234
A.1 Ethical approval granted for research involving second-hand hard drives . . . 288
A.2 Ethical approval granted to the author for this research . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
xiv
List of Tables
2.1 Types of electronic devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Classified levels of digital forensic analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Types of digital artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Common digital forensic data abstractions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Common disk image file formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6 Classification of data wiping techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 Anti-forensic tool classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1 File signatures from secure deletion programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 Forensic analysis results of data erasing tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Seraph matching results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4 An overview of system monitoring tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5 An overview of differential analysis tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.6 Run-time generation efficiency of common digital forensic hash functions . . . 65
3.7 Generation and comparison efficiency for digital forensic hash functions . . . . 66
3.8 List of common Windows Registry analysis tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1 Coincidence matrix for binary classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.1 Overview of data structures for different application software artifacts . . . . 104
5.2 List of LiveDiff source code files with a description of functionality . . . . 111
5.3 Overview of application profile metadata properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4 Properties added to the application profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.5 Summary of application profile metadata properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.6 Pre-defined XML entities and the associated LiveDiff checking function . . 123
5.7 Registry value data type variability between LiveDiff and hivexml . . . . 124
5.8 Path normalisation examples using environment variable naming conventions 133
5.9 Overview of file system path normalisation values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.10 Overview of Windows Registry path normalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.11 Overview of Windows Registry base name normalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.12 Complete list of available APXML metadata properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.13 List of Vestigium Python modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.14 List of Vestigium software package dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
xv
6.1 List of command line arguments for the LiveDiff tool . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.2 List of command line arguments for the CellXML-Registry tool . . . . . . 156
6.3 List of command line arguments for the Vestigium tool . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.4 Application life cycle phases selected for experimental testing . . . . . . . . . 160
6.5 Overview of the anti-forensic tools selected for application profile testing . . . 170
6.6 Average digital artifact counts for created application profiles . . . . . . . . . 170
6.7 Summary of application profile intersection results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.8 Summary of blacklisting effectiveness for each anti-forensic tool . . . . . . . . 178
6.9 Blacklisted data files classified on logical file system location . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.10 Blacklisted Registry values classified on logical Registry hive path . . . . . . . 181
6.11 Overview and comparison of original versus revised application profiles . . . . 184
6.12 Overview and comparison of original versus revised application profiles . . . . 186
6.13 Overview of the created forensic disk images from the known data set . . . . . 188
6.14 Overview of the M57-Patents scenario content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
6.15 Overview of ground truth information for the known data set . . . . . . . . . 190
6.16 Effectiveness results for file system matching for the known data set . . . . . 192
6.17 Effectiveness results for Registry matching for the known data set . . . . . . . 194
7.1 High-level overview of the M57-Patents scenario based on user . . . . . . . . . 202
7.2 Overview of the M57-Patents scenario content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
7.3 Potentially interesting forensic disk images from the M57-Patents scenario . . 206
7.4 Tool versions for application profiles versus the M57-Patents scenario . . . . . 206
7.5 Overview of ground truth information for the M57-Patents scenario . . . . . . 207
7.6 High-level overview of Vestigium results for the M57-Patents scenario . . . 209
7.7 Effectiveness results for file system matching for the M57-Patents Scenario . . 210
7.8 Overview of file system matching results for Eraser version 5.7.8 . . . . . . . 212
7.9 Effectiveness results for Registry matching for the M57-Patents Scenario . . . 215
7.10 Overview of Windows Registry matching results for Eraser version 5.7.8 . . 216
7.11 Overview of Registry keyword search analysis on the M57-Patents scenario . . 219
7.12 Cumulated false positive results for file system matching . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
7.13 Cumulated false positive results for Registry matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
7.14 Overview of the application profile created for XP Keylogger . . . . . . . . 223
7.15 Overview of file system and Registry matching for XP Keylogger . . . . . . 224
7.16 Overview of file system path detection rates using path normalisation . . . . . 230
7.17 Overview of Registry path normalisation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
7.18 Comparison of Registry parsing capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
7.19 Overview of system efficiency for the M57-Patents scenario . . . . . . . . . . . 237
7.20 Overview of efficiency results of the four Vestigium processing steps . . . . 238
7.21 Overview of fiwalk performance for the M57-Patents scenario . . . . . . . . 240
7.22 Overview of Registry processing tools for the M57-Patents scenario . . . . . . 243
7.23 Overview of revised system efficiency results for the M57-Patents scenario . . 245
xvi
7.24 Overview of the hard drives sourced for real-world data set testing . . . . . . 250
7.25 Overview of the hard drives selected for real-world data set testing . . . . . . 250
7.26 Overview of the content of hard drives selected for real-world data set testing 251
7.27 Effectiveness results for file system matching for the real-world data set . . . . 253
7.28 Effectiveness results for Registry matching for the real-world data set . . . . . 254
7.29 Overview of system efficiency for real-world data set processing . . . . . . . . 255
7.30 System efficiency for real-world data set processing on field triage laptop . . . 257
B.1 Overview of fileshot.c functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
B.2 Overview of regshot.c functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
C.1 Summary of application profile contents for CCleaner version 5.09 . . . . . . 323
C.2 Summary of application profile contents for Eraser version 6.2.0.2970 . . . . 324
C.3 Summary of application profile contents for TrueCrypt version 7.1a . . . . . 325
C.4 Application Profile Intersection Results for CCleaner version 5.09 . . . . . . 333
C.5 Application Profile Intersection Results for Eraser version 6.2.0.2970 . . . . 334
C.6 Application Profile Intersection Results for TrueCrypt version 7.1a . . . . . 335
C.7 Summary of the final application profile for CCleaner version 5.09 . . . . . . 344
C.8 Summary of the final application profile for Eraser version 6.2.0 . . . . . . . 344
C.9 Summary of the final application profile for TrueCrypt version 7.1a . . . . . 345
C.10 Summary of the final application profile for XP Keylogger version 2.1 . . . 345
C.11 Overview of file system counts for the known data set . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
C.12 Overview of Registry counts for the known data set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
D.1 Overview of file system counts for the M57-Patents scenario . . . . . . . . . . 353
D.2 Overview of Registry counts for the M57-Patents scenario . . . . . . . . . . . 356
D.3 Overview of the drives sourced for the real world data set . . . . . . . . . . . 377
D.4 Overview of file system counts for the real-world data set . . . . . . . . . . . . 379




3.1 RDS example entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Example of an ssdeep hash value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1 DFXML fileobject example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2 Example of RegXML structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3 Example of the revised RegXML CellObject structure . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4 Example of the Application Profile XML (APXML) structure . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5 Example of reading multiple APXML documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.1 Steps to invoke Command Prompt with administrator rights . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.2 Functional example of the APXML API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.3 Example of the APXML API statistics function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.4 Command line example to invoke Vestigium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.5 Command line example to invoke Vestigium with additional arguments . . 159
6.6 Example of method to create an immutable virtual disk . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.7 Example of method used to clone virtual disks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.8 Example of LiveDiff static blacklist structure and entries . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.9 Command line example to invoke Vestigium against the known data set . . 189
6.10 Example FileObjects with missing and incorrect metadata properties . . . 193
6.11 Example CellObjects with incomplete metadata properties . . . . . . . . . 195
7.1 Command example to invoke Vestigium against the M57-Patents scenario . 204
7.2 File path comparison between target and application profiles . . . . . . . . . . 211
7.3 Example of the script used to locate MD5 hash matches . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
7.4 List of additional file system paths detected using path normalisation . . . . . 231
7.5 Command line example to invoke Vestigium against the real-world data set 252
B.1 Example of the Application Profile XML creator element . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
B.2 Example of the Application Profile XML metadata element . . . . . . . . . . 296
B.3 Working example of TrueCrypt APXML document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
B.4 Full source code listing for APXMLPrintStats.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
B.5 Full source code listing for APXML2CSV.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
B.6 Full source code listing for HiveExtractor.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
B.7 Special character checking functions added to RegistryHive.cs . . . . . . 307
B.8 RegXML output function added to RegistryHive.cs . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
B.9 RegXML generation function added to RegistryHive.cs . . . . . . . . . . 311
xix
B.10 Full source code listing for FilePathNormaliser.py . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
B.11 Full source code listing for CellPathNormaliser.py . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
C.1 Full source code listing for DetectWindows.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
C.2 Full source code listing for APXMLIntersection.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
C.3 Full source code listing for APXMLBlacklist.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
C.4 Full listing of the LiveDiff static blacklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
C.5 Full listing of the APXMLPrintProfile.py script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
C.6 Full source code listing for FileSystemStats.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
C.7 Full source code listing for RegistryStats.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
D.1 Full source code listing for FSPathDetection.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
D.2 Full source code listing for REGPathDetection.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
D.3 Windows batch script to determine hard drive read speed . . . . . . . . . . . 364
D.4 Results from hard drive read speed testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
D.5 Results from hard drive read speed testing for the external HDD caddy . . . . 366
D.6 Results from hard drive read speed testing of the triage field laptop system . 367
D.7 Patch file to fix two fiwalk bugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
D.8 Quick Windows cross-compilation guide for fiwalk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
xx
List of Acronyms
AFF Advanced Forensic Format
API Application Programming Interface
APXML Application Profile XML
CD Compact Disc
CFTT Computer Forensic Tool Testing
CF Computer Forensics
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSI Crime Scene Investigation
CSV Comma-Separated Values
CTPH Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing
DEX Digital Evidence Exchange
DFXML Digital Forensics XML
DF Digital Forensics
DSRM Design Science Research Methodology
DS Design Science
EWF Expert Witness Compression
EXT Extended File System
FAT File Allocation Table
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FTK Forensic ToolKit
GB Gigabyte
GPL General Public License
GUI Graphical User Interface
HDD Hard Disk Drive
HFS Hierarchical File System
HTML HyperText Markup Language
IP Internet Protocol
IR Information Retrieval
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ISP Internet Service Provided
IS Information Systems
IT Information Technology
MAC Modified, Accessed and Created
xxi
MB/s Megabytes per second
MB Megabyte
MD5 Message Digest algorithm version 5
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MS-DOS Microsoft Disk Operating System
MSDN Microsoft Developer Network
NFS Network File System
NFTS New Technology File System
NIJ National Institute of Justice
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSRL National Software Reference Library





PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PML Process Monitor Format
RAM Random Access Memory
RDS Reference Data Set
RFCL Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory
RegXML Registry XML
SAM Security Account Manager
SATA Serial AT Attachment
SHA1 Secure Hash Algorithm version 1
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SP Service Pack




UFS Unix File System
UID User Identifier
USB Universal Serial Bus
VMDK Virtual Machine Disk Format
VM Virtual Machine
xxii
WMI Windows Management Infrastructure
WSH Windows Script Host
XIRAF XML Information Retrieval Approach to Digital Forensics
XML Extensible Markup Language
xxiii
xxiv
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may succeed for a short period of time, but sooner or later it’s going
to break free...
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Introduction
The word forensic derives from the Latin word forēnsis, and translates as “of or before the
forum” (Oxford Dictionary, 2013); meaning something that is made public. From this origin
the Oxford Dictionary (2013) then defines forensic as “scientific tests or techniques used in
connection with the detection of crime” and leading to forensic evidence. In a traditional
forensic investigation (e.g., a physical crime scene) a well known and relevant theory is that
based on the exchange principle first proposed by Dr. Edmond Locard (1877–1966). Locard
was a French pioneer in forensic science who propounded the concept that: “Any action of
an individual, and obviously, the violent action constituting a crime, cannot occur without
leaving a trace” (Locard, 1934, p. 8). Locard’s exchange principle has become known as:
every contact leaves a trace. In later research, Kirk (1953) expanded and expressed
Locard’s exchange principle as:
Wherever he steps, whatever he touches, whatever he leaves, even unconsciously,
will serve as a silent witness against him. Not only his fingerprints or his footprints,
but his hair, the fibers from his clothes, the glass he breaks, the tool mark he leaves,
the paint he scratches, the blood or semen he deposits or collects. All of these
and more, bear mute witness against him. This is evidence that does not forget
(Kirk, 1953, p. 4).
Although Locard’s exchange principle was originally formulated based on traditional forensic
science involving physical evidence, the same fundamental principle also exists in the digital
world. The investigation of digital information is known as digital forensics, a branch
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of forensic science which involves the examination of any digital component (Reith, Carr,
& Gunsch, 2002). A digital investigation can encompass a wide variety of digital devices
and evidence sources and, therefore, comprises sub-disciplines including computer forensics,
network forensics, and smart phone forensics.
The proliferation of digital devices, such as Personal Computers (PC) and smart phones,
generated and gave rise to the modern digital world that we live in. However, accompanying
the widespread use of computer systems, crime in the digital world has also risen. This is
commonly known as computer crime or cybercrime and has led to the need for forensic
techniques and tools to be developed for the detection and investigation of digital evidence.
Typically, cybercrime leaves digital fingerprints that investigators can analyse to determine
how the crime was committed enabling a case to be built to potentially bring criminals
to justice (Dahbur & Mohammad, 2011). The digital forensics procedure aims to discover
digital fingerprints, or events, and generally involves the identification, collection, analysis
and presentation of digital evidence (Palmer, 2001; Kent et al., 2006; Slay et al., 2009).
1.1 Research Motivation
“Since the 1980s, computers have had increasing roles in all aspects of human life–including
an involvement in criminal acts” (Garfinkel, 2013a, p. 370). Digital investigations are now
commonplace in computer crime cases, as well as in other criminal or civil cases where digital
devices are present in almost every instance. As a result digital forensic techniques and
tools have become an essential requirement. Specifically, digital forensic analysis tools
are used daily within local, state and federal law enforcement, military sectors, government
organisations and the private electronic discovery (e-Discovery) industry (Garfinkel, 2010).
The motivation for this research project in the field of digital forensics can broadly be
divided into two main categories: 1) Investigation challenges including the increased number
and size of cases; and 2) Technical challenges including the increased complexity of investiga-
tion targets.
In terms of investigation challenges, statistics highlight the increase in the number
and size of cases with a digital investigation component. The US-based Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) operates the Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory (RCFL) which
manages a total of 16 computer forensic laboratories that assist law enforcement agencies
in collection and examination of digital evidence to support criminal investigations such as
terrorism, intellectual property theft, fraud and other computer releated crime (RCFL, 2014).
According to statistics released by the FBI and RFCL program, the number of examinations
performed increased from 987 in 2003 to 8,566 in 2012 (RFCL, 2003; RCFL, 2012). This is
more than a 758% increase in the number of examinations conducted by the RCFL and equated
to the need to examine around 23 to 24 individual cases every day in the year 2012. It is not
only the exponential increase in cases requiring examination, the size of investigation targets
is also dramatically increasing. However, research and development in computer forensic
techniques and tools have had limited success in addressing efficient methods to analyse data
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sets of increasing size. In 2003 the total size of data examined was 82.3 terabytes (TB), while
in 2012 the total size of data examined was 5,986 TB. This is an increase of over 7,100%.
Figure 1.1 displays a summary of the number of cases and total size of data examined by the
RFCL between 2003 and 2012.
Figure 1.1: Digital forensic volume statistics from FBI Regional Computer Forensic Labora-
tory (RCFL) showing the total number of forensic examinations and data set size in Terabytes
(TB) from 2003 to 2012 (Source: Statistics taken from Quick and Choo (2014, p. 278))
As shown in this ten year period the RCFL has seen an increasing growth in the number of
examinations performed as well as the amount of data processed. However, these statistics
only include criminal investigations involving law enforcement. According to Roussev (2009),
criminal investigation is just the tip of digital forensic analysis, compared to the majority of
examinations which are conducted to support civil cases or internal investigations that can
encompass multi-terabyte data sets. Quick and Choo (2014) state that the increased size of
data sets for forensic analysis is due to three primary factors: 1) An increase in the number
of devices seized per case; 2) An increase in the number of cases with a digital evidence
component; and 3) An increase in the storage size of digital devices. Overall, the increasing
volume of digital evidence is creating serious challenges for digital forensic practitioners, who
are being expected to rapidly process and analyse a large amount of digital evidence. A key
technique to combat data volume is by automated forensic analysis and this challenge
has been taken up for this research project. Ayers (2009) states that automating forensic
analysis will enhance repeatability and robustness while decreasing cost and potential errors
that may results from manual analysis. Garfinkel (2012a) elaborates that automation will
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also aid tool validation, and that the lack of automation has limited the progress of digital
forensic research.
In addition to the challenges faced by the huge growth in the volume of digital inves-
tigations, there are also a plethora of technical challenges which all have the potential
to frustrate digital forensic analysis. Technical challenges most often exist due to the com-
plicated range of technological changes in the field of computing. According to Garfinkel
(2010), the prevalence of flash memory, the variety of hardware interfaces, the proliferation of
operating systems and the diversity of file formats all result in increased case complexity. Fur-
thermore, new data storage and encryption technologies create challenges in acquiring digital
evidence. Fahdi, Clarke, and Furnell (2013) surveyed a selection of digital forensic researchers
and practitioners and discovered that the three principal future research challenges were cloud
computing, encryption and anti-forensics. In terms of encryption, accessing digital evidence
without knowledge of an encryption key or passphrase can create problems on modern op-
erating systems where it is now commonplace to have strong full disk encryption available
(Casey & Stellatos, 2008). If used maliciously, encryption can be classified as an anti-forensic
technique.
Anti-forensics is defined as “any attempt to compromise the availability or usefulness
of evidence to the forensics process” (Harris, 2006, p. S45), and is a fundamental problem
in digital forensics. Anti-forensics has the potential to remove essential digital evidence that
may aid in determining a digital event. Anti-forensics may involve a variety of techniques
and tools ranging from encrypting data to block an investigator’s access (evidence hiding) to
securely wiping digital evidence to remove evidence availability (evidence destruction). A key
example of evidence destruction is overwriting the contents of illicit digital images thereby
removing the potential for a forensic analyst to recover the original data.
Opinion regarding anti-forensic prevalence in digital investigations varies, but the largest
American telecommunications company Verizon (2012), states that they often identify anti-
forensic techniques in the field, with an estimation of 13 of all cases incorporating some form
of anti-forensic element. To further complicate the problem, “the number of scholarly papers
on protecting against anti-forensic methods is greatly outnumbered by the number of web-
sites about how to exploit the forensic process” (Harris, 2006, p. S48). It was this fact that
alerted the need for further academic research to address the problem of anti-forensic prac-
tices. The other realisation was that the number of tools available to perform anti-forensic
techniques greatly outnumbers the forensic analysis tools able to detect anti-forensic tool us-
age. Some operating systems even have tools included to perform anti-forensic techniques;
for example, modern versions of Microsoft Windows, Apple OS X and Linux-based operating
systems all have built-in functionality to securely wipe data without the need for a third-party
tool. Ultimately, criminals can maliciously use anti-forensic tools to thwart digital forensic
investigations and remove the availability of essential digital evidence.
In broad terms the key phase of digital forensics targeted in this research is forensic
analysis of digital evidence, determining an appropriate conclusion based on the available
evidence (Kent et al., 2006). Thereafter, the motivation for the research project was inspired
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and driven by a combination of the investigative challenges (increase in the number and size of
data sets) and the technical challenges (increase in the complexity of digital investigations).
The discussion of research and real-world challenges faced by forensic analysts has, there-
fore, led to the identification of a specific research topic, the primary scope of which can be
summarised as performing detection of anti-forensic tools.
1.2 Research Methodology
Digital forensics falls within the Information Systems (IS) research discipline, where the goal
is to produce knowledge that encompasses the application of Information Technology (IT)
for organisational purposes. A common research methodology in the realm of IS is Design
Science (DS). “Design Science seeks to create innovations, or artifacts, that embody the ideas,
practices, technical capabilities, and products required to efficiently accomplish the analysis,
design, implementation, and use of information systems” (Hevner & March, 2003, p.111).
In IS research, design science aims to create an innovative and purposeful IT artifact which
addresses an important problem domain. There have been a variety of proposed DS research
methodology models for IS research. This research project specified the use of the Design
Science Research Methodology (DSRM) process model by Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger,
and Chatterjee (2007). Figure 1.2 displays a high-level overview of the DSRM process model.
Figure 1.2: Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) process model (Source: Figure
adapted from Peffers et al. (2007, p. 54))
The first element of the DSRM process model is to identify the research problem and
motivation which is covered in Section 1.1. The second element of the DSRM process model
5
is to define the objectives of a solution. One high-level research objective has been
proposed for this research project:
High-level Research Objective: To enable effective, automated detection of
relevant digital artifacts to identify application software presence on a target data
set. The solution must adhere to digital forensic triage requirements including high
system efficiency and initial forensic examination output
The high-level research objective specifies an effective and efficient system design centred
around automated forensic analysis of application software. In this research the application
software of interest is anti-forensic tools, as they present obstacles for digital investigations as
well as being a relevant and interesting case study. The system architecture can be classified
into two main stages: 1) Automated creation of an application software reference set; and
2) Automated correlation between the reference set and a target data set. The high-level
research objective has therefore been further broken down to a group of more specific lower-
level objectives, thus dividing the proposed system design into a variety of sub-components,
each with their own objectives.
The third element of the DSRM process model is the existent design of the proposed arti-
fact (system). Through design the process seeks attempts to solve the research problem based
on the specified research objectives. To aid this process, design requirements are established
followed by the application of relevant scientific and technical knowledge to design a solution.
In this research the process produces a system design to perform automated forensic analysis
of application software, implemented in the form of computer software to provide a real-world
applicable solution to the problem domain.
The fourth element of the DSRM process model is the demonstration of the implemented
system design which usually involves experimentation, simulation or a case study to aid in
showing that the implemented system can solve the specified problem. In this research a
controlled laboratory testing environment is used to test the functionality of the implemented
system to both automate the creation of reference sets for application software and subse-
quently test the output against a selection of known-content data sets authored specifically
for the project.
The fifth element of the DSRM process model is the evaluation of the system, in terms
of effectiveness and efficiency. This phase involves performing scientific evaluation of the
implemented system design to validate functionality and utility in a real world context. This
includes observing and measuring how well the designed artifact supports the objectives of
the solution using analysis and metrics. In this research two realistic data sets are tested:
1) A publicly available data set designed specifically for digital forensic research; and 2) A
real world data set comprised of second-hand hard drives with unknown and unpredictable
data content. The outcome of evaluation is evidential proof of system utility and overall
performance.
The sixth and final element of the DSRM process model is the communication of re-
search. The major goal of communication is to convey knowledge and findings to the target
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audience including researchers and practising professionals. This document communicates a
large portion of the research as conducted including in-depth specification of the designed
and implemented system. Furthermore, a portion of this research has been communicated
via peer reviewed academic publication. Finally, communication is also achieved by openly
publishing source code and documentation for the implemented system design in the form of
computer software that has been authored and evaluated during the course of this research
project.
1.3 System Design and Architecture
The design of an IT artifact is a significant component of a DS research methodology and
involves synthesis of a proposed solution to provide an innovative and purposeful solution to
the specified research objective (Nunamaker & Chen, 1990). Peffers et al. (2007) state that the
artifact can be any designed object with the contribution embedded in the design and where
the design process involves determining the required functionality, architecture and creation
of an actual artifact. The IT artifact produced in this research is in the form of a system
design. The required system functionality is to perform effective and efficient automated
detection of application software using a reference set populated with known content that can
be compared against a target data set. A full chapter is dedicated to the system design which
outlines the requirements, design and implementation (see Chapter 5). However, to provide
clarity a high-level overview of the system design and architecture is briefly outlined here, as
displayed in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: High-level overview of the system design architecture (Image sources: Mozilla
Firefox icon taken from The Mozilla Foundation (2013), Mozilla Thunderbird icon taken from
The Mozilla Foundation (2011), Chromium logo taken from The Chromium Authors (2015),
TOR icon taken from The Tor Project (2011). All other images are public domain or the
author’s original work.)
There are two inputs to the system architecture: 1) An application (e.g., Firefox, Chrome,
TrueCrypt and CCleaner); and 2) A target data set (e.g., a perpetrator’s hard drive). The
application is reverse engineered to determine the digital artifacts (e.g., data files, Registry
entries) that are uniquely associated with the application. Identified digital artifacts are
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populated into a reference set. This research uses the term application profile for
a reference set designed for storing, distributing and processing digital artifacts specifically
from application software. The application profile contains known content, represented by
metadata, that can be used to aid detection of the same digital artifacts on a target data set.
The target data set is the second input to the system design. The target is processed and a
metadata representation of the original evidence source generated. The application profile can
then be compared to the metadata representation of the target data set and digital artifact
matching performed. A set of prescribed matching methods are performed for each entry and
various metadata properties are correlated to determine if a match can be achieved. Any
matching entry is reported to the investigator. Finding such a match is digital evidence
that a digital artifact (e.g., data file) resides on the target data set which is known to be
uniquely associated with a known application. Essentially, this provides robust evidence that
the selected application is present on the suspect’s system and can also provide evidence of
the user who installed or ran the software.
1.4 Research Contribution
Numerous theoretical and practical contributions to the field of digital forensics have resulted
from this research. The overall research contribution is the design, implementation, demon-
stration and evaluation of a system to automate application software reference set creation
and subsequent correlation against a target data set. The following list outlines the major
methodological contributions made in this research project.
1) Improved application software reference sets for digital forensics: This re-
search advanced system-level reverse engineering methods to incorporate digital foren-
sic requirements. An automated data collection method was designed, removing time-
consuming manual analysis and post-processing requirements. A scalable blacklisting
method was designed to automate filtering of irrelevant digital artifacts that are not
unique to the application. Although implemented for Microsoft Windows, the data
collection method, differencing strategy and blacklisting design are portable to other
operating systems.
2) Application profile data abstraction: An application profile is a reference set for
application software which is populated with known content. A data abstraction was
specifically designed in this research to address digital forensic requirements. The Appli-
cation Profile XML (APXML) abstraction provides functionality to store, distribute and
automate processing of application profiles. The data abstraction provides functionality
to store multiple digital artifact types with accompanying detailed metadata.
3) Advanced digital artifact matching methods: Previous digital forensic reference
sets are limited to performing known file filtering using only cryptographic hash values.
This research designed advanced matching methods to include file system and Windows
Registry entries and correlation using multiple metadata properties; for example, data
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file matching is performed using the file name, file size, logical file system location
(absolute path), cryptographic hash value and allocation status (deleted or not). The
created matching methods solved the following complex matching scenarios:
a) Different software versions: The implemented matching method proved effec-
tive at detecting digital artifacts from application software from a different version
than that used to create an application profile; for example, TrueCrypt version
6.3a versus TrueCrypt version 7.1a. This is important as creating and maintain-
ing an application profile for every software version is not feasible.
b) Different operating system versions: The implemented matching methods
proved effective at detecting digital artifacts on different operating system versions
than that used to create the application profile; for example, Windows XP versus
Windows Vista. Similar to different software version problems, this is important
as creating an application profile for the same application on different operating
system versions is time consuming.
A variety of applied contributions have been made in the form of a data abstraction implemen-
tation as well as a selection of computer forensic tools to aid in performing a variety of tasks
in the overall system design. The tools were designed based on the objectives of a solution,
implemented in the form of computer software, demonstrated to convey functionality and
evaluated in terms of an overall system design. The applied contributions that have resulted
from the conducted research are as follows:
1) apxml.py: An Application Programming Interface (API) is provided to automate
processing of APXML documents using an object oriented model with built-in type
checking to create objects that represent the original information in an APXML doc-
ument. The API includes functionality to read, process, modify and write APXML
documents, as well as built-in functions to accomplish common processing tasks. The
API is distributed with a collection of scripts to automate common processing tasks.
2) LiveDiff: A portable live differential forensic analysis tool to automate profile cre-
ation that is designed specifically to address digital forensic requirements. It performs
system snapshots before and after a single action (e.g., installing an application), identi-
fies file system and Registry changes (new, modified and deleted entries) and populates
all results in an APXML document.
3) Vestigium: A forensic analysis framework to automate the correlation of application
profile(s) entries against target data set entries. The tool is designed to detect known
content from application profiles that reside in a target data set. Matching is performed
by correlating digital artifact metadata, in contrast to previous solutions which only
match using hash values. Any detected entries are reported to an investigator in two
formats: 1) a human-readable; and 2) a machine-readable data abstraction.
All authored tools are licensed under open source licenses (including GNU GPL and The MIT
License). It is hoped that this will promote tool usage by other researchers and practitioners,
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as well as further development of the tools produced in this research project. All source code
for each tool listed above is freely available from the author’s GitHub repositories1.
1.5 Research Publications
A collection of academic publications have resulted from the research conducted. The first
paper was published early in the author’s research journey and focussed on the initially
proposed research area, namely file carving. Laurenson (2013) outlined a performance analysis
of popular file carving tools to effectively perform data recovery in a variety of complex data
file structures and file types. Although the topic presented in this paper eventually changed,
the tools, metrics and data abstractions used were also utilised in this thesis research.
Another paper published was a collaborative study with a fellow postgraduate student.
Although not directly related to the thesis research presented, the paper utilised a variety of
underlying methods taken from this research; for example, the use of the DFXML forensic data
abstraction to process forensic analysis results. Gee, Laurenson, and Wolfe (2015) outlined
on detection and validation of Inland Revenue numbers, a variation of the American Social
Security Number (SSN) used for taxation purposes. The publication won best paper in the
Digital Forensics Conference stream, as well as the best overall paper at the 2015 SRI Security
Congress (out of a total of 46 papers).
In the later stages of the author’s candidature, a paper was published based on one stage
of the system design and approach presented in this research. Laurenson, MacDonell, and
Wolfe (2015) presented the design and implementation of the application profile component of
the system design, including the data collection method (the LiveDiff tool) and application
profile data abstraction design (the APXML document structure). All published academic
articles are listed below:
Published academic articles:
Laurenson, T. (2013). Performance analysis of file carving tools. In Security and
Privacy Protection in Information Processing Systems (pp. 419–433). Springer
Berlin Heidelberg.
Gee, H. & Laurenson, T. & Wolfe, H. (2015). Improving the Detection and Vali-
dation of Inland Revenue Numbers. In Proceedings of the 13th Australian Digital
Forensics Conference. Perth, Australia. 62–69.
Laurenson, T. & MacDonell, S. & Wolfe, H. (2015). Towards a Standardised
Strategy to Collect and Distribute Application Software Artifacts. In Proceedings
of the 13th Australian Digital Forensics Conference. Perth, Australia. 54–61.
Although not yet produced, it is envisioned that two additional academic papers will be
authored based on the research presented in this thesis. The listing below specifies the section
numbers from which the research is to be sourced and the accompanying paper titles:
1See: https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/
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1) Sections 5.3, 6.3 and 6.4: Filtering irrelevant digital artifacts from differential forensic
analysis using set intersection and dynamic blacklisting
2) Sections 5.5, 6.6 and 7.2: Advanced matching methods using rich metadata to correlate
file system and Registry artifacts
1.6 Thesis Structure
Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to the proposed topic of this research project. The
incentive to conduct additional research in the discipline of digital forensics was largely mo-
tivated by the number of existing research and practical problems that prevail in this field.
The research methodology outlined the DSRM process model to function as the guide for
this research project and a high-level research objective was identified; an intent to design,
implement and evaluate a system to perform automated reference set creation and subse-
quent automated correlation against a target data set. Numerous theoretical and practical
research outcomes achieved throughout the duration of the project have contributed relevant
and useful resources to the field of digital forensics.
The structure for the remainder of this thesis is outlined below. As the DSRM process
model has been chosen as the blueprint for the project, the chapter structure of the thesis
should be based on the different phases of the model as represented in Figure 1.4.
Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4   Chapter 4   Chapter 5   Chapter 6   Chapter 7
Figure 1.4: DSRM process model with links to relevant chapters
Chapter 2 presents background information regarding the field of digital forensics, including
documented procedures, techniques, tools and digital evidence sources. Many current digital
forensic research challenges are discussed but in particular the focus is concentrated on anti-
forensics, the techniques and tools that are available which have the capability to jeopardise
digital investigations. A selection of anti-forensic problems are then identified.
Chapter 3 provides an in-depth review of literature of specific relevance to the research
conducted and reported here. A review of previous academic research regarding anti-forensic
tool detection is presented. A thorough analysis of reverse-engineering techniques and tools
is conducted and associated limitations of current approaches specified. Finally, various au-
tomated digital forensic analysis techniques and associated tools are investigated and the
associated research challenges specified.
Chapter 4 outlines the complete research methodology. Various frequently used digital
forensic research methodologies are first reviewed supporting and justifying the use of design
science for this research project. Each phase in the DSRM process model is then described in
detail. The research problem is reiterated from the background and literature review chapters.
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The objectives of a solution are defined with one high-level objective and various lower-level
research objectives to aid in building a robust solution. An overview of experimental testing
is provided including data sets for testing and various metrics to measure system effectiveness
and efficiency.
Chapter 5 specifies a system design to be implemented with the required functionality
to address the particular research objectives. Firstly, the system architecture is introduced
with the necessary specification and divided into the required components. The actual design
process is then conducted for each distinct component. Information relevant to software
development is outlined that assists in the application of the specified design in a selection
of computer forensic tools and the end result is an implemented design ready to be executed
against a target data set.
Chapter 6 covers the use of the implemented system as it is demonstrated against a selected
data set to test functionality in a laboratory controlled environment. This process validates
the system design, confirming it can solve the specified research problems. The operation of
the authored tools is presented followed by a summary of the experimental testing method for
both demonstration and evaluation purposes. The system is then demonstrated by performing
testing against a data set authored specifically for this research which contains known content.
Refinements and modifications to the system design and the associated implemented tools are
finalised, rechecked and performed before proceeding to the evaluation stage.
Chapter 7 contains a thorough evaluation of the implemented system against two different
data sets on which to assess performance. A public data set designed specifically for digital
forensic research is implemented and a methodical review of effectiveness and efficiency is
carried out. System design refinements and modifications are presented from the further
lessons learned from evaluation. Finally, a real world data set comprised of hundreds of
second-hand hard drives with unknown data is tested. This data set was especially selected
as it provides more unpredictable and diverse data, resulting in more robust research findings
and potential software errors in a variety of non-laboratory controlled data. In closing, a
discussion summarises the overall system performance in terms of solving the research problem
and associated research objectives.
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the research conducted including future research
avenues. Appendices contain supplementary material not covered in the main text of the
thesis including additional tables and figures as well as some smaller pieces of programming




Chapter 1 provided an introduction to this research project. An escalation of current investi-
gation and technical challenges faced by digital forensic researchers and practitioners has led
to clear-cut motivations for research in the field of automated forensic analysis with specific
regard to the detection of anti-forensic tools. The Design Science Research Method (DSRM)
process model was specified to guide the project and the high-level research objective was
stated as the design, implementation and evaluation of an effective and efficient system to
automate the detection of anti-forensic tool activity on a target data set.
This chapter presents background information pertinent to the underlying foundations of
this research. An exhaustive background is not intended; rather the goal is to provide an
overview of the relevant technologies, processes and tools to inform the reader. Section 2.1 is
an overview of digital forensics, and more general digital investigations, including the digital
forensic procedure while Section 2.2 outlines digital evidence sources and common forensic
data abstractions. Section 2.3 presents a collection of digital forensic research challenges
including data volume, tool scalability, case complexity, technology advancements and the CSI
effect. Section 2.4 provides an overview of application software and the techniques and tools
commonly used to perform manual and automated forensic analysis of application software.
Section 2.5 introduces the important aspect of anti-forensics including the techniques and
tools followed by a summary of the challenges surrounding anti-forensic usage.
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2.1 Digital Forensics
The investigation of digital information is known as digital forensics, a branch of forensic
science involving the investigation of any digital or electronic component (Reith et al., 2002).
Digital forensics encompasses a wide variety of digital evidence sources and, therefore, has
sub-disciplines including computer forensics, network forensics and Internet forensics.
Computer forensics usually refers to the forensic examination of computer compo-
nents and their contents such as hard drives, compact disks, and printers. However,
the term is sometimes used more loosely to describe the forensic examination of all
forms of digital evidence, including data travelling over networks (a.k.a. network
forensics). (Casey, 2011, p. 3).
A variety of definitions have been proposed for the digital forensic procedure. However, these
definitions all outline similar key principles and investigation phases. The Digital Forensic
Research WorkShop (DFRWS) technical report, A Road Map for Digital Forensic Research,
defines digital forensics as:
The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the preservation,
collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and
presentation of digital evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose of fa-
cilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping
to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations
(Palmer, 2001, p. 16).
The American National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication:
Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, defines digital forensics as:
Digital forensics, also known as computer and network forensics, has many defi-
nitions. Generally, it is considered the application of science to the identification,
collection, examination, and analysis of data while preserving the integrity of the
information and maintaining a strict chain of custody for the data (Kent et al.,
2006, p. 9).
Although there are minor differences between the definitions and specified investigation phases,
the same overall principle applies; that is the use of scientific methods to determine digital
events based on reliable digital evidence. Similar to traditional forensic science, digital foren-
sics involves conducting an investigation.
A digital investigation is a scientific process where hypotheses are developed and tested
in an attempt to answer specific questions about digital events (Carrier, 2005). The digital
evidence obtained can be used to provide information to determine particular events that
have occurred to either support or refute the proposed hypotheses. There is not always a
criminal element associated with such an investigation which may simply involve investigation
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of any electronic event or information. A similar investigation scope is a digital forensic
investigation. “The main difference between a digital investigation and a digital forensic
investigation is the introduction of legal requirements” (Carrier, 2005, p.13), ensuring that
a chain of custody is documented for all collected evidence. Ultimately, the outcome of
both investigation types provides evidential proof of specific digital events. However, the
additional requirement of producing viable and sound evidence which can be made available
and is admissible in civil or criminal legal proceedings is the definable distinction of a digital
forensic investigation.
2.1.1 Digital Forensic Procedure
Digital forensics requires a rigorous and tested procedure so that the resultant digital evidence
can withstand contested scrutiny in a court of law. Specific standardised guidelines have
therefore been developed so that the investigation meets the necessary criteria. Figure 2.1
displays the overall digital forensic procedure.
Figure 2.1: Digital forensic procedure (Source: Figure adapted from Palmer (2001), Kent et
al. (2006) & Slay et al. (2009))
As displayed in Figure 2.1 the digital forensic procedure is comprised of the identification of
potential sources of digital evidence, the collection of identified digital evidence, the exami-
nation and analysis of evidence to determine specific digital events and lastly the reporting
and presentation of digital evidence. Underlying all of these phases is the preservation of
digital evidence that must be maintained throughout the entire digital forensic procedure.
The following subsections outline and discuss high-level information regarding the processes
conducted at each phase.
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2.1.1.1 Identification of Evidence
The initial digital forensic phase is to identify potential sources of evidence. McKemmish
(1999) states that the identification of evidence involves determining the presence of any
electronic device capable of storing digital data including establishing the type and format
in which the data is stored. Table 2.1 displays a list of electronic devices, specified by the
American National Institute of Justice (NIJ), that are commonly encountered at a crime
scene. Associated examples are included.
Table 2.1: Types of electronic devices (Source: NIJ (2008, p. 1-11))
Electronic Device Examples
Computer systems Desktop computers, laptops, tablets, servers
Storage devices Hard Disk Drive (HDD), external HDD, memory cards and
other removable media
Handheld devices Mobile phones, smart phones, Personal Digital Assistant
(PDA), Global Positioning Systems (GPS)
Peripheral devices Keyboards, webcams, microphones
Network devices Internet modems, network hubs, network switches, wireless
Access Points (AP), wireless cards/adapters
Other devices Surveillance equipment, digital and video cameras, audio
recorders and players, video game consoles, card readers
There are also a variety of other sources of digital evidence which may not be physically
present at a crime scene; for example, a PC identified at a crime scene may contain records
of a user’s Internet history. However, an Internet Service Provider (ISP), not located at the
physical crime scene, may also retain a log of a user’s Internet history. Additionally, when a
user visits a web site, the server hosting the web site may also retain logs of the user’s activity
on the site. These examples illustrate that digital evidence may be geographically dispersed
and that digital investigators need to be aware of this fact.
2.1.1.2 Collection of Evidence
According to Kent et al. (2006) the collection, or acquisition, of evidence should be performed
using a three step process: 1) Developing a plan to acquire the data; 2) Collecting the data
from identified evidence sources; and 3) Verifying the integrity of the collected data.
As there are multiple potential sources of digital evidence a plan is formulated at the outset
to first, identify the sources of evidence then, how best to acquire the identified evidence. Kent
et al. (2006) state that two major factors influence the preparation of an evidence collection
plan: 1) Estimating the likely value of evidence; and 2) Determining the volatility of the data
to be collected. The likely value of evidence from various sources is based on a practitioner’s
understanding and previous experience involving similar investigative scenarios. In terms of
volatility, it is important to recognise that certain digital evidence may be irretrievable if
16
the power source is removed from an electronic device. Volatile data therefore, needs to be
collected from a running system.
It is essential that digital evidence is collected using tested, reliable and proven tech-
niques. Palmer (2001) states that collection of evidence from identified sources involves using
approved methods together with hardware and software solutions to acquire the data. The
Computer Forensic Tool Testing Handbook, authored by the NIJ, specifies a list of disk imag-
ing, software write blockers and hardware write blockers that have been certified under the
Computer Forensics Tool Testing (CFTT) program (NIJ, 2015). Disk imaging tools provide
the capability to produce a forensic (bit-by-bit) copy of a target hard drive, while software
and hardware write blockers provide the functionality to ensure that no data can be written
to a target hard drive during evidence collection. The use of these tested and verified tools
ensures that data integrity is maintained during the process of evidence collection.
2.1.1.3 Examination of Evidence
Palmer (2001) states that examination of digital evidence involves filtering techniques, pattern
matching, hidden data discovery while all the time maintaining traceability and validation
of original evidence. Kent et al. (2006, p. 2-2), states a similar yet expanded definition of
evidence examination which involves “forensically processing large amounts of collected data
using a combination of automated and manual methods to assess and extract data of particular
interest, while preserving the integrity of the data”. Furthermore, the examination of evidence
requires performing targeted investigation based on the criteria of the case. Reith et al. (2002)
states an in-depth systematic examination is required with specific emphasis relating to the
suspected crime; for example, in an electronic fraud investigation the relevant evidence might
include the discovery of credit card and bank account numbers.
These definitions of the examination phase of digital forensics relate to the extraction of
relevant data from the original data set that may be useful to the digital investigation, yet still
requires further processing and additional analysis. Most digital forensic procedures specify a
separate examination and analysis phase, “typically, an analyst examines data and performs
analysis of that data, then conducts additional examination and analysis based on the results
of the initial analysis” (Kent et al., 2006, p. 3-6). The examination and analysis phases are
thus inherently intertwined.
2.1.1.4 Analysis of Evidence
Essentially, the resultant output from the above examination phase is extracted information
from the initially collected evidence which now requires further processing. The additional
analysis of this digital evidence serves to draw an appropriate conclusion based on the available
information, or otherwise to determine that no conclusion can be drawn (Kent et al., 2006).
N. Beebe and Clark (2005b) state that the questions needing to be put forward during the
digital forensic analysis phase include the who, what, when, where, why and how type questions
by surveying, extracting and reconstructing evidence. In turn, the answered questions should
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help identify people, places, items and events, and determine the relation of these elements
to draw an appropriate conclusion (Kent et al., 2006).
Casey (2013) states that there are three main levels of forensic analysis: 1) Survey/triage
forensic analysis; 2) Preliminary forensic analysis; and 3) In-depth forensic analysis. Each
level has a specific objective and investigation scope as outlined in Table 2.2. The variety of
levels used in forensic analysis is dependent on the type of analysis being conducted where a
variety of techniques and tools may be implemented by an investigator.
Table 2.2: Classified levels of digital forensic analysis (Source: Casey (2011, p. 213))
Analysis Phase Details
Triage forensic analysis Triage forensic analysis is a targeted review of all me-
dia involved in an investigation to discover the most
useful evidence sources for further processing
Preliminary forensic analysis Forensic examination of evidence identified from the
triage phase which helps investigators determine in-
formation to aid the digital investigation
In-depth forensic analysis Comprehensive examination of evidence that requires
additional investigation to provide a more complete
understanding of the evidence in question in order to
help answer the investigation hypothesis
2.1.1.5 Reporting of Evidence
The final phase of the digital forensic procedure is the reporting, or presentation, of digital
evidence. The main purpose is to convey the results of the detailed forensic analysis including
documentating the actions performed and how different techniques and tools were used (Kent
et al., 2006). The summarised explanation and conclusions conveyed from the analysis phase
should be written in non-technical English, clearly expressed and using terminology that is
easily understood (Reith et al., 2002).
The reporting phase can vary greatly depending on the case or scenario of the digital
investigation. Nevertheless, “writing a report is one of the most important stages of the
process because it is the only view that others have of the entire process” (Casey, 2013,
p. 175). Additionally, unless the procedures, findings and conclusions are well articulated it
is unlikely that the evidence will be considered viable or significant.
Closely related to reporting evidence is presentation evidence which has variations to
solely reporting. N. Beebe and Clark (2005b) state that the presentation of evidence involves
communicating findings (either written, oral or both) to a diverse audience including law
enforcement, management, technical, judiciary and legal personnel. Ultimately, the goal of
evidence presentation is to convey the findings of a digital forensic investigation in a succinct
and detailed manner to relay the information and the conclusions drawn from analysis.
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2.1.1.6 Preservation of Evidence Integrity
It is a priority that digital evidence is preserved throughout the entire digital forensic pro-
cedure including the identification, collection, examination, analysis and reporting of digital
evidence.
In order to be able to prove that the evidence presented in a court of law is
forensically sound, the integrity of the evidence has to be preserved, and the
complete documentation trail (referred to as the Chain of Custody) has to be
provided (Flaglien, Mallasvik, Mustorp, & Årnes, 2011, p. 122).
According to Roussev, Chen, Bourg, and Richard III (2006), hashing is a fundamental tool in
digital forensics to ensure data integrity. One-way cryptographic hash functions can be used
to verify the integrity of acquired evidence by generating a hash value during the collection of
evidence and using that generated hash value to compare at a later date. If the hash values
match it is assured that evidence integrity has been maintained.
2.1.2 Digital Forensic Triage
Digital forensic triage can be considered as a starting point to forensic examination and analy-
sis of evidence. In generalised terms, “triage is a term widely used to denote the prioritization
of work according to a quality inherent in the objects being acted upon” (Garfinkel, 2013b,
p. 57). A well known example is the sorting of medical patients based on the urgency of care
required. Digital forensic triage follows the same principles, applying precedence in the exam-
ination and analysis of investigation targets to determine potentially useful evidence sources;
for example, a triage examination to discover potential electronic fraud consisting of multiple
digital devices in an investigation (e.g., a desktop computer, laptop and smartphone) might
yield results that dictate that one device (e.g., the laptop) has a higher number of credit card
numbers and warrants further investigation before other devices.
Numerous definitions have been proposed for digital forensic triage. Roussev, Quates, and
Martell (2013) state that triage is a fast initial screen of (potential) investigative targets in
order to estimate their evidentiary value. Garfinkel (2013b) states triage also includes rapid
and largely automated analysis performed when evidence is first encountered and can reveal
the intelligence value of media and prioritisation of further in-depth analysis. The scope and
methods used to perform triage in digital investigations has been debated amongst researchers
and practitioners. Some state it is completely independent of the forensic procedure, while
others emphasise that it is linked with the forensic procedure as part of the examination
of evidence. The definition promulgated by Roussev et al. (2013), argue that triage can be
included in the examination phase of the digital forensic procedure and can be defined as:
Triage: A partial forensic examination conducted under (significant) time and
resource constraints (Roussev et al., 2013, p. 160).
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Others, such as Casey (2011) include triage as being the starting level for analysis of evidence
and as such has been adopted for this research project. Also, for the sake of clarity, the exam-
ination and analysis phases in this research will refer to the generic term forensic analysis,
while digital forensic triage is referred to simply as triage. The difference between the two
methods is only the time constraints of triage when compared to forensic analysis.
The overall digital forensic procedure aims to identify, collect, examine, analyse and report
useful digital evidence to prove, or disprove, a particular electronic event. The procedure is
inseparable from digital evidence as the source of information which is now discussed further
in the following section.
2.2 Digital Evidence
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) defines digital evidence as “information stored or
transmitted in binary form that may be introduced and relied on in court” (NIJ, 2008, p. 52).
Digital data is essentially a collection of binary data that represent higher-level information
such as text, audio, video and images. This section outlines information pertaining to digital
evidence starting with a generalised overview of digital artifacts and their use in digital in-
vestigations. A discussion of evidence sources used in this research includes file systems and
the Windows Registry. Finally, a summary of digital forensic data abstractions cover forensic
disk images used to store collected digital evidence followed by high-level data abstractions
used to enhance forensic examination and analysis.
2.2.1 Digital Artifacts
Using a practice similar to archaeologists, who seek to understand past human behaviour by
studying artifacts, digital investigators similarly study digital artifacts to understand past
behaviour in the digital world. N. Beebe (2009) states that digital artifacts are a function
of the physical media, operating system, file system and user-level applications which impact
on what digital evidence is created when a user interacts with a computer system. Digital
artifacts can include a wide variety of different types such as data files, system configuration
settings, information from volatile computer memory and network traffic packets. Table 2.3
displays common digital artifact types that are encountered in digital investigations.
During the course of a digital investigation, especially the examination and analysis of
digital evidence, an investigator seeks to extract these digital artifacts, analyse the contents
and associated metadata to reconstruct a digital event. An example of a common digital
artifact is a word processing document (e.g. report.doc) which is a data file. The contents
of the document can be examined to determine what it stores; for example, opening the
document using a native application (e.g., Microsoft Word) to determine the contents. In
addition, data files also have associated file metadata; for example, timestamp information
including the modified, accessed and created (MAC) times. Thus, the information obtained
during the analysis of digital artifacts serves to determine past behaviour on a system.
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Table 2.3: Types of digital artifacts
Digital Artifact Description
Data files Structured data created and used by user-level software such as word processors
and image editors; for example, documents (report.doc), photos (image.jpg),
multimedia files (video.mpg).
System configuration Structured data stored by an operating system for configuring the system such
as device drivers, services or interface options; for example, Windows Registry
and Apple Property Lists.
Network traffic Digital data communicated between two devices in a computer network; for
example, Internet Protocol (IP) packets.
Volatile memory Volatile information stored in RAM; for example, encryption keys, details of
running processes.
2.2.2 Digital Evidence Sources
Digital artifacts are a valuable source of evidence in digital investigations. This section com-
ments further on evidence sources and associated digital artifacts of interest to this research;
in particular the Microsoft Windows operating system platform. The file system as an ev-
idence source is first outlined, followed by information pertaining to the Windows Registry
both of which are intended to provide a generalised overview relating to the scope of this
research. References are provided to direct the reader to additional material if required.
2.2.2.1 File System
In the field of computing, a file system defines how digital data is controlled including stor-
age, naming conventions, organisation and access (Kent et al., 2006). The file system itself is
located on a partition of the physical digital storage device and are primarily used on digital
storage devices to provide a structure to store data and an index to point to the data stored. A
large variety of file systems exist and each has differences in structure, properties, functional-
ity, security and intended application. The remainder of this section provides a brief overview
of file systems for the scope of research presented in this project. Further information re-
garding physical hard drives, other digital storage devices, data encoding principles, in-depth
information on partitions and specific information regarding forensic analysis of different file
system types can be found in File System Forensic Analysis by Carrier (2005).
According to Carrier (2005), common examples of file systems include the File Allocation
Table (FAT) and New Technology File System (NTFS) primarily for Microsoft Windows
systems. The Unix File System (UFS) and Extended (EXT) file system are prominent on
Linux systems, while the Hierarchical File System (HFS) on Apple systems. Most file systems
can be classified based on the type of digital media they were originally intended for; for
example, the FAT file system was designed for block devices starting with floppy disks and
later for Hard Disk Drives (HDD). The Network File System (NFS) is a network protocol
that was designed and is used for file system access over a network, while the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9660 file system is designed specifically for Compact
Discs (CD).
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Although many types of file systems exist with unique structures and functionality, all share
common characteristics such as the concept of directories and files to store and organise dig-
ital data. Directories, also called folders, are organisational structures that act as a catalogue
provide the functionality for the operating system and allow the user to store and group files
into logical collections; for example, on a Microsoft Windows systems the Windows directory
stores almost all operating system files1, while the My Documents directory stores a user’s
documents. According to Kent et al. (2006), a file, also called a data file or computer file, is
a collection of digital information that is logically grouped into a single entity and referenced
by a unique file name. A huge variety of data file types exist including common examples
such as documents, images, and video files.
2.2.2.2 Windows Registry
According to Microsoft (2002), the Windows Registry is a central hierarchical database used
to store configuration information for users, applications and hardware devices. The Registry
was introduced in Windows 3.1 and replaced the text-based configuration files (.ini files)
used in MS-DOS. The Registry is an exceptionally valuable forensic resource containing rich
user and application information, especially when attempting to establish a timeline of system
activity (Carvey, 2011). This section provides a general commentary of the Windows Registry
for the scope of this research. Additional information regarding the internal structure of the
Registry, a summary of common Registry analysis tools and case studies of Registry analysis
can be found in Windows Registry Forensics by Carvey (2011).
Although the Registry is presented as a hierarchical database the different components of
the Registry are stored in a collection of local data files referred to as hives. “A hive is a
logical group of keys, subkeys, and values in the registry” (Microsoft, 2016b, para. 1). When
the system starts the required hives are loaded; for example, the NTUSER.DAT hive file is
loaded into the HKEY_USERS (HKU) and HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HKCU) Registry
root keys. The core system hive files (SAM, Security, Software and System hive files) are
located in the Windows directory (Windows\system32\config), while each user has an
individual NTUSER.DAT hive file in their associated user profile directory (Carvey, 2011).
Registry hives have a binary structure comprised of different cells, sometimes referred to
as record types2. Registry hives are stored as data files by the file system, and similarly
to file systems they have unallocated (slack) space (Carvey, 2011). Previous research has
investigated recovery of deleted Registry entries by investigation and extraction of information
from the slack space in a Registry hive file (Morgan, 2008).
Figure 2.2 displays a visual representation of different Windows Registry elements in-
cluding hive files, keys, subkeys, values, value types and actual value data. The interface is
displayed from the Windows Registry Editor, or regedit.exe, utility. As seen, the Reg-
1The Windows directory is a default setting that can be changed based on user preference.
2A discussion of the internal Registry structure goes beyond the scope for this discussion. Additional
information can be found in Chapter One of Windows Registry Forensics by Carvey (2011) and The
Windows NT Registry File Format by Morgan (2009).
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Figure 2.2: Structure of the Windows Registry (Source: Figure adapted from Carvey (2005)
& Carvey (2011))
istry is organised into a tree structure very similar to that of a file system (Morgan, 2008).
Registry keys are similar to file system directories, while Registry values are analogous to
data files that store discrete portions of raw data in a single entity. Registry keys are different
from Registry values in that the only timestamp information retained in the Registry is the
LastWriteTime (modification time) which is only stored by keys, not values. However, Reg-
istry values have additional information including a value name, value data type and value
data. The data type can be specific and is used to store strings, numbers and binary data.
2.2.3 Digital Forensic Data Abstractions
In the field of digital forensics, data abstractions are primarily used to store and represent dig-
ital evidence. This includes storing collected digital evidence while maintaining the integrity
of the original source, as well as transforming digital evidence into different representations
to ease forensic examination, analysis and reporting. Table 2.4 displays five widely used data
abstractions with accompanying examples of the type of digital evidence they can store.
Table 2.4: Common digital forensic data abstractions (Garfinkel, 2010, p. 69)
Data Abstraction Type Evidence Contained
Disk Images Digital data storage device; for example, hard drives or flash mem-
ory cards
Data Files Structured data files usually to present digital evidence or trans-
fer evidence between investigators; for example, documents and
images
Reference Sets A document containing known files represented by Message Digest
version 5 (MD5 ) & Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) hash values
Extracted Name Entities Information extracted from an investigation target including email
addresses and credit card numbers
Packet Capture Files Intercepted network traffic usually archived in data files
The following subsections briefly outline the digital forensic data abstractions used in the
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course of this research for the storage of digital evidence. A summary of forensic disk images
is first given followed by a brief overview of high-level data abstractions designed specifically
to advance digital forensic research and development.
2.2.3.1 Forensic Disk Images
Forensic disk images, also known simply as disk images or evidence files, are the most
common forensic data abstraction. Disk images are a bit-by-bit (or block-by-block) copy of
a digital data storage device such as a Hard Disk Drive (HDD). They provide the ability to
store and preserve the integrity of digital evidence by generating an exact duplicate of the
source media (Altheide & Carvey, 2011). Table 2.5 displays three of the most frequent disk
image formats used in digital investigations.
Table 2.5: Common disk image file formats (Flaglien et al., 2011, p. 124)
Image Format Extension Integrity Compression Software Support
Raw .RAW None None Extensive
.001
Expert Witness .E01 Entire MD5 and Zlib libewf library
Format (EWF) .EX01 Block CRC Multiple toolkits
Advanced .AFF Entire MD5 and Zlib afflib library
Forensic .AFD Block MD5 The Sleuth Kit
Format (AFF) .AFM
A raw disk image is commonly referred to as the dd image format because the file is derived
from the output from the dd tool found on UNIX and UNIX-like operating systems. The
primary purpose of the dd tool is to convert and copy a file (IEEE Std 1003.1, 2008) and
has previously been used to populate data in a disk image. However, since the file format
was not designed to store digital evidence it lacks essential digital forensic functionality; for
example, the capability to store an acquisition hash value to ensure evidence preservation.
Hashing limitations have been addressed by forensic software developers and modified versions
of the dd tool made available; for example, dcfldd3 is a forked version of the dd tool, while
dc3dd4 is a patched version of the dd tool. Both tools provide additional functionality
to better support forensic use such as the inclusion of hashing for the purpose of evidence
integrity preservation (Altheide & Carvey, 2011).
Expert Witness Compression Format (EWF) is a proprietary disk image format main-
tained by Guidance Software. EWF is considered to be the de-facto standard as it has,
in practice, been validated and approved to be forensically sound (Flaglien et al., 2011).
The EWF file format is also commonly referred to as E01, owing to the file extension it
3Dcfldd was created for the Defence Computer Forensics Laboratory by Nick Harbour and is available from
http://dcfldd.sourceforge.net/
4Dc3dd was created for the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center by Jesse Kornblum and is available
from http://sourceforge.net/projects/dc3dd/
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uses. EWF provides the means to store disk, partition and memory images and supports
data compression and splitting disk images into multiple segments (Metz, 2006). Guidance
Software introduced EWF version 2 with new functionality which includes support for data
encryption, additional compression algorithms and increased data acquisition performance
(Guidance Software, 2012). Since EWF is a proprietary format, the libewf project was de-
veloped to allow ease of integration of the EWF disk image format into other forensic tools5.
The libewf project is an open source library which provides: 1) The ability to add EWF
support to forensic tools; and 2) A selection of command line tools to work with EWF files
including the ability to acquire, mount and verify EWF disk images.
The Advanced Forensic Format (AFF) disk image format was developed as an alternative
to the existing proprietary disk EWF format. According to Garfinkel, Malan, Dubec, Stevens,
and Pham (2006), AFF has three significant benefits over other forensic disk image formats:
1) Open source implementation and support for multiple operating systems; 2) Additional
flexibility provided by the ability to store extensive metadata; and 3) Decrease in required
disk space by implementation of better data compression techniques. Similar to the libewf
project, the afflib project has a selection of command line tools to work with AFF files
including the ability to acquire, mount, convert and compare AFF evidence files.
2.2.3.2 High-level Forensic Data Abstractions
Table 2.4 displayed a selection of data abstractions that are frequently used in digital forensics.
However, these have challenges as there are no standardised techniques for forensic tools
to ingest input or store output. Almost every tool implements a unique output format,
resulting in tool output incompatibility. The lack of standardised and widely accepted high-
level data abstraction decreases forensic tool composibility; that is, the output from one
tool cannot directly be used as input to another forensic tool. Furthermore, research and
technological advances have been constrained due to the limitations and variability of existing
formats. Garfinkel (2010) states that a key component to improving digital forensic research
is the adoption of high-level data abstractions for storage, processing and documenting digital
evidence. There have been numerous attempts to develop abstraction methods, especially for
different digital artifacts types. A variety of approaches have used an Extensible Markup
Language (XML) approach to satisfy the storage and processing requirements of a digital
investigation. The use of XML is advantageous as it is easy to create structured documents,
is human-readable, machine-readable and can be validated through the use of an XML Schema
(Yergeau, Bray, Paoli, Sperberg-McQueen, & Maler, 2004).
Recently, a diverse range of XML-based data abstractions designed for digital forensics
have emerged. Alink, Bhoedjang, Boncz, and de Vries (2006) outlined an XML Information
Retrieval Approach to Digital Forensics (XIRAF) which described a framework for feature
extraction and forensic analysis using XML database technology for flexible and powerful
querying. By storing extracted features in XML, the system design provides a clear separation
5The libewf project is maintained by Joachim Metz. The project source code is available from https://
github.com/libyal/libewf
25
between examination and analysis, while providing a common output format to enable better
tool integration. Levine and Liberatore (2009) outlined the Digital Evidence Exchange (DEX)
data abstraction which aimed to provide digital evidence provenance, the ability to reproduce
evidence from the XML description and the ability to enable tool comparison and validation.
The DEX standard was released together with the initial publication of the corresponding
paper, but has not been updated since 20096.
A more successful effort at implementing a high-level forensic data abstraction using XML
is Digital Forensic XML (DFXML). Garfinkel (2012a) states that DFXML is an XML language
designed to represent a wide range of forensic information, specifically used to describe digital
artifacts and also to help simplify advanced forensic processing and automated analysis. Initial
development of DFXML was conducted by Garfinkel (2009) when implementing a tool, dubbed
fiwalk, which has the ability to produce detailed XML output to describe information
about a target evidence file (e.g. sector size), partition information (e.g. file system type),
file information (e.g. file name or size) and information about the tool which created the
XML file (e.g. tool name and version). According to Garfinkel (2012a), DFXML has the
following goals: 1) To complement and augment existing forensic formats; 2) Be easy to add
support for generation or incorporation of DFXML into existing tools; 3) Provide human
readability; 4) Be free, open and extensible; 5) Provide scalability to allow large and small
scale investigations; and 6) Adhere to existing forensic practices and standards. The official
DFXML project is available in both C and Python programming languages to allow ease of
integration into new and existing tools7. Even though DFXML is a relatively new development
a number of forensic tools already provide the functionality to output to the DFXML format;
for example, the bulk_extractor, hashdeep and photorec tools all provide the ability
to output to DFXML reports.
2.3 Digital Forensic Research Challenges
Although there has been steady research and development regarding the techniques and tools
used in the field of digital forensics, there are numerous research challenges that still exist.
Garfinkel (2010) states that both academic researchers and practitioners are currently facing
a digital forensic crisis where technology advances are being diminished, or even lost,
due to fundamental changes in the computer industry. The following subsections discuss a
range of current digital forensic research challenges including data volume and scalability,
case complexity, the CSI effect and legal challenges. The potential of anti-forensic technique
presence in investigations is another serious research challenge and, as it is an important
aspect of this research, an entire section is dedicated to this material (see Section 2.5).
6Additional information and the source code for the Digital Evidence Exchange project can be found at
http://forensics.umass.edu/research.php
7The DFXML project is available from https://github.com/simsong/dfxml
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2.3.1 Data Volume & Scalability
Data volume is a fundamental challenge in modern digital investigations. Moore’s law states
that the number of transistors on integrated circuits approximately doubles every two years
(Moore, 1965). Moore’s law is strongly linked to the growth of digital data storage device
capacity and the corresponding increasing size of target devices in forensic investigations.
“The targets that digital forensic investigations must process continues to grow and the cur-
rent generation of digital forensics tools is already struggling to deal with even modest-sized
targets” (Marziale, Richard III, & Roussev, 2007, p. S80). Garfinkel (2010) states that the
growing size of storage devices means that there is insufficient time to create a forensic image
of a target device, or to process all of the data found on the device; for example, a 2 terabyte
(TB) hard drive is relatively inexpensive but requires approximately 7 hours of processing to
capture a forensic disk image.
Large-scale digital forensic investigations present at least two fundamental chal-
lenges. The first one is accommodating the computational needs of a large amount
of data to be processed. The second one is extracting useful information from the
raw data in an automated fashion. Both of these problems could result in long
processing times that can seriously hamper an investigation (Roussev, Richard
III, & Marziale, 2007, p. 105).
Scalability of current forensic techniques and tools to large investigations is a fundamental
problem in digital forensic research and investigations. The exponential growth of data volume
is increasing case processing time and in turn the cost of conducting digital investigations.
N. Beebe and Clark (2005a) state that digital investigation tools and techniques are con-
strained by simplistic data reduction and mining algorithms, are not scalable to large data
sets, and produce an enormous volume of results which need to be manually analysed. Prac-
titioners are attempting to perform digital investigations on large scale target data sets using
first-generation forensic analysis tools. In order to combat these challenges more advanced
forensic analysis techniques are required to harness more efficient computational processing
methods.
2.3.2 Case Complexity
The case complexity of digital investigations is increasing due to a the rise of technological
changes in the field of computing. The prevalence of flash memory, the variety of hardware
interfaces in devices and the proliferation of operating systems and file formats all add to
an increasing difficulty to perform digital investigations and digital forensic research and
development (Garfinkel, 2010). The correlation of digital evidence between multiple electronic
devices has also become a growing challenge.
In terms of flash memory, the massive growth of electronic devices with flash-based
storage and a plethora of possible hardware interfaces make forensic acquisition of such
devices difficult to perform. In addition, the variety of operating system platforms and
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versions and the variety of file formats encountered in modern digital investigations all
create ongoing challenges. Take the example of smart phones:
Mobile forensics requires procedures that are very specific to device manufacturer
and/or model for both collection and analysis. Not only do mobile phones employ
a diversity of cables, interfaces and form factors, but the devices also have unique
software, memory layouts and storage techniques (Vidas, Zhang, & Christin, 2011,
p. S14).
Another technology that increases case complexity is the prevalence of cloud computing; a
modern computing service which provides users with remote storage and processing capabil-
ities, usually via the Internet. Cloud computing has the potential to create issues in digital
investigations due to the challenge of acquiring digital evidence that is stored at a remote
location. “Cloud service providers and customers have yet to establish adequate forensic ca-
pabilities that could support investigations of criminal activities in the cloud” (Ruan, Carthy,
Kechadi, & Crosbie, 2011, p. 35). Therefore, the ramifications of cloud computing in digital
investigations have still to be fully addressed. However, types of digital artifacts that can be
useful in these digital investigations are being explored; for example, Quick and Choo (2013)
investigated the data remnants from the cloud computing provider Dropbox.
The requirements of correlation between multiple targets in digital investigations is
becoming increasingly important. Digital investigations have progressed from forensic analysis
of a single device to the need to perform correlation of digital evidence from a large collection
and variation of devices from a single investigation target; for example, it is common that
the target of an investigation has a laptop, a smart phone and a potential plethora of other
electronic devices. However, current forensic analysis techniques are designed to independently
examine single sources of evidence and limited support is available to automate the process of
correlating evidence between multiple devices (Garfinkel, 2006); for example, it is difficult for
investigators to perform correlated analysis of information such as credit card numbers and
email addresses between multiple devices. Research and development of automated analysis
techniques are required plus next-generation digital forensic techniques and tools in order to
keep pace with the expanding digital world in which we live.
2.3.3 Technology Advancement Challenges
Garfinkel (2012b) states that temporal diversity is a major digital forensic research chal-
lenge centred around technology advancement challenges of continual software updates which
creates a never-ending forensic tool upgrade cycle. The problem is it is essential that com-
puter forensic tools are required to support all new software versions and operating system
platforms; for example, whenever new operating system or application software versions are
released by vendors, researchers are required to update the techniques and tools used to per-
form forensic analysis. The inability to update in a timely manner means investigators are
unable to perform analysis of new software. Furthermore, “not only must tools support new
28
targets within days of their release, but they must continue to support old target releases
forever” (Garfinkel, 2012b, p. S82). Support must also be provided for all applications on all
major operating systems which creates even more challenges.
As a further obstacle, digital forensics must provide support for technology that is con-
stantly changing; for example the advent of Internet services such as Internet applications
provided by Google which may change the system or format of services they provide. Such a
change results in the need to update the techniques required so that analysis can take place for
newly updated systems. An example of temporal diversity can be illustrated using the Mozilla
Firefox web browser. Firefox version 3 introduced a completely new database system to store
Internet history, bookmarks, form field information and browser cookies (Pereira, 2009). The
dramatic change in the database storage method required digital forensic researchers to re-
verse engineer the new technology in order to develop new techniques and tools form forensic
investigation of the same application.
The ongoing evolution of digital technology requires that digital forensic researchers and
tool vendors must repeatedly update and add support for new software, as well as new op-
erating systems, file systems and devices. Any new digital technology must be able to be
evaluated so that when encountered during an investigation the practitioner has the capabil-
ity to perform forensic acquisition and analysis of the identified evidence.
2.3.4 The CSI Effect
A unique digital forensic research challenge is the effect that Crime Scene Investigation (CSI)
style television shows may have on forensic evidence presented in a court of law. This phe-
nomenon has been referred to as the CSI Effect. “In recent years, the television program CSI
and its spin-offs have portrayed forensic science as high-tech magic, solving crimes quickly and
unerringly” (Schweitzer & Saks, 2006, p. 357). The specific problem is based on the proposed
hypothesis that CSI type shows have raised the expectations of forensic science evidence and
that jurors are disappointed by conventional evidence presented in court. To convey this, a
survey conducted in 2006 of 1,027 jurors in Michigan discovered that 46% of jurors expected
to see scientific evidence in every criminal case (Shelton, 2008).
Shelton, Kim, and Barak (2006) state that the increase in juror’s expectation of forensic
evidence is caused by a broader tech effect rather than just crime based television shows. The
tech effect is characterised by the advancement of modern technology which has created a
heightened reliance on evidence from forensic science to be used in a court of law. In terms
of digital forensics, computer-based crime investigations have become a staple of many CSI
type shows.
On the screen nearly every DF investigator is trained on every tool; correlation
is easy and instantaneous; there are never false positives; overwritten data can
frequently be recovered; encryption can frequently be cracked; it is all but impos-
sible to delete anything; and tools never crash. Reality is not so kind (Garfinkel,
2012b, p. S82).
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Whatever the root cause of the problem, it can be concluded that scientific evidence is an
expected requirement for civil and criminal legal proceedings. Therefore, digital forensics
requires continual research and development to advance the procedures, techniques and tools
used to perform investigations in order to produce even more thorough and reliable digital
evidence.
The following section introduces and provides background material specifically regarding
application software in the realm of digital forensics. Following this, a section is dedicated
to the introduction of anti-forensics with emphasis given to anti-forensic tools, a type of
application software that may be maliciously used to obstruct the digital forensic procedure
and remove the availability of digital evidence.
2.4 Application Software
Application software is a computer program (or set of programs) that perform specific end-
user tasks; for example, web browsers, word processors, image editors, and multimedia players.
The digital investigation of application software is a very active research and development area
because different types of software allows a user to perform certain tasks that are of forensic
interest; for example, using a web browser to access illegal content on the Internet, using file
sharing software to distribute copyrighted material or using hacking tools to illegally access
a computer system.
Digital investigation of application software commonly involves the analysis of the digital
artifacts (see Section 2.2.1) that are created, modified or deleted when a user interacts with
an application. Digital artifacts of interest include file system entries (e.g., data files) and
system configuration information (e.g., Windows Registry), as well as data remnants left after
application usage or uninstallation. Digital artifacts provide a robust source of digital evidence
regarding application software usage in specific scenarios and gives insight into the actions
conducted by a perpetrator; for example, digital artifacts are frequently used to perform event
reconstruction to create a timeline of digital events.
This section first presents a summary of the application life cycle and the different phases
in the life span of an application on a computer system. A synopsis on the use of reverse
engineering follows to determine the digital artifacts associated with an application and finally,
an introduction is made to the digital forensic techniques and tools commonly used to perform
the forensic analysis of application software.
2.4.1 Application Software Life Cycle
Application software that is executed on a host operating system is dynamic. This means
that the impact on the system that software leaves is dependent on the actions performed by
a user; for example, a user might install an application but never use it; this leaves different
digital artifacts than if the user executed the software and performed a variety of tasks over a
long time span. To understand the complexity of forensic analysis of application software it is
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important to outline how digital artifacts are introduced or removed from the host operating
system. This process is known as the application software life cycle.
Each application has a life cycle that follows a determinate path and includes phases such
as distribution, installation, execution and uninstallation (Davis, Kennedy, Pyles, Strickler,
& Shenoi, 2006). During each phase of the application life cycle the program makes changes
to the host operating system in the form of digital artifacts that are created, modified and/or
removed; for example, when installing an application, various folders, files, and configuration
settings are created which provide the resources to run the specific application. When an
application is uninstalled the digital artifacts are removed but some residual information may
remain.
Figure 2.3: High-level overview of the application software life cycle (Source: Figure adapted
from Davis et al. (2006, p. 177-178))
The application software life cycle illustrated in Figure 2.3 only displays a high-level overview
of the phases that application software may perform. An application is distributed to the
user; this generally involves the user downloading an installer from the Internet. The user
then installs the application, which may involve selecting configuration options or packages to
install for additional functionality. The application is then executed by the user to perform
a specific task; for example, browsing the Internet, creating documents, playing videos or
viewing images. The application may be further configured with settings specified by the
user. The application itself may create additional digital artifacts such as creating documents
or editing and saving digital images. Finally, the application is removed by uninstalling, a
feature designed to remove all application components from the user’s system.
In a real world environment, application software can perform numerous iterations of a
specific task (e.g., execution) and the range of potential application scenarios are endless.
Furthermore, not all potential phases are covered in Figure 2.3; for example, if an application
is somehow corrupted it may require reinstallation or a different version may be installed.
However, the phases of the basic life cycle of an application are generally constant.
2.4.2 Reverse Engineering Application Software
“Reverse engineering is the process of extracting the knowledge or design blueprints from
anything man-made” (Eilam, 2011, p. 3). In the context of computing, reverse engineering
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is the process of analysing a subject to create a representation of the system at a higher
level of abstraction (Chikofsky & Cross, 1990). Reverse engineering can be seen as a hostile
process; for example, when used to illegally replicate software. However, reverse engineering
also has a variety of legitimate uses; for example, inspecting malware to determine how it
operates. “Reverse engineers attempt to infer the behaviour of malware by comparing the
contents of a hard drive before the malware is introduced with the hard drive captured after
the malware infection” (Garfinkel, 2012a, p. S5). In the context of the forensic analysis of
application software, system-level reverse engineering is required to determine the design,
operation and/or behaviour of the application8.
Behavioural analysis is the process of reverse engineering the inner workings of ap-
plications by examining their effects on the system they operate in. Because source
code is not always readily available, behavioural analysis is the major technique
for determining what an application does and how it manipulates data (Seifert,
Steenson, Welch, Komisarczuk, & Endicott-Popovsky, 2007, p. S23).
Reverse engineering is required when performing forensic analysis of application software
due to: 1) Unavailable source code; 2) Source code complexity; and 3) Limited developer
documentation. Therefore, reverse engineering is implemented to deconstruct application
software and determine how it operates and what digital artifacts are created, modified or
deleted in different scenarios. This can include created, modified or deleted file system entries
(e.g., data files and directories) and system configuration entries (e.g., Windows Registry keys
and values). The information aids in providing reliable knowledge about digital artifacts with
regard to application software usage on a system.
Previous research has performed reverse engineering of a large variety of application soft-
ware to support digital investigations; for example, instant messaging software such as Digsby
(Yasin & Abulaish, 2013), cloud storage software such as Dropbox (Quick & Choo, 2013), and
anti-forensic tools (Geiger & Cranor, 2006) have all been investigated using reverse engineer-
ing techniques. In these examples the following method is conducted: 1) Manual analysis of
application software using reverse engineering and a variety of different tools; and 2) Docu-
mentation of the analysis method, the discovered findings, and sharing of knowledge (usually
via academic publication).
2.4.3 Forensic Analysis of Application Software
The terms (and phases) forensic examination and forensic analysis are intertwined. Forensic
examination of application software aims to determine the existence, or absence, of specific
software on an investigation target; for example, to determine if a BitTorrent application
8In terms of reverse engineering application software, in some scenarios the process may involve taking the
program’s binary code and attempting to trace back to assembly language or original source code. In this
research, the generic term reverse engineering is used to refer to system-level reverse engineering, where
the method attempts to determine system-level changes (files or Registry entries) that the application creates,
modifies or removes.
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is on a target system. Forensic analysis aims to make sense of the discovered evidence; for
example, what was the BitTorrent application used to download. The following discussion
uses the generic term forensic analysis to refer to both phases.
Although forensic analysis of application software is a fundamental requirement in digital
investigations there are few tools designed specifically to perform examination of user-level
programs on a target data set. Instead, practitioners implement a variety of conventional
analysis techniques and tools to investigate of all types of application software which may
range from rudimentary to complex analysis.
Carrier (2003) described the purpose and goals of digital forensic analysis tools using
abstraction layers to represent each level of a target digital storage device. An overview of
how the four prescribed abstraction layers interact with each other is shown in Figure 2.4 for
the scenario of analysing a HyperText Markup Language (HTML) file of a hard disk drive.
As depicted, the physical hard drive is comprised of a head and cylinders which is further
divided into sectors (or blocks) of data. In the media management layer the sectors store the
partition table and are amalgamated to form a partition. Each partition has a file system
which stores a boot sector, a file allocation table (FAT) and logically grouped data in files. In
the example, the location of the logical grouping of data is stored by the file system. Finally,
the application layer is the highest level of abstraction which translates data from the file
system into the custom application format. In this example, the HTML could be rendered in
a web browser, or source code displayed in a text editor.
Figure 2.4: Abstraction levels and layers of an HTML file (Source: Figure taken from Carrier
(2003))
Forensic analysis can take place on any of the prescribed abstraction layers. Application
software analysis can be performed on the sector level using block-based hashing and sub-file
forensics to identify chunks of data files associated with an application (Garfinkel, Nelson,
White, & Roussev, 2010). On the file system level, application software can be analysed
using file system metadata (Kälber, Dewald, & Idler, 2014) or by using file hashing (Roussev,
2009). On the application level, proprietary file formats can be natively analysed using the
application which created the file; for example, viewing documents in a word processor.
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2.5 Anti-forensics
In response to the procedures developed for digital investigations, criminals and hackers have
become aware of investigation methods and, in turn, have developed their own techniques
and tools in an attempt to thwart the digital forensics procedure. Such techniques are known
as anti-forensics, or counter-forensics, which is defined as “any attempt to compromise
the availability or usefulness of evidence to the forensics process” (Harris, 2006, p. S45). This
section outlines and discusses anti-forensic techniques and tools that may be maliciously used
to hinder digital investigations. Following this, the anti-forensic problem is also outlined and
discussed to establish the key research and real world digital investigation challenges.
2.5.1 Anti-forensic Techniques
Anti-forensic techniques can be classified based on the method used to manipulate the original
data. Harris (2006) classified anti-forensic techniques into four categories: 1) Hiding; 2) De-
struction; 3) Elimination; and 4) Counterfeiting of digital evidence. The following subsections
provide a brief discussion of each anti-forensic technique.
2.5.1.1 Evidence Hiding
“Hiding evidence is the act of removing evidence from view so that it is less likely to be
incorporated into the forensic process” (Harris, 2006, p. S46). A physical world example
would be discarding a firearm into the ocean where it is less likely, or more difficult, for an
investigator to discover. In the digital world the primary evidence hiding technique is data
encryption. However, steganography can also be implemented to hide digital information as
well as more rudimentary techniques including hidden partitions.
Data encryption is the process of disguising a message in such a way as to hide its
substance (Schneier, 1996). Evidence hiding using encryption can be achieved on almost
all electronic devices or digital communication. Data encryption can range from encrypting
individual files to encrypting an entire disk. The integration of strong Full Disk Encryption
(FDE) into modern operating systems has created a problem for investigators as encryption
cannot normally be circumvented without a key or passphrase (Casey & Stellatos, 2008).
Data encryption is also prevalent in network traffic; for example, Transport Layer Security
(TLS) provides encrypted network communication, and onion routing provides anonymous
encrypted Internet access (Dingledine, Mathewson, & Syverson, 2004).
Schneier (1996, p. 16) states “steganography serves to hide secret messages in other mes-
sages, such that the secret’s very existence is concealed”. Steganography is commonly de-
scribed as security through obscurity as the hiding process involves concealing the original
information. A routine example is hiding illicit digital images inside another container such
as a word processing document.
In addition to the main methods of evidence hiding there is also a variety of other evidence
hiding techniques. One example is the Slacker tool which is part of the Metasploit
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framework. Slacker can hide files in the slack space, or unallocated area, of a digital
storage device with the Microsoft Windows New Technology File System (NTFS)(Kessler,
2007). Another example is by manipulating digital storage devices:
Users may create hidden partitions by altering the partition table to disrupt disk
management and prevent applications from seeing that the data area exists. Hid-
den data can also be found within ADSs on NTFS volumes, in the end-of-file slack
space and free space on a medium, and in the Host Protected Area (HPA) on some
hard drives, which is a region of a drive intended to be used by vendors only (Kent
et al., 2006, p. 42).
Morgan (2008) outlined a variety of techniques that could be implemented to hide data in
the Windows Registry; for example, a user could hide data in the registry file header which
contains reserved space that is ignored by the operating system and most Registry tools.
Even the simple technique of “an obscure key or value placed deep within a little-known
configuration tree would likely avoid notice in most cases due to the poorly documented
nature of the registry” (Morgan, 2008, p. S40). Evidence hiding presents a daunting problem
for digital investigations. As evidence can be removed from plain sight it introduces difficulties
in discovering information to provide supporting evidence of specific digital events.
2.5.1.2 Evidence Destruction
Harris (2006) states that evidence destruction involves dismantling or otherwise making digital
evidence unusable to the investigative process as data is partially or completely obliterated.
An example of evidence destruction in the physical world is wiping fingerprints off a gun or
removing gun powder residue from hands, both of which destroys evidence that can link a
perpetrator to a firearm. Digital evidence destruction can be either physical or logical
based on the technique used to destroy the data.
Physical evidence destruction will most likely result in an unusable device after ev-
idence destruction measures have been conducted as it involves physically destroying the
storage device. Usually, this is accomplished by applying brute force; for example, disas-
sembling the device or the use of hammers and drills. However, more sophisticated methods
can be implemented. NIST recommends physical destruction as the ultimate form of media
sanitization including methods such as disintegration, incineration, pulverization and melting
of digital media devices (Kissel, Scholl, Skolochenko, & Li, 2006). A specialised means of hard
drive destruction is the use of degaussing which is the process of reducing the magnetization
of a storage device to zero by applying a reverse magnetizing force, rendering any previously
stored data unreadable and unintelligible (Peron & Legary, 2005).
Logical evidence destruction involves destroying digital data by performing some form
of logical data manipulation. Data wiping is the most common logical evidence destruction
technique, also referred to as: data overwriting, secure deleting, zeroing, cleaning, sanitising,
scrubbing or nuking. Data wiping renders logical data unavailable when compared to normal
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file system entry deletion. When a file is deleted the disk cluster link in the directory entry
of a file system is set to zero (0) indicating that the clusters have been unallocated. However,
the actual contents of the drive are still present (Pal & Memon, 2009). Therefore, in order to
avoid data file recovery a malicious user has to actively wipe the contents of the file. There are
a variety of standards, algorithms and techniques that can be implemented to perform data
wiping. Nevertheless, there has been a great deal of controversy regarding data wiping and
the ability to recover data that has been overwritten. According to Joukov, Papaxenopoulos,
and Zadok (2006), a single overwrite of data will greatly enhance security and will make any
software-based data recovery impossible. Wright, Kleiman, and Sundhar (2008) also state that
although there is a good chance of recovering a single bit of data from an overwritten hard
drive, using physical based recovery techniques, the possibility of recovering even a small size
of data is negligible. A perpetrator can maliciously implement tools to perform data wiping
on an entire device, or specific areas of a device, in an attempt to remove the availability of
digital evidence. Table 2.6 displays three data wiping techniques which each target a specific
area of a digital storage device.
Table 2.6: Classification of data wiping techniques (Source: Table populated from Garfinkel
(2007) & Bassett et al. (2006))
Technique Description
Entire device wiping Overwriting the entire contents of a digital storage device with zeros or random
data
Free space wiping Overwriting unallocated (free) space of a digital storage device so that previ-
ously deleted files and file fragments are overwritten
Digital artifact wiping Overwriting specific files using automated or manual tools. Common examples
include wiping user-generated operating system artifacts (e.g., recently used
software list) and Internet artifacts (e.g., web browser cache)
If implemented correctly there is little chance to recover potential evidence after physical
device destruction has taken place, as the medium itself has been rendered unusable. Similarly,
logical evidence destruction has the potential, if implemented correctly, to provide little chance
to recover data. However, improper logical evidence destruction may leave traces of evidence
that still remain in the form of tool logs of incorrectly deleted files.
2.5.1.3 Evidence Elimination
According to Harris (2006), eliminating sources of evidence involves neutralising the creation
of evidence so that it is never produced. A physical world example is wearing gloves when
handling a firearm which means that fingerprints are not left on the object. A simple example
of evidence elimination in digital investigations is the perpetrator disabling system log files to
remove any future event logging; for example, disabling audit logon events so that no entries
are stored when a user logs on to a system. Another example is the use of a live Linux
operating system that can be temporarily used as a secondary system. Since the system is
live, all changes are stored in volatile memory and lost when the system is shut down.
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2.5.1.4 Evidence Counterfeiting
Harris (2006) states that evidence counterfeiting is a method which involves manipulating
digital evidence to produce a faked version of the original data, modified to appear different
in some aspect. A physical world example is planting another person’s registered firearm with
their fingerprints at a crime scene to make it appear the other person was responsible for
the crime. A simple example in the digital world is creating legitimate looking e-mails or
documents on purpose to mislead an investigator. A more technical example is changing the
created timestamp of a file to make it appear that the file was created at a different date and
time then it actually was.
2.5.2 Anti-forensic Tools
“Encryption, steganography and erasing tools are increasingly used by malicious individuals to
hinder forensic investigation” (Davis et al., 2006, p. 171). Therefore, the problems caused by
anti-forensic techniques and the removal of digital evidence is further accentuated by the high
availability of anti-forensic tools capable of achieving the task. These tools usually require
minimal technical knowledge to operate but can cause significant loss of digital evidence;
for example, privacy suite tools “claim to expunge all traces of information about specific
computer usage, including documents and other files created, records of websites visited,
images viewed and files downloaded” (Geiger & Cranor, 2006, p. 16). However, while anti-
forensic tools are relatively easy to use, the underlying principle of how the tool operates is
usually too advanced for an average user to understand.
What also must be understood is that anti-forensic tools are not always developed for
unlawful practices and many have legitimate uses; for example, encryption is a primary tech-
nique to perform data hiding, but encryption tools also have legitimate uses such as protecting
confidential data in government and medical sectors. To avoid confusion, tools that are for
specific anti-forensic use must be classified based on the malicious intent to manipulate the
availability of digital evidence, rather than the technical functionality of the tool. Table 2.7
displays three groups of anti-forensic tools that may be used for illicit purposes with details
of the tool functionality for each classification.
Table 2.7: Anti-forensic tool classifications (Source: Table populated from Garfinkel (2007))
Tool Classification Tool Functionality
Data Encryption Perform data encryption on an entire disk, partition or file using a
variety of encryption algorithms depending on the implementation
and application
Data Wiping Overwrite data on digital data storage devices which may include
overwriting individual files, partitions, whole disks or free space
Privacy Suites Automate the removal (either deletion or overwriting) of digital
artifacts associated with data created by various system or appli-
cation activity
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Anti-forensic tools can be categorised into two main sources, including: 1) Tools that are
built-in to an operating system; and 2) Tools that are purpose built third-party applications.
Although many anti-forensic tools are stand-alone applications, there are also a collection of
built-in operating system utilities to perform anti-forensic techniques; for example, in terms of
logical evidence destruction, most modern operating systems have built-in data wiping utili-
ties: The shred utility is available on most Linux-based operating systems, the cipher.exe
utility is available on most Microsoft Windows systems, and the rm utility (with the -P ar-
gument) can overwrite data files on most Apple OS X systems. In addition, a plethora of
third party tools are available to perform the previously specified anti-forensic techniques.
The following subsections provide a brief summary of the three classifications of anti-forensic
tools with usage examples and a discussion on the effect they have on evidence.
2.5.2.1 Data Encryption Tools
Data encryption tools are able to encrypt data in a range of scenarios, from encrypting a single
file to encrypting an entire hard disk. To heighten the problem, data encryption tools are
readily available. “Advances in communications technologies, such as the Internet, have made
complex encryption products widely accessible, presenting the forensic computer examiner
with a significant barrier” (McKemmish, 1999, p. 6).
Programs such as PGP and TrueCrypt enable file-level encryption, as well as
encrypted containers that may be mounted as a volume and used to store data.
Some encryption systems make an effort to support plausible deniability, making
it difficult to determine whether a disk contains encrypted versus random data
(Casey & Stellatos, 2008, p. 93).
Furthermore, modern operating systems are now shipped with built-in disk encryption ca-
pability; for example, Microsoft Windows BitLocker Drive Encryption or Apple FileVault.
Casey, Fellows, Geiger, and Stellatos (2011) also state that many applications exist for disk
or volume encryption including open source (TrueCrypt) or third party (McAfee’s Safeboot,
WinMagic’s SecureDoc, Symantec’s PGP and GuardianEdge) options.
2.5.2.2 Data Wiping Tools
According to Berghel and Hoelzer (2006), the advancement of modern computer forensics has
prompted disk wiping to become increasingly important to protect proprietary, confidential
and private information, ultimately resulting in a plethora of readily available disk and data
wiping utilities. However, the potential malicious usage of data wiping tools can be devastating
to forensic investigations.
Many existing programs claim to properly sanitize a hard drive, including $1,695
commercial offerings that boast government certifications, more than 50 tools
licensed for a single computer system, and free software/open-source products
that seem to offer largely the same features (Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003, p. 22).
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Data wiping tools can be broadly classified based on functionality into three categories: 1)
Disk wiping tools; and 2) Free space wiping tools; 3) File wiping tools. However, some tools
may include support for two or even all three functions. As the name implies, disk wiping
overwrites all logical data on a digital storage device, or disk. Data wiping tools that overwrite
free space sanitise unallocated, or slack, space on a digital storage device so that previously
deleted (unlinked) files and file fragments are securely removed (Garfinkel & Malan, 2006).
Finally, file wiping tools perform secure removal of data files by overwriting the data contained
in the file.
2.5.2.3 Privacy Tools
Privacy tools operate on the same premise as file wiping tools, by securely deleting files by
overwriting the original file. However, “unlike tools designed to wipe a whole disk or filesystem,
counter-forensic privacy tools are designed to locate activity records scattered across the
computer filesystem and erase them irretrievably, while leaving the system otherwise fully
functional” (Geiger & Cranor, 2006, p. 16). Basically, privacy tools automate the discovery
and secure wiping of data files that may be unwanted. Common examples include temporary
files, Internet history, previously deleted files (e.g., Recycling Bin), search history and a list
of recently used applications or files. There are no built-in privacy tools which are bundled
with operating systems, rather privacy tools are stand-alone third-party applications.
2.5.3 The Anti-forensics Problem
It is important to develop a better understanding of the problems surrounding the use of anti-
forensic techniques and tools because of the impact they have on digital investigations. It has
already been discussed how anti-forensic techniques and associated tools have the potential
to adversely affect the availability of digital evidence. However, the anti-forensics problem is
exacerbated by a variety of other factors including the prevalence, increased sophistication
and availability of anti-forensic tools encountered in real world digital investigations.
2.5.3.1 Anti-forensic Prevalence
According to Sartin (2006), anti-forensics is a trend that is on the rise in both the law enforce-
ment, government and private sectors. In terms of the prevalence of anti-forensics, there is
some difference in opinion on the occurrence of anti-forensics techniques encountered in real
world digital investigations. However, Verizon publish an annual Data Breach Investigations
Report since 2007 which presents detailed information and statistics compiled from the cases
handled by the digital forensic investigation team of the company. “The fact of the matter is
that for the entire period that we have been studying breaches, we have seen consistent signs
of anti-forensics” (Verizon, 2011, p. 61) . Additionally, although anti-forensic techniques are
hard to identify if effective, Verizon (2012, p. 55) states that they often identify anti-forensic
techniques in the field, with an estimation that 1/3 of all cases incorporate some form of anti-
forensic element. Additionally, Verizon (2009, p. 40) states that in cases where anti-forensics
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was encountered, data wiping was discovered in 31% and data hiding techniques accounted
for 9% of all cases reported.
2.5.3.2 Anti-forensic Tool Usage
The techniques and tools used to remove the availability of evidence are becoming increasingly
sophisticated and, thus, presenting a growing challenge for investigators. “Computer forensics
presumed usefulness against anyone with computer savvy is minimal because such persons can
readily defeat forensics techniques” (Caloyannides, 2009, p. 18). The ability to compromise
potentially essential digital evidence presents a daunting problem for the digital investigation
process.
Unfortunately, with people becoming more mindful of information security, the
further introduction of security within operating systems (e.g. full disk encryp-
tion within Microsoft and Apple Mac), the promotion of anti-forensic technologies
and wiping of media, the ability for investigators to locate relevant evidence will
become increasingly challenging (Fahdi et al., 2013, p. 7-8).
A further challenge is the availability of anti-forensic tools. “The number of scholarly papers on
protecting against anti-forensic methods is greatly outnumbered by the number of websites
about how to exploit the forensic process” (Harris, 2006, p. S48). A quick Google search
emphasises the availability of data wiping tools, producing approximately 12 million links
using the term data wiping tool as a keyword. A brief investigation provides a perpetrator
with numerous potential data wiping tools for any operating system platform. On the first
page of the performed Google search, a Wikipedia page was found named List of data-erasing
software with a total of 16 different data wiping tools (Wikipedia, 2016). Additionally, another
list entitled 42 Free Data Destruction Software Programs was also found on the first page of
links (Fisher, 2016). The same problems are also prevalent for encryption programs and other
similar anti-forensic tools. This readily available information illustrates that anti-forensic
tools and associated information on how to use them is widely distributed and available to
anyone with an Internet connection.
2.6 Conclusion
Chapter 2 has presented the pertinent background information required to understand the
content covered during the course of this research project. An overview of digital forensics was
presented which included various phases of the investigation procedure. Digital evidence was
defined and outlined including the use of digital artifacts to aid forensic analysis, evidence
sources of digital artifacts used in this research, as well as a summary of commonly used
forensic data abstractions. Various digital forensic research challenges were identified. A
review of anti-forensics provided a summary of techniques and associated tools used to remove
the availability of digital evidence, followed by the real world challenges faced by anti-forensic
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presence in digital investigations. This background information has led to knowledge of the
subject area and direction of this research project.
Chapter 3 continues on from the background information presented in this chapter with
the purpose of reviewing further literature to aid in identification of gaps in existing research.
Limitations of the technology, techniques and tools used to perform forensic analysis of ap-






Chapter 2 presented an overview of relevant background material for this research project in
which a summary of digital forensics, digital evidence and digital forensic research challenges
were summarised. An introduction to application software was presented coupled with typical
forensic analysis techniques used to investigate applications. Anti-forensics was then outlined
with a summary of the techniques and tools which can be maliciously used to remove the
availability of digital evidence creating problems that challenge both research and real world
investigations.
This chapter presents an in-depth review of literature that is pertinent to the selected
research topic; specifically, literature that focusses on either forensic analysis of anti-forensic
tools or automated forensic analysis. Firstly, a study of research papers surrounding the
forensic analysis of anti-forensic tools is presented. This aims to summarise previous research
in the detection of anti-forensic tools as well as to provide an overview of digital artifacts
associated with anti-forensic tool usage. A detailed evaluation of reverse engineering tech-
niques and tools is then undertaken; the goal being to identify current reverse engineering
practices to aid identification of digital artifacts from application software, and more specif-
ically, anti-forensic tools. Next, various approaches to performing automated digital artifact
detection are critiqued to determine what techniques are available to identify digital artifacts
from application software on an investigation target with a summary of the problems and
issues discovered.
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3.1 Forensic Analysis of Anti-forensic Tools
Anti-forensic tools were previously introduced (see Section 2.5) and shown to have the poten-
tial to remove the availability of digital evidence. As such, academic research has analysed
the techniques these tools implement to determine how they operate and how they can be
defeated. Specifically, attempts to determine digital artifact remnants left after anti-forensic
tool usage has been a key focus. Research has also investigated techniques to detect anti-
forensic tool usage on an investigation target. In order to provide a better understanding of
preceding research, a body of similar case studies will be reviewed in the following subsections.
Where available, information will be discussed regarding what types of digital artifacts are
potentially available and what methods and tools were used by researchers to reverse engineer
the tested anti-forensic tools.
3.1.1 Evaluation of Counter-Forensic Privacy Tools
Geiger (2005), and Geiger and Cranor (2006), both reviewed the performance of six com-
mercial anti-forensic privacy tools in terms of the ability to purge a variety of operating
system activity including Internet history, recently used files, search history, temporary files,
previously deleted files and unallocated space. The research papers outlined that the experi-
mental testing platform was Windows XP Professional with the New Technology File System
(NTFS). Additional software was installed, including Microsoft Office. Eight days of typical
user activity was performed1 and documented using specific marker phrases to later identify
content. This process was repeated for each of the six anti-forensic tools tested on a sepa-
rate testing system. Each system was subjected to a forensic bit-by-bit copy and analysis
performed using a common forensic analysis tool, namely Forensic ToolKit produced by
Access Data. Additionally, a baseline system was created prior to anti-forensic tool usage.
Geiger (2005) documented the successes, errors and limitations for the six selected anti-
forensic tools. Notable tool errors included incomplete wiping of unallocated space, failure
to wipe targeted user and system files, failure to remove Registry records (e.g., a list of
recently used files), failure to wipe data retained in the actual file system table and failure
to remove system restore points. In addition, each anti-forensic tool left a variety of tool
operation information including a record of tool configuration and activity (e.g., files selected
for deletion) and distinct file signatures (e.g., wiped files were renamed with a unique suffix).
This information is exceptionally useful for a practitioner to discover; that is, what files were
targeted by the user and what files were securely removed by an anti-forensic tool.
Selectively purging sensitive data on a filesystem - as opposed to a blanket wipe of
the filesystem - is a challenging task. All of the commercial counter-forensic tools
tested left data of potential value to an investigation of activity on the computer
system (Geiger, 2005, p. 11).
1The typical user activity included browsing arbitrary websites, registering new accounts for websites,
posting comments to online forums, saving HTML pages, performing instant messenger chatting and retrieving
and composing emails.
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Nevertheless, each anti-forensic tool did succeed in wiping the majority of targeted data, hav-
ing the potential to destroy evidence and hinder the forensic analysis process. Geiger (2005)
proposed future research to carry out additional analysis of anti-forensic tools to document
operation weaknesses and to expand a catalog of file signatures that are created by anti-
forensic tools when wiping data files. Full details of discovered weaknesses and discovered file
signatures are available from Geiger (2005), and Geiger and Cranor (2006).
3.1.2 Assessing Trace Evidence Left by Secure Deletion Programs
Burke and Craiger (2006) published a paper entitled: Assessing Trace Evidence Left by Secure
Deletion Programs, which investigated trace evidence from a collection of Windows based anti-
forensic tools to perform secure deletion (data wiping). The overall findings indicate that the
majority of secure deletion programs left identifiable signatures and file system metadata when
deleting files. In contrast to the previous research study by Geiger (2005), Burke and Craiger
(2006) investigated data wiping tools in the context of securely deleting data files rather than
evaluating privacy tools which automate data wiping of specific digital artifacts.
Burke and Craiger (2006) implemented a test environment using a sanitised floppy disk
and copied the target data file to the disk. Each of the five secure deletion programs were then
used to wipe the file on a separate testing system. “As expected, all the programs completely
deleted the file contents. However, several programs did leave digital signatures within the
file’s root directory entry” (Burke & Craiger, 2006, p. 191). Table 3.1 displays a summary
of the identifiable file signatures and file system metadata information that remained after
performing secure deletion of a file. All file signatures are displayed using the short (MS-DOS)
file name convention.
Table 3.1: File signatures from secure deletion programs (Source: Table derived from Burke
and Craiger (2006, p. 191-195))
Tool Version Identifiable File Signature
Evidence Eliminator 5.0 Did not rename deleted file, did not remove file system meta-
data and also created temporary file, named “?E--- 1.TMP”
UltraSentry 2.0 Attempted to rename deleted file name to “?PPPPP.PPP”,
where new file name is the same length as the original, also
no file system metadata associated with the deleted file was
removed
CyberScrub 4.0 File name and metadata were overwritten with random char-
acters and values, deleted file was set to the “hidden” attribute
and directory entries were renamed with the “.WIP” extension
East-Tec Eraser 2005 File name and metadata were overwritten with random char-
acters and values, deleted file was set to the “hidden” attribute
and directory entries were renamed with the “.WIP” extension
Eraser 5.3 File name renamed with random characters, file creation and
modification dates set to the FAT file system epoch (January
1, 1980)
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“Tests of five popular Windows-based programs demonstrate that each program leaves unique
signatures, which could assist examiners in determining whether a secure deletion was per-
formed and in identifying the program used to perform the deletion” (Burke & Craiger, 2006,
p. 194-195). Interestingly, the findings determined that various file system metadata informa-
tion, including creation and modification time stamps, was left unaltered by most programs
which could assist in determining the date and time that secure deletion took place.
Future research suggested extending the research to other file systems such as FAT32,
NTFS and EXT2 and other operating systems including Linux, UNIX and Apple OS X. Ad-
ditionally, Burke and Craiger (2006) also noted that all of the tested programs had numerous
options which could be optimised to extend the effectiveness of the secure deletion process.
3.1.3 An Evaluation of Data Erasing Tools
Martin and Jones (2011) performed similar research to Burke and Craiger (2006) but carried
out a more extensive test using twelve different data wiping tools and a much larger data
set, comprised of hundreds of thousand data files. Overall, the number of anti-forensic tool
failures were observed to be high; in particular it was detected that a variety of residual data
in the System Volume Information folder present on NTFS file systems.
The testing method first involved creating a baseline data set comprised of a collection
of more than 140,000 data files of different file types (e.g., archives, images, documents and
videos). The testing environment used a sanitised physical 80 GB hard drive to ensure no
residual data remained, copying the file data set to the hard drive, wiping all files using each
data wiping tool, and finally creating a forensic image of the drive. A range of common forensic
analysis tools were used, two if which were Forensic Toolkit, md5deep to perform file
hashing and scalpel to perform file carving. Table 3.2 displays an analysis of the results
including the tool name, version, number of files recovered by Forensic Toolkit (FTK),
the number of files recovered by scalpel and the data wiping pattern.
Table 3.2: Forensic analysis results of data erasing tools (Source: Table derived from Martin
and Jones (2011, p. 87-88))
Tool Version FTK Scalpel Overwrite
Recovered Recovered Pattern
BCWipe 4.01.23 28,326 170 Zeroes
DPWiper 1.1 91 126 Random
Eraser 6.0.8.2273 3,255 40 Random
File Eraser 5.7 3,075 6,333 Random
File Shredder 2.0 145,695 59 Random
Freeraser 1.0.0.23 145,687 12 Random
Hard Drive Eraser 2.0 58 34 Unknown
The overall results discovered that seven of the twelve data wiping tools left recoverable
information. Forensic Toolkit was able to recover a large number of data files, while the
scalpel file carver was able to extract fragments of files, as well as some entire files.
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3.1.4 Identifying Trace Evidence from Target-Specific Data Wiping
Carlton and Kessler (2012) performed an investigation of five privacy tools that securely wipe
targeted files and evidence of selected system activity including Internet history and Registry
entries. The goal of the research was to identify trace evidence which data wiping programs
left after usage. The research conducted is similar to that previously covered but evaluation
was performed on more recent software including the Microsoft Windows 7 operating system
and data wiping tools that support Windows 7 and have a Graphical User Interface (GUI).
Carlton and Kessler (2012) prepared sample data on fresh Windows 7 installation and
inserted a collection of sample data on the system. A total of 57 sample data files were
added to the system, made up of common file formats including documents and images. Files
were added using a variety of scenarios such as downloading files from the Internet, creating
documents using a word processor and taking and saving screenshots. This resulted in a
variety of generated data in various evidence sources. Each anti-forensic tool was executed
on an identical system and configured to wipe specific files and to automate discovery and
wiping of Internet history and Registry entries.
The findings stated that all five data wiping tools left some form of trace evidence that may
be of value to forensic analysts (Carlton & Kessler, 2012). Specifically, the findings showed
that trace digital artifacts remained in web browser history and in the Windows Registry while
some data wiping tools created log files which retained information regarding tool usage.
3.1.5 Detecting Data Concealment Programs
Davis et al. (2006) published a paper entitled: Detecting Data Concealment Programs Using
Passive File System Analysis, outlining a method to detect trace evidence left by data wiping
tools. The previously reviewed studies in this section analysed the failures of data wiping tools
which left traces of evidence. This research differs in that the premise is: “having established
the presence of a specific data concealment program on a seized computer, an investigator can
attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities in the program to recover concealed or erased data”
(Davis et al., 2006, p. 181–182). The vulnerabilities discussed are anti-forensic tool errors; for
example, the tool has not been successful in completely removing the data (as described in
the previous studies).
Davis et al. (2006) first described the application software life cycle (see Section 2.4.1),
stating that an application has various phases of operation including installation, execution
and uninstallation. Providing an investigator with information of where the application is
found in the life cycle is valuable evidence to determine the actions of the perpetrator. The
application life cycle was recreated for a selection of data wiping tools and an application
fingerprint generated which contained metadata about data files. Figure 3.1 displays an
overview of the implemented system to perform fingerprint generation of a specific program.
It is important to note that Davis et al. (2006) constructed a single fingerprint for each



















Figure 3.1: Fingerprint generation system to detect data concealment programs (Source:
Figure adapted from Davis et al. (2006, p. 177-178))
After identification of the digital artifacts associated with a specific program, the conducted
research developed and tested a tool, dubbed Seraph, which aimed to assist forensic inves-
tigators by automating the detection of digital artifacts associated with various data wiping
applications. According to Davis et al. (2006), digital artifact matching was performed by
correlation of the file name, full file system path, or MD5 file hash. In terms of matching
effectiveness, file name matching produced a significant number of false positives due to a
common file name; for example, most applications include a readme.txt file. When using
the full path the false positive rate was greatly reduced, especially when applications were
installed in default directories. Additionally, using file hashing was effective, but the results
illustrated a drop in effectiveness as different versions of the same software produced different
file hash values. Table 3.3 displays an overview of the results from the experimental testing of
the Seraph tool including the data wiping tool tested and the corresponding software state,
the number of matched entries compared to the entries in the fingerprint profile, as well as
the related confidence rating.
Table 3.3: Seraph matching results (Source: Table taken from Davis et al. (2006, p. 179))
Program State Matched Fingerprint Confidence
Entries Entries
Complete Cleanup Installed 39 42 92.86%
Complete Cleanup Run 43 46 93.48%
Eraser Installed 41 48 85.42%
Eraser Run 40 49 81.63%
TrackEraser Installed 53 55 96.36%
TrackEraser Run 53 56 94.64%
Overall, the research conducted by Davis et al. (2006) was a new technique to generate
reference sets for data wiping tools. However, a number of limitations are present, including
generating only digital artifacts for the install and run phases of the application life cycle. The
uninstallation phase would also be an important phase to test as perpetrators might uninstall
a tool to potentially remove any traces of activity.
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3.1.6 Anti-forensic Research Challenges
The previous subsections introduced and discussed research papers that focussed on advancing
research and knowledge on the topic of anti-forensic techniques and tools. The reviewed
academic research papers can be categorised into the following three primary research areas:
1) Evaluating the performance of anti-forensic tool functionality; for example, the ability
of a data wiping tool to remove all evidence (Geiger, 2005; Geiger & Cranor, 2006;
Burke & Craiger, 2006; Martin & Jones, 2011)
2) Determining residual remnants from anti-forensic tool operation; for example, log files
which retain tool operation information (Geiger, 2005; Martin & Jones, 2011; Carlton
& Kessler, 2012)
3) Development and evaluation of systems to aid detection of anti-forensic tools; for exam-
ple, automating analysis of data files associated with a known anti-forensic tool (Davis
et al., 2006)
While all the mentioned research papers have presented useful and interesting findings for the
digital forensic community, serious research challenges remain. The problem is that, although
much research has been conducted, the current methods ultimately result in researchers having
to test every anti-forensic tool (and every tool version) on every operating system in every
scenario. Furthermore, the research output distributes knowledge and practitioners must read
every paper to determine the effect of a specific anti-forensic tool which they may encounter
in an investigation. If documentation is not available, investigators must themselves conduct
time consuming research to establish such knowledge. Overall, this method results in research
output that produces no technological advancement to the fundamental methods, techniques
and tools with which digital investigation of anti-forensic tools are performed.
Research requires that the tested anti-forensic tools be reverse engineered to determine the
digital artifacts created, modified or removed. Furthermore, each project investigates anti-
forensic tools in an endless variety of scenarios; for example, wiping a file, wiping Internet
related files, deleting Registry keys or wiping an entire disk. Each of these scenarios is also
affected by the experimental testing environment. Basically, no official set of procedures exist
for analysing each tool. Instead of each researcher setting an arbitrary number of experiments,
a method is needed to specify important scenarios to test. The overall outcome is that no
tangable advancement of the underlying technology is made from the research topics outlined
in the previous subsections. Research is required in the area of anti-forensic tool detection to
narrow the scope of the investigation, allowing the practitioner to manually analyse a specific
tool to find trace evidence and establish digital events.
Forensic tools will have to become less focused upon identifying evidence that
is criminal in its own right and become more intelligent in identifying artifacts
that highlight misuse. For example, analyses will need to be developed that are
capable of picking up trace evidence to the application of anti-forensic techniques.
Whilst not evidence of the crime itself, it will provide invaluable intelligence to
the examiner to how to best proceed (Fahdi et al., 2013, p. 7).
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In summary, previous research in the realm of anti-forensics has provided a strong definition
of scope; knowledge regarding effectiveness of anti-forensic tools and knowledge regarding
remnant digital artifacts and unique file signatures. The following section investigates the use
of reverse engineering to aid in deconstructing anti-forensic tools and application software in
a general sense. The outcome of the process would be discovery of digital artifacts associated
with an anti-forensic tool which may later be used to aid detection on an investigation target.
3.2 Reverse Engineering of Application Software
The use of system-level reverse engineering to aid digital forensics has already been briefly
introduced and defined (see Section 2.4.2). To reiterate, reverse engineering is the process of
analysing a subject to create a representation of that subject at a higher level. For clarity,
this research uses the generic term reverse engineering to refer to system-level reverse
engineering. In digital forensics reverse engineering application software is commonly used to
determine the digital artifacts (e.g., data files or Registry entries) created on a system; for
example, malware is reverse engineered to determine how it operates.
In terms of application software, reverse engineering is usually accomplished by performing
system-level reverse engineering. “System-level reversing requires a variety of tools that
sniff, monitor, explore and otherwise expose the program to being reversed” (Eilam, 2011,
p. 15). Such tools have the functionality to obtain system-level information about applica-
tions and track program input and output; for example, when an application is installed,
tools can track what file system and Windows Registry additions, modifications or deletions
have occurred. Two primary techniques are commonly implemented for system-level reverse
engineering of application software: 1) System monitoring; and 2) Differential analysis. Each
technique has certain advantages and disadvantages but both have the functionality to moni-
tor and determine the system-level changes that an application makes during the application
life cycle.
3.2.1 System Monitoring
System monitoring has a broad scope depending on the context in which it is implemented;
it can range from monitoring the resources (CPU usage, running processes, RAM utilization)
of a single desktop to monitoring an entire network of computers using a distributed system.
However, system monitoring is not solely for performance measurements, rather, it also in-
cludes monitoring system activity and tracking system changes. In digital forensics, system
monitoring encompasses the latter scope, where tools are commonly used to track system
activity including events such as file system and Windows Registry changes.
System monitoring tools range in scope, complexity and functionality; for example, the
Microsoft Windows built-in tool, Task Manager, is a type of system monitoring tool which
displays the programs, processes and services that are running on a system. However, Task
Manager provides no functionality to determine file system or Windows Registry changes, or
the ability to record such events, which are both necessary functions for reverse engineering
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of application software. This section will therefore outline system monitoring tools used in
digital investigations to track and record operating system events with a specific emphasis on
detecting file system and Windows Registry changes. Table 3.4 displays a selection of system
monitoring tools commonly used in digital forensics to reverse engineer application software.
Table 3.4: An overview of system monitoring tools to track file system and Windows Registry
changes. Operating system (OS) support is checked if the tool natively supports Windows
XP, Vista, 7 and 8. File system and Registry columns indicate support for each data source.
Logging indicates the functionality to output discovered system changes to the following log
file formats: TXT = Text based log file, PML = Native Process Monitor Format, CSV =
Comma-Separated Values, XML = Extensible Markup Language
Tool License OS File System Registry Logging
CaptureBAT Open 3 3 3 3 TXT
FileMon Freeware 7 3 7 3 PML, CSV, XML
RegMon Freeware 7 7 3 3 PML, CSV, XML
Process Monitor Freeware 3 3 3 3 PML, CSV, XML
Seifert et al. (2007) developed a system monitoring tool specifically targeted for digital foren-
sics called CaptureBAT2. The tool provides the functionality to monitor Microsoft Windows
operating system state changes at a low kernel level and has the ability to capture both
file system and Windows Registry changes, as well as monitoring process information. All
events that CaptureBAT detects are logged to standard output in a delimited text format
including the timestamp (date and time), the source (file system, Registry or process), the
event (e.g., write, create), the process that caused the event and the full path of the file that
was acted upon. CaptureBAT includes portable exclusion lists that are designed to omit
detected events from being logged; this being included to filter normal system events such as
system services that are constantly running and creating system noise. Seifert et al. (2007)
demonstrated CaptureBAT capability by analysing and collecting evidence of the payload
from a malicious Microsoft Word document being invoked on a test system. A key point of
CaptureBAT is it was designed for digital forensic requirements.
According to Russinovich and Margosis (2011), FileMon captures information about
file system activity, while RegMon captures information about Registry activity. However,
according to Microsoft (2016a) and Microsoft (2016c) both tools are out-dated with the last
release being in 2006. Process Monitor3 was first released in 2006 to replace the obsolete
FileMon and RegMon tools. Process Monitor provides a unified view of file system,
Registry and process activity while offering non-destructive filtering and a detailed log file
format (Russinovich & Margosis, 2011). The functionality to log changes is essential to
perform forensic analysis of application software. Process Monitor includes support to
log system changes to the Process Monitor Format (PML) and export options to Comma-




Many forensic and digital investigators consider the tool [Process Monitor] the de
facto advanced monitoring tool for Windows systems due to its advanced features,
including live filtering and the ability to save session details in Process Monitor
Format (PML), which further allows the data to be loaded into Process Monitor
for subsequent analysis (Halsey & Bettany, 2015, p. 25).
Tools such as Process Monitor and CaptureBAT determine file system and Registry
changes using common operating system Application Programming Interfaces (API). For ex-
ample, the CaptureBAT tool monitors file system changes using kernel drivers and call-
back functions available in the Windows API (Seifert et al., 2007). Examples provided are
ReadDirectoryChangesW() and FindFirstChangeNotification() functions which
have the capability to monitor a directory (or entire volume) for changes (Microsoft, 2017a).
Another example is the FileSystemWatcher class avilable in the .NET framework which
also monitors a directory for file system changes (Microsoft, 2017b). The stated APIs have
the capability to be easily implemented to track both file system and Registry changes in
Windows environments. In addition, similar solutions exist for Linux and OS X operating
systems.
In summary, system monitoring tools provide the functionality for forensic analysts to
reverse engineer application software by detecting and reporting system-level changes. All of
the reviewed system monitoring tools operate in real time on a running operating system.
However, while all tools collect detailed information on running processes, this particular
functionality is not required for this research project. Rather, the goal is to determine the
digital artifact changes that application software creates. Another technique that can be
implemented to reverse engineer application software, however, is differential analysis.
3.2.2 Differential Analysis
Garfinkel, Nelson, and Young (2012) define differential analysis as an analytical process that
compares two objects and reports the differences between them. Differential analysis is a type
of delta algorithm which can be defined as an function that computes the difference between
two files or strings (Hunt, Vo, & Tichy, 1996). Delta algorithms are commonly used for version
management systems that track revisions of documents or computer programs. A simple
example is the diff utility that is included in most Linux operating systems. Differential
analysis, specifically differential forensic analysis, operates on the same principles as delta
algorithms but varies depending on the nature of input. While delta algorithms commonly
take text files as input, differential forensic analysis performs differencing on objects such as
forensic disk images, Registry hive files, or network traffic captures.
The differential forensic analysis formula developed by Garfinkel et al. (2012) can be
expressed as: A −−−−−−−−−→
R
B. “If A and B are disk images and the examiner is evaluating
the installation footprint of a new application, then R might be a list of files and Registry
entries that are created or changed” (Garfinkel et al., 2012, p. S51). The objects that are
compared using differential analysis can be any two common objects; for example, two forensic
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disk images of hard drives, two data files, or two network traffic capture files. The result from
differential analysis is the reporting of changes between the two objects; for example, in the
case of two forensic disk images the differences are the additions, modifications, or deletions
to the file system and Windows Registry that occur. Table 3.5 displays a group of various
differential analysis tools supported on the Microsoft Windows operating system.
Table 3.5: An overview of differential analysis tools to determine file system and Windows
Registry changes made by an application. Data source indicates the input data requirements.
File system and Registry columns indicate support for each data source. Logging indicates
the functionality to output discovered system changes to the following log file formats: TXT
= Text based log file, PML = Native Process Monitor Format, CSV = Comma-Separated
Values, XML = Extensible Markup Language, DFXML = Digital Forensic XML, RegXML
= Registry XML
Tool License Data Source File System Registry Logging
Regshot Open Live Differencing 3 3 3 TXT
WhatsChanged Freeware Live Differencing 3 3 3 TXT
idifference.py Open Disk Image 3 7 3 TXT, DFXML
idifference2.py Open Disk Image 3 7 3 TXT, DFXML
rdifference.py Open Registry hive 7 3 3 RegXML
The tools are categorised based on the input data source, either: 1) Snapshot tools which
are run on a live operating system and use a live file system and Registry hives to perform
differential analysis; and 2) Disk image and Registry hive tools which use post-mortem data
sources such as a forensic disk image of a hard drive and offline Registry hive files to perform
differential analysis.
3.2.2.1 Snapshot Tools
Snapshot tools, also referred to as live differencing tools or simply diff tools, are similar
to system monitoring techniques but function using a different method to determine system-
level changes. Both techniques are executed on a live running operating system. System
monitoring tools operate by constantly monitoring the system and reporting changes, while
snapshot tools collect a snapshot before and after a specific scenario, compare them and
report the results; for example, a snapshot of file system entries is collected before and after
an application installation, compared and the differences between them reported.
The Regshot tool is a differencing utility available for Microsoft Windows. Regshot
provides the functionality to take a system snapshot of the file system and Windows Registry
on a live system and compare them to determine the changes that have occured (Carvey,
2011). Regshot has been used by in a number of digital forensic research studies to re-
verse engineer applications and determine the digital artifacts created or left after performing
different actions. Studies where Regshot was used for data collection include the forensic
analysis of digital artifacts left by virtual disk encryption tools (Lim, Park, s. Lim, Lee, &
Lee, 2010), investigation of Registry artifacts produced by BitTorrent applications (Lallie &
Briggs, 2011), review of cloud storage client applications (Malik, Shashidhar, & Chen, 2015)
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and an analysis of timestamps when inserting and removing USB devices (Deb & Chetry,
2015). Furthermore, as stated by Kang and Srivastava (2011), Regshot is commonly used
to perform dynamic malware analysis; a technique that monitors malware on a system.
There are a variety of similar tools, such as WhatsChanged, but none are prominent in
digital forensics practice or research. According to He, Duan, Luo, Wang, and Zhang (2011),
WhatsChanged is a system snapshot tool that can scan the file system and Registry, save the
snapshot and compare multiple snapshots. A variety of other similar solutions exist including
InCtrl54, TrackWinstall5 and SysTracer6. It is important to note that none of these
tools were designed specifically for digital forensics in spite of having been adopted by forensic
researchers in the absence of a better solution.
3.2.2.2 Disk Image and Registry Hive Tools
In contrast to snapshot tools, there are a selection of differential analysis tools that have been
specifically designed for digital forensic research. These tools were developed by Garfinkel et
al. (2012) when outlining a general strategy to perform differential forensic analysis and are
built on specifically authored high-level forensic data abstractions (e.g., Digital Forensic XML
(DFXML)) developed by the same researchers (see Section 2.2.3.2).
Garfinkel et al. (2012) authored tools to perform differential analysis of: 1) Forensic disk
image contents, specifically, file system differences; and 2) Windows Registry hive files. Both
tools leverage the DFXML data abstraction, associated DFXML Application Programming In-
terface (API) and are written in the Python programming language. The idifference.py7
tool takes two forensic disk images as input (or two DFXML reports generated by fiwalk)
and reports the differences between them. The rdifference.py8 tool takes two offline
Registry hive files as input (or two RegXML reports generated by the regxml_extractor9
tool) and reports the differences between them. Both tools are relatively new, being released
in 2012, and designed specifically for digital forensics research.
Nelson, Steggall, and Long (2014) performed additional research and development of
DFXML differencing capabilities resulting in a completely rewritten file system differencing
tool, idifference2.py10. They also wrote and released a new DFXML API, Objects.py11,
to provide additional functionality.
In summary, this section has explored academic literature resources and provided examples
of reverse engineering techniques and tools used to aid digital forensic research. The express
goal of reverse engineering in this research project is to determine the digital artifacts that
are uniquely associated with application software. However, a number of challenges exist that










3.2.3 Reverse Engineering Challenges
A variety of techniques and an assortment of tools to perform system-level reverse engineering
of application software has highlighted a collection of fundamental problems when performing
reverse engineering as an aid to digital forensics. Challenges include a lack of standardisation
surrounding reverse engineering techniques and tools, problems with experimental testing
environments and methods, as well as a high prevalence of unrelated results from reverse
engineering caused by operating system noise.
3.2.3.1 Lack of Standardisation
Although reverse engineering tools, specifically differential analysis tools, are widely used in
digital forensics to achieve a variety of reverse engineering tasks, there is no standardisation of
the procedures, techniques or tools that should be used. The following direct quote eloquently
summarises the current situation:
Many of today’s DF [digital forensic] engineering resources are dedicated to re-
verse engineering hardware and software artifacts that have been developed by
the global IT economy and sold without restrictions into the marketplace. But
despite the resources being expended, researchers lack a systematic approach to
reverse engineering. There is no standard set of tools or procedure. There is little
automation. As a result, each project is a stand-alone endeavor, and the results
of one project generally cannot exchange data or high-level processing with other
tools in today’s forensic kit (Garfinkel, 2010, p. S68).
In later research, Garfinkel et al. (2012) specified a general strategy for differential forensic
analysis which provides an abstract differencing procedure to suit a variety of evidence sources
(disk images, network traffic and volatile memory captures). Although such research helps
to standardise the technology implemented to perform reverse engineering, there are still no
standardised tools available to reverse engineer application software. Instead, researchers and
practitioners implement techniques lacking digital forensic requirements and tool that lack
digital forensic functionality.
Commonly used tools, such as Regshot, were never designed for use in digital forensic
research and lack the functionality required for the specialist area of forensic analysis; for
example, Regshot provides limited metadata when reporting system-level changes and does
not include important information such as cryptographic hash values for identified files. Ad-
ditionally, the text-based output of most differencing tools is not easily parsed and usually
requires manual analysis or an API authored and tested to handle each output format. Fur-
thermore, each tool generates a different output syntax, requiring a different method to parse
the results from each tool. It is also difficult to share the output from reverse engineering
tools when each tool generates different output formats.
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3.2.3.2 Experimental Testing Challenges
Two foremost challenges still exist when performing reverse engineering in the realm of digital
forensic research: 1) Contamination of the testing environment; and 2) Non-standardised
experimental testing methods.
Although the discussed reverse engineering tools are useful at detecting and recording
system-level changes, they can also introduce unrelated data into a testing environment. “The
use of a system monitoring tool to collect data during experimentation can introduce errors
into an experiment” (Casey, 2013, p. 167). Quick and Choo (2013) agree with this position,
stating that system monitoring tools can introduce unintended changes to the monitored
system. The same problem exists for any system monitoring or differential analysis tool
that is being executed on a running system where the use of the tool creates additional
digital artifacts on the system. Therefore, tools should only be used on a system which is
independent to the actual system used during testing. A simple method to achieve this is to
implement Virtual Machines (VM) and clone the same virtual hard drive used for testing to
an independent system. This creates an exact replica of the test system which can be used
for system monitoring purposes and provides a controlled and contaminant free test system
environment. However, the previously mentioned idifference.py and rdifference.py
tools do not suffer from this issue because the tools are not executed on a live system. This
means that unintended changes cannot be made to the target system being analysed. In
comparison, if live system monitoring tools need to be executed on the same testing system
it is necessary to test the tools to determine the digital artifacts that have been created. The
identified digital artifacts can then be documented so that the entries can be deleted from
any results.
A further challenge with experimental testing using reverse engineering is the method or
procedure of how an application is reverse engineered. There are a large number of variables
that exist when reverse engineering of an application software is performed:
1) There exists a variety of different application life cycle phases which can be recreated
and reverse engineered.
2) There exists a variety of different operating systems on which to perform reverse en-
gineering of application software. Since each operating system introduces changes to
what digital artifacts are produced the output will be different. This is true for different
operating system platforms (e.g., Windows versus Linux) and even in the same family
of operating systems (e.g., Window XP versus Windows 7).
3) There exists a variety of different application software versions to perform experimental
testing. Similarly to different operating system versions, different application software
versions can produce different results.
Each research effort commonly analyses a single application software version on a single op-
erating system platform or version and can produce dramatically different results when com-
pared to a different experimental testing environments. The challenge of a variable testing
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environment culminates in one research study being directly linked to a single operating sys-
tem (platform and version) and a single application version. Due to the extensive resources
required to perform reverse engineering research to aid digtial forensics, it is currently not
feasible to test every application version on every potential operating system. As also stated,
each research study can pick and choose which of the application life cycle phases to investi-
gate. To combat this, a generic testing procedure needs to be implemented.
3.2.3.3 Prevalence of Unrelated Results
Another challenge when performing reverse engineering of application software is that a high
number of unrelated results are commonly detected and reported. This is because modern
operating systems are highly complex and even when the system is idle (not actively running
any user-level applications or tasks) there can be services, processes and network activity that
creates system noise.
To determine the behaviour of software on a complex operating system is a difficult
endeavour. Many system events occur even when an operating system is idle.
Thousands of events are generated that would overwhelm an analyst if one would
simply listen to all events. On a clean, idle Windows XP SP2 installation, we
observed 530 registry events and 60 file events within 1 min (Seifert et al., 2007,
p. S24).
To support this argument, Garfinkel et al. (2012) performed a differential forensic analysis
on the M57-Patents scenario and discovered that realistic usage of a Windows XP system
over one (1) day generated approximately 5,000 new files, 200 deleted files and 700 files with
modified content. Garfinkel et al. (2012) documented that the majority of file system changes
appeared to be the result of non-interactive processes (system services), Windows updates
and application software updates. The high number of results that are not directly related
to an application makes it difficult to determine what digital artifacts are actually associated
with, or unique to, the application. This leaves the challenge of filtering unrelated results.
However, various solutions have been proposed.
Carvey (2011) states that when using differencing tools to perform Windows Registry
analysis the best practice is to collect a snapshot before and after a single task, defined as
an atomic action; for example, collecting a system snapshot before and after installing
the application. By using atomic actions the time taken between collecting the two system
snapshots should reduce possible extraneous information that is not specifically related to
the application being investigated. By using a shorter time frame or smaller task the system
activity between snapshots should result in a reduced number of differential analysis results.
Kälber, Dewald, and Freiling (2013) proposed a consensus building approach when reverse
engineering application software by performing multiple runs for each atomic action to build
metadata profiles. For each application being profiled they performed each atomic action
(e.g., installing the application) a total of 100 times, the returned results were compared and
only the digital artifacts that were present in all 100 profiles were selected. This technique
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is similar to the matimatical principle of set intersection, where the intersection of two sets
is the objects that reside in both input sets. The premise is that specific irrelevant entries
may be present in some test results, but not all. Therefore, only entries that are unique to
the application will be present every reverse engineering report. (James, Gladyshev, & Zhu,
2011) performed a similar consensus building approach, by running Process Monitor 400
times per test and selecting only entries that were present in every test. Using this approach
the number of detected Registry entries was reduced from approximately 11,000 to 4,000.
However, “consistent noise was still found to be present” (James et al., 2011, p. 99). A similar
technique to using a consensus building approach could be to use multiple tools to reverse
engineer the same scenario on the same test system and compare the output from different
tools.
Seifert et al. (2007) state that normal system events are constantly generated and therefore,
adopted the use of exclusion lists to omit results from the final report. Exclusion lists are also
commonly referred to as blacklists and contain content that should be ignored. However, this
requires knowledge of the digital artifacts that a specific application creates before performing
reverse engineering.
The sources of literature consulted in reverse engineering of application software has fea-
tured not just the various techniques and procedures used, but also identified and highlights
some shortcomings. Potential scope for improvements with an emphasis on standardisation,
functionality and digital forensic requirements are a few of the challenges to be addressed by
future research.
3.3 Automated Digital Forensic Analysis
The previous section discussed the use of reverse engineering as a resource to aid digital
forensic analysis. The generated outcome of this process is the identification of the digital
artifacts associated with application software. This information is classified as known content
that can be linked to a specific application. In order to establish the presence, or absence,
of application software on a target data set, the previously known content can be searched
for. If a match is detected it can be concluded that the application is, in fact, present on
the system. Likewise, if not, it can be concluded that the application is not present on the
system.
The importance of digital artifacts was previously discussed (see Section 2.2.1) but to
reiterate, digital artifacts are a fundamental source of evidence in digital investigations which
is simply digital data that is logically grouped; for example, file system entries (e.g., data
files and directories) and Windows Registry entries (e.g., Registry keys and values). Digital
forensic analysis commonly involves searching electronic data for digital artifacts of interest
within each of these entities. This provides the information, and ultimately the evidence of
the actions that a suspect has performed.
This section discusses literature that is relevant to automating forensic analysis, specifically
automated detection of digital artifacts from application software. File hashing techniques of
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data files coupled with the implementation of reference sets is first outlined followed by a sum-
mary of alternative hashing algorithms to enhance data file matching, including block-based
hashing and similarity digests. An in-depth review of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Diskprint project then provides a wider scope for reference set contents.
Finally presented is a brief appraisal of Windows Registry analysis to aid application software
detection including the techniques, tools and available data abstractions, culminating in the
lack of automated processes available to perform Registry investigation.
3.3.1 File Hashing and Reference Sets
According to Roussev (2009), hashing is a fundamental tool in digital forensics to aid identi-
fication of data files. A cryptographic hash function (or algorithm) takes an arbitrary length
input and produces a fixed length output, usually called a digest or hash value (Ferguson
& Schneier, 2003). Hash functions are useful to identify data files that are exactly the same
because they are collision resistant, which means that finding two different inputs with the
same output is not computationally feasible. Therefore, two data files with different content
could never have the same hash value – this statement is only valid if a secure and reliable
cryptographic hash function is implemented. Given this property, hash functions are com-
monly used to perform identification of data files by hashing every file on a target data set
and comparing the calculated hash values against a database of known file hashes.
The use of reference sets in conjunction with hash values is a fundamental digital inves-
tigation technique used to automate detection of known content. Reference sets, commonly
referred to as reference databases or hash sets, are a document populated with metadata
about known data files, including the file name, file size and a cryptographic hash value.
The general approach is to construct a reference set of known data and then use
a forensic tool to automatically search the target to filter irrelevant or relevant
artifacts as the case may be. Since the common unit of interest is a file, this
technique is often referred to as known file filtering. The standard known file
filtering approach is to use cryptographic hashes, such as MD5 and SHA1 , and
construct tables of known hash values (e.g., of operating system and application
installation files) (Roussev, 2012, p. 19-20).
A populated reference set is, therefore, a document containing known files and the associated
hash values. To perform forensic analysis, the target device is processed, each file hashed
and then compared to the hash set. If a match is found in the hash set, it can be concluded
that the files are the same. Reference sets have two primary uses: 1) To identify relevant
content (e.g., illicit digital images); or 2) Filter irrelevant content (e.g., known operating
system files). A well known example of a reference set for application software is maintained
and distributed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) which operates
the National Software Reference Library (NRSL). The NSRL distributes a Reference Data
Set (RDS) comprised of hash values for a variety of commercial software (NIST, 2015b). In
the RDS version 2.41, there are a total of 14,503 different profiled applications available.
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The RDS is used by law enforcement, government, and industry organizations to
review files on a computer by matching file profiles in the RDS using an automated
system. The reference data is used to rapidly identify files on computer systems,
based solely on the content of the files ... In most cases, NSRL file data is used
to eliminate known files, such as operating system and application files, during
criminal forensic investigations. This reduces the number of files that must be
manually examined and thus increases the efficiency of the investigation (Lyle,
White, & Ayers, 2008a, p. 1).
The RDS, therefore, is commonly used to perform data reduction by filtering known files
that are not of forensic interest. However, the RDS can also be used to detect relevant files;
for example, to determine which applications are present on a system. Such information
regarding the presence of an application may provide insight of how the system was being
used and where potential evidence may reside (Mead, 2006); for example, if a data wiping tool
is detected on an investigation target it is possible that the suspect may have attempted to
securely remove files. This provides a lead for the investigator to further analyse the available
evidence in an attempt to discover additional or corroborating evidence including application
log files, configuration files, or pertinent Registry entries. Listing 3.1 displays a single example
of a file entry taken from the RDS. The file (WORD.EXE) is displayed with associated metadata
including MD5 and SHA1 hash values, file name, file size and other product and operating
system information.
"SHA−1" ,"MD5" ,"CRC32" ," FileName " ," F i l e S i z e " ," ProductCode " ,"OpSystemCode" ,"
Specia lCode "
"AC91EF00F33F12DD491CC91EF00F33F12DD491CA" ,"DC2311FFDC0015FCCC12130FF145DE
78" ,"14CCE9061FFDC001" ,"WORD.EXE" ,1217654 ,103 ,"T4WKS" ,""
Listing 3.1: RDS example entry (Source: Listing taken from NIST (2009))
As seen in Listing 3.1, the hash values included are Message Digest version 5 (MD5 ) and
Secure Hash Algorithm version 1 (SHA1 ). Both of these are commonly used hash functions
in digital forensics for both preservation integrity and for performing known file filtering.
However, there is debate about the validity and reliability of both MD5 and SHA1 hash
collisions that has been presented in various research papers. Nevertheless, the requirements
of hash function usage in digital forensics differs from information security requirements.
Thompson (2005) states that potential MD5 collisions in digital forensics in unlike that in
computer security and does not pose a threat in the same context. Furthermore, “it can be
clearly stated that the use of MD5 and SHA1 hashing within the field of digital forensics
remains a valid scientific practice” (Schmitt & Jordaan, 2013, p. 42).
Although the use of the MD5 and SHA1 hash functions are still widely accepted and
reliable in digital forensics there still exists an underlying problem with traditional file hashing
techniques. Small modifications to a file (even modifying a single bit in a file or one word in a
document) creates a completely different hash value resulting in the inability to detect similar
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files using MD5 or similar traditional hash functions. This is problematic as two almost
identical files cannot be matched. This difficulty is caused by the fragility of hash functions
and led to the digital forensic research community focussing on improvements to file hashing
technology.
3.3.2 Advanced Forensic Hashing Techniques
The major drawback to the use of traditional file hashing in digital forensics is that only exact
matching can be performed, because it is infeasible to modify a message without changing
the hash, meaning that a secure hash function will produce completely different output if even
one bit of the input message (or data file) is changed. Nevertheless, “files with one-bit changes
are almost entirely identical and share a large ordered homology” (Kornblum, 2006, p. S92).
A real world example would be when a single word in a document is changed, resulting in
a completely different hash value even though both documents share a majority of similar
content. As a consequence further advancement in digital forensics has attempted to develop
hashing algorithms specifically to detect files with only slight differences. The design and use
of block hashing to perform sub-file forensics as well as approximate matching using similarity
digests are outcomes of recent research.
3.3.2.1 Block Hashing
File hashing computes a hash value for an entire file. In contrast, block hashing is a tech-
nique that calculates hash values for individual blocks of data using a constant block size
(Young, Foster, Garfinkel, & Fairbanks, 2012). Block hashing has a number of different terms
including: block-based hashing, piecewise hashing, and sector hashing. The generic
term block hashing is used in this research. Block hashing splits a data file, disk image or
another form of structured data into separate fixed sized blocks (e.g., 512 byte blocks) which
are then used as input to a hash function. Figure 3.2 displays a visual representation of how
block hashing operates on a file. As illustrated, the file is divided into blocks of equal size,
used as input to a hash function and result in each block having a unique hash value.
Figure 3.2: Visual representation of block hashing performed on a data file (Source: Figure
adapted from Kornblum (2011, p. 10); Image sources: file icon is public domain)
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The first implementation of block hashing for digital forensics usage was developed by Nick
Harbour who created dcfldd, a modified version of the dd tool to adhere to forensic require-
ments when performing data collection. “Harbour subsequently modified dcfldd to compute
hashes over segments of the disk image so that if it was inadvertently modified, a chain of
custody could be maintained for at least part of the image. He called this piecewise hashing”
(Young et al., 2012, p. 30). This technique aided preservation of evidence integrity, but was
not yet implemented to aid file detection. Block hashing received additional development
when Jesse Kornblum released the hashdeep12 tool. The main advancement was that the
functionality to compute block hashes to aid detection of data file fragments was also achieved.
A reference set can be created using hashdeep which has the ability to compare the created
reference set against a target forensic disk image or collection of files.
Sector hashing is an extension of block hashing logic which uses specifically selected
block sizes that are commonly encountered sector sizes in file systems. Foster (2012) first
proposed the use of sector hashing to perform rapid content identification by hashing sector
size blocks (e.g., 512 or 4096 bytes) and comparing each sector hash to a database of known
sector hash values. A major advantage to sector-level processing (see Figure 2.4) is that it
is file system independent and, therefore, requires no knowledge of the overlying file system.
This is useful as the file system may be either unavailable or corrupt. Furthermore, sector-
level processing can be highly parallelised as it is possible for data to be sequentially read
and processed from a target device. This does not apply to file hashing, as files are not
sequentially stored and each file needs to be located before being hashed. “File-based data
access tends to generate a nonsequential disk access pattern, which can seriously degrade
throughput” (Roussev, 2009, p. 50). Figure 3.3 displays an example of hard drive throughput
which compares the average speed in Megabytes per second (MB/s) at which a 500 Gigabyte
(GB) hard drive can be read at different sequential levels.
As shown in Figure 3.3, reading a hard drive 100% sequentially results in an average
throughput of 68 MB/s. In contrast, reading the same hard drive 98% sequentially the average
throughput lowers to 48 MB/s (therefore, 2% of data is read using random disk seeks). This
is a 30% performance penalty when compared to sequential disk reading and illustrates the
performance advantages of sector-level hashing.
Another advantage of both block and sector hashing is the potential identification of not
just entire files, but also file fragments (Garfinkel et al., 2010). Detection of file fragments
provides the capability to detect previously deleted files where fragments may still exist in
unallocated (free) space when complete file recovery is not possible. Block hashing is also
used to detect files where small changes have been made, but where a large proportion of
the file remains the same. As with other hashing techniques, block or sector hashes can be
used to create a reference set of known content, the only difference from traditional hash sets
is that instead of storing one hash value for each file (e.g., one MD5 hash value), multiple
hashes are stored for each known file. The number of hashes stored varies based on the size
of the file and the specified block size.
12See: https://github.com/jessek/hashdeep
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Figure 3.3: Throughput for 500 GB hard drive (Source: Figure taken from Roussev et al.
(2008, p. 103))
Block hashing remains an active digital forensic research area with numerous contributions
being made to the underlying technology and practical application in the form of computer
forensic tool development. Garfinkel and McCarrin (2015) developed an advanced algorithm
to aid hash-based carving using block hashing. Taguchi (2013) leveraged the use of sector
hashing to perform rapid triage of large investigation targets. Furthermore, the practical
application of block hashing has been advanced through a variety of robust forensic analysis
tools. The hashdeep tool creates reference sets comprised of block hashes and compares them
to a target forensic disk image or set of files. The bulk_extractor13 has the functionality
to perform highly parallelised sector hashing and comparison against a target. Finally, the
hashdb14 tool is a purpose block hashing database built for fast comparison of block hashes.
The use of block hashing and sector hashing enables detection of files and file fragments.
However, a crucial file detection challenge arises when a perpetrator inputs just one bit of
data into a file. “If we insert a single character into a file, all the block hashes following the
change will also change” (Roussev, 2009, p. 52). To combat this problem and address the
shortcomings of both file hashing and block hashing, research has been conducted in the field
of approximate matching.
3.3.2.2 Approximate Matching and Similarity Digests
According to NIST (2013, p. 1), “approximate matching is a technique for identifying similar-




do not match exactly”. In terms of data file matching, it can be seen that previous forensic
analysis techniques have primarily relied on performing exact matching using traditional
hash functions such as MD5 and SHA1 . Either the hashes match, and the file is known,
or the hashes don’t match and the file is not known. Approximate matching improves
on previous matching techniques by specifying a comparison based on a degree of similarity
between the two files (Breitinger & Roussev, 2014).
NIST (2013) state that an approximate matching algorithm should perform at least one
of the following four matching functions: 1) Object similarity detection (e.g., two different
versions of a document that has been slightly modified); 2) Embedded object detection (e.g.,
an image in a document); 3) Fragment detection (e.g., a cropped image); and 4) Cross
correlation (e.g., detecting files in different targets). Furthermore, approximate matching
algorithms can be used for enhancing black or white listing using reference sets and to perform
object grouping. NIST (2013) specify that the ssdeep and sdhash tools are both being
implemented in the NSRL project. The following paragraphs provide a brief discussion of
each tool.
Kornblum (2006) first proposed the use of approximate matching using a hashing tech-
nique called context triggered piecewise hashing (CTPH). According to Kornblum (2006,
p. 91), CTPH is a “technique for constructing hash signatures by combining a number of tra-
ditional hashes whose boundaries are determined by the context of the input”. The technique
is based on an e-mail spam detection tool, dubbed spamsum, which compares the similarity
of two e-mails by generating and testing the signature of an email compared to known spam.
A similarity metric of the two e-mails with a value between 0 and 100 is provided (Tridgell,
2009). The implementation of CTPH resulted in the release of the ssdeep proof-of-concept
tool to compute and compare hashes. Listing 3.2 displays an example hash value created by
the ssdeep tool. Line 1 displays the execute command, line 2 displays the ssdeep header,
and line 3 displays the actual signature where each component is separated by a colon. As
illustrated, the ssdeep hash value is dramatically different from a traditional hash value
(e.g., MD5 ).
$ ssdeep Msdosdrv . txt
ssdeep ,1.0−− b l o c k s i z e : hash : hash , f i l ename
384 :6A+A46SBSZHJEi4gMOzscKThLKxmdokp72mzdfdM72 l 3zefMENY2PDr20 sypztHc :KQx+
AecKumvlAN20sY0yX5uR,"Msdosdrv . txt "
Listing 3.2: Example of an ssdeep hash value (Source: Listing taken from Kornblum (2006))
Roussev et al. (2007) proposed the use of similarity hashing to produce an efficient and
scalable technique to identify similar objects. In later research, Roussev (2010) released the
sdhash tool to generate and compare similarity digests. According to Breitinger and Roussev
(2014), the sdhash tool addressed the short-comings of ssdeep by selecting statistically
improbable features to represent each object instead of simply dividing a file into chunks (as
implemented in ssdeep). Similar to all approximate matching algorithms, similarity digests
can be compared on a value of 0-100 to highlight the similarity between two objects. Roussev
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(2011) performed a thorough evaluation that compared the ssdeep and sdhash tools in a
variety of forensic analysis scenarios to determine capabilities of each tool.15
The use of advanced forensic hashing techniques to aid in automated detection of digital
artifacts, specifically data files using ssdeep and sdhash has made progress. However, both
techniques and associated tools have never been tested for detecting data files and similari-
ties in the realm of application software. Nevertheless, performance evaluations in terms of
computational efficiency have been published and is discussed in the following subsection.
3.3.3 Performance Summary of Forensic Hashing Tools
Tool efficiency is critical in digital forensics due to the challenge of data volume (see Figure
1.1 and Section 2.3.1). Furthermore, performance is exceptionally important when conducting
digital forensic triage which attempts to execute a partial forensic examination under signifi-
cant time and resource constraints (see Section 2.1.2). Therefore, it is prudent to investigate
the performance of available hashing techniques so that the selection of hash functions for the
system design in this research can be later made.
Hash function efficiency can be divided into two phases: 1) Hash function generation
(e.g., computing the hash value of a file); and 2) Hash value comparison (e.g., comparing two
previously generated hash values). Table 3.6 displays the efficiency of hash value generation for
the MD5 , SHA1 , ssdeep and sdhash functions. The run-time efficiency (displayed in seconds)
is given for a 500MB test file filled with random data (generated from /dev/urandom).
Row 2 displays a performance comparison using MD5 as a benchmark, that is, the run-time
generation efficiency of each hash function compared to the MD5 algorithm. Similarly, row 3
displays another performance comparison using SHA1 as a benchmark.
Table 3.6: Run-time generation efficiency of common digital forensic hash functions (Source:
Table adapted from Breitinger and Petrov (2013, p. 112))
MD5 SHA1 ssdeep sdhash
runtime efficiency 1.35 2.33 6.48 22.82
algorithm
MD5
1.00 1.72 4.80 16.90
algorithm
SHA1
0.58 1.00 2.78 9.87
As displayed in Table 3.6, MD5 is the most efficient hash function, taking 1.35 seconds to
compute a hash value from the 500MB file. SHA1 takes almost twice as long, while ssdeep
takes approximately 5 times as long and sdhash takes almost 17 times as long. Similar trends
are seen when comparing SHA1 to the ssdeep and sdhash tools. Simply put, traditional
hash functions are much more efficient when compared to approximate matching algorithms.
The second efficiency phase is correlation of previously computed hash values. “Fast fin-
gerprint comparison is part of the runtime efficiency as an approach is only useful if it has a
15Please refer to Roussev (2011) for further information regarding each tool and performance results
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fast comparison function” (Breitinger, Stivaktakis, & Baier, 2013, p. S53). Table 3.7 displays
results from fingerprint generation and comparison for SHA1 , ssdeep and sdhash algo-
rithms using the t5 corpus16, a publicly available data set comprised of 4,457 files equating
approximately 1.78 GB. Results are displayed for the average hash generation time for each
tool, total hash generation time for each tool and hash value correlation time. Similar to the
information displayed in Table 3.6 a benchmark of hash value correlation efficiency is included
using the SHA1 hash function as the benchmark.
Table 3.7: Generation and comparison efficiency for common digital forensic hash functions
(Source: Table adapted from Breitinger et al. (2013))
Tool Average Total Hash valuecorrelation
algorithm
SHA1
sha1sum 0.0013 5.632 - 1.00
ssdeep -s 0.0089 39.789 18.217 7.06
sdhash 0.0167 74.278 356.730 13.19
sdhash -p4 0.0066 29.382 346.902 5.22
Once again, as seen in Table 3.7, traditional hash functions (e.g., SHA1 ) are much more
efficient compared to approximate matching algorithms (e.g., ssdeep and sdhash). SHA1
fingerprint comparison is not displayed as it is a simple string comparison and requires min-
imal time to compare two hash values. The ssdeep tool required 18 seconds to perform a
comparison, compared to approximately 350 seconds for sdhash. These results highlight the
inefficiency of approximate matching algorithms compared to traditional hash functions.
In summary, knowledge has been gained from the comparison of traditional hashing func-
tions with advanced hashing algorithms. It is evident that traditional hash functions are
much more computationally efficient, yet lack the capability to detect similar files. Compara-
tively, advanced approximate matching algorithms can detect similar files, but are much more
computationally intensive. This is true for both fingerprint generation and correlation.
The following sections continue to investigate literature relevant to automated detection
of digital artifacts. A new research direction at the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) is to create reference sets specifically tailored for detection of digital
artifacts from operating systems and application software.
3.3.4 NIST Diskprint Project
According to NIST (2015a), the NSRL RDS contains file-based metadata of application soft-
ware which is generated from installation media; for example, the files that make up the
software distribution (e.g., application installer) and the actual files created during installa-
tion (e.g., executable, library and configuration files). However, this information only informs
a practitioner if an application has been installed on an investigation target. Recent research
at NIST has focussed on advancing the technology and techniques used to automate forensic
16See: http://roussev.net/t5/t5.html
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analysis of data files. The new project, dubbed diskprints, attempts to progress the use of
reference data sets to aid forensic analysis of application software by collecting digital artifacts
from the entire application life cycle.
Tebbutt (2012) initially introduced the project as application footprints with the aim of
tracking the lifetime of application software. The project aims to determine the file system,
Registry and volatile memory changes that occur at different stages of the application life
cycle. To achieve this Virtual Machines (VM) are specified as the state of the system can be
captured at any time by simply pausing the VM and copying the evidence sources (virtual
hard drive, memory contents). Tebbutt (2012) referred to the collected data as slices, because
they represent a slice of the overall application life cycle. One key detail is that the life cycle
is manually created by an investigator who is required to perform and document the process.
Figure 3.4 displays an example of the diskprint analysis workflow for the installation of the
Mozilla Firefox web browser. The first slice is a fresh installation of Microsoft Windows,
while the second is after the installation of Firefox. Differencing is achieved by comparing
the two slices, specifically, two DFXML reports. The result is a delta DFXML report
(∆.dfxml) which documents the file system changes that have occurred as a result of the
installation of Firefox.
Figure 3.4: Diskprint analysis workflow (Source: Figure adapted from Nelson, Laamanen, et
al. (2014, p. 24)); Image sources: Mozilla Firefox icon taken from The Mozilla Foundation
(2013), other images are public domain.)
Later research outlined by (Laamanen & Nelson, 2014) specified target operating systems
including Microsoft Windows XP, Vista, 7 and 8 in 32-bit and 64-bit variants. Additionally,
diskprints are being created for a variety of popular web browsers, network tools, archivers and
messenger applications. Furthermore, details were included for the collection of network traffic
at each phase and that automated collection was being developed. Additional research by
Nelson, Laamanen, et al. (2014) outlined information regarding Windows Registry detection
utilising the method specified and techniques implemented in the diskprint project.
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To date, 33 diskprints are available17 for a total of three operating systems and 16 applications.
Only one research presentation has been published regarding performance and evaluation of
the diskprint project. Jones et al. (2015) performed an analysis of past-activity of application
software using block hashing to detect files and file fragments. They were able to detect
file fragments (blocks) that remained after uninstallation of an application even after nor-
mal system activity continued. Additionally, a weighted score was developed to determine
the percentage of matched artifact fragments. Jones et al. (2015) specified that future re-
search should include enhancement of computation, sector differencing and noise reduction at
collection and extension of the method to malware, mobile and memory artifacts.
Overall, the NIST diskprint project has advanced the fundamental technology that is used
to create reference sets for application software. As an ongoing research project, it presents
a much more comprehensive technique to automate the process of detecting the presence of
application software on an investigation target compared to previous approaches. In addition
is the functionality to classify the application life cycle phase (e.g., execution) of detected
digital artifacts. This is exceptionally useful information to provide an investigator regarding
application software usage.
3.3.5 Automated Detection of Registry Entries
A brief introduction to the Windows Registry was previously outlined including the potential
evidential value, an overview of hive files and types as well as a brief summary of the Registry
structure (see Section 2.2.2.2). To reiterate, the Windows Registry is a hierarchical datadase
used to store configuration information for users, applications and hardware devices. Given
the information that the Registry stores, it is an exceptionally useful resource to aid digital
investigations. This section provides a summary of literature and software available to investi-
gate the Windows Registry to aid detection of digital artifacts directly relevant to application
software. Potential Registry analysis tools are first presented, followed by previous research
which has focussed on automating Registry content analysis.
3.3.5.1 Windows Registry Analysis Tools
Due to the evidentiary value of the Windows Registry there are a wide range of computer
forensic analysis tools designed specifically to parse, process, examine and analyse different
aspects of the Registry. Available tools range from simple command line applications to
search the Registry, to advanced solutions with Graphical User Interfaces (GUI) to discover
forensically interesting Registry entries and generate reports to document potentially useful
evidence. Carvey (2011) provided a list of various tools available to performWindows Registry
forensics including live analysis tools, monitoring tools and post-mortem forensic analysis
tools. Table 3.8 displays a list of common Windows Registry tools used to aid forensic
analysis. The tool name is provided followed by classification of operation on either live or
offline Registry hive files and an associated description of tool functionality.
17See: http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/dskprt/sequence.html
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Table 3.8: List of common Windows Registry analysis tools (Source: Table populated from
Carvey (2011, §§ 2.1-2.2))
Tool Classification Description
reg.exe Live A native command line tool included with Microsoft
Windows to read, write, modify or delete Registry en-
tries
regedit.exe Live A native Registry tool to read, write, modify and
delete Registry entries
Autoruns Live/Offline GUI tool which classifies Registry entries based on po-
tential information including Windows Explorer infor-
mation, scheduled tasks, system services and logon in-
formation
Scripting Live/Offline A variety of programming languages provide live and
offline access to Registry hive files including Windows
Management Infrastructure (WMI), Windows Script
Host (WSH), Windows PowerShell, Perl and Python
MiTeC Registry Offline Provides a GUI interface similar to regedit.exe to
browse and search Registry entries
RegRipper Offline A GUI tool to import offline Registry hive and scan
using a variety of plugins to extract forensically inter-
esting information including autorun and logon entries
3.3.5.2 Automated Windows Registry Analysis
Very few forensic techniques and associated tools are available to perform automated analysis
of the Windows Registry. However, this section will outline a collection of semi-automated
analysis techniques including string searching and Registry entry detection using high-level
forensic data abstractions.
A common analysis technique involves string searching the Registry using keywords in
an attempt to discover evidence. According to N. L. Beebe and Clark (2007, p. 49), “digital
forensic text string searches are designed to search every byte of the digital evidence, at the
physical level, to locate specific text strings of interest to the investigation”. However, in many
scenarios a string search of the Registry may not yield many results as the data is stored in a
binary format and, in some cases, subjected to various encodings; for example is the use of the
ROT-13 basic encryption algorithm for UserAssist Registry value entries (Carvey, 2005). Mee,
Tryfonas, and Sutherland (2006) state that most Registry viewers have search functions which
an investigator can leverage to discover application software; for example, in an investigation
involving a specific peer-to-peer application, named KaZaA, the application name can be used
to search for potentially interesting Registry entries. This is possible because a Registry viewer
transforms the binary structure of the Registry, thus, allowing searching strings that are not
in the native binary format. However, string searching for applications using keywords is
only successful when the desired application has an uncommon name. Applications including
Google Chrome may yield numerous entries if the keyword chrome was used. Furthermore,
69
string searching has minimal automation to both discover potential keywords and to analyse
search output.
In terms of advanced automated Registry analysis it is essential to implement a high-level
data abstraction to provide easier mechanisms to search and process Registry entries. An
example of this is the Registry XML (RegXML) data abstraction. Nelson (2012) developed
RegXML to represent Windows Registry hive files by documenting the logical structure and
location of data found within hive files. The research was released with supporting software,
named regxml_extractor, designed to extract Registry hive files from a forensic disk
image and then parse and document entries in the RegXML data abstraction. An associated
programming library was also developed which allows an investigator to write simple scripts
to read all Registry entries and perform searches. Aside from this example, there are very few
research papers or forensic analysis tools available to automate processing and analysis of the
Registry. In particular, minimal research is available that has focussed directly on Registry
analysis to aid application software detection.
3.3.6 Automated Forensic Analysis Challenges
This section has outlined and discussed literature, forensic analysis techniques and the de
facto industry tools to perform automated detection of digital artifacts. Two primary digital
artifact types were investigated: data files and Registry entries. A number of automated
analysis techniques and associated tools are available for detecting data files. The use of
reference sets and file hashing is prominent in digital investigations and in scenarios where
traditional file hashing fails, researchers have developed more flexible hashing approaches
using block hashing and approximate matching. Both are suitable to create reference sets to
represent known content used in automated detection of file system entries. However, in terms
of automated Registry analysis, there are very few solutions available. This section highlights
specific challenges centred around performing automated detection of digital artifacts with
specific relevance to identifying application software on a target data set.
3.3.6.1 Automated Detection Performance
Due to data volume challenges in digital forensics, rapid automated solutions are required.
The performance of file hashing was investigated (see Section 3.3.3) which highlighted that
traditional file hashing (e.g., MD5 and SHA1 ) present viable and computationally efficient so-
lutions for known file identification. However, they lack the flexibility to detect files which are
similar. Block-based hashing and approximate matching were developed to address this chal-
lenge. However, the performance overhead is high, even when factoring in performance gained
for sequential disk processing. These problems culminate with the challenge of developing a
solution that is both flexible enough to detect similar files while also being computationally
efficient to perform rapid application software detection on a target data set.
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3.3.6.2 Digital Artifact Diversity
As previous research has noted, the types of digital artifacts produced by application software
are diverse. According to Tebbutt (2012), digital artifact sources from application software
may encompass file system entries, system configuration information, volatile memory in-
formation and network traffic. Garfinkel (2010) agrees with this position, stating that an
application software reference set could be populated with all of the above digital artifact
sources. However, no such solution exists to determine and subsequently correlate such a
diverse range of digital artifacts.
From the reviewed literature, the only robust solutions to automate detection of digital
artifacts are data file centric; for example, reference sets of known data files with an as-
sociated hash value. Such solutions only differ based on the hash function or algorithm to
generate the associated hash value. These solutions do not even include file system directory
(folder) detection. This is because directories lack the logical file contents required to generate
a hash value. The same problem exists for Registry entry detection, where no reference set
solution exists as Registry entries have no content and are not applicable to hash generation
or comparison. This culminates in research challenges, of application software that creates a
diverse range of digital artifact types, where only data files have a robust automated detection
solution. There is a wealth of potentially useful evidence that an investigator has to manu-
ally analyse. Given the digital investigation data volume challenge an alternative automated
analysis solution is paramount.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented and discussed literature that is pertinent to the research project
being conducted. A summary of previous research regarding anti-forensic tools was outlined.
Research challenges were discovered from this review, specifically that previous research has
evaluated tool performance and determined residual evidence after anti-forensic tools usage.
The research challenge that persists is the inability to detect anti-forensic tool usage in an
automated and timely manner. The technique of reverse engineering was then outlined in-
cluding system monitoring and differential forensic analysis techniques and associated tools.
Research challenges were discussed including a lack of standardisation, experimental testing
problems and a prevalence of unrelated results. Finally, a thorough review of automated
digital artifact detection methods to perform forensic analysis was covered. The outcome is
that there are limited robust solutions to aid detection of digital aritfacts from applications,
where most solutions are data file centric. The research challenge exists to develop a solution
that is built to aid automated software discovery while ensuring computational efficiency.
Chapter 4 leads on from the background information presented in Chapter 2 and literature
reviewed in this chapter. Several severe research and real world challenges surround the
automated detection of application software, specifically anti-forensic tools. The next chapter
specifies the research methodology implemented for this project, a system architecture and





Chapter 2 provided a background to digital forensics including a discussion on the procedure
and techniques for conducting digital investigations as well as digital forensic research prob-
lems. The challenges of anti-forensics was introduced with an overview of the techniques and
tools that may be used to maliciously remove the availability of digital evidence. Chapter
3 presented and discussed research relating to the forensic analysis of application software,
automated forensic analysis, forensic analysis of anti-forensic tools and an appraisal of the
current investigation techniques to discover digital artifacts from application software. The
aim of this research is to design, implement, demonstrate and evaluate a system to perform
automated detection of digital artifacts from application software. Specifically, anti-forensic
tools are selected as the application software of choice for this research as they present an
interesting and relevant case study.
A research methodology is essential to specify a strategy when undertaking a research
project so that reliable knowledge and useful output is achieved. The purpose of this chapter
then, is first to select a suitable and sound research methodology for implementation based
on various digital forensic research practices and requirements. The outcome is that Design
Science (DS) has been selected as the research methodology of choice for this project. The
remainder of the chapter then implements the Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM)
process model and specifies the following phases: identification of the problem, stating research
objectives, the design and development of a solution, demonstration of the proposed system,
the evaluation of the system design and communication of research. The experimental testing
method is outlined which specifies data sets and metrics for evaluation.
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4.1 Digital Forensic Research Methodologies
According to N. Beebe (2009), traditional forensic sciences (e.g., toxicology and ballistics)
resulted from academic research, thus, allowing science to precede forensic science application.
However, digital forensics is a relatively new discipline which has had an unusual emergence
into the scientific community.
Originating in the late 1980s as an ad hoc practice to meet the service demand
from the law enforcement community, computer forensics has recently developed
into a multi-domain discipline crossing the corporate, academic and law enforce-
ment fields (Guo, Slay, & Beckett, 2009, p. S12).
Palmer (as cited in N. Beebe (2009, p. 18-19)) agrees with this premise, stating that digital
forensics emerged from the practitioner community where crime investigators and computer
forensic tool developers carried out research as a means to solve real world problems. Nance,
Hay, and Bishop (2009) support this position, stating that digital forensics is a largely practi-
tioner driven field where technology advances are made in a bottom-up approach in reaction
to a specific incident. In contrast a top-down approach first identifies a research challenge
and then formulates potential solutions. A top-down approach promotes a more robust sci-
entific research methodology to better advance technologies, processes and techniques.
In the field of digital forensics, a variety of methodologies have been used to carry out
research. Baggili, BaAbdallah, Al-Safi, and Marrington (2013) categorised and analysed a
sample of 500 digital forensics academic publications to determine research trends. Of the
papers reviewed in the study the findings showed there was an approximate 30% division
between empirical, exploratory and constructive research methodologies, while implemented
research methods were made up of qualitative (80%) and quantitative research (20%).
In considering the general context of Information Systems (IS), which includes digital
forensics, Nunamaker, Chen, and Purdin (1990) state that basic research, also called pure
research, involves developing and testing theories and hypotheses that are the endeavour of
the researcher based on intellectual interest, rather than the need for practical solutions.
In contrast, “applied research is the application of knowledge to solve problems of immediate
concern” (Blake; Bailey as cited in Nunamaker et al. (1990, p. 631). Since digital forensics is a
highly practical field, applied research is arguably the most appropriate research methodology.
Applied research is a fundamentally important aspect of digital forensics, providing
reliable knowledge of computer processes to support conclusions concerning what
activities occurred on a device or network (Casey, 2013, p.167).
Baggili et al. (2013) also determined that in 81% of the 500 reviewed publications, it was
applied research that was initiated to solve practical problems in the research domain. In
digital forensic research the outcome of applied research often results in a practical implemen-
tation of the solution; for example a computer forensic tool (computer software specifically
tailored for digital investigation). Development and implementation of a computer forensic
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tool provides the capability to: 1) Demonstrate and evaluate the solution by providing a
platform to perform experimental testing; and 2) Communicate the research in an additional
output. This provides an increased confidence in forensic tools through publication, review,
and formal testing (Manson et al., 2007, p. 226).
Demonstration and evaluation of a tool/software is an exceptionally important aspect of
digital forensic research. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) manages
the Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) project which has established a methodology for
testing CF tools using function orientated testing for general tool specifications, test proce-
dures, test criteria, test sets, and test hardware (Lyle, White, & Ayers, 2008b). Development
of standardised computer forensic tool testing methods aid in producing reliable and accu-
rate results. Tool testing also provides additional information to the research and industry
communities whose feedback can be further used to improve tool functionality.
Publication of the specific techniques that a computer fornesic tool uses is highly advan-
tageous to both researchers and practitioners. Open-source software is an excellent platform
as it is readily available to end-users and source code can be reviewed to determine the de-
sign and operation of the tool. Carrier (2002) states that open-source tools more clearly and
comprehensively meet forensic guidelines and requirements than closed source tools. Addi-
tionally, publication of the descriptive procedure for a tool is useful to provide a high level
overview of design and operation. However, there is a downside to making research open and
available. Open-source tools are also available to suspects who, in-turn, then learn digital
forensic methods, techniques and tools to potentially counter the forensic process.
It remains that open-source software does aid computer forensic tool advancement as
it continues to build on previous research and development. This is also true of academic
research in digital forensics, as the need to continually update and improve on previously
conducted research outcomes is recognised as being highly beneficial.
Without a clear strategy for enabling research efforts that build upon one another,
forensic research will fall behind the market, tools will become increasingly obso-
lete, and law enforcement, military and other users of computer forensics products
will be unable to rely on the results of forensic analysis (Garfinkel, 2010, p. 64).
“Reproducibility, rigor, transparency, and independent verification are cornerstones of the
scientific method” (McNutt, 2014, p. 679). Speciafically, reproducible research is the concept
of replication of the scientific method by other scientists (Fomel & Claerbout, 2009, p. 5).
Research reproducibility is necessary in digital forensics to adhere to scientific principles.
Forensic techniques and tools must achieve a consistent standard throughout the investigative
procedure including reliable and measurable quality (Pan & Batten, 2005). In addition to
the scientific methods used, the utilisation of standardised and publicly available data sets,
dubbed digital corpora, are key to advancing research quality (Garfinkel, Farrell, Roussev,
& Dinolt, 2009). Digital corpora in the form of disk images, data files, memory dumps and
network traffic captures can be used to test forensic analysis techniques and tools on publicly
available data, allowing other researchers to replicate results and build on previous solutions.
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This research aims to identify and solve an identified problem that effects the real world
digital investigation of application software, specifically the automated forensic analysis of
application software (anti-forensic tools). Applied research is specified as a desired research
method because it produces findings that are relevant to identified problems and focuses on
development of a solution to the problem domain. The desired research method requirements
have resulted in the selection of an Information Systems (IS) research methodology known as
Design Science (DS).
4.2 Design Science Research Methodology
“Information Systems (IS) is an applied research discipline” (Peffers et al., 2007, p. 46). De-
sign Science (DS) can be implemented to perform applied research in the field of IS. “The
goal of information systems research is to produce knowledge that enables the application of
information technology for managerial and organizational purposes” (Hevner & March, 2003,
p.111). This statement aligns with the proposed research aim of solving the real world digital
investigation problem area of automated forensic analysis of application software, specifically
anti-forensic tools (a type of application software). Furthermore, the expected research out-
come has a significant relationship to IS research as the overall goal is to further the knowledge
and improve the systems, processes, techniques and tools used to conduct digital investiga-
tions.
“Design science seeks to create innovations, or artifacts, that embody the ideas, practices,
technical capabilities, and products required to efficiently accomplish the analysis, design,
implementation, and use of information systems” (Hevner & March, 2003, p.111). Hevner,
March, Park, and Ram (2004) then state that, in the realm of IS research, design science aims
to create and communicate a purposeful and innovative Information Technology (IT) artifact
which addresses an important problem domain.
There have been a variety of DS research methodology models proposed for conducting
IS research. Peffers et al. (2007) reviewed the process elements from seven academic research
papers (from IS and other disciplines) and synthesised a Design Science Research Method-
ology (DSRM) process model specifically tailored for IS research. It was constructed using
a consensus-building approach to produce a research process model that is established on
accepted elements. Figure 4.1 displays the DSRM process model which will be implemented
as the framework to conduct this research.
The DSRM process model follows a nominal sequence based on a variety of possible
research entry points dependent on the context of the research being conducted. In this
research the entry point is a problem-centred initiation as the research topic is a problem
area that has been identified from a thorough review of literature. Each of the six individual
DSRM elements will be outlined and discussed in the following subsections.
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Figure 4.1: Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) process model (Source: Figure
taken from Peffers et al. (2007, p. 54))
4.2.1 Identify Research Problem and Motivation
The first element in the DSRM process model is problem identification and motivation. This
involves the definition statement of the specific research problem, the importance of the prob-
lem and specifying the justification of value that the solution will provide (Peffers et al., 2007).
Problem identification aims to highlight the requirement and importance of conducting addi-
tional research to aid in development of an artifact which will provide an effective solution.
A collection of problems were outlined and discussed in the background material and the
literature review.
The background material (Chapter 2) presented an overview of digital forensics and anti-
forensics. Section 2.3 outlined a collection of digital forensic research challenges including:
1) The increase of data volume; 2) The increase in case complexity; 3) Problems with foren-
sic analysis technique and tool scalability; and 4) Temporal diversity challenges caused by
continual technology advances. Section 2.5.3 discussed a variety of problems centred around
anti-forensic techniques and tools including: 1) The prevalence of anti-forensic techniques and
tools encountered in digital investigations; 2) Increased sophistication of anti-forensic tools
used to remove digital evidence availability; and 3) The advanced knowledge and skill required
by investigators to perform forensic analysis of anti-forensic tool activity.
The literature review (Chapter 3) presented and discussed material relating to foren-
sic analysis of anti-forensic tools. A review of previous research surrounding anti-forensic
research was presented accompanied by issues with current research direction and lack of
technological advancements. Reverse engineering to aid general application software forensics
was discussed and problems outlined including: 1) A lack of standardisation; 2) Experimen-
tal testing challenges; and 3) The prevalence of unrelated results from reverse engineering
techniques. Finally, automated forensic analysis techniques were investigated and challenges
surrounding techniques and tools performance was covered, as well as the challenge of digital
artifact diversity.
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The reviewed literature has led to the identification of a variety of problems when perform-
ing automated forensic analysis of application software using reference sets. The current
practice is to implement reference sets of known content; for example, data files represented
by metadata. A populated reference set is compared to a target data set and matching is
performed usually by comparison of cryptographic hash values to match data files. When a
match is found it is reported to the investigator. Reference sets have two main filtering pur-
poses: 1) To identify digital artifacts of forensic interest; and 2) To perform data reduction
by filtering irrelevant content. The use of known file filtering is an excellent forensic analysis
technique when performing identification of identical and static files (e.g., detecting illicit
photographs). There are, however, inherit limitations and challenges of present reference set
systems when performing forensic analysis of application software. This research divides the
identified problems into three distinct categories:
Problem 1: Creating application software reference sets.
Problem 2: Storing and sharing application software reference sets.
Problem 3: Correlating reference sets against target data sets.
The following three subsections discuss each of the classified research problems and highlight a
variety of specific challenges when implementing application software reference sets to perform
automated digital forensic analysis.
4.2.1.1 Problem 1: Creating Application Software Reference Sets
The reviewed literature aided in identifying a variety of problems surrounding the creation of
application software reference sets. These problems are shared by researchers (who attempt
to advance the technology) and practitioners (who perform actual digital investigations). The
following list highlights the current problems:
• Reverse engineering techniques lack standardisation: Reverse engineering is
essential to identify application software artifacts. However, Garfinkel (2010) states
that researchers lack a standardised and systematic approach to reverse engineering
compounded by the absence of a standard set of tools, minimal tool automation and
results that are unable to be shared between parties. This culminates in research being
a standalone endeavour with minimal advances in the underlying technologies used.
• Reverse engineering problems: Previous research has implemented a variety of
methods, techniques and tools to perform reverse engineering. However, in terms of
creating application software reference sets a number of research challenges remain:
– Reverse engineering produces irrelevant results: Previous research has dis-
covered reverse engineering produces a high number of irrelevant digital artifacts
caused by operating system noise (Seifert et al., 2007). Therefore, a created refer-
ence set will contain unrelated operating system files and Registry entries that are
not uniquely associated with the application software being reverse engineered.
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– Reference set creation requires a manual decision making process: Due
to the number of irrelevant results produced, a reference set then requires a manual
decision making process to classify relevant and irrelevant digital artifacts. This
is a time-consuming process, requires a high level of knowledge and introduces
analyst bias into the reference set creation process.
• Reference set generation time: Modern applications are regularly updated which
means that maintaining a reference set for every software version is becoming less feasible
(Roussev, 2011). Research has attempted to solve this problem using more flexible
hashing techniques such as similarity digests (Roussev & Quates, 2012) and small block
forensics (Garfinkel et al., 2010). A more practical solution would be to improve the
speed and simplicity of data collection to enable rapid reference set creation. This would
also increase the potential for application code coverage; for example, collecting data
and resultant system changes from conducting various application execution tasks such
as creating a document, encrypting a file and securely deleting a file.
As reverse engineering techniques are not specifically designed to aid forensic analysis of ap-
plication software, further research is needed to improve reference set creation in terms of
the time taken, functionality to filter irrelevant results and to provide an automated cre-
ation method. Solving the identified research problems would provide a solution specifically
designed to reverse engineer application software to aid real digital investigations.
4.2.1.2 Problem 2: Storing Application Software Reference Sets
The reviewed literature revealed a variety of problems surrounding storing and sharing appli-
cation software reference sets. Again, the identified problems are shared by researchers and
practitioners. The following list highlights these current problems:
• No standardised data abstraction: There currently exist a variety of forensic data
abstractions that are commonly used in digital investigations. However, none have been
specifically designed and implemented to address the requirements of reference sets for
application software. A forensic data abstraction requires the functionality to store,
distribute and automate processing of application specific digital artifacts.
• Challenges incorporating multiple evidence sources: Reference sets are primar-
ily comprised of metadata that represent data files (Roussev, 2010). However, most
Windows applications store system configuration information in the Windows Registry
(Morgan, 2008). Registry information has yet to be incorporated in reference sets and
forensic analysis of Registry entries from application software is a predominately man-
ual task. This results in limited functionality for application software reference sets as
they lack complete application software information. Furthermore, there are currently
no methods to store multiple evidence sources in a single reference set document.
• Challenges classifying known digital artifacts: Present reference set systems are
limited in the functionality provided to perform classification of digital artifacts from
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application software. For example, matches returned do not provide information such as
which application life cycle phase (e.g., install or execution) the original digital artifact
is from. This information could provide evidence of what tasks the user has performed
with an application. For example, if a user has just installed the application but never
run it; or if a user has installed, run and then later uninstalled the software in an attempt
to hide their activity.
Currently available data abstractions are not specifically designed to aid forensic analysis
of application software. They lack the functionality to store multiple digital artifact types
from different evidence sources. They also lack the functionality to retain application specific
information useful to forensic analysis of application software; for example, classifying the
digital artifact life cycle. These problems are caused by no standardised or widely accepted
forensic data abstractions to store, distribute or automate processing of digital artifacts from
application software.
4.2.1.3 Problem 3: Correlating Reference Sets Against Targets
The reviewed literature also showed a variety of problems surrounding correlating application
software reference sets against target data sets. Again, the problems are shared by researchers
and practitioners. The following list highlights the current problems that have been identified:
• Challenges detecting fragile data types: Present reference sets are primarily im-
plemented using only data files and matching is performed using cryptographic hashing
(e.g., MD5 or SHA1 ). Correlating data files using only hash values can limit discovery
as only homologous files1 are identified (Kornblum, 2006). Hash based file identification
fails to detect fragile data types. For example, application software usually includes var-
ious dynamic files (e.g., configuration or log files) which are frequently modified resulting
in a variable hash value that cannot be used for digital artifact detection.
• Challenges performing version detection: Modern applications are subjected to
regular patching and updates, which means maintaining a reference data set of cryp-
tographic hash values for every software version is not feasible (Roussev, 2011). This
problem is related to fragile data types, but has a different cause. An application ref-
erence set is constructed using: 1) A specific application version; and 2) A specific
operating system version. Using reference sets against variable targets introduces the
following challenges:
– Difficulty detecting known digital artifacts from a different application version
than that used to create the reference set.
– Difficulty detecting known digital artifacts on a different operating system
version and architecture than that used to create the reference set.
In order to address the outlined problems it is proposed that a reference set system is to
be designed which is specifically tailored to automate forensic analysis of application soft-
1Homologous files are completely identical files that share exactly the same sets of bits in the same order.
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ware. More specifically, automated decision making of different digital aritfacts types (e.g.,
file system and Registry entries) that are associated with application software is prescribed.
Furthermore, automated processing and detection of digital artifacts against a target data set
is specified. The three identified problems have been discussed and satisfy the first element
in the DSRM process model: to identify the research problem and motivation.
4.2.2 Define the Objectives of a Solution
The second element in the DSRM process model specifies that the objectives of a solution
are defined. Objectives are to be stated based on the definition of the problem area and
knowledge of what is possible or feasible, including a description of how the proposed artifact
is expected to provide a solution to unresolved problems (Peffers et al., 2007). The following
subsections outline the objectives for this research project. The high-level research objective
is specified including solution requirements and a high-level overview of the proposed system
design. Following this, a selection of lower-level research objectives are specified, each are
categorised based on the proposed system architecture.
4.2.2.1 High-Level Research Objective
The problems identified in Section 4.2.1 highlighted a number of challenges surrounding the
implementation of reference sets and the potential to perform automated forensic analysis.
This has led to development of the objective for this research project, that is, to automate the
identification of application software presence on an investigation target. Furthermore, due
to the digital forensic challenges of data volume and the number of targets requiring analysis,
an efficient solution is paramount. This introduced the requirement of designing a solution
that adheres to digital forensic triage requirements. Therefore, the high-level objective for
this research project is:
High-level Research Objective: To enable effective, automated detection of
relevant digital artifacts to identify application software presence on a target data
set. The solution must adhere to digital forensic triage requirements including high
system efficiency and initial forensic examination output
It is important to specify requirements on which to design and later evaluate the high-level
research objective. The following list specifies a collection of requirements that the solution
must meet to be considered successful. References to the prescribed design elements and
evaluation measurements are outlined:
• Effectiveness: The system should be functionally capable of detecting a high number
of relevant digital artifacts that are unique to an application, while also returning a low
number of irrelevant digital artifacts. Ultimately, the system is proven to be effective if
it has the ability to provide evidence that an application is present on an investigation
target.
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• Automation: The system should be completely automated with no requirement of
human intervention during operation.
• Efficiency: The system should be highly efficient while maintaining functional capa-
bility to detect forensically interesting digital artifacts.
• Digital forensic triage: The system should adhere to triage requirements including
performing a partial forensic examination and retaining the output for later in-depth
forensic analysis. Additionally, the system should identify investigation targets which
have specific application software of interest, therefore, prioritising in-depth analysis of
forensically interesting targets.
The high-level research objective specifies for the design, implementation and evaluation of a
system to perform automated forensic investigation, specifically, triage of application soft-
ware. To aid in solving the high-level research objective a system architecture is now pro-
posed. This will aid in dividing the primary objective into a selection of lower-level objectives
which will each address a specific component of the system architecture.
A reference set represents known content (digital artifacts) that are uniquely associated
with an application (e.g., data files, Registry entries). The research objective specifies an
automated approach to reference set creation using reverse engineering. The reference set
can then be used as an input and compared against a target data set. The two inputs
should be automatically processed and digital artifact matching performed. The system
should then produce forensic reports populated with known content matches. A match occurs
when the same digital artifact resides in both the reference set and the target data set. These
results are digital evidence of application usage in the target data set. The high-level research
objective specifies for an effective and efficient solution. These terms are very important to
evaluate the proposed system design, both are later defined and discussed in the evaluation
specifications (see Section 4.3.4 and Section 4.3.5). Figure 4.2 displays a high-level overview
of the proposed system design and associated architecture.
Figure 4.2: High-level overview of the proposed system design architecture (Image sources:
Mozilla Firefox icon taken from The Mozilla Foundation (2013), Mozilla Thunderbird icon
taken from The Mozilla Foundation (2011), Chromium icon taken from The Chromium Au-
thors (2015), TOR icon taken from The Tor Project (2011). Other images are public domain.)
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To aid in breaking down the high-level research objective a group of more specific lower-level
research objectives should be outlined. Each individual component of the system architecture
(as displayed in Figure 4.2) has been singled out and specific lower-level objectives associated
with each component are outlined and discussed in the following subsections.
4.2.2.2 Reverse Engineering Objectives
The reverse engineering component of the system design involves identifying the digital ar-
tifacts that are uniquely associated with an application. Reverse engineering is required
because the source code and/or extensive documentation is not readily available for most ap-
plication software. However, reverse engineering techniques for application software forensics
(and digital forensics in general) lack standardisation. Although there is a variety of methods,
techniques and tools available, none are specifically designed for reverse engineering applica-
tion software to aid automated forensic analysis. Furthermore, reverse engineering techniques
have a collection of problems including the prevalence of irrelevant results which leads to a
manual decision making process to determine digital artifacts of interest. In order to solve the
current approaches used to reverse engineer application software the first lower-level research
objective is:
Lower-level Research Objective One: To enable effective and efficient auto-
mated identification of relevant digital artifacts from application software
A solution to automate reverse engineering of application software would advance the funda-
mental technology used to create reference sets for application software. A specific focus on
digital forensic requirements is essential, something that existing solutions lack. Automation
is a key requirement, providing the functionality to remove the human element of the reverse
engineering process. It removes the manual decision making requirement and will aid in au-
tomating reference set creation. Automation would also decrease reference set creation time
while increasing potential code coverage of application software, resulting in a more detailed
and useful reference set.
The output from the reverse engineering process is a reference set populated with unique
digital artifacts associated with application software. A data abstraction is now required to
store, distribute and automate processing of the results from reverse engineering.
4.2.2.3 Reference Set Objectives
The reference set component of the system architecture involves designing and implementing
a data abstraction to store, distribute and automate processing of digital artifacts associated
with application software. Previous research has conducted numerous investigations centred
on forensic analysis of application software by examining digital artifacts (see Section 2.2.1).
However, there is no standardised or widely accepted data abstraction available to store or
distribute this valuable research output, thus making it accessible to other researchers or prac-
titioners. Instead, forensic practitioners are required to investigate every type of application
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software, determine remnant digital artifacts from multiple evidence sources, and then con-
duct a manual investigation using a variety of software tools. This is a fundamental problem
when advancing the overall technology used in automating forensic analysis of application
software. This process could be solved by designing and implementing a suitable data ab-
straction for application software reference sets. Therefore, the second lower-level research
objective is:
Lower-level Research Objective Two: To design an effective data abstraction
for storing, distributing and automating the processing of different digital artifact
types from application software
Once a data abstraction has been designed and implemented the digital artifacts identified
from reverse engineering can be populated into the prescribed format. It is envisaged that
the reference set will be populated with corresponding digital artifact metadata (e.g., name,
size, location, hash value) from file system and Registry entries that are uniquely associated
with an application. Once a reference set is implemented using a suitable data abstraction it
can be populated with identified digital artifacts and correlated against a target data set.
4.2.2.4 Target Data Set Objectives
The third component of the proposed system design is the target data set. In a digital
investigation the target data set is a previously identified and collected digital evidence source;
for example, a bit-by-bit copy of a computer Hard Disk Drive (HDD). In order to provide the
ability to automate correlation between the reference set and the target data set both sources
should be stored in the same data representation. Since the reference set contains a metadata
representation of digital artifacts from application software, the target data set should also
be processed and converted to the same metadata representation. The metadata must adhere
to digital forensic requirements and accurately represent the target data set. The generated
metadata representation should also be stored and saved in a data abstraction that can be
reprocessed, which will save time if reprocessing is a future requirement. Therefore, the third
lower-level research objective is:
Lower-level Research Objective Three: To establish an effective and efficient
automated technique to generate a metadata representation of the target data set
The result from lower-level research objective three is an accurate and reliable metadata
representation of the target data set. The next component of the system design is to correlate
information between the reference set and target data set.
4.2.2.5 Digital Artifact Matching Objectives
The fourth component of the system design is performing digital artifact matching between
the reference set and target data set. Correlation of digital artifacts is a key component of
the system design as it automatically determines if there are matching entries that reside in
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both sets. The outcome of this phase is a list of matched digital artifacts and evidence of
software presence, or absence, on a target system. However, there are a variety of challenges
when performing matching of application software artifacts.
As previously outlined (see Section 4.2.1.3), forensic analysis of application software using
a reference set fails to detect fragile data types with variable content. Examples such as
application configuration files, log files and some Registry values all have dynamic content
which creates difficulties when performing matching; for example, configuration files cannot be
matched using hash values as the content is continually modified. Registry values have similar
properties and may store an application configuration setting; for example, if the application
automatically checks for updated versions. Depending on the option selected by the user,
different value data could be stored. Digital artifact types (e.g., data files, folders, Registry
keys and values) all have different metadata property values that are able to be correlated to
determine matches. Therefore, the forth lower-level research objective is:
Lower-level Research Objective Four: To determine effective and efficient
automated methods to correctly detect relevant digital artifacts from a target data
set using the known content from a reference set
As previously discussed (see Section 4.2.1.3), reference sets for application software are created
with a specific application version on a specific host operating system with a specific version
and architecture. All of these variables create a reference set with different information. The
difference may be vast depending on the variables involved and the effect it has on the resultant
reference set. Creating a reference set for every version of an application is not feasible. It is
proposed that techniques can be designed and implemented that can aid performing detection
of digital artifacts from different application versions and/or operating systems. Therefore,
lower-level research objectives five and six are:
Lower-level Research Objective Five: To determine effective and efficient
techniques to perform detection of digital artifacts created by different application
software versions
Lower-level Research Objective Six: To determine effective and efficient tech-
niques to perform detection of application software artifacts on different Windows
operating system versions
The matching of digital artifacts is an essential objective to be solved in the design of an
advanced reference set system tailored for the automated detection of application software
artifacts. The proposed lower-level research objectives four, five and six specify the digital
artifact matching goals to be achieved. The overall objective of the research is to design
and implement a system to perform automated detection of digital artifacts from application
software. The objectives of a solution have therefore been proposed and various lower-level
objectives specified for each system component.
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4.2.3 Design and Development
The third element in the DSRM process model specifies the design and development
of the system. The design phase attempts to solve the research problem based on the set
down research objectives. Nunamaker and Chen (1990) state that design is one of the most
important aspects in the Design Science process and involves the application of relevant
scientific and technical knowledge to synthesise the proposed solution. The result of the
design and development phase is the creation of an innovative and purposeful artifact.
A design research artifact can be any designed object in which a research contribu-
tion is embedded in the design. This activity includes determining the artifact’s
desired functionality and its architecture and then creating the actual artifact
Peffers et al. (2007, p. 55).
Hevner et al. (2004) are more specific, stating that design science research must produce an
artifact in the form of a construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation. Overall, the goal
of the design and development element is to create a purposeful artifact that solves the
identified problem. The purposeful artifact of this research is the design and development of
a system to perform effective and efficient automated forensic analysis of application software
using a reference set populated with known content. A full chapter is dedicated to system
design (see Chapter 5). Following design and development of the artifact, is demonstrating
that the system can solve the identified problems.
4.2.4 Demonstration
The fourth element of the DSRM process model is demonstration of the designed and devel-
oped design science artifact, in this research the artifact is a system. Nunamaker et al. (1990)
summarise the demonstration of the artifact by simply building the system. Peffers et al.
(2007) elaborate on this premise, stating that demonstration of the artifact involves proving
that the idea works by solving one or more instances of the problem and may entail exper-
imentation, simulation, case study, proof, or other appropriate activities. Demonstration of
the artifact is an important element in design science research as the proposed solution cannot
always be mathematically proven or empirically tested.
Researchers have to develop a system to demonstrate the validity of the solution,
based on the suggested new methods, techniques, or design. Once the system has
been built, researchers can study its performance and the phenomena related to its
use to gain insights into the research problem (Nunamaker & Chen, 1990, p. 635).
Demonstration aims to verify the functionality and the utility of the artifact in a laboratory
context. It is proposed that the resultant artifact from this research be demonstrated by the
instantiation of the system design via software development. However, “building a system
in and of itself does not constitute research” (Nunamaker et al., 1990, p. 103). Therefore,
the demonstration of an artifact is inherently linked with the subsequent evaluation phase.
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“The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact must be rigorously demonstrated via
well-executed evaluation methods” (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83). The implemented software
tool will be demonstrated when tested against specifically authored data sets with known
content to prove functionality. The tool can then be subsequently evaluated to provide richer
details of the resultant solution.
4.2.5 Evaluation
“The essence of IS as a design science lies in the scientific evaluation of artifacts” (Hevner &
Chatterjee, 2010, p. 55). Therefore, the designed and demonstrated artifact must be evaluated
to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed solution. The evaluation of the
artifact should also validate the functionality and utility in a real world context. Peffers et
al. (2007) state that the evaluation phase includes observing and measuring how well the
designed artifact supports a solution by comparing the research objectives to the observed
results using relevant metrics and analysis techniques.
Evaluation of a designed IT artifact requires the definition of appropriate metrics
and possibly the gathering and analysis of appropriate data. IT artifacts can be
evaluated in terms of functionality, completeness, consistency, accuracy, perfor-
mance, reliability, usability, fit with the organization, and other relevant quality
attributes (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 84).
Evaluation of the designed and demonstrated artifact is not a one-way operation. Peffers et
al. (2007) state that researchers can iterate back to the design and development phase in an
attempt to improve the overall quality of the artifact and then re-evaluate the new design.
Nunamaker et al. (1990) agree, stating that experience gained from design, development and
evaluation of a system usually leads to further refinement. This research prescribes that the
evaluation phase should appraise the system in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Therefore,
the primary goal of the evaluation phase is to observe how effective and efficient the system
design is at providing a solution to the problem area. The high-level research objective specifies
the effective and efficient detection of digital artifacts from application software using reference
sets. Each lower-level research objective also specifies for effectiveness and/or efficiency to
aid in design, development and evaluation of the proposed system. The following subsections
outline the requirements of the effectiveness and efficiency measurements.
4.2.5.1 System Effectiveness
The effectiveness of the proposed system can be determined by using measurements to aid
in quantifying the overall success of experimental testing. Each measurement informs on
different aspects of overall effectiveness as follows:
• Retrieval rate when performing digital artifact identification or detection.
• Relevance rate when performing digital artifact identification or detection.
• Accuracy level when performing digital artifact identification or detection.
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Using the prescribed measurements, system effectiveness can be described as:
Effective: The artifact is deemed effective if the functionality of the system de-
sign can provide a high level of retrieval, relevance and accuracy when performing
automated identification and detection of digital artifacts from application soft-
ware. The system is deemed effective if: 1) It is more successful when compared
to previous methods (i.e., implementation of reference sets using hash values for
known file identification); and 2) Also meets a certain threshold of success. To
achieve this, measurements can be quantified:
- Higher number of correctly detected digital artifacts.
- Lower number of unrelated detected digital artifacts.
4.2.5.2 System Efficiency
The efficiency of the proposed system can be determined by ascertaining the processing speed
(computational efficiency) of the implemented system.
Efficient: The artifact is deemed efficient if the automated identification and
detection of digital artifacts from application software maintains computational
efficiency and/or can be judged to be improved when compared to previous similar
methods.
The evaluation phase (see Chapter 7) is an important component in this research that will
provide the ability to assess the overall success of the design science artifact to solve the
research objectives.
4.2.6 Communication
The final element in the DSRM process model is communication of the conducted research
to relay the resulting knowledge. Peffers et al. (2007) state that communication of the re-
search should target relevant audiences including researchers and practising professionals and
involves: 1) Communication of the problem and its importance; 2) Communication of the
designed artifact including its usefulness, novelty, rigour of design and the effectiveness. Po-
tential communication avenues include peer-reviewed scholarly publications in journals and
conferences as well as technical reports.
“Design-science research must be presented effectively both to technology-oriented as well
as management-oriented audiences” (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83). Technology-orientated au-
diences require adequate detail to construct (implement) the artifact (system) to allow for
future extension, development and evaluation. “This establishes repeatability of the research
project and builds the knowledge base for further research extensions” (Hevner et al., 2004,
p. 83). In contrast, management-oriented audiences require details regarding the costs needed
to construct (or purchase) and use the artifact in their organisation. Management-orientated
audiences also expect evidence of the usefulness to determine the potential economic and
production benefits.
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This research is in the form of a PhD thesis and as such a large component of the material
will be communicated in this document. The research will also be communicated via research
papers in academic peer-reviewed journals and conferences.
The aim of the research is to construct the proposed artifact in a system design and
then implement the design into a proof of concept software solution, or computer forensic
tool. The development of software creates additional avenues of research communication
by: 1) Releasing software source code to provide complete technical details of the methods
and functionality of the system design; and 2) Additional software documentation including
computer forensic tool operation and functionality.
4.3 Experimental Testing Method
Experimental testing is a significant aspect in the scientific method. The following subsections
outline various components of the experimental testing method. The data sets used for
experimental testing are specified including tailored known, publicly available and real
world data sets. The remainder of the section outlines the effectiveness and efficiency metrics
that will be used to determine the overall system performance to aid system evaluation.
4.3.1 Operating System Selection
The experimental testing method requires the selection of a specific operating system type to
be implemented throughout the testing process. A single operating system is prescribed so
that a manageable research scope can be established. This research project has selected the
Microsoft Windows operating system due to its popularity and prevalence in digital investi-
gations. Although just one operating system is chosen, it is expected that multiple Microsoft
Windows versions (e.g., Windows 7, Windows Vista and Windows XP) will be involved in
experimental testing. However, the proposal is that Microsoft Windows 7 will be the primary
testing operating system as, according to NetApplications (2015), it controls approximately
56% of the total desktop operating system market share.
4.3.2 Application Software Selection
The experimental testing method requires a collection of applications to create reference sets
as well as to create known data sets for system demonstration. Reference sets have two
primary uses: 1) To identify relevant evidence of application software usage; and 2) To perform
data reduction by filtering irrelevant content. The reference sets proposed in this research
are to automate the identification of relevant content. Therefore, the selection of application
software should incorporate tools that are forensically interesting, that is, the existence of
application software on a suspects system is evidence of possible malicious application usage.
Anti-forensic tools have been selected as the application software of choice as they present
a relevant and interesting case study. Since anti-forensic tools can be maliciously used, a
reference set of an anti-forensic tool would be used to detect the presence, or absence, of
that tool on a suspects system. Three anti-forensic tools have been selected for testing: 1)
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CCleaner; 2) Eraser; and 3) TrueCrypt. Each of the selected anti-forensic tools are
briefly outlined in the following subsections.
4.3.2.1 CCleaner
CCleaner, developed by Piriform, is a system cleaning and privacy tool with the functionality
to remove unused files and personal information from a computer system; for example, Inter-
net browsing history (Piriform, 2015). CCleaner is classified in the anti-forensic technique
of evidence destruction. It is a freeware (or freemium) application which has no associated
source code available. CCleaner provides support to securely remove a wide variety of Mi-
crosoft Windows artifacts including the Recycling Bin contents, recent documents, temporary
files, log files and clipboard contents, while also having a built-in Windows Registry cleaner.
Furthermore, CCleaner provides support to remove Internet artifacts including temporary
files, cookies and web browser history from popular web browsers including Internet Explorer,
Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Apple Safari. When performing file deletion to pre-
vent any data recovery, CCleaner has secure deletion capability to enable data overwriting
(Velupillai & Mokhonoana, 2008). However, CCleaner has to be explicitly set by the user
to perform secure deletion as it is not turned on by default (Piriform, 2016).
4.3.2.2 Eraser
Eraser, developed by Heidi Computers Ltd, is a secure data removal tool designed for the
Microsoft Windows operating system platform (Eraser Team, 2015). Eraser is classified
in the anti-forensic technique of evidence destruction. It supports Microsoft Windows
XP (with Service Pack 3), Vista, 7, 8, 10 and Windows Server 2003, Server 2008 and 2012.
Eraser is an open-source application released under the GNU General Public License (GPL)
version 3.0 and distributed as either compiled binaries2 or source code3. It provides a variety
of advanced functionality to perform secure deletion of file system entries and of unused
(unallocated) disk space, overwriting any previously deleted files. A built-in scheduler allows
users to create scheduled tasks which perform secure deletion of specified targets. In total,
Eraser provides 11 different secure deletion algorithms.
4.3.2.3 TrueCrypt
“TrueCrypt is an open-source program that allows the user to create encrypted virtual disks
and to encrypt not only entire system partitions, but also the entire system drive containing
the operating system” (Forte, 2009). TrueCrypt performs data encryption which is classi-
fied in the anti-forensic technique of evidence hiding. The TrueCrypt project has had a
rich and colourful history. TrueCrypt version 1.0 was released by a group of anonymous
developers in 2004 and was based on another encryption application called Encryption for




since its release. However, according to Leyden (2014), the TrueCrypt project closed down
on the 28 May 2014. A warning notice was displayed on the project website4 stating that the
software is not secure and may contain unfixed security issues. At the same time, TrueCrypt
version 7.25 was released which only provides the functionality to decrypt previously created
TrueCrypt volumes. Although the TrueCrypt project is now defunct, the tool was selected
for testing prior to the closure of project. Since the shutdown a number of dedicated reposi-
tories have been established to provide users with access to the software. van Bergen (2015)
maintains the DrWhax TrueCrypt Archive, a GitHub repository which retains almost every
TrueCrypt version. Steve Gibson (2016), a well-known security researcher, released the
TrueCrypt Final Release Repository which hosts TrueCrypt version 7.1a. The Open Crypto
Audit Project (2014) also host a repository for TrueCrypt version 7.1a.
TrueCrypt still has widespread popularity and has been downloaded almost 700,000
times from Gibson’s repository. Of this number, TrueCrypt version 7.1a for Mircrosoft
Windows 32/64-bit was downloaded over 270,000 times. Since the TrueCrypt project website
is no longer available, the software for this research was sourced from the TrueCrypt Final
Release Repository (Gibson, 2016). In order to ensure a reliable version of TrueCrypt
was sourced for testing, the MD5 hash value of the downloaded executable (TrueCrypt
Setup 7.1a.exe) was compared to other executables hosted on the previously mentioned
TrueCrypt repositories6.
4.3.3 Data Set Selection
The experimental testing method requires a selection of data sets for the digital artifact
matching component of the system architecture. The data sets discussed in this section will
be used as the target data set input into the system architecture (see Figure 4.2). Three
data sets have been chosen which include known, publicly available and real world data.
Each proposed data set has a specific purpose to aid in answering the research objectives.
Therefore, each data set will be executed in different phases of the DSRM process model
adopted for this research project. The following subsections outline the proposed data sets to
be used.
4.3.3.1 Known Content Data Sets
The first data set proposed for experimental testing is to aid in system demonstration (see
Section 4.2.4). Demonstration involves proving the designed system has the prescribed func-
tionality and can solve the research problem/objective. It is proposed that a data set with
known content is to be authored in a controlled laboratory environment. Authoring a data
set involves creating a realistic computer system and then populating it with known content.
Since this research focusses on application software, the known content is generated by per-
forming tasks with applications; for example, installing an application or executing a specific
4See: http://www.truecrypt.org/
5See: sourceforge.net/projects/truecrypt/files/TrueCrypt/TrueCrypt-7.2.exe
6The MD5 hash value of TrueCrypt version used in testing is 7a23ac83a0856c352025a6f7c9cc1526
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task with an application.
Experimental testing must be performed in a documented, reliable and secure testing
environment. Therefore, it is proposed that Virtual Machines (VMs) will be implemented.
VMs provide an excellent platform to perform experimental testing as they can easily be put
into use compared to a physical system. This is important as it saves time, especially when it
is necessary to conducted multiple experimental runs. VMs also provide a containment free
testing environment.
The simulated computer system needs to be populated with application software data so
therefore a life cycle is recreated to generate known content (see Figure 2.3). The selected
application life cycle phases are to be replicated from the National Institute of Standard and
Technology (NIST) Diskprint project (Laamanen & Nelson, 2014) as it is similar to this
research. Selection of the same life cycle phases allows for a comparison to be made between
the two projects. This will provide a baseline (the Diskprint project) on which to compare
and evaluate the outcomes of this research. The following life cycle phases are to be recreated
for each tested application:
1) Install the application (using default options)
2) Open the application
3) Close the application
4) Uninstall the application
5) Reboot the system
Each application life cycle phase will be recreated on the specified VM test system and the
virtual disk will be subjected to a bit-by-bit forensic copy. Therefore, each application will
have a total of five (5) separate forensic images (evidence files) to represent each application
life cycle phase. The known data set provides a selection of testing scenarios on which to
perform system demonstration and verify the implemented system in terms of functionality
and ability to solve one or more parts of the research objectives.
4.3.3.2 Publicly Available Data Sets
The second data set proposed for experimental testing is a publicly available data set designed
specifically for digital forensic research. (Garfinkel et al., 2009) states that standardised and
publicly available digital forensic corpora (data sets) are essential to enable research repro-
ducibility. Therefore, the public data set should be openly distributed and freely available for
public download from the Internet.
The public data set for this project is to be implemented when performance evaluation
of the system design is carried out (see Section 4.2.5). It will offer the capability for other
researchers, forensic practitioners, software and tool developers to test, evaluate, verify and/or
build on the findings presented in this research.
The proposed public data set is the M57-Patents scenario, authored and distributed by
the Digital Corpora project7. “The M57-Patents scenario is a multi-modal corpus consisting of
7See: http://digitalcorpora.org/
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hard drive images, RAM images, network captures, and images from other devices typically
found in forensics investigations such as USB drives and cellphones” (Woods et al., 2011,
p. 123). Since this research focuses on forensic analysis of the Microsoft Windows desktop
operating system, the data of interest are the hard drive images (a physical forensic image of
the original hard drive). There are a total of 79 hard drive images in the M57-Patents corpora
which run different Microsoft operating system versions including Windows XP and Windows
Vista (Woods et al., 2011). Although the M57-Patents scenario contains information derived
from copyrighted materials it is available for research, education, training and the production
of educational material8.
There are two additional reasons why the M57-Patents scenario was specifically selected
for experimental testing. Firstly, the M57-Patents scenario is known to have at least one
of the applications selected for experimental testing. Roussev and Quates (2012) discovered
that, using the sdhash tool, a user (Jo) had used the TrueCrypt software. Therefore, at
least one of the anti-forensic tools selected for testing is present on the data set. Secondly, the
Windows operating system versions present in the M57-Patents scenario are different from
the version used to create the application software reference sets (Windows 7 versus Windows
XP and Vista). Therefore, the data set provides the capability to test on a different operating
system version. This aids in evaluating the system design, specifically lower-level research
objective numbers five and six.
The M57-Patents scenario has been used extensively in previous published digital forensic
research in a variety of research topics. Roussev and Quates (2012) used the M57-Patents sce-
nario as a case study to demonstrate the utility of similarity digests, specifically the sdhash9
tool, to perform rapid content-based forensic triage to identify relevant evidence from disk
images, RAM snapshots and network traces. Nelson (2012) used the M57-Patents scenario to
perform a longitudinal time analysis of Windows Registry entries by investigating modified
(last write) timestamp values in Registry keys. N. Beebe and Liu (2014) used the M57-Patents
scenario to evaluate a relevancy ranking algorithm for string search output. Garfinkel and
McCarrin (2015) used the M57-Patents scenario to evaluate a hash-based file carving approach
using sector hashing and the hashdb tool10. These examples of previous research using the
M57-Patents scenario illustrate the popularity and usefulness in adopting publicly available
data sets for digital forensic research.
4.3.3.3 Real World Data Sets
The third data set selected for experimental testing is a real world data set comprised of
used (second-hand) hard drives. Performing experimental testing on real world data sets for
digital forensic analysis development and evaluation is advantageous due to data diversity
and unpredictability, thereby providing more robust research findings (Garfinkel et al., 2009).
8The M57-Patents scenario contains copyrighted binaries from Microsoft Windows XP and Windows Vista
operating systems. In order to remove potential copyright issues the bitstream of any executable and library
files were altered before distribution. See Woods et al. (2011), Section 9.4 for additional information.
9See: https://github.com/sdhash/sdhash and http://roussev.net/sdhash/sdhash.html
10See: https://github.com/NPS-DEEP/hashdb/wiki
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The specific goal of a real world data set is to subject the solution developed in this research
to unpredictable and diverse data including different Microsoft Windows operating system
versions, a wide range of installed application software and a wide variety of file formats. The
purpose of this diverse data is to to identify system design issues and general programming
errors. The end result is validation of the functionality for the implemented software.
The real world data set is to be compiled from two sources. Firstly, a total of 100 second-
hand hard drives are to be sourced from previous research conducted by Roberts (2013) at the
Department of Information Science, University of Otago (the same university as the author).
Secondly, it is proposed that the author will purchase additional second-hand hard drives
specifically for this research sourced from online auction websites.
The second-hand hard drives are to be physically imaged using accepted digital forensic
techniques. A write blocker will be used to ensure that the original hard drive is not altered
when attached to a host computer. Each hard drive will then be forensically collected and a
bit-by-bit copy of the source hard drive produced. This process results in a forensic disk image
(evidence file) that represents the exact contents of the original hard drive. The forensic disk
images will be used as input to the digital artifact matching component of the system design.
4.3.3.4 Data Set Summary
As outlined above, three data sets have been proposed: 1) Known data set; 2) Publicly
available data set; and 3) Real world data set. Each data set will be used as the target
data set in the proposed system design (see Figure 4.2). The known data set provides the
ability to demonstrate the functionality of the system implementation. The public data
set provides research reproducibility and different operating system versions to evaluate the
system implementation. Finally, the real world data set provides an unknown and complex
investigation target on which to further evaluate the system implementation.
4.3.4 Effectiveness Metrics
The purpose of the proposed system is to automate the identification and detection of digital
artifacts from application software. As such, the system design has a similar function to
Information Retrieval (IR) systems. “Information retrieval is a discipline that deals with the
representation, storage, organization, and access to information items. The goal of information
retrieval is to obtain information that might be useful or relevant to the user” (Ceri et al.,
2013, p. 3). IR has previously been used for a large number of systems and applications. A
traditional example of an IR system is a library card catalogue system. However, the example
of Internet search engines is arguably the most widespread and important IR system. Search
engines operate by taking a search query and returning relevant web page links.
The system design in this research aims to perform IR by automatically detecting digital
artifacts from a target data set and returning the results (matched digital artifacts) to the
investigator. The effectiveness of the implemented system design can be measured based on
the capability to correctly detect and report digital artifacts. IR metrics can therefore be
used to determine the effectiveness of the system.
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4.3.4.1 Information Retrieval Metrics
“When IR systems return unordered results, they can be evaluated appropriately in terms of
precision and recall” (Ceri et al., 2013, p. 7). Since the actual order of returned results is not
an issue in determining the effectiveness of the proposed system, the implemented framework
can be measured using the standard IR metrics of precision and recall. According to Ceri
et al. (2013), precision (P) is the fraction of retrieved documents that are deemed relevant
based on the specified query and provides a measure of soundness of the system. Equation





The intersection (∩) of relevant documents and retrieved documents is determined and divided
by the total number of retrieved documents. In the experimental testing the documents are
digital artifacts (e.g., data files, Registry entries). Relevant documents are digital artifacts
that are detected by the system when analysing the target data set; for example, a data file
from the application profile that is detected in the target data set, regardless of if they are
actually in the application profile. Retrieved documents are all the digital artifacts that were
detected in the target data set. Relevant and retrieved documents (detected digital artifacts)
need to be classified and correctly grouped.
The results from an experiment are classified based on a coincidence matrix (later discussed
in subsection 4.3.4.2). The classifiers True Positive (tp), True Negative (tn), False Positive (fp)
and False Negative (fn) are specified and each digital artifact assigned to a single classification.
Equation 4.2 displays the precision metric using the specified document classifiers. The tp
values are the intersection (∩) of relevant documents from retrieved documents, while tp +





The precision metric does not incorporate the total number of documents that are deemed
relevant. This is an important measurement to determine the number of digital artifacts
detected by the implemented system. Therefore, the recall metric was also used to determine
system effectiveness. According to (Ceri et al., 2013), recall (R) determines the fraction of
explicitly relevant documents that are retrieved. Recall provides a measure of the completeness
of the system design. Equation 4.3 displays the recall formula, while Equation 4.4 displays









“As precision and recall have different advantages and disadvantages, a single balanced IR
95
evaluation measure has been introduced as a way to mediate between the two components”
(Ceri et al., 2013). This measurement is known as F–measure, displayed in Equation 4.5.
Fβ −measure(Fβ) =
(1 + β2)× P ×R
(β2 × P ) +R
(4.5)
The F–measure (or F–score) metric considers both the precision and recall scores to provide a
combined average measurement. Equation 4.5 displays the F–measure metric with a undefined
β value. The β value can be manipulated to derive a F–measure score which focusses more
on either recall or precision depending on the requirements of testing. According to Ceri et
al. (2013), F1–measure is the harmonic mean of the precision and recall scores where β
equals 1, thus, giving an equal weight to both scores. In this research the F1–measure metric
is prescribed and is displayed in Equation 4.6.
F1 −measure(F1) =
(1 + 12)× P ×R
(12 × P ) +R
(4.6)
The final effectiveness metric is accuracy, also known as the Rand Index or Rand Accuracy.
“The overall accuracy of a classifier is estimated by dividing the total correctly classified
positives and negatives by the total number of samples” (Olson & Delen, 2008, p. 138).
Accuracy determines the total number of true results (true positive and true negative) against
the total number of cases examined. The accuracy metric is displayed in Equation 4.7.
accuracy(A) =
tp+ tn
tp+ tn+ fp+ fn
(4.7)
4.3.4.2 Digital Artifact Classification
In order to calculate the prescribed IR metrics the documents (digital artifacts) that are
returned by the system require classification. “In classification problems, the primary source
of performance measurements is a coincidence matrix” (Olson & Delen, 2008, p. 138). Table
4.1 displays a coincidence matrix for a two-class classification problem.
Table 4.1: Coincidence matrix for binary classification (Source: Table taken from Sokolova
and Lapalme (2009, p. 429))
Actual Class
positive negative
Predicted positive true positive (tp) false positive (fp)
Class negative false negative (fn) true negative (tn)
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The results from an experiment are classified based on the coincidence matrix. Each digital
artifact (e.g., data file, Registry entry) can be classified as one of four possibilities: 1) True
positive (tp); 2) True negative (tn); 3) False Positive (fp); and 4) False negative (fn). A de-
scriptive method can be used to perform digital artifact classification based on the coincidence
matrix. Each of the four available classifiers are described as:
• True positive (tp) is a digital artifact that is relevant and correctly detected
• True negative (tn) is a digital artifact that is irrelevant and not detected
• False positive (fp) is a digital artifact that is irrelevant and incorrectly detected
• False negative (fn) is a digital artifact that is relevant and not detected
After each digital artifact has been correctly classified, the prescribed effectiveness metrics
can be conducted as the first measure in determining system performance.
4.3.5 Efficiency Metrics
Two different types of efficiency metrics are proposed to further evaluate system performance.
Computational efficiency determines the functional data processing performance of the system.
Two computational performance measurements are to be used: 1) Absolute speed, which
measures the complete analysis clock time; and 2) Relative speed, which determines the
average rate that the tool can process evidence compared to the rate at which data can be
read from the source device (Ayers, 2009). Equation 4.8 displays the formula to determine
the absolute speed. Equation 4.9 displays the formula to determine average processing speed
in megabytes per second (MB/s) which is used to determine the relative speed as shown in
Equation 4.10.
absolute speed (time) = total elapsed processing time (4.8)
average processing speed (MB/s) =




average processing speed (MB/s)
drive read speed (MB/s)
(4.10)
In order to calculate the relative speed metric two variables are required. The average pro-
cessing speed is first determined by calculating the rate at which the system can process input
data (see Equation 4.9). The drive read speed also needs to be ascertained on the testing
system. This can be achieved by performing a read speed test on the hard drive using a vari-
ety of hard drive benchmark utilities. It is proposed that multiple runs should be performed
when determining drive read speed so that the average can be used to determine the input to
the relative speed metric.
The purpose of the relative speed metric is to provide results that measure the average
rate that a tool can analyse data compared to the rate that data can be read from a target
device. Given that the drive read speed is incorporated into the metric, the metric provides
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an indication of performance without intricate details of the testing system. Furthermore, the
relative speed metric is directly comparable to results from similar research efforts where the
testing system is inevitably different.
To ensure comparable computational efficiency results, all testing will be conducted on the
same computer hardware: Intel Core i5-3570K CPU with 8 GB RAM and running Microsoft
Windows 7. The Hard Disk Drive (HDD) used for testing is a Western Digital Green 2.0 TB
SATA 3 desktop 3.5-inch hard drive.
4.4 Ethical Approval
According to University of Otago (2016), any research that involves human participants must
be obtain ethical approval and comply with the University’s ethics policy. The only component
of this research that involves human participants in the use of a real-world data set to perform
system evaluation (see Section 4.3.3.3). The data set is to be formed using a variety of sources
of second-hand (used) hard drives that will likely have personal information from the previous
owner. A collection of hard drives will be sourced from Roberts (2013) who conducted similar
research in the same department as the author. Additionally, a collection of additional second-
hand hard drives will be sourced from online Internet auction web sites in order to increase the
size of the data set. This research project was granted ethical approval before commencing.
Additional documentation regarding ethical approval is available in Appendix A.
4.5 Conclusion
Chapter 4 has specified the selection of Design Science as the most appropriate research
methodology for this research project. The DSRM process model is a fitting guide for Infor-
mation Systems research and meets the requirements of this project to create a purposeful
artifact. Research problems were highlighted which include specific challenges centred on cre-
ating, sharing and correlating reference sets for application software. A high-level research
objective was specified with accompanying lower-level research objectives set out to aid in
obtaining a functional solution. From this a system design architecture was formulated.
Thereafter, an experimental testing method involved the selection of an operating system
platform, application software and data sets to use during testing, demonstration and evalu-
ation. Finally, testing metrics to measure system effectiveness and efficiency were prepared,
a vital culmination of the process model which will later aid in evaluation of overall system
performance. The following chapter, System Design, solely covers the third element on the




The Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) process model serves as a functional
framework for conducting this research. The third element of the DSRM process model centres
on the designing of an artifact. According to Peffers et al. (2007), this involves determining
the desired functional requirements of the artifact, specifying the architecture, then creating
the actual artifact. The design must contribute to the achievement and ultimately satisfy
the objectives of the solution; that is, in this research, the effective and efficient detection of
digital artifacts from application software using automated reference set creation followed by
automated correlation against a target data set. The artifact created in this research is, thus,
in the form of a system design and the subsequent implementation of that design.
Chapter 5 specifies the design of the system to advance the automated detection of digital
artifacts from application software. This research uses anti-forensic tools as the application
software of interest. The system encompasses two main stages: 1) Design and implementation
of a system to create a reference set to aid detection of application software; and 2) Match-
ing the reference set against a target data set. To achieve this an overview of the system
architecture is first described. The actual artifact (system design) is specified based on four
components of the system architecture which includes: 1) Identifying digital artifacts to pop-
ulate a reference set; 2) Development of a data abstraction for the reference set; 3) Processing
the target data set; and 4) Performing digital artifact matching between the reference set and
target data set. Each component has design requirements specified, is designed based on the
requirements and finally implemented in the form of computer software.
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5.1 System Design Overview
The overall high-level system design was established in the research methodology based on
the research objectives (see Section 4.2.3 and Figure 4.2). The system design is centred
around the concept of creating a reference set of known digital artifacts uniquely associated
with a specific application. Reference sets for the forensic analysis of application software
have a variety of naming conventions: Application profile, application footprint, application
fingerprint, application signature and hash set. For reasons of clarity, the term used in this
research is application profile. Figure 5.1 displays a high-level overview of the system
architecture with four main components (displayed with corresponding section numbers).
Figure 5.1: High-level overview of the system architecture (Image sources: Mozilla Firefox
icon taken from The Mozilla Foundation (2013), Mozilla Thunderbird icon taken from The
Mozilla Foundation (2011), Chromium icon taken from The Chromium Authors (2015), TOR
icon taken from The Tor Project (2011). Other images are public domain.)
Stage one of the system design is the creation of an application profile, starting with the input
of an application software; for example, Figure 5.1 shows four applications: 1) Google Chrome
web browser; 2) Mozilla Firefox web browser; 3) TrueCrypt disk encryption tool; and
4) CCleaner privacy suite tool. An application is subjected to reverse engineering which
aids in performing digital artifact identification; for example, determining the file system
entries and Windows Registry entries that are uniquely associated with that application. The
identified digital artifacts are populated into an application profile data abstraction. The
application profile itself is a reference set document that contains detailed metadata which
represents identified digital artifacts and provides the functionality to store, distribute and
automate processing of digital artifacts.
Stage two of the system design is digital artifact matching, that is, matching the
reference set against the target data set. Two inputs are required for matching to take place:
1) the application profile; and 2) the target data set. Every digital investigation has at
least one target data set; for example, a forensic image of a hard disk. However, before
matching can be performed the target data needs to undergo target data set processing
by generating metadata to represent the original evidence source (e.g., file system entries and
Windows Registry entries). Digital artifact matching can then be performed by correlating
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digtial artifacts between the application profile and the target data set. The results are then
presented as forensic reports to the investigator.
As displayed in Figure 5.1, the system design architecture is divided into four distinct com-
ponents: 1) Digital artifact identification; 2) Application profile data abstraction; 3) Target
data set processing; and 4) Digital artifact matching. The following sections outline the design
requirements and design processes for each component and the subsequent implementation of
the design as functional computer software.
5.2 Digital Artifact Identification
The first component in the system architecture is to reverse engineer application software
to identify digital artifacts uniquely associated with an application. The identified digital
artifacts are later populated into a specified application profile data abstraction. This section
starts by specifying the system design requirements for performing digital artifact identifica-
tion. The design process is then specified to achieve the desired functionality including a data
collection and comparison method, as well as specific functionality to filter irrelevant digital
artifacts and perform efficient file hashing. The design process is described with accompany-
ing software development which culminates in a computer forensic tool to perform automated
digital artifact identification.
5.2.1 Digital Artifact Identification Requirements
The identification of digital artifacts determines the additions, modifications, and/or deletions
to the computer system that occur throughout the different phases of the application life
cycle (see Section 2.4.1). On the Microsoft Windows operating system, file system entries
(directories and data files) and Windows Registry entries (keys and values) encompass the
majority of the digital artifacts of interest to aid digital investigation (see Section 2.2.2).
As the source code and/or extensive documentation is not readily available for most appli-
cation software, reverse engineering is required to identify the digital artifacts associated
with an application (see Section 2.4.2 and Section 3.2). It is proposed that differential
forensic analysis (see Section 3.2.2) be implemented to perform reverse engineering of ap-
plication software. The system design requires the solution of several problems which exist
with previous approaches that have been used for creating application software reference data
sets (see Section 3.2.3). To achieve this the following list of design requirements have been
specified:
• Support for a portable Microsoft Windows tool to run on a live system
• Support for an efficient automated data collection procedure
• Support to determine file system and Windows Registry changes
• Functionality to blacklist irrelevant digital artifacts
• Functionality to include data file hashing (e.g., MD5 and SHA1 )
• Functionality to report results to a suitable data abstraction
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The specified requirements for a new tool can be met in part by a mix of previous approaches
(see Section 3.2.2.1 and Section 3.2.2.2). The Regshot tool provides rapid data collection
as it runs on a live system. However, Regshot has limited functionality in terms of report-
ing sufficient digital artifact metadata; for example, file hash values are not included in the
differential analysis strategy or reported in the results. In contrast, the DFXML differencing
tools (idifference.py and rdifference.py) provide exceptionally detailed metadata
reports (in DFXML syntax), but lack rapid data collection due to the performance overhead
of post-mortem analysis (using acquired forensic disk images to perform differential analysis).
It is proposed that the new solution is designed and implemented based on the strengths of
these different approaches, while also removing the existing weaknesses. Similar to Regshot
and the DFXML differencing tools, the new solution should support file system and Registry
entry differencing and subsequent reporting of identified system-level changes. Additional ex-
tension is also required to fulfil the specified functionality outlined by the design requirements
including blacklisting irrelevant digital artifacts, performing file hashing and reporting results
to a suitable data abstraction. This leads to the design specification of a live portable tool
that is effective at detecting system-level changes, runs efficiently on a live Microsoft Win-
dows operating system and provides functionality to produce detailed and accurate reporting
(specified later in Section 5.3).
5.2.2 Advanced Tool Design: LiveDiff
A new tool has been authored to perform digital artifact identification and subsequent pop-
ulation into a data abstraction. The resultant tool is named LiveDiff, after the reverse
engineering technique that it implements: live differential forensic analysis. LiveDiff
is based on the Regshot project (discussed in Section 3.2.2.1) and authored using the C
programming language. Regshot is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
License (version 2) as stated in the project ReadMe.txt file1. This allows modification and
redistribution of the source code. Since Regshot performs the same high-level functionality
as required by the new proposed tool, it makes sense to implement and then develop from
source code that has been previously authored and thoroughly tested.
LiveDiff has been implemented using the fileshot.c and regshot.c source code
files from the Regshot project. The two source code files provide the functionality to capture
and compare system snapshots (containing all file system and Registry entries) on a running
Windows system. However, the source code taken from the Regshot project has required
extensive modification and additional source code to achieve the desired functionality as spec-
ified by the system design requirements. Almost all of the programming functions and data
structures taken from the Regshot source code have required some refinement but for the
most part have been rewritten using the original source code as an example. The follow-
ing subsections outline the core design of the system and LiveDiff tool including a data
collection method, required tool functionality and an overview of software development.
1See: http://sourceforge.net/p/regshot/code/HEAD/tree/trunk/files/ReadMe.txt
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5.2.3 Data Collection Method
The proposed data collection method is to perform live differential forensic analysis by
collecting and comparing system snapshots2. Data collection is achieved by taking a sys-
tem snapshot that contains all file system and Windows Registry entries. A snapshot is taken
before and after a single action; for example, installing an application. Two snapshots are
compared using differential forensic analysis and the system changes (in the form of digital
artifacts) are then identified. A data collection procedure is required to collect and com-
pare system snapshots throughout multiple application life cycle phases. Each data collection
requirement is discussed in the following subsections as to how the method has been imple-
mented in the LiveDiff tool.
5.2.3.1 Data Collection: System Snapshots
Each system snapshot consists of two different evidence sources: 1) Entries present in the local
file system; and 2) Entries present in Windows Registry hive files. Both of these evidence
sources have been established to be avenues of forensic interest (see Section 2.2.2).
File system data collection is achieved by performing a snapshot of the system drive (usu-
ally C:\). System information functions have been implemented to determine the correct
system drive (volume) at run-time3. To populate a system snapshot, data collection involves
enumerating (processing) every file system entry and saving each entry and associated meta-
data in a data structure (FILECONTENT).
Windows Registry data collection is accomplished by enumerating (processing) every en-
try from the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HKLM) and HKEY_USERS (HKU) Registry
hives4. The selected Windows Registry data sources incorporate the SAM, SECURITY,
SOFTWARE, SYSTEM and NTUSER.DAT Registry hive files. Metadata from each entry
is saved in a data structure (KEYCONTENT for keys and VALUECONTENT for values).
Table 5.1 displays the implemented data structures used to store digital artifact information.
All the processed file system entries and Registry entries are stored in a single snapshot data
structure, named SNAPSHOT. Each system snapshot stores a variety of child data structures
to retain metadata values for every processed entry. All data structures were originally sourced
from the Regshot project with modifications to include additional metadata information,
consisting of: 1) Hash values for data files, 2) Modified (or last write time) for Registry keys;
and 3) Additional timestamp information for all file system entries. Along with the properties
listed in Table 5.1, each structure retains a pointer to the parent, sibling and/or sub-structures
to provide access to related structures.
2Various differential analysis methods were investigated and trialled including virtual machine snapshot
comparison and various Windows APIs functions to monitor file system and Registry changes. However,
collection and comparison of system snapshots was selected due to potential future scalability of the method
to different operating system types without reliance on specific platform dependent APIs
3When LiveDiff is executed, the system drive is dynamically determined by calling the
GetVolumePathName() on the result from the GetSystemWindowsDirectory() function.
4The HKLM and HKU Registry hives were selected for inclusion as they commonly contain application
software configuration information (see Section 2.2.2.2). Inclusion of other Registry hive files have a low
possibility of yielding results of interest while also increasing tool processing time.
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Table 5.1: Overview of data structures for different application software artifacts
Digital artifact Structure name Properties
Data file FILECONTENT File name, size, write time, access
time, hash value and attribute
Directory FILECONTENT Directory name, size, write time, ac-
cess time and attribute
Registry key KEYCONTENT Key name, modified time
Registry value VALUECONTENT Value name, type, data and data
size
After collecting two snapshots (one before and after an action), a comparison is made to
determine the system changes that have occurred using a differential analysis strategy.
5.2.3.2 Data Comparison: Differential Analysis Strategy
The proposed differential analysis strategy has been implemented based on the general dif-
ferential forensic analysis strategy specified by Garfinkel et al. (2012), represented by the
following notation: Snapshot1 −−−−−−−−−→
R
Snapshot2. The formula is based on the pre-
viously discussed differential forensic analysis formula (see Section 3.2.2). Snapshot1 is the
system state before an application life cycle phase is conducted (e.g., application installation).
Snapshot2 is the system state after an application life cycle phase has been conducted. The
two snapshots are compared and result in a list of created, modified and/or removed digi-
tal artifacts, represented by R. Figure 5.2 displays a visual representation of the snapshot
method. Snapshot1 is a fresh installation of Microsoft Windows, while Snapshot2 is the same
system after installation of the Mozilla Firefox application. Snapshot2 clearly illustrates
a collection of files, directories and Registry entries that have been created on the system after
application installation.
Figure 5.2: Visual representation of the snapshot differencing method (Image sources: Mozilla
Firefox icon taken from The Mozilla Foundation (2013). Other images are public domain.)
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In order to perform comparison between the content of two SNAPSHOT structures, a dif-
ferential analysis algorithm is required for both file system and Windows Registry entries.
Algorithm 1 specifies the differential analysis strategy for file system entry correlation (FC
refers to FILECONTENT structures). The algorithm has been developed based on the orig-
inal Regshot comparison algorithm outlined in the CompareFiles() function from the
fileshot.c source code file. The primary modification made to the original implemen-
tation was to include correlation of hash values (MD5 and/or SHA1 ) when comparing file
system entries.
Algorithm 1 Differential analysis strategy for file system entries
1: procedure CompareFiles
2: for each FILECONTENT in Snapshot1 (FC1) do
3: for each FILECONTENT in Snapshot2 (FC2) do
4: if (FC2 has previously been matched) then skip FC2
5: end if
6: if (FC1 type and name does not equal FC2 type and name) then skip FC2
7: end if
8: if FC1 is a file then
9: if (all FC1 properties equal all FC2 properties) then FC2 is matched
10: end if
11: if (FC1 write time does not equal FC2 write time) then FC2 is changed
12: end if
13: if (FC1 size or hash does not equal FC2 size or hash) then FC2 is modified
14: end if
15: end if
16: if FC1 is a directory then




21: if FC1 is not matched then FC1 must be deleted
22: end if
23: end for
24: for each FILECONTENT (FC2) in Snapshot2 do




The differencing algorithm for Registry entries follows a similar differential analysis strategy.
However, differencing of Registry values is performed in an embedded loop after two matching
Registry keys are discovered. The algorithm is taken from the original Regshot comparison
algorithm outlined in the CompareRegKeys() function. No major changes to the original
Registry algorithm have been made. The only additions have been to perform an additional
check to determine modified Registry keys based on the modified (last write time) timestamp
value. The Window Registry differencing algorithm is available in Appendix B.1.
105
The result from snapshot comparison (namely, differential forensic analysis) are a list of entries
that are deemed new, changed, modified or deleted. These results are added to another data
structure (RESULTS) which retains all system changes and are later parsed and reported to
the application profile data abstraction (discussed later in Section 5.3).
5.2.3.3 Data Collection Procedure
In order to provide an automated data collection procedure LiveDiff has been intentionally
implemented as a console application to reduce required user interaction. The implementation
of an automated method to perform data collection simplifies and accelerates application
profile generation and is displayed in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Data collection procedure implemented in LiveDiff
Data collection follows a simple automated procedure that requires minimal user interaction.
After executing LiveDiff, the user is prompted to enter the application name, version num-
ber and application life cycle phase; for example, if the user was performing the installation
of TrueCrypt version 7.1a, they would enter: 1) TrueCrypt; 2) 7.1a; and 3) install. The
user would press Enter to collect Snapshot1, be prompted to perform the actual application
life cycle phase (e.g., install the application), and press Enter to collect Snapshot2. The two
snapshots are then compared using the prescribed differential forensic analysis algorithms
and the reports appended to the output file. The data collection procedure then starts a
looped process. Snapshot1 is discarded and Snapshot2 copied to the Snapshot1 variable. For
each subsequent life cycle phase the user must: 1) Enter the life cycle state; 2) Perform the
application life cycle phase (e.g., open the application); 3) Press Enter to collect Snapshot2.
Again, the two snapshots are compared and results appended to the output file. If subsequent
application life cycle phases are required, the process is looped again until the user exits the
program.
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The prescribed automated data collection procedure greatly simplifies performing multiple
snapshots and comparisons. This provides rapid recreation and data collection of the entire
application life cycle. Theoretically, the ability to copy a previous end snapshot (Snapshot2 )
to the first snapshot position (Snapshot1 ) reduces the number of system snapshots by ap-
proximately 50%, as only one snapshot needs to be collected for each application life cycle
phase. Thus far, the design incorporates data collection and subsequent comparison to iden-
tify digital artifact changes on a system. However, additional tool functionality is required to
meet the system design requirements.
5.2.4 Tool Functionality
LiveDiff has been developed specifically to address the shortcomings of other system-level
reverse engineering tools, primarily because other tools are not designed for reverse engineering
application software to aid digital forensic investigations. The requirements of digital forensics
are paramount for this research in terms of system design and software development. The
additional functionality can be classified into three main categories: 1) Dynamic blacklisting
of irrelevant operating system artifacts; 2) Inclusion ofMD5 and SHA1 cryptographic hashing
for data files; and 3) Reporting of comparison results to a specialised data abstraction. The
following subsections describe each tool function while reporting of comparison results is later
discussed in Section 5.3.
5.2.4.1 Dynamic Blacklisting
The system design requirements specified the use of blacklisting in an attempt to filter irrele-
vant operating system artifacts from differential analysis results. This is because system-level
reverse engineering is known to produce a high number of unrelated results (see Section 3.2.3).
In order to remove time consuming manual analysis, automated techniques are required to fil-
ter irrelevant entries while retaining digital artifacts of interest. To achieve this, it is proposed
that blacklisting is implemented.
Blacklisting is a common practice in digital investigations and computing in general; for
example, blocking spam email using a list of known bad email addresses. This research pro-
poses an approach to perform data reduction using blacklisting to filter irrelevant results. The
proposed technique has been named dynamic blacklisting, as the blacklist is dynamically
generated at application run-time. This is in contrast to common blacklisting approaches
which are manually populated before usage and populated with known bad or irrelevant en-
tries. Manual blacklisting methods are not flexible because they are: 1) Too time consuming
to create; and 2) Require blacklists to be created for every operating system. Dynamic black-
listing can be a powerful data reduction method if we assume the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: That any file system or Registry entry that exists before an application
is introduced to the testing environment is not unique to the application.
The dynamic blacklisting strategy follows simple logic; if a specific file system or Registry path
(absolute logical path) existed before an application was introduced to the testing environment
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it is not unique to the application and therefore not included in data collection. Dynamic
blacklisting is achieved by collecting a system snapshot before performing any data collection
or differential analysis. The entries in the snapshot are considered known content which
exist before performing any actions with a specific application. The snapshot of known content
is used to create the dynamic blacklist, where known content is established based on the full
path of each file system or Registry entry.
To perform blacklisting during LiveDiff run-time a highly efficient string search and
comparison implementation is required. This is because additional processing may signifi-
cantly reduce data collection speed and adversely affect differential analysis results. In order
to perform run-time blacklisting a Prefix Tree, or Trie, has been implemented using a
trieNode data structure designed for string insertion and searching. Each file system and
Registry entry found from the initial system snapshot is populated into the Prefix Tree using
the full path acting as the string index. Figure 5.4 displays an example of a Prefix Tree that
is populated with six file system entries. The inserted file system entries are listed on the



























































Figure 5.4: Example of a prefix tree (trie) populated with file system entries
After populating the dynamic blacklist, any subsequent entry is subjected to a search function
against the populated prefix trees (blacklists). If a matching entry is found, the entry is not
processed any further and is simply excluded from data collection and subsequent differen-
tial analysis; for example, LiveDiff is invoked, dynamic blacklist specified and an initial
snapshot is collected and used to populate the prefix trees. Another snapshot is invoked,
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the file system is scanned and each processed entry has its full path resolved and used to
search against the prefix tree. If the path is found, the entry is discarded and the next entry
processed. Otherwise, if the entry is not found it is processed and added to the snapshot.
LiveDiff implements two prefix trees: 1) blacklistFILES for file system entries; 2)
blacklistREGISTRY for Registry entries. Both prefix trees are stored in volatile memory
and only retained while running LiveDiff. Storing blacklists in memory adds a significant
advantage when performing system-level differencing, since no file system entries are created
to store the blacklist there is no chance of being erroneously included in the system snapshot.
A key advantage of the proposed dynamic blacklisting method is that since the blacklist
is dynamically generated during run-time it should be scalable to any Windows-based testing
system. This is exceptionally important because traditional operating system blacklists are
tailored to a specific version (e.g., Windows XP or Windows Vista). A Windows XP blacklist
on a Windows Vista system is unable to be (effectively) used as there are differences in the
core operating system files. Basically, all systems are unique and contain different directory
structures and data files that are a part of the operating system content. However, the
dynamic blacklisting technique should be scalable to any system, removing the requirement
to manually create a blacklist for every operating system for which LiveDiff will run on.
5.2.4.2 Data File Hashing
File hashing is a fundamental forensic analysis technique used to identify data files that are
exactly the same (see Section 3.3.1). The use of reference sets to perform automated file
detection on a target rely on computing and comparing file hash values. Therefore, the
inclusion of file hashing is essential in the identification of data files between the application
profile and target data set components of the system design. The reviewed literature identified
a variety of potential file hashing solutions including: 1) Traditional hash functions such as
Message Digest 5 (MD5 ) or Secure Hash Algorithm version 1 (SHA1 ); 2) Block-based hashing;
and 3) Approximate matching using tools such as ssdeep and sdhash. The high-level
research objective specifies an efficient solution suitable for digital forensic triage, therefore,
a computationally efficient hashing algorithm is required. This requires a hash function with
both fast hash value generation and comparison. Reviewed literature dictated that traditional
file hashing is by far the most computationally efficient for hash generation and comparison
(see Section 3.3.3, Table 3.6 and Table 3.7). Therefore, traditional hash functions have been
selected. However, traditional hash functions are unable to detect similar files (see Section
3.3.2). This limitation has been counteracted by designing and implementing a collection of
matching methods to perform matching of similar files (see Section 5.5.3).
Although traditional MD5 and SHA1 file hashing functions perform fast hash generation,
it is hypothesized that calculating a hash value for every data file on a target system would be
computationally inefficient. This is especially the case for performing data collection on a live
system and would also be true for any suitable hashing algorithm commonly used in digital
forensics. Initial testing of LiveDiff has confirmed this premise, taking approximately 15
minutes to calculate a SHA1 hash value for every data file on a default Microsoft Windows
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7 installation. This is problematic as the time taken to perform data collection (snapshots)
with file hashing would increase application profile creation time. Furthermore, an increase
in time to capture snapshots could also adversely effect differential analysis results as more
irrelevant system noise would be collected during the longer snapshot collection process. This
could potentially increase the number of irrelevant digital artifacts that would need to be
filtered in order to obtain a profile with only unique application software artifacts.
In order to provide a more efficient approach to file hashing the proposed dynamic black-
listing technique (see Section 5.2.4.1) has been leveraged in that only data files which are
not blacklisted are hashed. It means that any data file that is present before performing
differential analysis will not be subjected to hashing. When performing a snapshot of file
system entries the file hashing function is only called on when: 1) The file system entry has
not been blacklisted; and 2) The non-blacklisted file system entry is a data file (directories are
not hashed). Only new data files created by the application software are therefore subjected
to file hashing. This method results in a dramatically smaller number of calls to the hashing
function while maintaining effectiveness by only hashing non-operating system files. Pre-
liminary testing of this implementation discovered that hashing non-blacklisted files proved
computationally efficient and only increased the time taken to collect a system snapshot by an
average of two (2) seconds. Furthermore, preliminary testing also discovered that all unique
application related data files were correctly hashed and included in the differential analysis
results.
Two cryptographic hashing algorithms were selected for inclusion in the LiveDiff tool:
1) Message Digest 5 (MD5 ); and 2) Secure Hash Algorithm version 1 (SHA1 ). Both al-
gorithms are widely accepted in digital investigations. Each hashing function has been im-
plemented by using the Microsoft Cryptography Application Programming Interface (API),
provided by the Wincrypt.h header file. To perform file hashing, an MD5 and SHA1 hash-
ing function, CalculateMD5() and CalculateSHA1(), have been authored and included
in the fileshot.c source code file. For each non-blacklisted data file that is encountered
each hashing function can be called and the hash value appended to the FILECONTENT
data structure. Inclusion of file hashing during LiveDiff execution is determined by user-
specified command line options which controls if file hashing is to be performed and which
hashing algorithm to implement.
5.2.5 Software Development: LiveDiff
LiveDiff has been designed based on the system requirements and a data collection pro-
cedure and specified tool functionality for digital artifact identification and documentation
outlined. The LiveDiff implementation has resulted in approximately 6,000 lines of source
code in seven different files. A total of four of these were authored specifically for LiveDiff:
1) livediff.c; 2) dfxml.c; 3) blacklist.c; and 4) output.c. These four source code
files contain around 2,000 lines of new code while the remaining 4,000 or so lines of code has
been taken from the Regshot project and subjected to various levels of modification. These
files include: 1) regshot.c; 2) fileshot.c; and 3) global.h. Appendix B.2 provides an
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in-depth comparison of source code for both projects and the changes that have been made.
In summary, approximately 2,500 lines (out of 4,000 lines) of original source code from the
Regshot project has been either rewritten or heavily modified. In addition, a total of five
(5) new programming functions were added to the existing Regshot code to achieve the de-
sired functionality that LiveDiff required. Table 5.2 outlines a summary of the LiveDiff
source files with an accompanying description of code purpose and functionality.
Table 5.2: List of LiveDiff source code files with a description of functionality
Source File Description
livediff.c Program entry point. Parses command line arguments. Executes se-
lected mode of operation including collecting and loading snapshots
regshot.c Windows Registry processing. Executes Registry snapshot collection,
comparison, saving and loading. Helper functions to fetch the full path,
data type and value data for Registry entries
fileshot.c File system processing. Executes file system snapshot collection, com-
parison, saving and loading. Helper functions to fetch the full path and
calculate SHA1 hash values for file system entries
output.c Processing of comparison results (system changes) to be reported. Man-
ages output files and helps display snapshot and result information
dfxml.c Writes comparison results in XML syntax including writing APXML
structure, populate FileObjects and CellObjects from comparison
results. Helper functions to write XML element formats
blacklist.c Perform blacklisting of file system and Registry entries. Generates black-
lists from a system snapshot and populates a Prefix Tree (or Trie) to
enable full path indexing and searching
global.h Header file. Specifies global variables, functions and structures
The output from LiveDiff is an application profile that is populated with file system and
Windows Registry entries that are created, modified and/or deleted during the life cycle of
an application. The populated application profile can be used as input to compare against
a target data set. However, a viable data abstraction is first required in order to store,
distribute and automate processing of the file system entries and Registry entries that have
been identified.
5.3 Application Profile Data Abstraction
The application profile is the second component of the system architecture (see Figure 5.1). An
application profile has previously been defined as a “collection of files that make up an appli-
cation, the Windows Registry or Macintosh plist information associated with an application,
volatile memory (RAM) information, document signatures and network traffic signatures”
(Garfinkel, 2010, p. S69). Therefore, an application profile is comprised of various digital
artifact types that are uniquely associated with an application. The digital artifacts are com-
monly represented by metadata, do not contain actual content and are stored in a file (usually
a document or database) for future processing. Each digital artifact is created, modified or
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deleted through the application life cycle. This information is the resultant output from the
identification of digital artifacts and implemented in the LiveDiff tool (see Section 5.2.3).
This section describes the design and implementation of a suitable data abstraction to
retain application software information which will later be used to perform detection of known
digital artifacts by matching metadata properties. Design requirements are first specified
for an application profile data abstraction followed by the design to incorporate the relevant
digital artifact types and metadata property values selected. Further metadata property values
are identified to provide application software-specific information. Finally, an Application
Programming Interface (API) is designed and implemented based on the data processing
requirements.
5.3.1 Data Abstraction Requirements
An application profile requires a data abstraction to store, distribute, and automate pro-
cessing of digital artifacts. On the Microsoft Windows operating system, file system entries
(directories and data files) and Windows Registry entries (keys and values) encompass the
majority of the digital artifacts of interest to aid digital investigation (see Section 2.2.2). The
LiveDiff tool was designed specifically to identify these digital artifacts to aid in creating
an application profile. However, there is no data abstraction expressly designed to act as an
application software reference set (that is, an application profile). Furthermore, there is no
data abstraction that has the functionality to store multiple evidence sources in one document.
To achieve the desired system functionality the following design requirements are specified:
• Provide support for file system and Windows Registry entries
• Provide support for automated processing
• Adhere to digital forensic requirements
• Is open and extensible
5.3.2 Data Abstraction Design
The system requirements for an application profile data abstraction can be achieved through
the extension and development of previous partial solutions. It is advantageous, as well
as common practice, to utilize prior solutions that have been specifically designed for, and
adhere to, digital forensic requirements. The following subsections describe the design of a
data abstraction that will be used to store digital artifact metadata for file system entries and
then Registry entries, followed by a proposed data abstraction structure.
5.3.2.1 Digital Forensics XML
Digital Forensic XML (DFXML), in combination with Registry XML (RegXML), has been se-
lected as the data abstraction on which to develop a new application profile format. DFXML
conforms to all the identified requirements including functionality to document file system en-
tries, Windows Registry entries, as well as case provenance (Garfinkel, 2012a). Furthermore,
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DFXML adheres to digital forensic requirements and has an Application Programming Inter-
face (API) to provide automated processing. However, DFXML was not designed specifically
for application software reference sets and requires additional design, development and imple-
mentation for this research project. According to Garfinkel (2009), DFXML stores file system
entries within XML tags named fileobjects. Extensive metadata is stored for each entry
including file name, file size, allocation status, MAC timestamps, hash values and location of
data using byte_run elements. Listing 5.1 displays an example of a DFXML fileobject
for a digital image.
<f i l e o b j e c t>
<f i l ename>DCIM/100CANON/IMG_0044 .JPG</ f i l ename>
< f i l e s i z e>105195</ f i l e s i z e>
<pa r t i t i o n>1</ pa r t i t i o n>
<a l l o c>1</ a l l o c>
<mtime prec=’ 2 ’>2008−12−25T04:21:44</mtime>
<ctime prec=’ 2 ’>2008−12−25T04:21:44</ ctime>
<atime prec=’ 86400 ’>2008−12−24T00:00:00</atime>
<l ibmag ic>JPEG image data , EXIF standard 2 .2</ l ibmag ic>
<byte_runs>
<byte_run o f f s e t=’ 0 ’ f s_o f f s e t=’ 88576 ’ l en=’ 32768 ’ />
<byte_run o f f s e t=’ 32768 ’ f s_o f f s e t=’ 1497600 ’ l en=’ 32768 ’ />
<byte_run o f f s e t=’ 65536 ’ f s_o f f s e t=’ 6330880 ’ l en=’ 39659 ’ />
</byte_runs>
<hashd ige s t type=’md5 ’>cef79634dd3a86455a2cd900a691adf3</ hashd ige s t>
<hashd ige s t type=’ sha1 ’>916 a88a00c58b7a566711acd25e61d549df5d303</ hashd ige s t>
</ f i l e o b j e c t>
Listing 5.1: DFXML fileobject example (Source: Listing taken from Garfinkel (2012a,
p. 165))
According to Nelson (2012), RegXML stores Registry entries using XML tags named keys
and values. However, while DFXML stores flattened fileobjects, RegXML has a nested
structure based on the hierarchical nature of the Registry. Listing 5.2 displays a RegXML
example taken from the HKEY_CURRENT_USER Registry hive. The nested structure
of RegXML makes it difficult to store a collection of single Registry entries. Therefore, a
new RegXML structure is required to meet the prescribed design requirements. In addition,
the design of DFXML and RegXML means that file system entries and Windows Registry
entries are independent and, therefore, usually stored in different documents. Hence, a new
data abstraction structure is required to store all digital artifacts in a single reference set
document. Although amalgamation of all digital artifacts into a single abstraction is not
essential, it makes sense to group data to ease distribution of the output. The following
subsections introduce a new RegXML structure to store Registry information in a flattened
structure, followed by a new application profile document structure that amalgamates DFXML
and the revised RegXML structure components into a single entity.
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<value name="ColorTable00 " type="REG_DWORD" value="0"/>
<value name="ColorTable01 " type="REG_DWORD" value="8388608"/>
. . .
<value name="WindowSize" type="REG_DWORD" value="1638480"/>
<value name="WordDelimiters " type="REG_DWORD" value="0"/>
</key>
</key>
</msreg i s t ry>
Listing 5.2: Example of RegXML structure (Source: Listing taken from Garfinkel (2012a,
p. 168))
5.3.2.2 Revised Registry XML Elements
As previously outlined, RegXML represents Registry entries in a nested XML structure where
a Registry sub-key or value is stored under the associated parent key. Unfortunately, using a
nested structure means that a Registry single entry is unable to be extracted and represented
by itself (as each child entry requires the parent entry to establish the full path). To effec-
tively store and process Registry entries a modified XML structure is required. This research
revised the design of RegXML elements to mimic the flattened structure used by DFXML.
Although not implemented in any Registry parsing tool, the DFXML Objects.py API pro-
vided a new set of Python objects to store flattened RegXML syntax in a new object named
CellObjects. The new object bindings have the functionality to store a variety of Registry
entry properties depending on the type of entry; either keys or values. Listing 5.3 displays
the revised RegXML CellObject structure that has been designed for this research. The
listing displays three Registry entries that are the same as the first three entries as displayed
in Listing 5.2. As illustrated, the revised RegXML CellObject structure provides a single
XML tag (element) for every Registry entry. The key difference is that each CellObject
stores the full cellpath for every Registry entry. However, no Registry parsing tool can
produce the revised RegXML syntax since the new structure has been specified in this re-
search. Therefore, a new or modified tool will be required to perform RegXML generation of
the Registry hive files that will be extracted from the target data set processing (discussed
later in Section 5.4.3).
5.3.2.3 Application Profile Structure
When utilizing DFXML and RegXML, file system and Registry entry information is usually
stored individually in a separate XML document. However, the design requirements specify
that all digital artifact metadata should be stored in a single document. Therefore, in order
to implement the proposed application profile, a hybrid data abstraction is required using a
combination of the functionality provided by DFXML and RegXML. This new data abstrac-
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<c e l l o b j e c t root=’ 1 ’>
<c e l l p a t h>HKEY_CURRENT_USER</ c e l l p a t h>
<name_type>k</name_type>
<a l l o c>1</ a l l o c>
</ c e l l o b j e c t>
<c e l l o b j e c t>
<ce l l p a t h>HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Console</ c e l l p a t h>
<name_type>k</name_type>
<a l l o c>1</ a l l o c>
<mtime>2010−03−24T10:10−04:00Z</mtime>
</ c e l l o b j e c t>
<c e l l o b j e c t>
<ce l l p a t h>HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Cosole /ColorTable00</ c e l l p a t h>
<name_type>v</name_type>
<a l l o c>1</ a l l o c>
<data_type>REG_DWORD</data_type>
<data>0</data>
</ c e l l o b j e c t>
Listing 5.3: Example of the revised RegXML CellObject structure
tion has been named Application Profile XML, or APXML. Listing 5.4 illustrates the
proposed structure of the APXML data abstraction. The document structure amalgamates
storage of different digital artifact types into a single XML file using DFXML FileObjects




<cr ea t o r>
<build_environment />
<execution_environment />
</ c r ea t o r>
<!−− DFXML Fi l eOb j e c t s −−>
<!−− RegXML Ce l lOb j e c t s −−>
<rusage />
</apxml>
Listing 5.4: Example of the Application Profile XML (APXML) structure
The root XML element, apxml, defines that the XML file is an APXML document. Vari-
ous XML namespaces are included in the root element which specify unique XML elements
(tags) and associated attributes that are stored in the document. A number of XML names-
paces are needed to form the APXML structure as it includes DFXML FileObject entries,
RegXML CellObject entries and DFXML delta annotations to describe FileObject and
CellObject differencing states; for example, new, deleted and changed.
An APXML document contains a metadata element which documents information about
the created application profile. It uses XML Dublin Core to annotate the XML document
including the document type and publisher. Information is also stored about the application
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profile including application name and version number.
The creator element provides information about the tool used to create the APXML
document and is sourced from the DFXML standard (version 1.0). The creator element
outlines the program name and version number which created the document. Additional ele-
ments provide detailed information about program compilation and execution environments.
The build_environment element contains information about the system that was used to
compile the program. The execution_environment element specifies details about the
system on which the program was run. Finally, the rusage element provides tool run-time
CPU information. All of these XML elements are populated by LiveDiff when invoked.
Further information regarding the APXML structure is available in Appendix B.3. Exam-
ples are included for the creator and metadata elements, as well as an example of a partially
populated APXML document (see Listing B.3). Thus far, the high-level design of a suitable
data abstraction has been proposed using DFXML and revised RegXML elements. The fol-
lowing subsection discusses the inclusion of pertinent metadata properties to establish the
information that should be retained for file system and Registry entries.
5.3.3 Digital Artifact Metadata Properties
The DFXML and RegXML standards store exceptionally detailed metadata for file system
entries using FileObjects and Windows Registry entries using CellObjects. Both are
stored as XML elements with standardised metadata properties to retain important informa-
tion about files and Registry entries; for example, file name, and file hash value. However, the
application profile for this research only requires particular metadata properties to perform
digital artifact matching; for example, the file name, file size, hash value and allocation status
are all beneficial metadata properties for file system matching. Similarly, the cell path, alloca-
tion status and data type are beneficial metadata properties for Windows Registry matching.
However, there are a number of metadata properties that do not aid digital artifact matching.
DFXML FileObjects store timestamp information which is not beneficial for file system or
Windows Registry matching as this value changes depending on when the suspect installed
or used the application5. Another example of an unnecessary metadata property is the user
identifier (UID) value which retains which user owns a file. A UID varies between users and
systems and is therefore not useful to aid digital artifact matching either.
Table 5.3 displays the selected metadata properties that are populated in an application
profile to aid digital artifact matching. A total of four different digital artifacts are recorded:
1) File system directories (folders); 2) File system data files; 3) Windows Registry key entries;
and 4) Windows Registry value entries. Each digital artifact type is displayed with the selected
metadata properties that are included in the application profile. The digital artifact metadata
properties listed in Table 5.3 use the naming conventions from the DFXML project, specifically
the Objects.py Application Programming Interface (API)6.
5Although the timestamp metadata property is not required in the application profile for matching, it is
essential that the framework output report includes timestamp information for any matched digital artifact
found on the target data set. It provides evidence of when the suspect installed or last used an application.
6See: https://github.com/simsong/dfxml/blob/master/python/Objects.py
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Table 5.3: Overview of the metadata properties recorded in the application profile for different
digital artifact types (DFXML Objects.py API naming conventions are used)
File System Windows Registry
Directory Data file Key Value
filename filename cellpath cellpath
meta_type meta_type name_type name_type




5.3.3.1 Additional Digital Artifact Metadata Properties
Although FileObjects and CellObjects store detailed metadata about file system and
Registry entries, it was envisioned that additional metadata properties would be useful in other
components of the system design, specifically to aid digital artifact matching. Therefore, a
variety of other metadata properties have been designed and added. Table 5.4 outlines these
properties including a description of the contents of the added metadata property.
Table 5.4: Properties added to the application profile for FileObjects and CellObjects
Property FileObject CellObject Description
app_name 3 3 Application name (e.g., TrueCrypt)
app_state 3 3 Application state (e.g., install)
basename 3 File name without logical full path
basename_norm 3 Normalised file name without full path
filename_norm 3 Normalised file name with full path
cellpath_norm 3 Normalised cellpath of Registry entry
orphan_name 3 Normalised deleted path
data_raw 3 Value data in hexadecimal format
rootkey 3 Registry hive root key (e.g., SYSTEM)
It is proposed that the DFXML Objects.py API is leveraged to parse and represent file
system and Registry entry metadata in FileObjects and CellObjects. Any additional
metadata properties need to be implemented in the existing Objects.py source code and
is discussed in the following subsections.
5.3.3.2 Digital Artifact Classification
Classifying which particular application and which particular phase of the application life
cycle a digital artifact is associated with is crucial to the application profile. It provides
the forensic investigator with further information regarding application software usage; for
example, installing an application is a different scenario from installing and then executing
the software for a specific task. Both scenarios provide useful evidence for the investigator
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to determine what tasks a suspect conducted with an application. The APXML structure
therefore requires a flexible method to store particular application-specific information. Two
additional metadata properties are therefore specified: 1) app_name stores the application
name (e.g., TrueCrypt); and 2) app_state stores the application life cycle state (e.g., install,
open, close, uninstall). These modifications made to the Objects.py API thus provide func-
tionality for every FileObject and CellObject to have an app_name and app_state
property available for storage and processing.
5.3.3.3 Metadata Property Normalisation
It is proposed that various metadata properties can be subjected to normalisation techniques
to aid digital artifact matching. In this regard, five additional metadata properties are speci-
fied: 1) basename_norm stores a normalised base name (e.g., file name without the logical
full path) for file system and Registry entries; 2) filename_norm stores a normalised path
of a file system entry with logical full path; 3) cellpath_norm stores a normalised full path
of a Registry entry; 4) orphan_name stores a normalised path for deleted entries to align
with how fiwalk represents deleted file system entries; and 5) data_raw stores Registry
value data in hexadecimal format without any data transformation (e.g., transforming the
binary value of a Registry string value). The importance of metadata property normalisa-
tion is covered in detail later in Section 5.5.3.1 when outlining the digital artifact matching
component of the system design.
5.3.3.4 Compilation of Digital Artifact Metadata Properties
This subsection has presented in-depth information and the associated design of the applica-
tion profile in regards to storing pertinent metadata properties for file system and Registry
entries. Available metadata properties from the DFXML project were first selected (see Table
5.3) and a collection of new metadata properties have been designed to aid in digital artifact
matching (see Table 5.4). A summary of all available metadata properties are presented in
Table 5.5 where each metadata property is provided using the prescribed naming conventions
with an associated description and various examples of data that would stored by each prop-
erty. These metadata properties will be used in the later design for digital artifact matching
(see Section 5.5). The top half of the table specifies all properties for file system entries
represented by FileObjects, while the second half of the table specified all properties for
Registry entries represented by CellObjects. The bottom of the table displays application
specific information (app_name and app_state) that is stored by both FileObjects and
CellObjects.
Thus far, this section has designed a suitable data abstraction with all required information
to store and represent digital artifacts in an application profile. The following subsection
designs a suitable software solution to parse the designed application profile structure and
contents.
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filename File or folder full path Program Files/TrueCrypt/TrueCrypt.exe
filename_norm Normalised full path %PROGRAMFILES%/TrueCrypt/TrueCrypt.exe
basename File or folder name TrueCrypt.exe
orphan_name Deleted file name $OrphanFiles/TrueCrypt.exe
meta_type File system entry type 1 = file
2 = directory
filesize File size in bytes 36563
sha1 SHA1 hash value 7689d038c76bd1df695d295c026961e50e4a62ea
alloc_inode Metadata allocation status 1 = allocated
0 = unallocated













cellpath Registry cell full path $$$PROTO.HIV\Classes\AppID\TrueCrypt.exe
cellpath_norm Normalised full path SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\TrueCrypt.exe
basename Name of Registry value C:\Program Files\TrueCrypt\TrueCrypt.exe
basename_norm Normalised value name %PROGRAMFILES%/TrueCrypt/TrueCrypt.exe
rootkey Normalised hive root key SOFTWARE
name_type Registry artifact type k = Registry key
v = Registry value
alloc Cell allocation status 1 = allocated
0 = unallocated
data_type Registry value data type REG_SZ = Null terminated string
REG_DWORD = 32-bit number
REG_BINARY = Binary data in any form
data Registry value data @C:\Program Files\TrueCrypt\TrueCrypt.exe
data_raw Untransformed data 54 00 72 00 75 00 65 00 43 00 72 00 79 00 70
(in hexadecimal encoding)
app_name Application name TrueCrypt, Firefox, Chrome
app_state Life cycle state install, open, close, uninstall, reboot
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5.3.4 Software Development: apxml.py
The APXML data abstraction requires an Application Programming Interface (API) to read
and automate processing of APXML documents. Since the APXML data abstraction is similar
to the standardised DFXML format, a similar approach to developing and implementing an
API can be used.
Garfinkel (2012a) implemented an object-orientated API for the DFXML data abstrac-
tion in the form of the dfxml.py7 Python module. The dfxml.py module reads DFXML
files using Python’s Simple API for XML (SAX) parser or Python’s xml.dom.minidom
class. The DFXML document is parsed and Python objects are created to represent volume,
fileobject and byte_run structures. Nelson, Steggall, and Long (2014) created an addi-
tional DFXML API, Objects.py8 which provides a mutative object-orientated model with
built-in type-safety which conforms to the DFXML schema when reading and writing. Type
safety is advantageous for forensic data processing as it provides the functionality to trans-
parently check errors and that the correct data type is used for each metadata property; for
example, a file name must be a string and the allocation status (alloc_inode, alloc_name or
alloc) must be a boolean value (in the form of 0, 1, true or false).
5.3.4.1 APXML API Design Requirements
The APXML API has the following design requirements:
• Functionality to read, write and automate processing of APXML documents
• Capability to perform data type checking
• Support for file system entries using FileObjects from the Objects.py API
• Support for Registry entries using CellObjects from the Objects.py API
5.3.4.2 APXML API Functionality
In order to meet the requirements above the APXML API has been implemented using the
Python programming language and a new module, apxml.py, has been authored. In order
to store an APXML document, the apxml.py module implements Python objects for the
following XML elements that are permitted in APXML documents:
• APXMLObject to store the entire APXML document and child objects
• MetadataObject to store document information
• CreatorObject to store document provenance
• RusageObject to store tool processing information
• FileObject to store file system entries
• CellObject to store Registry entries
All XML processing is handled by the Python ElementTree9 module which is included





“The Python xml.etree.ElementTree module implements a simple and efficient API for
parsing and creating XML data” (Python Software Foundation, 2015). Each Python object
class in the apxml.py module has methods to:
• populate_from_Element(): populate the object from an ElementTree element
• to_Element(): convert an object to an ElementTree element object
• to_xml(): convert an ElementTree element object to an XML string
Both FileObject and CellObject Python classes have been sourced from the DFXML
project Objects.py API. Therefore, apxml.py requires that the Objects.py module be
available and imported at run-time. In order to provide the required functionality, both classes
were modified to store additional object properties (as stated in Table 5.4). The additional
properties require that the Objects.py source code be updated to reflect the changes. Each
added metadata property has been included to the object’s _all_properties set, new
setters and getters to perform type checking have been added and each property has been
included in the to_Element() functions. These modifications provide the functionality to
populate and interact with the new metadata properties in the existing object classes.
Various helper methods, type casting and type checking functions have been sourced from
the Objects.py API including: 1) _ET_tostring to convert an Element to a string;
2) _qsplit to split an Element object during parsing to a namespace and tag name pair
in a Python tuple; 3) _typecheck to check object type against another specified object;
4) _strcast to cast a value to a sting; 5) _intcast to cast a value to an integer; and 6)
_boolcast to cast a value to a boolean. One additional helper casting function, _datecast,
was added to convert a timestamp to a Python datetime object to provide an easy technique
to manipulate and compare date and time properties.
Finally, a statistics-based class has been added in an attempt to ease statistical process-
ing during experimental testing. A Python class, named StatisticsObject, has been
implemented to store statistical information regarding a specific APXML document. The
generate_stats() function calculates statistics for a specified APXMLObject.
The apxml.py module is approximately 600 lines of original code written specifically for
this research. In addition, the original Objects.py API required modification to implement
the additional functionality needed for the system design; for example, adding extra metadata
properties. These changes resulted in approximately 200 lines of added source code and
approximately 100 lines modified source code. Appendix B.4 provides a collection of simple
Python scripts to illustrate APXML API usage including functional examples to process
APXML documents and examples of how the statistics class can be used to provide summary
information of APXML document contents.
5.3.5 Adding APXML Output Support to LiveDiff
Thus far, this section has designed and implemented a specialised forensic data abstraction to
store, distribute and automate processing of application software artifacts, namely file system
and Registry entries. The LiveDiff tool design and implementation has been previously
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specified (see Section 5.2) which identifies file system and Registry entries that are unique
to an application. However, reporting the output of identified digital artifacts first needed
a suitable data abstraction which has now been designed and implemented. Support can
therefore be added to LiveDiff to output all differential analysis results to the Application
Profile XML (APXML) document format.
This section specifies the design and implementation of adding APXML reporting func-
tionality to the LiveDiff tool including reporting results to APXML documents, handling
of special XML characters, handling of Unicode control characters and representing Windows
Registry data to facilitate metadata correlation.
5.3.5.1 Reporting Results to the APXML Data Abstraction
A skeleton APXML file structure was designed and implemented to store digital artifact meta-
data specifically from application software (see Listing 5.4). The APXML structure leverages
the DFXML standard to store file system entries as FileObjects and the associated revised
RegXML standard to store Windows Registry entries as CellObjects. LiveDiff develop-
ment needs to be advanced to provide the functionality to report the results of the specified
metadata properties and associated values to aid digital artifact correlation.
Although Regshot only included support for text or HTML reporting functionality, the
original output.c10 source code was used as a reference to understand and re-implement the
reporting function from the original data structures. LiveDiff uses a new output.c file
to parse all digital artifact changes (file system or Registry entries) that have been identified.
Digital artifact changes are sourced from the RESULTS data structure that is populated
after performing differential analysis. Two new functions have been authored to parse the
comparison results and extract each file system and Registry entry to be reported. Each
comparison result is individually passed to either: 1) PopulateFileObject() to produce
a populated FileObject element in DFXML format; or 2) PopulateCellObject() to
produce a populated CellObject in RegXML format. The populated XML element is
then appended to the APXML document. Various methods to generate and print XML
elements have been sourced and adapted from the PhotoRec tool11 which includes DFXML
reporting for data files. A variety of challenges were discovered when implementing XML
output including: 1) Handling of special characters and unicode control characters; and 2)
Correctly representing Registry value data.
5.3.5.2 Handling Special XML Characters
The XML specification version 1.0 defines five special characters that must be correctly
represented when printing character data (strings) (Yergeau et al., 2004). All XML processors
will crash and present an error if a special character is encountered when parsing an XML




displays the five special characters with the name, original character, escaped character and
programming functions added to LiveDiff to search strings for each special character.
Table 5.6: Pre-defined XML entities and the associated LiveDiff checking function
Name Original Escaped LiveDiff Check Function
ampersand & &amp; xml_ampersand_check()
double quote mark “ &quot; xml_quote_check()
single quote mark ‘ &apos; xml_apos_check()
greater than > &gt; xml_gt_check()
less than < &lt; xml_lt_check()
Each function searches an input string for any special character (&, “, ‘, > and <) and
replaces it with the corresponding escape character (&amp;, &quot;, &apos;, &gt; and &lt;).
The string check functions are only called on when printing certain XML strings. During
preliminary testing special characters have been encountered in a variety of metadata property
values, including 1) Registry key and value full path (cellpath); 2) Registry value data
(data); and 3) File system entry full path (filename). The content from each listed
property is, therefore, checked and fixed before appending to an APXML document.
Similar problems were identified when printing and parsing Unicode control characters.
Similar to special XML characters, Unicode control characters cause an XML parser to
crash during document parsing. Testing identified control characters were present in only
Registry value data. In order to fix this, a new function named xml_check_control()
has been included. Each Registry value data entry is checked for control characters by utilising
the built-in C programming function iswcntrl()12 If at least one control character is found,
the Registry value data is subject to Base64 encoding using the CryptBinaryToString()
function from Wincrypt.h library. If a control character is found and value data encoding
performed, the data_encoding metadata property attribute is added to the CellObject
with the attribute base64. This provides the capability to determine data encoding during
later processing.
5.3.5.3 Representing Registry Value Data
Another identified functional limitation was how Registry value data is represented in the
original Regshot code and in other Registry parsing tools. When informally comparing
LiveDiff output to other Registry parsing tools it was discovered that many tools inter-
preted, encoded and output Registry value data in a variety of different formats. Simply,
LiveDiff performed different value data transformation (encoding) compared other tools.
Although not tested, this would inevitably cause problems when performing correlation of
Registry value data between the application profile and target data set. Table 5.7 provides
12The iscntrl() C programming function the commonly known function to check for control characters.
The implemented iswcntrl(). function is a wide character (Unicode) function available in Visual C++.
Since LiveDiff is authored for full Unicode support the wide character function was implemented.
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examples of Registry values represented in output from LiveDiff compared to the hivexml
tool as an example. Since the Windows Registry is stored in a binary data format, the corre-
sponding hexadecimal representation is also included.
Table 5.7: Registry value data type variability between LiveDiff and hivexml
Data Type LiveDiff hivexml Hexadecimal
REG_DWORD 0x00000001 1 00 00 00 01
REG_QWORD 0x0000000000000000 0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
REG_BINARY 04 C0 00 00 BMAAAA== 04 C0 00 00
In order to simplify Registry value data correlation a new metadata property has been added
to RegXML CellObjects to store the data extracted from Registry values. The new element
was named data_raw and included in APXML documents for all Registry value entries (see
Table 5.5 for an example). This new element stores the native data in hexadecimal format
without performing any data encoding or transformation. In the above example (Table 5.7),
the hexadecimal value is stored by the data_raw element. The original data element has not
been removed as it maintains human readability of Registry value data entries; for example,
Registry values with a string data type.
5.3.6 Application Profile: Data Abstraction Summary
The Application Profile XML (APXML) document is a hybrid data abstraction which lever-
ages the standardised DFXML and RegXML forensic data abstractions to store metadata
associated with file system and Windows Registry entries. Various additional metadata prop-
erties have also been implemented for the existing FileObject and CellObject Python
classes that are required for application specific information. The incorporation of a Python
API, apxml.py, has been designed and authored as a key feature to aid automated processing
of application profiles stored in APXML documents.
The final result of integration of APXML reporting to LiveDiff is the functionality to
successfully report all file system and Registry changes to the prescribed data abstraction
format in order to automate processing of digital artifacts from application software. The
next component in the system architecture is the processing and transformation of the target
data set into a metadata representation to facilitate digital artifact matching.
5.4 Target Data Set Processing
The third component in the system architecture is processing the target data set. This
section discusses, in detail, the various operations performed to the target data set which
includes parsing, extracting and transformation of file system and Windows Registry entries
to facilitate digital artifact matching.
In a digital investigation the target data set is typically a forensic disk image (evidence
file) which is a bit-by-bit copy of a digital storage device. Common examples include Hard
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Disk Drives (HDD) and Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash memory drives. Processing the
target data set involves parsing the file system and Registry data structures to extract and
transform entries in a metadata representation of the original evidence source. The ultimate
outcome are metadata reports stored in a suitable format for digital artifact matching. Figure
5.5 displays the method used to process the target data set and generate reports populated
with metadata representing the original evidence sources. The following subsections outline
the target data set processing requirements, followed by the method used to generate file





















Figure 5.5: High-level overview of target data set processing and the method used to generate
DFXML and RegXML reports to represent the original evidence sources
5.4.1 Target Data Set Processing Requirements
The application profile has been specified to be stored in the designed Application Profile XML
(APXML) data abstraction (see Section 5.3). The APXML structure stores digital artifact
information in DFXML FileObjects for file system entries and RegXML CellObjects
for Windows Registry entries. Therefore, it is logical that the target data set should also
be represented in the same format in order to support subsequent analysis using the same
standardised forensic data abstractions. Two different evidence sources from the target data
set therefore require processing: 1) File system entries; and 2) Windows Registry entries.
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Both need to be transformed into the DFXML and RegXML structure to represent the original
evidence sources and leads to the following design requirements:
• Functionality to generate DFXML representation of target file system
• Functionality to extract Windows Registry hive files from evidence file
• Functionality to generate RegXML representation of Window Registry hive files
• Functionality to recover deleted (unallocated) file system and Registry entries
The following subsections outline the design to achieve target data set processing and produce
a high-level metadata representation of the original evidence source. Firstly, an overview of
file system metadata generation is outlined and achieved using existing solutions. Secondly,
the requirements for Windows Registry metadata generation are specified followed by design
and implementation of a new parsing tool to generate the revised RegXML structure.
5.4.2 File System Metadata Generation
The first step in target data set processing is to parse the forensic disk image (evidence
file) and generate file system metadata. This is shown on the left-hand side of Figure 5.5
and displays the process used to parse the target data set file system to produce a DFXML
report. The fiwalk13 tool has been used to generate the report as the tool is inherently
linked to the DFXML project and data abstraction. fiwalk was the first program authored
to generate DFXML reports and describes the partitions and files on a hard drive or disk image
(Garfinkel, 2009). The DFXML report contains every file system directory and data file that
resides on the target data set. Each file system entry is stored in a DFXML FileObject
with extensive metadata properties. The fiwalk tool provides built-in support to recover
deleted file system entries.
The Objects.py API is to be leveraged to generate the DFXML report. The API
provides support to pass the target evidence file to the Objects.iterparse() function,
which in turn invokes fiwalk against the target. Each file system entry returned by fiwalk
is populated into a FileObject and built-in transparent error and type checking performed
based on the DFXML schema (dfxml.xsd14). This provides a robust solution that is able
to handle file system errors if present.
5.4.3 Windows Registry Metadata Generation
The second step in target data set processing is to find, extract and process Windows Registry
hive files to produce RegXML reports that represent the original evidence source. Unfortu-
nately, generating Registry metadata is not as simple as the file system counterpart. This
is primarily due to the inability of commonly implemented Registry parsing tools to recover
deleted Registry entries. Therefore, it is important to first establish the system design re-




5.4.3.1 System Design Requirements
The system design requirements for Windows Registry metadata generation are:
• Functionality to process an evidence file and extract Registry hive files
• Support to parse offline Registry hive files and generate the revised RegXML format
• Functionality to recover deleted Registry entries
• Support for different operating systems (desirable)
The first requirement is the extraction of Registry hive files from the target data set. The
regxml_extractor15 tool would be the obvious choice as it was specifically designed to
extract Windows Registry hive files and generate RegXML reports of each extracted hive file
(Nelson, 2012). However, regxml_extractor is limited due to reliance on the hivexml16
tool to generate XML. The hivexml tool has the following limitations:
• Inability to process deleted (unallocated) Registry entries
• Exports Registry entries to a nested XML structure17
• Only available on Linux-based operating systems
The inability to recover deleted Registry entries is a major limitation when attempting to
correlate digital artifacts from application software. Without recovery of deleted entries it
impossible to identify deleted Registry entries from application software that has been unin-
stalled. Therefore, this research requires a solution to extract the Registry hive files and
subsequently parse each file and produce a metadata representation of all Registry entries,
including deleted keys and values. Furthermore, the solution must output Registry entries in
the revised RegXML format (see Listing 5.3).
A total of approximately 20 Registry parsing tools and different programming libraries
were found that support processing Windows Registry hive files. However, as discovered,
there are very few that support the recovery of deleted Registry entries, while none have the
functionality to export to the revised RegXML syntax. In terms of Registry parsing tools
only three were found that support the recovery of deleted Registry entries.
1) Morgan (2008) developed reglookup-recover18 which has the functionality to re-
cover unallocated Registry entries and is available for Microsoft Windows and Linux
based systems
2) Thomassen (2008) developed the regslack19 Perl script (and in Windows executable
format) to recover unallocated Registry entries
3) Zimmerman (2015) developed the Registry parser project20, a fully featured offline
Registry hive parser written in the C# programming language
15See: https://github.com/ajnelson/regxml_extractor
16See: http://libguestfs.org/hivex.3.html





Unfortunately, none of the above tools, that is reglookup-recover, regslack and the
Registry parser have the functionality to export to RegXML syntax. Nor is there an
available performance comparison for each tool (in terms of effectiveness or efficiency) which
makes selecting a possible solution difficult. However, a manual review of source code revealed
the Registry parser project to be much more exhaustive in terms of active software
development and extensive documentation and as a result it was selected as the basis for the
creation of a new tool in this work. The design and implementation of a modified tool based
on the Registry parser project is discussed in the following subsections.
5.4.3.2 Windows Registry Metadata Generation Solution
The right-hand side of Figure 5.5 displays the solution for the process used to generate
RegXML reports for Registry hive files from the target data set. There are two inputs to
the Windows Registry metadata generation process: 1) The forensic disk image (evidence
file); and 2) The previously generated DFXML report previously generated from file system
metadata generation (see left-hand side of Figure 5.5). The Registry hive files are extracted
using a newly authored Python program, named HiveExtractor.py. Each extracted hive
file is then processed using the new Registry processing tool, named CellXML-Registry,
which generates a RegXML report to represent the original Registry hive file. The follow-
ing subsections discuss each of the implemented tools used for Windows Registry metadata
generation.
5.4.3.3 Software Development: HiveExtractor.py
The HiveExtractor.py script has been specifically designed and implemented to process
the target data set, discovered Registry hive files using file system metadata (the DFXML
report) and extract the hive files to be processed. HiveExtractor.py is based on the
rx_extract_hives.py21 script from the regxml_extractor tool. HiveExtractor.py
requires three inputs: 1) Forensic disk image (evidence file); 2) DFXML report previously
generated by fiwalk; and 3) A user specified output directory for exporting Registry hive
files and the tool log file. HiveExtractor.py processes the DFXML report and searches
the full path of each FileObject for known Registry hive file locations (based on the logical
file system path). If a hive file is discovered it is extracted and saved to the specified output
directory. After executing HiveExtractor.py against the target data set the output di-
rectory is populated with all discovered Registry hive files. Each hive file requires additional
processing to transform the contents into a RegXML report.
The full HiveExtractor.py script is provided in Appendix B.5. Additionally, the script
is available online from the author’s GitHub account22. The script totals approximately 200





5.4.3.4 Software Development: CellXML-Registry
Based on the system design requirements (see Section 5.4.3.1), a better solution is needed to
provide the functionality to process Registry hive files and generate a metadata representation
of the Registry entries. The tool requirements specified support for the recovery of deleted
Registry entries and functionality to export to the revised RegXML CellObject structure.
A new tool, CellXML-Registry has been developed using the Registry library from the
Registry parser project. The ExampleApp23 from the Registry parser project was
used as a reference when creating CellXML-Registry.
To provide support for reporting in RegXML syntax two new functions were included
in the RegistryHive.cs source code file. After processing a Registry hive file the new
ExportDataToXMLFormat() function is called which starts exporting all Registry entries
to the RegXML format. After processing the Registry hive root key, the new recursive
DumpKeyXMLFormat() function is called which generates CellObjects for every Reg-
istry entry. After a Registry key is processed, the next key entry is called by the recursive
function.
Initial testing revealed similar problems to those encountered by LiveDiff when gen-
erating XML to represent Registry entries, specifically XML special characters and unprint-
able control characters (see Section 5.3.5.2). Therefore, additional functions have been au-
thored and implemented to check certain strings before printing results in XML format:
1) ControlXMLCharacterCheck() to search and encode Unicode control characters in
Base64 encoding; and 2) SpecialXMLCharacterCheck() to search and replace special
characters with their escaped counterpart (see Table 5.6). Both functions are called for the
same metadata properties as implemented in LiveDiff.
The CellXML-Registry source code is provided in Appendix B.6. The additional func-
tions that have been included in the Registry parser project to provide XML report
functionality have also been included for reference. CellXML-Registry is available online
from the author’s GitHub account24 and contains approximately 250 lines of original C#
source code, while the modifications to the Registry parser project contains approxi-
mately 300 lines of additional C# source code to produce RegXML output.
5.4.4 Target Data Set Processing Summary
Target data set processing generates reports that represent the original evidence sources of
the file system and Registry. Each report is used as input to the digital artifact matching
stage to correlate digital artifacts between the application profile and target data set. The
next, and final, component in the system architecture involves digital artifact matching.
23See: github.com/EricZimmerman/Registry/tree/master/ExampleApp
24See: https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/CellXML-Registry for full source code and
https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/CellXML-Registry/releases for precompiled executable
binaries (.exe files) for Microsoft Windows.
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5.5 Digital Artifact Matching
Digital artifact matching is the fourth and final component of the system architecture which
correlates an application profile(s) (APXML documents) against the metadata representation
of the target data set (DFXML and RegXML documents). Each document is used as input to
the matching process and links between digital artifacts are established by matching selected
metadata properties. The output of the process is a list of detected digital artifacts that are
reported to the investigator. Any detected digital artifact can be considered known content
that is uniquely associated with a profiled application.
A variety of methods to detect application software were discussed in Section 3.3, pri-
marily performing file identification using cryptographic hashing algorithms – the de facto
standard in digital forensic investigation and path matching/searching for Windows Registry
entries. Various other avenues were investigated for potential solutions including newer foren-
sic techniques such as block-based hashing and similarity digests. Other computing fields were
also investigated for potential, including common anti-virus and malware detection techniques
such as signature-based and heuristics-based methods. However, given the system design re-
quirements, the proposed metadata matching approach coupled with traditional file hashing
was selected as it is a highly reliable and efficient solution that fits the research objective of
a forensic triage solution. This solution incorporates the requirement of an initial forensic ex-
amination (triage) allowing the system output to be directly used as input to other commonly
used forensic tools.
This section discusses the design and implementation of a solution to perform matching of
digital artifacts. Design requirements and specifications are based on the developed research
objectives. A novel approach to implement path normalisation is designed and a selection of
advanced matching methods will be established. The actual process to achieve correlation
of the file system entries and Windows Registry entries are then individually designed and
implemented in a proof-of-concept tool. Forensic reporting then conveys the tool results to
an investigator. Finally, the implementation of the system design is in the form of a newly
authored forensic analysis tool.
5.5.1 Digital Artifact Matching Requirements
The primary goal of digital artifact matching is to detect digital artifacts from the target
data set that are also in the application profile(s). The matching process is divided into
two phases: 1) Matching of digital artifacts from the target file system; and 2) Matching of
digital artifacts from the target Windows Registry hive files. Currently, a tool does not exist
to perform correlation of multiple evidence sources (e.g., file system and Windows Registry
entries) or correlation of multiple digital artifact metadata properties (e.g., file hash value,
file name, file path and allocation status). Available reference solutions operate solely on data
files using cryptographic hash value to detect known content (see Section 3.3). Therefore, a
new software tool is required.
As specified in the research objectives (see Section 4.2.2.5), digital artifact matching needs
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to be accomplished in a variety of complex scenarios; for example, matching digital artifacts
from different operating system versions and different application software versions. Any
detected results from digital artifact matching need to be reported to an investigator to
ultimately ascertain the presence, or absence, of application software. Therefore, the system
design requirements for digital artifact matching are:
• Support for comparison of file system entries (FileObjects)
• Support for comparison of Windows Registry entries (CellObjects)
• Support for completely automated comparison using multiple metadata properties
• Functionality to perform digital artifact matching in complex scenarios
• Functionality to report digital artifact matches in a human and machine readable format
• Functionality to ascertain application software presence
The specified system requirements could not be satisfied by current tool availability and so
a new software tool is essential to provide the desired support and functionality. The tool
needs to correlate different digital artifact types which each have different metadata properties.
Lower-level research objectives four and five specify that the design should address limitations
of other solutions and provide functionality to detect digital artifacts in complex matching
scenarios such as different operating system versions and from different application software
versions. A similar design requirement is the detection of fragile data type; for example, a
data file that has a variable hash value (e.g., an application log file or configuration file).
Finally, the tool needs to report any detected digital artifacts to the investigator in the form
of a human readable data abstraction, as well as a machine readable data abstraction that
provides the functionality for further automated processing of tool output.
5.5.2 Advanced Tool Design: Vestigium
A new tool has been authored to perform digital artifact matching between the applica-
tion profile(s) and target data set. The resultant proof-of-concept tool has been named
Vestigium, from Latin meaning footprint or trace. This name is highly fitting for the
system design which attempts to determine the footprint that application software creates and
trace evidence that software leaves on a computer system. Vestigium is completely original
work produced for this research project. The Python programming language was selected as
all the data abstraction inputs to the tool (APXML, DFXML and RegXML documents) have
an API written in Python. The tool has been released using the open-source GNU General
Public License (version 2) license and is freely distributed and available to other researchers
and practitioners. Vestigium is available online from the author’s GitHub account25.
The following subsections outline the core design of the Vestigium tool including a digital
artifact matching strategy, file system matching process, Windows Registry matching process,
forensic reporting of digital artifact matches and an overview of software development.
25See: https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/Vestigium/
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5.5.3 Digital Artifact Matching Strategies
A major constraint when implementing reference sets to perform automated detection of
digital artifacts is the failure to detect potential evidence in complex matching scenarios (see
Section 4.2.1.3). The following list highlights the different scenarios that need to be solved in
this research:
• Functionality to detect fragile digital artifact types; for example, a log file with variable
content and variable file hash value
• Functionality to detect digital artifacts on a different operating system version
• Functionality to detect digital artifacts from a different application software version
Based on the specified system design requirements and the prescribed digital artifact matching
scenarios, the following digital artifact matching strategies are required: 1) File system
matching methods to correlate digital artifact metadata properties for file system directories
and data files; and 2) Windows Registry matching methods to correlate digital artifact
metadata properties for Registry keys and values. Additionally, to aid matching logical path
properties (e.g., file system paths and Registry paths) between operating system versions the
technique of path normalisation has been be designed and implemented to transform file
and Registry path values.
5.5.3.1 Path Normalisation
Each version of Microsoft Windows introduces slight variations in how and where data is
logically stored by the operating system. For example, the logical file system location of a
user’s home directory (in the example the username forensic) in Windows XP and Windows
7 are respectively:
Windows XP: C:\Documents and Settings\forensic
Windows 7: C:\Users\forensic
Furthermore, a username can be any character combination as selected by the user. This
results in variable file system paths between systems and, ultimately, the inability to correlate
the full path of a file system and/or Registry entry in many scenarios. Therefore, a method
is needed to transform full path values to a generalized value to allow path correlation. Path
normalisation is a transformation method designed specifically in this research to address
full path correlation and has been defined by the author as:
Path normalisation is the process of transforming a full path value of a file system
or Registry entry to a generalized value, thus, enabling correlation in complex
matching scenarios where the logical location differs (e.g., different operating sys-
tem versions or paths with variable user content)
To further explain path normalisation, the example of a user’s home directory in Microsoft
Windows XP and Windows 7 can be applied. Path normalisation would transform both
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file system paths to the same generalized value as each path logically points to the same
location, that is, a user’s home directory. Path normalisation would also remove the username
component as matching cannot be performed between two file system paths with different
user generated content. Furthermore, in the Microsoft Windows operating system family,
each hard drive has an assigned drive letter (e.g., C:\). Path normalisation would remove
the drive letter to enable correlation of file path information where the drive letter may differ
between systems.
Path normalisation has been previously used in digital forensics in an informal context
without specification of the technique; for example, the fiwalk tool automatically removes
the assigned root drive letter/value. This is a type of path normalisation and is not just
beneficial to full path values for file system artifacts. Carvey (2011) states that Windows
Registry key and value structure often changes (sometimes dramatically) between Windows
versions. Therefore, path normalisation is beneficial to both file system and Registry artifacts.
In this research, path normalisation needs to be implemented to achieve two particular goals:
1) The ability to correlate the full path value on different Windows operating system versions
where the path has the same function but a different naming convention; and 2) Replace
random values, such as the variable username value, to correlate full path values. It is
proposed that path normalisation can be achieved using environment variables to normalise
the path value and remove/transform operating system-specific or user-specific values from
the full path value. Microsoft has specified known folder naming conventions that use a
common variable name for different file system paths (Microsoft, 2014). Using this naming
convention technique, the previous example of a user’s home directory can be normalised
to %USERPROFILE%. Table 5.8 displays four different examples of a user’s home profile
for two different operating system versions (again, Windows XP and Windows 7), with the
original path and the transformed normalised path.
Table 5.8: Path normalisation examples using environment variable naming conventions to
translate the full path of a user’s home directory in Windows XP and 7 (in the examples the
Windows XP username is forensic and the Windows 7 username is investigator)
OS Original Path Normalised Path
WinXP C:\Documents and Settings\forensic %USERPROFILE%
Win7 C:\Users\investigator %USERPROFILE%
WinXP C:\Documents and Settings\forensic\Desktop %USERPROFILE%/Desktop
Win7 C:\Users\investigator\Desktop %USERPROFILE%/Desktop
Table 5.8 illustrates that path normalisation can translate and return a full path value that
can provide the functionality to correlate a full path property value for a digital artifact on
different versions of Windows operating systems. Even though a different file system loca-
tion and different username is apparent in the examples provided, both variable values can
be normalised to allow full path correlation. As stated, path normalisation is also impor-
tant for Windows Registry entries. According to research by Metz (2016a), the primary
difference between a Windows Registry full path is the root key which varies based on: 1)
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Windows operating system version; and 2) The hive file type. Windows Registry path nor-
malisation should replace the root key with standardized Windows naming conventions such
as: SOFTWARE and SYSTEM for the hive file that is being processed. Additionally, Windows
Registry key entries are not case sensitive, meaning that key names do not rely on matching
the case of the path to be correlated. For example, the RegOpenKeyEx() function from the
Windows API does not require the correct case to open Registry keys (Microsoft, 2016).
Based on the preceding discussion, this research has designed and implemented path nor-
malisation to aid matching of digital artifact path properties. Specifically, two Python modules
have been designed: 1) File system path normalisation implemented in the Python module
named FilePathNormaliser.py; and 2) Registry path normalisation implemented in the
Python module named CellPathNormaliser.py. Both Python modules are designed to
take a file system or Registry full (absolute) path value as input and produce a normalised
path as output. The source code for both modules are available in Appendix B.7 and also
electronically distributed with the Vestigium tool26.
The techniques for path normalisation have been designed and implemented based on
the authors’ knowledge coupled with preliminary testing of authored application profiles.
The specified path normalisation techniques are outlined in the tables on the next page and
display an actual path and the subsequent normalised path example for different operating
system versions/platforms. Table 5.9 outlines all normalisation techniques for file system
path values that have been implemented in the system design. Commonly observed file sys-
tem paths for application software that require normalisation have been identified including:
1) The Program Files directory used to store application specific files; 2) The All User
directory used to store global application configuration information; 3) The Users home
directory to store user-specific application configuration information; 4) The AppData direc-
tory to, again, store user-specific application configuration information; 5) The Start Menu
directory to store Windows ShortCut link files used for application execution; and 6) The
Windows directory to store system-relevant application files or configuration information.
Table 5.10 displays normalisation techniques for Registry root key and path values. Three
techniques have been implemented: 1) Root key normalisation to transform variable root
key values to common Registry hive names (e.g., software, system); 2) Transformation to
lower case for all Registry key paths; and 3) Normalisation of Control Set names from the
SYSTEM Registry hive. Table 5.11 displays normalisation techniques for path information
stored by Registry value data that have been implemented. Two normalisation techniques
have been implemented: 1) Transformation of Registry value data where the property stores
a file system path; and 2) Decryption and transformation of UserAssist Registry values which
contain a ROT-13 encrypted file system path. According to Stevens (n.d.), UserAssist Registry
value data is encrypted using the ROT-13 algorithm, therefore, any UserAssist value data
is decrypted using the Python standard codec library to decrypt the path value. Any file
system path stored in Registry value data is used as input to the FilePathNormaliser.py
module, subjected to normalisation and then appended to the original CellObject.
26See: https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/Vestigium/tree/master/src
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Table 5.9: Overview of file system path normalisation values. The actual file system path is displayed with Windows XP and Windows 7
examples followed by normalised path examples.































Table 5.10: Overview of Windows Registry path normalisation. The actual Registry path is displayed with Windows XP and Windows 7
examples followed by the normalised path examples. Two Registry root key examples are displayed. The system hive examples display the use
of the environment variable naming convention for the system control set key.





Table 5.11: Overview of Windows Registry base name normalisation. Examples from two Registry keys are taken: 1) NewShortcuts; and 2)
UserAssist. Both examples display the operating system version, actual path and associated normalised path values.
OS Actual Path Normalised Path
WinXP C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\TrueCrypt\TrueCrypt.lnk %STARTMENU%\Programs\TrueCrypt\TrueCrypt.lnk
Win7 C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\TrueCrypt\TrueCrypt.lnk %STARTMENU%\Programs\TrueCrypt\TrueCrypt.lnk
WinXP HRZR_EHACNGU:P:\Qbphzragf naq Frggvatf\VRHfre\Qrfxgbc\GehrPelcg Frghc 7.1n.rkr %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe
Win7 P:\Hfref\sberafvp\Qrfxgbc\GehrPelcg Frghc 7.1n.rkr %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe
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Path normalisation may prove to be advantageous for digital artifact detection, as an appli-
cation profile authored using one Windows version could also be effective at detecting digital
artifacts on other Windows versions27. Path normalisation could, therefore, overcome the
need to create an application profile for every operating system version. Profile authoring is a
time consuming process and producing one profile that can detect digital artifacts on multiple
operating systems would be exceptionally beneficial.
5.5.3.2 Available Digital Artifact Metadata Properties
It is proposed that a selection of matching methods needs to be designed and implemented
based on the type of digital artifact that needs to be correlated. The system design incorpo-
rates four different digital artifact types: 1) File system directories; 2) File system data files; 3)
Registry keys; and 4) Registry values. Each digital artifact type is retained by FileObjects
in the meta_type element and by CellObjects in the name_type element. This provides
the functionality to determine what type of digital artifact is stored. Table 5.12 displays a
complete list of metadata properties available for each of the four digital artifact types.
Table 5.12: Complete list of available APXML metadata properties for directories, data files,
Registry keys and Registry values.



















app_name 3 3 3 3
app_state 3 3 3 3
Each digital artifact type has different metadata properties available, so each type requires
27Although environment variables are widely used in tasks such as system administration including writing
scripts to automate administration, tasks between different systems and system versions, this research is the
first to implement path normalisation to perform correlation of digital artifact full path values. Thus, it is not
yet known if this technique, although theoretically valid, will be effective at aiding digital artifact detection
and also be computationally efficient.
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tailored matching methods to enable correlattion; for example, each directory has the file
name, normalised file name and allocation status available for matching, whereas data files
have file name, normalised file name, allocation status, file size and file hash value (MD5 and
SHA1 ). These metadata properties differ because directories have no actual contents and data
files do. Therefore, different matching methods (functions) are needed to correlate different
properties. The same is true for Registry keys and values. The following subsections outline
the matching methods for file system entries, followed by matching methods for Windows
Registry entries.
5.5.3.3 File System Matching Methods
Preliminary system design and informal testing of Vestigium revealed that file system
entries require specific matching methods to perform detection of known digital artifacts.
File system entries can be broadly classified by their type, either directories or data files. For
each FileObject this information is retained by the meta_type element and can either
be: 1) A directory specified by the integer value 2 (two); or 2) A data file specified by
the integer value 1 (one). Both types require different matching methods due to different
metadata properties. The following list specifies a total of five file system matching methods
that have been designed and implemented in Vestigium. One matching method has been
authored for directories while four methods have been authored for data files. Each matching
method indicates the digital artifact metadata properties that are used for correlation. All
metadata properties are specified using the DFXML naming conventions (see Table 5.5 for
examples).
1) Directory: filename_norm, meta_type, alloc_inode, alloc_name
2) File Soft: filename_norm, meta_type, alloc_inode, alloc_name
3) File Hard: filename_norm, meta_type, filesize, md5/sha1, alloc_inode, alloc_name
4) File Deleted: orphan_name, meta_type, filesize, md5/sha1, alloc_inode, alloc_name
5) File Hash: meta_type, filesize, sha1, alloc_inode, alloc_name
Each specified file system matching method is achieved by comparison of all metadata proper-
ties between two entries of the same type; that is, one entry from the target data set and one
entry from the application profile. All correlation is achieved by determining equality of each
specified metadata property; for example, when comparing two directories, each must have
the same normalised file name, be the same type (directory) and have the same allocation
status (deleted or not). If all properties are the same, a match is confirmed.
Multiple data file matching methods are required as there are complex matching scenarios
when correlation of every metadata property will fail; for example, an application executable
(e.g., TrueCrypt.exe) with a default installation path has a fixed full path and hash value.
However, an application configuration or log file has a fixed full path but a variable hash
value. This is because a configuration file is typically modified based on the options selected
by the user resulting in a variable hash value. A special matching method (file soft) has
been included in the prescribed matching methods to match a data file which has all the same
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properties as a complete match (file hard) but without the file hash value. This provides
the ability to detect fragile digital artifact types with a variable hash value. Additionally, a
file deleted method is prescribed. Deleted files require a dedicated matching method due
to the technique which fiwalk represents unallocated file system entries where a deleted
file has a unique prefix ($OrphanFiles) followed by the data file basename; for example:
$OrphanFiles\TrueCrypt.exe. The final matching method is file hash correlation,
which only matches the file hash value of the data file without comparing any file system path
information.
5.5.3.4 Windows Registry Matching Methods
Windows Registry matching methods are similar to the prescribed file system matching meth-
ods. This is because Registry keys are very similar to directories and Registry values are very
similar to data files and although Registry entries have different metadata property nam-
ing conventions, the properties and behaviour are similar; for example, directories have a
file name and allocation status, while Registry keys have a cell path and allocation status.
Therefore, a similar matching method should be specified. Each of the designed matching
methods correlate the metadata properties specified in Table 5.12. The following list specifies
three matching methods for Registry entries, one for keys and two for values.
1) Key: cellpath_norm, name_type, alloc
2) Value Soft: cellpath_norm, name_type, alloc, data_type
3) Value Hard: cellpath_norm, name_type, alloc, data_type, data_raw
Metadata correlation is achieved by comparison of all specified metadata properties for each
matching method between two Registry entries of the same type; again, one entry from the
target data set and one from the application profile. As specified for file system matching
methods all correlation is performed by determining equality of each specified metadata prop-
erty; for example, when comparing two Registry keys, each must have the same normalised
cell path, be the same type (key) and have the same allocation status (deleted or not). If all
of these properties are equal, a match is confirmed.
Similar to data file matching methods, multiple Registry value matching methods have
been specified. This aids in matching Registry values in a variety of complex scenarios where
properties may differ. A Registry value can be used for configuration settings and can store
different value data depending on the option selected by the user. A Registry value may
store a value to check for application updates. Depending on the option selected by the user,
different value data can be stored; for example, if the application should automatically check
for updates (value = 1) or if the application should not automatically check for updates (value
= 0). This is a similar scenario to data file matching. Therefore, two matching methods are
specified. The value hard matching method correlates all available metadata properties,
including the raw_data contents, while the value soft compares the same properties except
for the raw_data contents. This is similar to the file hard and file soft matching methods
which either include or exclude matching of the file hash property.
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The specified matching methods have outlined a total of eight different matching methods for
the four digital artifact types. Each matching method specifies different metadata properties
that are to be used for correlation. All correlation is achieved by equality of each specified
metadata property. The prescribed matching methods provide the functionality to match
digital artifacts in a variety of complex scenarios. The actual technique used to compare
digital artifacts using the designed matching methods is discussed in the following subsections
for file system and Registry matching respectively.
5.5.4 File System Matching
The purpose of file system matching is to detect file system artifacts in the target data set that
are present in the application profile. Figure 5.6 displays a high level overview of the process
designed to perform file system artifact matching. The two inputs are: 1) The application
profile that represents a reference set of known digital artifacts from a profiled application; and
2) The DFXML report that represents the file system entries from the target data set. Both
inputs have been previously transformed and stored in metadata reports and are represented
as DFXML FileObjects to provide ease of comparison.
The industry standard approach for correlation of file system artifacts is a brute force
(or an all-against-all) comparison between the reference data set and target data set. Ac-
cording to Breitinger, Rathgeb, and Baier (2014), the lookup complexity of a single entry
from a reference data set can be expressed as O(n), where n denotes the number of entries
in the reference data set. This simply means that every digital artifact in a reference set
needs to be compared against every digital artifact (of the same type) in the target data set.
Due to the increasing size of digital investigation targets, a brute force comparison can be a
computationally intensive operation; for example, “the lookup complexity of similarity digests
hamper the usage in the field” (Breitinger, Baier, & White, 2014, p. S2). This is due to the
problem of comparing two similarity digest values as it is not performed using equality, rather
the similarity digests are compared based on the likeness to each other. This is why traditional
cryptographic hashing was chosen for the system design. The proposed system design does
not implement a brute force comparison. Instead, the application profile is processed and
divided into a selection of Python dictionaries to perform lookups based on various matching
methods. In addition, matching methods are implemented using previously generated meta-
data property values (e.g., file name) and correlation is based on equality (e.g., if the two
objects are equal). The overall design is envisioned to be computationally feasible28.
At the outset of file system artifact matching, the application profile (APXML document)
is first processed and stored in a variety of data structures to enable fast metadata property
comparison. Next, the metadata report (DFXML document) containing a representation of
the target file system is processed. File system entry matching can then be conducted using
the prescribed matching methods (see Section 5.5.3.3).
28The computational efficiency of performing equality comparison between multiple digital artifact metadata
properties is envisioned to be efficient. However, this requires confirmation by performing efficiency testing
during the experimental testing phase of this research.
139






























Figure 5.6: High-level overview of the file system matching process designed to automate
correlation of file system entries between the application profile and the target data set
5.5.4.1 Application Profile Processing
An application profile (APXML document) is parsed using the APXML API, namely the
apxml.py, and each entry processed and appended to a selection of Python dictionaries for
later processing. Listing 5.5 provides an example of the code implemented in Vestigium
that is used to read in multiple APXML documents (profiles) and populating a dictionary
with all file system entries (FileObjects). The simplicity and briefness of code is due to
the APXML API which provides simple reading and writing of APXML documents.
Each FileObject from a profile (PFO) is extracted and stored in a variety of Python
dictionary data structures which maps a metadata property to the actual FileObject. A
Python dictionary structure is used because, according to the Python Wiki (2012), the average
lookup complexity (Get Item) for a dictionary is O(1). This is more computationally efficient
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than other data structures; for example, a Python list data structure has an average lookup
complexity of O(n). For each dictionary a string value is specified for the dictionary key
because it is: 1) A unique value; and 2) A Python string object has faster lookup performance
as it mitigates error checks when compared to other object types (Python Wiki, 2012).
1 import sys , c o l l e c t i o n s , apxml , Objects , dfxml
2
3 # Spec i f y p r o f i l e d i c t i ona r y
4 pfos_dict = c o l l e c t i o n s . d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
5
6 for p r o f i l e in sys . argv [ 1 : ] :
7 # Read the APXML document us ing i n t e r pa r s e func t i on
8 apxml_obj = apxml . i t e r p a r s e ( p r o f i l e )
9
10 # For each entry , i f i t i s a F i l eOb jec t , append to d i c t i ona r y
11 for pfo in apxml_obj :
12 i f isinstance ( pfo , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
13 pfos_dict [ pfo . filename_norm ] . append ( pfo )
Listing 5.5: Example of reading multiple APXML documents
A total of three Python dictionaries map different metadata properties to actual file objects.
The following dictionaries have been specified which include the dictionary name, key and
linked object:
1) Normalised path: filename_norm –> [FileObject]
2) Deleted path: orphan_name –> [FileObject]
3) File hashes: md5/sha1 –> [FileObject]
The first dictionary (normalised path) maps the normalised file path to the FileObject
and is utilised for the directory, file soft and file hard matching methods. Since not all file
system entries are matched based on an exact normalised full path, other dictionaries are also
implemented. The deleted path dictionary maintains a deleted name (orphan_name) lookup
for possible deleted file entries, while the file hashes dictionary maintains a hash table lookup.
All three dictionaries are used when processing the file system entries from the target data
set using the process specified in the following subsection.
5.5.4.2 File System Artifact Matching Process
As displayed in Figure 5.6, the first action in the matching process is to read in the DFXML
report which provides a metadata representation of the target file system. All file system
matching is specified in the Vestigium source file named FileSystemProcessing.py.
The DFXML report is processed by iterating (reading) each file system entry using the
Objects.iterparse() function. If a previously generated DFXML report is not provided,
the same function is still called with the disk image (evidence file) as the target. This parses
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the file system and generates FileObjects on-the-fly using the fiwalk tool. In this sce-
nario, a DFXML report is saved to the user-specified output directory as it may be used
later for additional processing. Providing support to directly parse the forensic disk image
allows Vestigium to operate directly on the evidence source without any pre-processing
requirements. Each Target FileObject (or TFO) from the target is processed individually.
A simple generic exclusion rule is applied for all file system entries by excluding the following
file system navigation entities: 1) Dot dirs that represent the current directory (/.); or 2)
Dot dot dirs that represent the parent directory (/..). The TFO file name (filename)
is then normalised on-the-fly to produce a normalised full path (filename_norm). Three
separate matching tests are then performed for each TFO.
Firstly, the normalised full path is used as a dictionary lookup to identify a matching file
system path. If the normalised path is discovered the TFO is further processed. Three of the
five file system matching methods are tested (directory, file hard and file soft). If the TFO
is a directory, the directory matching method is called, match_dir(), and the normalised
file name and allocation status checked for equality. If all match, the TFO is deemed a
matching directory and appended to a Python list of matched FileObjects from the target
data set. If the TFO is a data file, the file hard and then file soft matching methods are
tested. The match_file() function is called and the normalised file name, file size, hash
value (MD5 and/or SHA1 ) and allocation status checked for equality. If all match, the TFO
is appended to the list of matched FileObjects, if not, the file soft matching method is
called. This matches the normalised file name and allocation status. Again, if a match is
found it is appended to the list of matches. Secondly, if no match was found in the dictionary
of normalised file names and the TFO is not allocated the deleted file dictionary is used for a
path lookup. If a matching deleted file name (orphan_name) is found, the TFO is deemed
a match. Thirdly, if no match has yet been found, the PFO hash value is used as a lookup
to the hash dictionary. If a matching file hash is found the TFO is deemed a match and
appended to the results. Finally, if no match has been found, the TFO is deemed to not be
a match to any entry in the application profile and the next TFO is subsequently processed.
When a file system artifact is detected and deemed a match to an application profile
artifact the FileObject is added to a Python list of matched artifacts that are processed
at the end of the file system matching phase. This is later discussed in further detail in the
forensic reporting section.
An additional task when performing file system matching is to process each TFO and
determine if it is a Registry hive file, and if so, extract the file to allow later processing by
the CellXML-Registry tool. Matching a Registry hive file is accomplished by performing
a string search on the full path. This is achieved using the HiveExtractor.py module.
5.5.5 Windows Registry Matching
The purpose of Windows Registry matching is to detect Registry artifacts (keys and values) in
the hive files from the target data set. Figure 5.7 displays a high-level overview of the process
designed to perform Registry artifact matching. Matching Windows Registry entries follows
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a similar overall process to file system matching. However, there are a number of differences
during initial processing as each target system will have multiple Registry hives. Most Registry
entries (keys or values) only reside in a specific hive file; for example, UserAssist values
are known to only exist in the NTUSER.DAT hive file. Therefore, it is pointless to search for
UserAssist values in the SYSTEM or SOFTWARE hive files. A Registry entry hive file can
be determined by inspecting the rootkey property of each CellObject being processed
and only the required hive is searched.
Similar to file system artifact matching two inputs are required to perform Windows
Registry matching: 1) The application profile (APXML document) that represents a reference
set of known digital artifacts from a profiled application; and 2) A collection of Registry hive
files that processed and transformed to RegXML reports that represent each individual hive
file from the target data set. Both inputs are stored in the revised RegXML CellObject
format (see Listing 5.3). This allows ease of comparison as the profile and target are stored
in the same data abstraction.
5.5.5.1 Application Profile Processing
As with file system artifact matching, an application profile must first be processed. The
APXML document is parsed using APXML API and each Registry entry (CellObject)
is extracted and stored in a Python dictionary. However, only one Python dictionary is
implemented that uses the normalised path (cellpath_norm) as the key which maps to the
actual CellObject. This is the same technique as implemented when populating dictionary
objects for file system matching; a dictionary is utilised to provide an efficient lookup technique
and the normalised full path is used as the key because it is a unique string object which
provides a more efficient lookup performance.
An additional step performed when processing the application profile(s) is to determine the
Registry hives that are required to perform matching. When parsing the application profile
a Python set data structure is populated and returned which contains a unique collection of
the different Registry hive file rootkeys that are present. This is achieved by extracting the
rootkey property from each profile entry and populating into a set named target_hives.
Take the example of an application profile which only contains Registry entries from the
SOFTWARE and NTUSER.DAT hive files. The resultant set will have a Python set populated
with: software and ntuser.dat. This set will only be used during matching to iterate
(read) and search Registry hive files where a potential match to the application profile may
reside. This process is not necessary to perform Registry matching and is solely designed
to reduce the number and type of Registry hives to process and, ultimately, improve system
efficiency.
5.5.5.2 Registry Artifact Matching Process
As displayed in Figure 5.7, the first action in Registry entry processing is to read the RegXML
documents that provide a metadata representation of the Windows Registry. All Registry
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Figure 5.7: High-level overview of the Registry matching process designed to automate cor-
relation of Registry entries between the application profile and the target data set
The information regarding the necessary hive files have already been determined when pro-
cessing the application profile and provides a set of required hives and any hive file that is
not needed is not processed.
EachTarget CellObject (orTCO) from the required RegXML documents are processed.
Two variables are specified that track which Registry hive is currently being processed: 1)
The active_rootkey represents the hive file root key currently being processed (e.g., sys-
tem, ntuser.dat); and 2) The active_hive stores the actual hive file name that has been
extracted from the target system (e.g., Users/Terry/NTUSER.DAT.hive). When one
RegXML document is finished processing, the two variables are updated. These variables are
later used for reporting the correct Registry file that a matched entry was discovered.
For each TCO processed from each RegXML document, the first step is to transform the
Registry path (cellpath) into the normalised path (cellpath_norm). This is divided
into two phases. Firstly, the root key is normalised (as depicted in Table 5.10). Secondly, the
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actual path is normalised (as depicted in Table 5.11). Additionally, if the Registry entry is a
value and contains a file system path (e.g., starts with C:\) it is subjected to file system path
normalisation (as depicted in Table 5.9). All of these normalised path components are joined
and populated into the normalised path (cellpath_norm) and used as a lookup value to
the single Python dictionary. If a match is found the entry is subjected to further processing.
Additional matching is performed based on Registry entry type. Registry keys are sub-
jected to the key match method and the normalised cell path, type and allocation status
checked. For a match to be confirmed all three metadata properties much be equal and if
so, the entry is appended to a list of matched objects. Registry values are subjected to two
matching methods. A value hard matching method correlated the normalised cell path, type,
data type, actual data contents and allocation status. Again, if all metadata properties are
deemed equal a match is confirmed. The only difference in the value soft matching method
is that a equality check for data contents does not need to be confirmed. This provides the
functionality to match a Registry value with a variable data content; for example, a Registry
value that stores a variable user configuration setting.
When a Windows Registry entry is detected and deemed a match to an artifact in the
application profile, the CellObject is added to a Python list of matched artifacts that are
processed at the end of the matching phase. This is discussed in further detail in the following
section.
5.5.6 Forensic Reporting
Forensic reporting entails the communication of results to the investigator. Vestigium
provides two output formats: 1) A human-readable text-based log file; and 2) Machine-
readable reports containing file system matches in a DFXML report and Registry matches in
a RegXML report.
5.5.6.1 Log File
The goal of the human-readable log file is to convey the tool results and the configuration used
during operation. As it is part of the standard library, Vestigium implements the Python
logging module29 to perform event logging. Recorded events include:
• Case information derived from Vestigium command line arguments including: evi-
dence file, output directory, application profile(s), DFXML input file, RegXML input
directory and other command line parameters
• Application profile information including name, state and full path for each entry
• Digital artifact matching information including a list of detected and not-detected digital
artifacts (with application name, state, full path)
• Time information: Start and end time, processing time for each matching phase, DFXML
and RegXML generating time
29https://docs.python.org/3.4/library/logging.html
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5.5.6.2 DFXML and RegXML Reports
Machine-readable reports are prescribed in the system design as they provide the functionality
to: 1) Convey and report detected digital artifacts in a standardised manner; and 2) Provide
the functionality for automated post processing. All detected file system and Windows Reg-
istry artifacts are exported to a DFXML and RegXML report respectively. The reports are
populated with the FileObjects or CellObjects from the target data set that have been
correctly matched. Each object has the matched entry from the application profile appended
to the original FileObject or CellObject. This provides the functionality to save the
detected digital artifact and the associated the profile artifact for potential post-processing.
DFXML and RegXML reports provide efficient post-processing capability by any tool or
script that supports the DFXML standard. The availability of the DFXML API provides the
functionality to extract the file or Registry entry information; for example, the DFXML report
output from Vestigium can be ingested into simple scripts to provide further automated
processing such as generating a printed list of all file paths and associated hash values. This
information could be used to create a text file hash set. A more complex example is that
the DFXML report could be processed and a timeline of the file access dates conveyed to the
investigator.
5.5.7 Software Development: Vestigium
The system design requirements specified the need for a forensic tool that could ingest an
application profile(s) and a target data set and correlate the entries in each. Digital artifact
matching is performed by matching every digital artifact from the target data set against every
digital artifact from the application profile. A proof-of-concept software tool, Vestigium,
was authored solely for digital artifact matching to provide later demonstration and subse-
quent evaluation of the system design.
The Vestigium tool uses the Python programming language (version 3.4.0) and is com-
patible with Microsoft Windows operating systems. Vestigium can be executed on Linux
operating systems but lack the functionality to perform Registry matching (as the underlying
CellXML-Registry tool is only available on Windows platforms). Vestigium was solely
written by the author and contains approximately 3,000 lines of original source code. It is
implemented through a variety of Python modules that provide programming code to perform
specific tasks. Table 5.13 outlines the implemented Python modules with an accompanying
description of functionality.
Vestigium has a collection of dependencies that are required to run the tool. Table 5.14
lists these dependencies including the software name, version, if the package is required to
run Vestigium and a description of the usage. Three dependencies are explicitly required:
1) Python as the primary programming language; 2) fiwalk to parse a forensic image,
extract file system entries and produce a DFXML report populated with FileObjects;
and 3) CellXML-Registry to parse Windows Registry hive files, extract Registry entries
and produce RegXML reports populated with CellObjects. Table 5.14 also includes two
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Table 5.13: List of Vestigium Python modules
Module Name Description
Vestigium.py Program entry point. Parses command line arguments. Handles
file system and Windows Registry matching configuration
FileSystemMatching.py Matching engine for file system entries. Performs correlation
between the file system entries (FileObjects) from the appli-
cation profile and the target data set
RegistryMatching.py Matching engine for Windows Registry entries. Performs cor-
relation between the Registry entries (CellObjects) from the
application profile and the target data set
FilePathNormaliser.py Performs path normalisation of a file system entry
CellPathNormaliser.py Performs path normalisation of a Windows Registry entry
non-required packages for reading forensic disk image formats: 1) The AFFLIB library for
Advanced Forensic Format (AFF) support; and 2) The libewf library for Expert Witness
Compression Format (EWF) support. Both of these libraries are not essential to run the
Vestigium tool, but provide the support to process a target disk image that is stored
in .aff and .E01 disk image formats. Therefore, the inclusion of these two libraries is
advantageous as both disk image formats are regularly used in digital investigations (Flaglien
et al., 2011).
Table 5.14: List of Vestigium software package dependencies. Required dependencies are
marked with a tick (3) while non-required dependencies are marked with a cross (7)
Software Version Required Usage
Python 3.4.0 3 Primary programming language
fiwalk 0.6.9 3 Parse the file system of the target data set and
produce a DFXML report
CellXML-Registry 1.2.0 3 Parse and Registry hive files and produce
RegXML reports
afflib 3.7.4 7 Support for the Advanced Forensic Format
(AFF) disk image format
libewf 20140608 7 Support for the Expert Witness Compression
Format (EWF) disk image format
5.5.8 Digital Artifact Matching Summary
The design requirements to perform digital artifact matching between the application profile(s)
and the target data set bought about the introduction of a proof-of-concept forensic analysis
tool named Vestigium. A collection of matching strategies were designed to perform corre-
lation of digital artifacts in complex detection scenarios and implemented in the Vestigium
tool. A novel technique to perform path normalisation was proposed and implemented in
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the tool to provide full path correlation in complex matching scenarios. Communication of
any results detected during digital artifact matching was achieved by implementing a human-
readable log file, while a machine-readable data abstraction was leveraged to export results
for potential post-processing.
5.6 Conclusion
The goal of the third element of the DSRM process model was to design an artifact by specify-
ing the functional requirements to solve the identified research objectives from Chapter 4. A
system architecture formed and divided into two main stages to ease the design process which
each had two components. The total four system architecture components were each subjected
to requirement specification, design and subsequent practical implementation. The ultimate
outcome has resulted in a system design theoretically capable of automating the detection of
known interesting digital artifacts on a target data set using application profiles. However,
to prove that the system design is functional, it needs to be subjected to demonstration, the
next element in the DSRM process model.
Chapter 6 therefore proceeds from the progress made thus far. Each component of the
architecture is initially demonstrated to display an overview of software usage with examples.
The implemented system will then be demonstrated to prove that it can solve the specified
research objectives in terms of functionality in a lab controlled environment. Each component
of the system design is to undergo demonstration in an established experimental testing
environment. Firstly, application profile creation is demonstrated using the LiveDiff tool
and various data reduction techniques tested in an attempt to remove irrelevant operating
system noise from the authored profiles. Secondly, the created profiles are to be tested against
a selection of data sets with known content to demonstrate functionality of the Vestigium




The Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) process model serves as the framework
for this research. Peffers et al. (2007) state that the demonstration element of the DSRM
process model involves validating that the designed and implemented artifact can solve one
or more of the research problems and associated objectives (see Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2).
The research objective specified for the effective and efficient detection of digital artifacts
from application software using automated reference set creation and subsequent automated
correlation against a target data set. A system was designed based on specified requirements
and implemented in the form of various designed forensic analysis tools (see Chapter 5).
Chapter 6 now demonstrates the implemented system to determine the effectiveness and
efficiency in a controlled laboratory testing environment, while the following chapter (Chapter
7) considers the utility of the system in a selection of more typical non-laboratory investigation
scenarios.
This chapter begins with an overview of the implemented software based on the system
design including tool operation. The LiveDiff tool is first demonstrated by creating appli-
cation profiles for three selected anti-forensic tools followed by investigation of a variety of
data reduction techniques to remove irrelevant results from the created application profiles.
The Vestigium tool is then used to perform digital artifact matching between the created
profiles and a target data set. The target data set is comprised of known content, authored
to verify the system design and to demonstrate functionality. New initiatives arising from
the results of testing are then acted on and system refinements conducted as per the cyclical
nature of the design science approach.
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6.1 Tool Operation
The practical implementation of the system design is in the form of computer software, specifi-
cally forensic analysis tools. Two separate tools were implemented which map to the two main
stages in the system architecture:
1) LiveDiff: A portable live Microsoft Windows tool that automates application profile
creation by executing differential forensic analysis (a form of reverse engineering) to
determine operating system-level changes throughout the life cycle of an application
(see Section 5.2)
2) Vestigium: A forensic analysis tool that performs automated processing of a target
data set and subsequent correlation of digital artifacts between an application profile
and target data set (see Section 5.5)
In addition to these two pivotal tools, other components and associated software were au-
thored to achieve the required functionality specified by the system design requirements. This
resulted in the design and implementation of two additional computer software components:
3) apxml.py: An Application Programming Interface (API) written in Python to parse
and automate processing of the prescribed Application Profile XML (APXML) data
abstraction (see Section 5.3.4)
4) CellXML-Registry: A portable Microsoft Windows tool that parses offline Registry
hive files and extracts entries, recovers deleted entries and produces a RegXML report
to represent the original evidence source (see Section 5.4.3)
Figure 6.1 displays a high-level overview of the implemented system design. The first main
stage of the system architecture begins with the identification of digital artifacts. As illus-
trated, application software is used as input to the LiveDiff tool with four examples shown,
including: 1) The Chromium web browser; 2) Mozilla Firefox web browser; 3) The Tor
anyonymous web browser; and 4) Mozilla Thunderbird email client. The selected applica-
tion is reverse engineered using differential forensic analysis provided by the LiveDiff tool
and the results (identified digital artifacts) are populated into an Application Profile XML
(APXML) document.
The second main stage of the system architecture begins with target data set processing,
followed by matching of digital artifacts between the created application profile and target
data set. To achieve matching, the application profile and target data set are used as input to
the Vestigium tool. Correlation is performed between the two inputs and matched digital
artifacts are reported to the investigator in the form of human-readable and machine-readable
data abstractions.
The following subsections outline the operation of LiveDiff, the apxml.py API, the
CellXML-Registry tool and Vestigium tools.
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Figure 6.1: High-level overview of the implemented system design (Image sources: Mozilla
Firefox icon taken from The Mozilla Foundation (2013), Mozilla Thunderbird icon taken from
The Mozilla Foundation (2011), Chromium icon taken from The Chromium Authors (2015),
TOR icon taken from The Tor Project (2011). Other images are public domain.)
6.1.1 Creating Application Profiles: LiveDiff
The first stage of the system design centres on the creation of application profiles. This
involves identification and documentation of digital artifacts including file system directories
and data files and Windows Registry keys and values. The specified digital artifacts are
uniquely associated with a particular application and used to populate a reference set for
application software, named application profiles. The resultant output from this process is an
application profile stored in an Application Profile XML (APXML) data abstraction which
is populated with known application software artifacts and used to automate application
detection on an investigation target.
A new tool was authored to create application profiles according to the functionality
required by the system design (see Section 5.2). To reiterate, the system design requirements
specified the need for a tool that could run on a live Microsoft Windows operating system,
functionality to automate collection and comparison of system snapshots (file system and
Registry entries) and the capability to output results to the prescribed APXML document
structure. The resultant tool was named LiveDiff, after the reverse engineering technique
that it implements: live differential forensic analysis. LiveDiff is authored using the C
programming language and released under the GNU Lesser Public License Version 2.1. The
LiveDiff tool is approximately 6,000 lines of source code, with approximately 1,500 lines
sourced directly from the Regshot project (on which LiveDiff is based on). LiveDiff
source code is available from:
https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/LiveDiff
Compiled binaries for Microsoft Windows (e.g., LiveDiff.exe) are available from:
https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/LiveDiff/releases
LiveDiff is a console application and, as such, a variety of command line arguments are
151
available to control what operations the tool performs. All command line arguments are
specified in the livediff.c source code file, the main program entry point. LiveDiff
can be executed using the Windows Command Prompt (or cmd.exe). It is recommended,
although not essential, that the Command Prompt is started using administrator permissions.
Administrator privilege is advantageous because the system scanning process requires elevated
permissions to access and read the entire file system and Windows Registry1. According to
Microsoft (2010), a Command Prompt can be invoked as administrator using the actions
displayed in Listing 6.1.
Start Menu > All Programs > Accessories
Right-click Command Prompt and click Run as Administrator
NOTE: If the User Account Control dialog box appears click Continue.
Listing 6.1: Steps to invoke Command Prompt with administrator rights
Once a command prompt with administrator privileges has been started a user must navi-
gate to the directory with the LiveDiff executable (e.g., LiveDiff.exe). The following
command executes LiveDiff and prints the help menu to the user:
$ LiveDiff.exe -h
Figure 6.2 shows the LiveDiff menu that is displayed to the user when executing the above
command. The help menu describes a variety of configuration options available to the user
that can be selected when running LiveDiff.
Figure 6.2: LiveDiff program help menu
1When LiveDiff is executed in a Command Prompt without administrator privileges a number of file
system and Registry entries cannot be accessed and, therefore, are not included in the system snapshots or
differential analysis processing; for example, there are some portions of the Windows root folder structure
that cannot be accessed without the appropriate system rights.
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Table 6.1 displays a complete list of all command line arguments that the LiveDiff tool
accepts and an associated description of each argument.
Table 6.1: List of command line arguments for the LiveDiff tool
Argument Description
-h Display the help menu
-help Display the help menu
/? Display the help menu
-s Boolean argument to toggle saving of snapshot files [Default =
FALSE]
-b Boolean argument to toggle inclusion of the dynamic blacklist
when performing snapshots [Default = FALSE]
-profile Default mode of operation which implements a looped scanning,
comparison and output process to perform multiple differential
analysis runs
-profile-reboot Mode of operation to finish creating an application profile after a
system reboot
-load Mode of operation to request loading of previously saved snapshot
files which requires one or two snapshot file locations
The LiveDiff tool has three modes of operation each designed to perform a specific
tasks: 1) Profile mode (default); 2) Profile reboot mode; and 3) Loading mode. However,
the profile mode of operation (-profile) is key to the generation of application profiles by
implementing a looped snapshot and comparison cycle to collect data from all application life
cycle phases (e.g., install, open, close, uninstall and reboot). This strategy simplifies applica-
tion profile creation by using an automated data collection and reporting method (see Figure
5.3). The resultant output from the profile mode is a populated Application Profile XML
(APXML) document containing file system and Registry entries associated with the applica-
tion software being profiled. By default, the profile mode includes dynamic blacklisting and
file hashing using the MD5 and SHA1 algorithms and therefore does not require additional
command line arguments.
The profile reboot mode of operation (-profile-reboot) is provided to continue the
data collection procedure after a system reboot. This mode re-loads the previously created
dynamic blacklist into memory and continues populating the previously created APXML doc-
ument. The following command invokes LiveDiff after a system reboot and automatically
loads the previously saved snapshot:
$ LiveDiff.exe --profile-reboot
The load mode of operation (-load) provides the functionality to load one or two previously
saved snapshot files. If one snapshot file is provided the file is loaded and the second snapshot
is then captured on the live system (this is useful for collecting snapshots before and after
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a system reboot). If two snapshot files are provided both are loaded and then compared
(this is useful for tool debugging and development). In both scenarios the differences between
snapshots are reported to the user in an APXML document. The following command line
argument executes LiveDiff and loads two previously saved snapshot files (1.shot and
2.shot) and then compares both files:
$ LiveDiff.exe --load 1.shot 2.shot
The different modes of operation provide a variety of program functionality when performing
differential analysis. Each mode provides the necessary components to perform experimental
testing and demonstrate tool functionality. However, the profile mode of operation is the
recommended method to use when performing differential forensic analysis of application
software. This mode was specifically designed to implement a data collection strategy to
determine system-level changes throughout the entire life cycle of an application with minimal
user intervention. The output from the profile mode is an APXML document with all digital
artifacts deemed new, modified, changed and/or deleted that are classified based on the
application life cycle phase. The APXML document can then be directly used as input to
digital artifact matching against a target data set.
6.1.2 Processing Application Profiles: apxml.py
In order to simplify application profile processing an API was written, named apxml.py,
with the ability to automate processing of Application Profile XML (APXML) documents.
Simple scripts can therefore be created to read, write and manipulate the contents of APXML
documents. The API was written in Python primarily to integrate with the existing DFXML
Python APIs, namely the original dfxml.py and newer Objects.py modules,2 as well as
to provide compatibility with the components built and software developed in this research.
The apxml.py module is approximately 700 lines of original code written specifically for this
research. The apxml.py module is released under the GNU Lesser Public License Version
2.1 and is available from:
https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/apxml
An APXML document can be read using the simple Python script displayed in Listing 6.2.
The first step is to import the apxml.py module. The APXML document is then read using
apxml.iterparse() function with the specified target file name. In the example script,
the application profile file name is TrueCrypt.apxml and resides in the current working
directory. The function returns a populated APXMLObject stored in the apxml_obj variable
and contains Python objects which represents all of the information in the application profile.
The final portion of the script loops over all profile entries, determines if each entry is a data
file (if the Python object is an instance of the FileObject type and meta_type of 1) and,
if so, prints the file name and SHA1 hash.
2See: https://github.com/simsong/dfxml/tree/master/python
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1 # Import APXML module
2 import apxml
3
4 # Read the APXML document us ing i t e r p a r s e
5 apxml_obj = apxml . i t e r p a r s e ( "TrueCrypt . apxml" )
6
7 # Loop through each o b j e c t and p r i n t f i l e name and SHA−1 hash va lue
8 for f i in apxml_obj :
9 i f isinstance ( f i , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) and f i . meta_type == 1 :
10 print ( f i . f i l ename , f i . sha1 )
Listing 6.2: Functional example of the APXML API
The APXML API also has a statistics function to facilitate generation of statistics for exper-
imental testing. Listing 6.3 displays a short Python script that prints the total number of
files, the total number of Registry keys and the number of files created during the application
installation phase using the StatisticsObject class implementation.
1 # Import APXML module
2 import apxml
3
4 # Read the APXML document us ing i t e r p a r s e
5 apxml_obj = apxml . i t e r p a r s e ( ’ TrueCrypt . apxml ’ )
6
7 # Generate s t a t i s t i c s about the APXML document
8 apxml . generate_stat s ( apxml_obj )
9
10 # Print a c o l l e c t i o n o f s t a t i s t i c s
11 print ( ’ Total F i l e s : ’ % apxml_obj . s t a t s . f i l e s )
12 print ( ’ Total Reg Keys : ’ % apxml_obj . s t a t s . keys )
13 print ( ’ I n s t a l l e d F i l e s : ’ % apxml_obj . s t a t s . f s_s ta t e [ ’ i n s t a l l ’ ]
Listing 6.3: Example of the APXML API statistics function
6.1.3 Target Data Set Processing: CellXML-Registry
A software tool, named CellXML-Registry, was authored (based on, and using the func-
tionality provided, by the Registry parser library) to generate a metadata representa-
tion of Windows Registry hive files to fulfil the following requirements: 1) Represent Registry
entries using the revised RegXML CellObjects format; and 2) Provide functionality to
recover deleted Registry entries. CellXML-Registry uses the Registry parser project
as the underlying Registry processing library. The tool is written in the C# programming
language, contains approximately 600 lines of new code. The tool is released under the MIT
license (the same license as the Registry parser project) and available from:
https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/CellXML-Registry
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Compiled binaries for Windows (e.g., CellXML-Registry.exe) are available from:
https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/CellXML-Registry/releases
CellXML-Registry provides the functionality to parse offline Registry hives, process each
Registry entry and potentially recover deleted entries. A RegXML report is produced which
represents the original evidence source. CellXML-Registry is a console application and
provides a variety of arguments to control tool operation as displayed in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: List of command line arguments for the CellXML-Registry tool
Argument Description
-help Display the help menu
-f Specify a offline Registry hive file to process
-d Specify a directory of offline Registry hive files to process
-r Recover deleted Registry entries [Default = FALSE]
-v Specify log verbosity: 0 = Info, 1 = Debug, 2 = Trace [Default = 0]
CellXML-Registry is used by the Vestigium tool to process the target data set be-
fore digital artifact matching is performed. As Vestigium automates all target data set
processing, the investigator is not required to manually execute the CellXML-Registry
tool. However, the tool can be used to generate RegXML metadata reports for ingestion
to other forensic tools that are able to parse the RegXML format, or alternatively, simply
search the document using utilities such as grep. Furthermore, support was added to the
existing DFXML Objects.py API to process the revised RegXML structure produced by
CellXML-Registry. Similar to the apxml.py module, simple Python scripts can be writ-
ten to perform processing and analysis.
6.1.4 Digital Artifact Matching: Vestigium
The second main stage of the system design is the matching of digital artifacts between the
application profile(s) and target data set. The resultant output from this process are forensic
reports containing digital artifact matches; that is, the digital artifacts that are present in
both the application profile and the target data set. The reports therefore document known
and relevant application software artifacts that are of forensic interest.
In order to perform matching between the application profile and target data set a new
tool was designed and implemented based on the system requirements. The tool was named
Vestigium, from Latin meaning footprint or trace. This name is highly appropriate for
the system design which attempts to determine the footprint that application software leaves
on a computer system. Vestigium is authored using the Python programming language and
is comprised of approximately 2500 lines of original source code. The tool is released under
the GNU Lesser Public License Version 2.1 and available from:
https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/Vestigium
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Provided that the git version control system is available on an investigator’s system, the
Vestigium tool and all dependencies for the Microsoft Windows system can be downloaded
to the current working directory using the clone utility as displayed below:
$ git clone https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/Vestigium.git
Vestigium was designed as a console application. As such, a variety of command line ar-
guments are available to control what operations the tool performs. The command line argu-
ments are specified and handled by the Vestigium.py source code file which acts as the main
program entry point. Similar to LiveDiff, the Vestigium tool can be executed using the
Windows Command Prompt (or cmd.exe). Being dependant on the CellXML-Registry
tool, which is only available on the Windows platform, Vestigium was designed to operate
on the Microsoft Windows operating system. However, Vestigium can be used on Linux,
but then provides no support for Registry processing. Administrator privileges are not re-
quired to run the tool. The following command invokes Vestigium using Python (version
3.4) and prints the program help menu:
$ C:\Python34\python.exe Vestigium.py -h
Figure 6.3 shows the Vestigium help menu that is displayed to the user when executing the
above command. The help menu displays a variety of required arguments and configuration
options available to the user.
Figure 6.3: Vestigium program help menu
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Vestigium requires three positional command line parameters that must be provided by
the user, including: 1) A forensic disk image file (evidence file); 2) A user specified output
directory; and 3) One or more previously authored application profiles. Table 6.3 displays a
compete list of all command line arguments for Vestigium with an accompanying description
of usage. The top of the table displays arguments to print the program help menu, the middle
displays mandatory positional arguments and the bottom displays optional arguments to
further control tool operation behaviour.
Table 6.3: List of command line arguments for the Vestigium tool
Argument Description
-h Display the help menu
-help Display the help menu
imagefile Forensic disk image (evidence file)
outputdir Target directory for all tool output and reports
profiles One or more application profiles
-dfxml Specify a DFXML report generated using the fiwalk tool
-regxml Specify previously generated RegXML reports
-d Do not remove files ending in ’/.’ and ’/..’ [Default = FALSE]
-t Report timestampts in UNIX time format [Default = FALSE]
-z Zap (delete) a output directory if it already exists [Default = FALSE]
An example of a command to invoke Vestigium against a target forensic disk image named
CaseOne.E01 is shown in Listing 6.4. Three mandatory positional arguments are speci-
fied, including: 1) The target forensic disk image (CaseOne.E01); 2) A user-specified out-
put directory (C:\CaseOneOutput); and 3) A total of three application profiles for the
CCleaner, Eraser and TrueCrypt anti-forensic tools. The listing specifies new line char-
acters (ˆ) and comments (REM) using Windows command conventions.
$ C:\Python34\python.exe Vestigium.py ^
D:\CaseOne.E01 ^ REM Forensic disk image
D:\CaseOneOutput ^ REM Output folder
CCleaner-5.09-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM CCleaner profile
Eraser-6.2.0.2970-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM Eraser profile
TrueCrypt-7.1a-6.1.7601.apxml REM TrueCrypt profile
Listing 6.4: Command line example to invoke Vestigium
Listing 6.5 provides an example of supplementary command line arguments and specifies a
previously generated DFXML report (CaseOne.xml) and a directory of previously generated
RegXML reports (D:\CaseOneHives). Again, the same Windows command conventions
are used for newline characters and comments.
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$ C:\Python34\python.exe Vestigium.py ^
D:\CaseOne.E01 ^ REM Forensic disk image
D:\CaseOneOutput ^ REM Output folder
CCleaner-5.09-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM CCleaner profile
Eraser-6.2.0.2970-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM Eraser profile
TrueCrypt-7.1a-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM TrueCrypt profile
--dfxml CaseOne.xml ^ REM fiwalk DFXML report
--regxml D:\CaseOneHives REM Folder of RegXML reports
Listing 6.5: Command line example to invoke Vestigium with additional arguments
6.1.5 System Implementation Summary
The operation of the two main tools (LiveDiff and Vestigium), plus one supplementary
tool (CellXML-Registry) and one API (apxml.py) have been implemented using the
system design and each operation has been described. LiveDiff provides an automated
technique to reverse engineer the initial application software input using differential forensic
analysis. The application life cycle is recreated and LiveDiff identifies digital artifacts
that are the result of the system changes during different life cycle phases. The associated
metadata from each individual digital artifact is extracted and populated into the specifically
designed Application Profile XML (APXML) forensic data abstraction.
The Vestigium tool takes an authored application profile and a target data set as input.
The target data set is processed and correlated against the APXML profile to determine
digital artifacts that reside in both the application profile and the target data set. When a
digital artifact is deemed a match Vestigium reports it to the investigator using a hybrid
DFXML report, as well as documenting tool operation in a text based log file.
The designed and implemented software tools provide a practical solution to feasibly per-
form automated forensic analysis. Experimental testing in a controlled laboratory environ-
ment is now required to demonstrate functionality and determine if the system design meets
the specified objectives of a solution (see Section 4.2.2).
6.2 Experimental Testing
Experimental testing demands a robust method to perform data generation and collection.
Such a testing environment is provided using Virtual Machines (VM) which is both rapid and
contaminant-free. A method to perform data generation is specified which involves recreating
the application profile life cycle. This provides the ability to subsequently collect data to
allow the creation of application profiles. It also allows the creation of known data sets to be
used as the target data set for system demonstration. A method for determining the ground
truth (baseline information) of digital artifact presence on the specified testing data sets is
also outlined. Finally, an overview of system effectiveness and efficiency metrics are covered
including information on score interpretation.
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6.2.1 Virtual Machine Testing Environment
The rigour of experimental testing calls for a documented, controlled and secure testing envi-
ronment. Virtual Machines (VM) were therefore implemented to satisfy these requirements.
VMs provide an excellent platform to carry out experimental testing as implementation is
simple and time-effective compared to a physical system. This is important, especially when
multiple experimental runs are necessary. Another advantage is that VMs guarantee a test-
ing environment that is free from contaminants. The Virtual Box software by Oracle was
selected to create the VM testing environment being open source with a GPL license provid-
ing accessibility and, therefore, research reproducibility. VirtualBox is a general purpose
virtualisation software giving the necessary functionality to create and modify VMs.
6.2.2 Data Generation: Recreating the Application Life Cycle
The application life cycle is a chronological progression in the life span of an application and
the changes the software makes to the host operating system (see Section 2.4.1 and Figure
2.3). It is important that the recreated life cycle phases are strictly specified outlining how
the resultant data was generated and collected as the same procedure must be followed for
creating application profiles and known data sets. Furthermore, later system evaluation will
compare this research to other solutions and the same life cycle phases must be performed to
enable a fair comparison.
The selected application life cycle phases were replicated from those used in the National
Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) Diskprint project (Laamanen & Nelson, 2014)
which is similar to this research. However, it only focusses on file system entries (primarily
data files), whereas this project includes file system and Registry entries. Another significant
difference, is that the data collection technique used to perform identification of application
software artifacts in this research is performed on a live system, while the Diskprint project
performs post-mortem data collection by cloning the VM disk. In spite of this, the Diskprint
project will serve as a useful experimental testing baseline against which to compare results.
Table 6.4 displays a total of five application life cycle phases specified for testing with an
associated description of how each phase was conducted using the selected application.
Table 6.4: Application life cycle phases selected for experimental testing
Phase Description
Install Copy application installer from shared folder to the Windows Desktop, launch the
application installer and install using default options
Open Run the application software. Order of precedence for running the software is: 1)
Windows Desktop link file; 2) Windows Start Menu link file; and 3) Run directly
from the Windows Command Prompt
Close Close the application. Where applicable ensure any application related services or
processes are also exited. This is predominantly achieved by quitting the applica-
tion using the Windows notification area on the taskbar
Uninstall Removal of application software using the Programs and Features interface avail-
able in the Microsoft Windows Control Panel
Reboot Reboot the system using the restart option in the Windows Start Menu
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Figure 6.4 illustrates the application life cycle with visual examples of various file system
and Windows Registry changes. The diagram uses the Firefox browser to describe the
application life cycle phases. The ground truth phase is representative of a clean Windows 7
installation. The installation of an application (Firefox) creates directories, executable files
(.exe), library files (.dll), system files (.sys) and a variety of Registry entries (keys and values).
Opening the application creates additional artifacts (e.g., additional folders for configuration
settings). Closing the application creates more artifacts (e.g., creation of configuration files).
Uninstallation of the application results in most artifacts being removed. However, artifacts
may still reside in the Recycle Bin, Registry and some files may not be completely removed.
Finally, rebooting the system may remove some residual digital artifacts (e.g., files not re-
moved during uninstallation as they were being used or the application uninstaller was not
configured to remove them).
Figure 6.4: High-level graphical overview of the application life cycle phases (Image sources:
Mozilla Firefox icon taken from The Mozilla Foundation (2013). All other images are public
domain or the author’s original work)
To achieve data generation to recreate the application life cycle phases the VM testing envi-
ronment was leveraged. A VM was created and installed with Microsoft Windows 7 32-bit
which was selected due to its popularity as, according to NetApplications (2015), it controls
approximately 56% of the total desktop operating system market share. VirtualBox3 (version
5.10) was used. The created VM is a ground truth4 data set from which to generate addi-
tional VMs. The ground truth VM was produced and a new disk created using the Virtual
3See: https://www.virtualbox.org/
4A Ground Truth image is also known as a baseline image from which to compare future system changes.
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Machine Disk (VMDK) format. Microsoft Windows 7 32-bit was installed on the VM and
a new user named forensic was added. All other options were left at default values. After
installation a small number of modifications were made; for example, Windows Updates were
disabled in an attempt to reduce system noise (see Section 3.2.3.3). The VirtualBox Guest
Additions were installed on the guest VM to provide the functionality to mount a shared folder
between the host system and guest VM. The shared folder was used to copy data between
the guest and host operating system.
The implemented testing environment provides an easy method of data generation from
which to author an application profile and to create test data sets with known content.
6.2.3 Data Collection: Creating Application Profiles
The data generation technique recreates the application life cycle phases and then, using the
VM testing environment, the LiveDiff tool can be executed and data collection performed.
The resultant output is a populated application profile stored in the APXML data abstraction.
The APXML structure supports any application life cycle phase and is stored in an additional
metadata property (XML element) named app_state (see Table 5.4). This information is
populated in the XML tag for each FileObject or CellObject by the LiveDiff tool
and is specified by the user when performing data collection.
A key benefit to implementing VMs for testing is the speed and convenience of performing
experiments on a guest operating system. An efficient method is essential to performing data
collection, as creating a fresh VM for each application is time-consuming. Additionally, the
testing environment should provide the same VM state for all testing scenarios to ensure
consistent results. To accomplish this the ground truth VM (named Win7-32-GT) was cloned
into a new VM specifically for application profile creation. The disk of the new VM was
configured as an immutable disk (Oracle Corporation, 2015), which is a read-only virtual
disk where all modifications made when running are stored in volatile memory and discarded
after powering off the VM. Immutable disks are transparent to the user and the guest operating
system functions the same as a normal VM.
Listing 6.6 displays an example of the command used to change a normal virtual disk to
immutable by using the VBoxManage tool with the modifyhd parameter. In the example,
the VM disk name is Win7-32-LD (LD represents LiveDiff) and is purpose-designed to
create application profiles. The listing specifies new line characters (ˆ) and comments (REM)
using Windows command conventions.
$ cd C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox
$ VBoxManage.exe modifyhd ^ REM VirtualBox tool
D:\Win7-32-LD\Win7-32-LD.vmdk ^ REM Location of VM disk
--type IMMUTABLE REM Set type to immutable
Listing 6.6: Example of method to create an immutable virtual disk
Immutable disks are useful when creating application profiles with LiveDiff as each appli-
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cation can be profiled on a clean system without the need to reinstall an operating system
for each testing scenario. This minimises the time required to perform experimental testing.
It also allows each test to be performed on the same system, thus, removing the variability of
the operating system state from experimental testing.
Using the immutable VM, the prescribed data generation method (see Section 6.2.2) is
to be performed for each selected anti-forensic tool. In particular, the LiveDiff tool is
used to collect a snapshot before and after one application life cycle phase (see Table 6.4).
The output is then populated to an APXML document with the digital artifact changes that
have occurred during each application life cycle phase (e.g., files created from installing the
application).
6.2.4 Data Collection: Creating Known Data Sets
The VM testing environment for creating known data sets differs from that used when creating
application profiles. Immutable disk images cannot be used because known data set generation
is accomplished by collecting a forensic image of the virtual disk. Since immutable disks make
no changes to the virtual disk, they cannot be implemented. Therefore the default normal
virtual disk type is required.
Known data sets are created by cloning the original ground truth VM into additional
VMs as needed using the VirtualBox VBoxManage tool. A new cloned VM is required for
each anti-forensic tool tested. Listing 6.7 demonstrates how the ground truth VM (named
Win7-32-GT) was cloned using the VBoxManage tool with the clonevm argument.
$ cd C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox
$ VBoxManage.exe clonevm ^ REM VirtualBox tool
D:\Win7-32\Win7-32-GT.vmdk ^ REM Location of VM disk
D:\Win7-32-clone\Win7-32-TC ^ REM Specifies new VM for TrueCrypt
--register REM Add VM to VirtualBox
Listing 6.7: Example of method used to clone virtual disks
Each cloned VM is used to recreate the application life cycle for a given application. At
the end of each life cycle phase, data collection was conducted by pausing the VM and
collecting a forensic image of the virtual hard disk using the dc3dd5 tool. The dc3dd tool
was implemented as it provides an automated forensic acquisition process (using a bash script),
maintains evidence integrity using cryptographic hashing and has been tested and approved
by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) under the Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT)
project (NIJ, 2011).
The previously specified application life cycle phases (see Table 6.4) were recreated on
each cloned VM. This process generates the required data for each forensic disk image in the
known data set. The first stage of known data set generation is to clone the ground truth VM.
This new VM is then started and the application installer is copied from the VirtualBox
5See: http://sourceforge.net/projects/dc3dd/
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shared folder to the guest operating system. The application is installed using default options.
Installation results in the creation of various files, directories and Registry entries (see Figure
6.5). The VM is paused and a forensic disk image (in the .raw format) of the VM disk file is
acquired using the dc3dd tool. The VM state is resumed, the application opened, the VM is
paused again and a further forensic image created. Additional digital artifacts are created in
the form of files, directories and Registry entries. The VM is resumed, the application software
closed, the VM paused and another forensic disk image acquired. The VM is resumed and the
application software is uninstalled using the Programs and Features interface. Various files,
directories and Registry entries are removed from the system. However, many of these digital
artifacts remain on the system in an unallocated state. The VM is paused and another forensic
image acquired. Finally, the VM is resumed, restarted, paused after rebooting and the final
forensic image acquired. Each profiled application resulted in a total of five forensic images:
1) Install; 2) Open; 3) Close; 4) Uninstall; and 5) Reboot. Figure 6.5 visually illustrates the
ground truth data set generation method based on the prescribed application life cycle phases
specified in this research.
Figure 6.5: High-level overview of the known data set generation method (Image sources:
Mozilla Firefox icon taken from The Mozilla Foundation (2013). All other images are public
domain or the author’s original work.)
6.2.5 Establishing Data Set Ground Truth
A data set with unknown content is problematic when performing system demonstration and
evaluation as there is no ground truth, or baseline, on which to accurately and reliably
measure the effectiveness of the implemented system design; for example, it is unknown if
an application is present, or absent, on a specific target disk image. Furthermore, if an
application is present, the number of digital artifacts associated with the application is also
unknown. Therefore, in order to determine the effectiveness of the system, the ground truth
needs to be established to allow comparison of the results from digital artifact matching.
The required ground truth information includes: 1) Establishing the presence (or absence)
of the anti-forensic tools selected for testing; and 2) Establishing the digital artifacts uniquely
associated with an anti-forensic tool on each target data set. Basically, determining ground
truth should provide a list of all digital artifacts (directories, data files and Registry key and
values) that are uniquely associated with the application that also reside on the target data
set. The ground truth can be determined by using the contents of the application profile, but
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only if the following two parameters are constant: 1) The same Microsoft Windows version;
and 2) The same anti-forensic tool version. Given these two constants, the target data set
should have the same contents as the application profile; for example, consider the installation
phase of the TrueCrypt tool, the same digital artifacts should appear in both the application
profile and target data set.
In order to establish the ground truth of data sets with unknown content, certain require-
ments first need to be specified to initiate a suitable an accurate solution which will now be
described.
6.2.5.1 Ground Truth Requirements
For each of the forensic disk images to be used for experimental testing, the following ground
truth requirements must be determined:
1) Identify Microsoft Windows operating system version
2) Determine anti-forensic tool presence
3) Determine anti-forensic tool artifacts (if tool present):
a) Determine anti-forensic tool version
b) Reverse engineer anti-forensic tool (using LiveDiff) to establish associated file
system and Registry entries
c) Document results in a machine-readable data abstraction to ease storage, process-
ing and distribution to aid this research as well as future research and development
Three distinct phases of chronological investigation are therefore prescribed to determine anti-
forensic tool ground truth on each data set. These phases will now be separately outlined.
6.2.5.2 Ground Truth: Determining Windows Version
The first phase of ground truth determination is to establish the Microsoft Windows version on
the target forensic disk image. Two methods can be utilised: 1) Reviewing the documentation
provided with the data set (if available); and 2) Forensic analysis of the forensic disk image
to indicate operating system information. This is a straightforward task if documentation is
available. However, without this information a manual investigation is essential being that
forensic tools are not available to ascertain Windows operating system versions. Forensic Wiki
(2012) outline the following chronological steps to detect the operating system for a potential
Microsoft Windows system:
1) Check root file system for a windows or winnt directory
2) Extract the SOFTWARE Registry hive file
3) Locate the following Registry key: Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
4) Examine the following Registry values: ProductName, CSDVersion, ProductId
Since this research promotes automated forensic analysis, a manual investigation to de-
termine the Microsoft Windows version seems cumbersome. Therefore, a Python script,
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named DetectWindows.py, was authored to perform the steps outlined above with auto-
mated ability to report if the target system has Microsoft Windows installed and the version
present. The script utilises the data abstractions (DFXML and RegXML) and tools developed
(CellXML-Registry) in this research. However, detailed discussion of the script operation
is beyond the scope of this section, so the method and the full source code is available in
Appendix C.1. If a valid Microsoft Windows operating system installation is discovered on
the target forensic disk image, the desired anti-forensic tool can then be searched for.
6.2.5.3 Ground Truth: Determining Anti-forensic Presence
The second phase of ground truth determination is to confirm the presence, or absence,
of the anti-forensic tool of interest. An existing method is not available for determining
application software presence on a target forensic disk image, therefore, this research proposes
the following:
1) Determine anti-forensic tool presence using string searching with unique keywords
2) Determine anti-forensic tool version using manual analysis
Establishing the presence of an anti-forensic tool can be accomplished by performing a text-
based string search of all forensic disk image contents. This can be achieved by invoking the
strings utility with the data set disk image as input. It is proposed that the anti-forensic
tool name (e.g., ccleaner, eraser and truecrypt) can be used as the keywords in this research.
The method may sometimes yield false positive search hits if the keyword is not unique.
However, a preliminary test using a default Microsoft Windows 7 installation (without any
anti-forensic tools installed) produced no search hits. This indicates that using the anti-
forensic tool name (for the selected tools) is a unique keyword. Once an anti-forensic tool is
discovered on a data set further manual investigation is required to determine the software
version. Again, no widely accepted method or forensic tool exists to achieve this. However,
based on the author’s knowledge there are various sources to determine tool version, including:
1) Locating the tool installer with an embedded version number in the executable; and 2)
Locating a Registry value created by the tool with the version number stored in the Registry
value data property. Given the variables involved, this is a manual investigation method.
6.2.5.4 Ground Truth: Determining Digital Artifacts
The previous investigation phases have determined the Windows operating system version
and the anti-forensic tool version. Given these two variables it is possible to create a new
application profile which will document the digital artifacts that are uniquely associated with
the anti-forensic tool. This is achieved by creating an application profile with the same anti-
forensic tool version on the same operating system version. Figure 6.6 displays a high-level
overview of the implemented method to establish ground truth.
The known application software is used to create a new application profile for the same
anti-forensic tool version and operating system version; for example, if Eraser version 4.0
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Figure 6.6: High-level overview of the method to establish ground truth (Image sources:
Mozilla Firefox icon taken from The Mozilla Foundation (2013), Mozilla Thunderbird icon
taken from The Mozilla Foundation (2011), Chromium icon taken from The Chromium Au-
thors (2015), TOR icon taken from The Tor Project (2011). Other images are public domain.)
was discovered on the target data set running Microsoft Windows Vista, a new application
profile would be created for Eraser version 4.0 using Windows Vista as the host operating
system. In contrast, the application profile created during this research is for Eraser version
6.2.0 on Windows 7.
The fiwalk and CellXML-Registry tools are used to generate DFXML and RegXML
reports for each identified disk image which is known to have an anti-forensic tool present.
The newly created profile is then manually compared to the metadata reports to identify the
actual digital artifacts that reside in both the disk image and the newly created application
profile. Manual analysis is achieved by comparing metadata properties for each entry in the
application profile, primarily using file system and Registry full path values. Any entries
deemed a match are then copied to a new application profile (APXML document) which
retains the digital artifact metadata that is taken directly from the target data set. This
document contains the actual file system and Registry entries that appear in the disk image
and provide an accurate metadata representation of ground truth for the selected anti-forensic
tool.
6.2.6 System Evaluation Metrics: Score Interpretation
Two different categories of metrics for system demonstration and evaluation were previously
specified in the proposed research methodology (see Section 4.3). To reiterate, one category
of metrics provides an applicable statistical measurement to determine the effectiveness of
the implemented system to detect relevant digital artifacts from a target data set. The other
metrics category was specified to provide the ability to measure the computational efficiency
of the implemented system. Both metrics are essential to determine the capability of the
implemented system and, ultimately, provide robust evidence to prove that the system is
both effective and efficient and can solve the high-level research objective. The purpose of this
section is to restate the evaluation metrics to be used with examples of score interpretation.
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6.2.6.1 Effectiveness Metrics
A total of three effectiveness metrics were sourced from the field of Information Retrieval
(IR) to aid in determining system effectiveness: 1) Precision (P); 2) Recall (R); and 3)
F1–measure (F1). The required input to calculate each metric can be determined using a
coincidence matrix to provide four levels of digital artifact classification: 1) True positive
(tp); 2) True negative (tn); 3) False positive (fp); and 4) False negative (fn). Classification
of detected digital artifacts is determined by comparison to the established ground truth
data (see Section 6.2.5). Further information regarding each effectiveness metric is covered
in Section 4.3.4, while digital artifact classifier information is covered in Section 4.3.4.2. To
provide a baseline on which to evaluate system effectiveness the following score interpretations
have been provided:
1) Precision (P ): Measures the correctness of the system at detecting relevant digital
artifacts. Low scores (e.g., 0.40) indicate that a high number of false positive (incorrect)
digital artifacts were detected, while high scores (e.g., 0.95) indicate a low number of false
positive digital artifacts were detected; for example, a precision score of 0.90 dictates
that 10% of detected digital artifacts were false positives and incorrectly detected from
the target data set
2) Recall (R): Measures the ability of the system to detect a high number of explicitly
relevant digital artifacts. Low scores (e.g., 0.40) indicate that a low number of the digital
artifacts from the target data set were detected, while high scores (e.g., 0.95) indicate
that a high proportion of digital artifacts were correctly detected; for example, a recall
score of 0.50 dictates that only half of the relevant digital artifacts were detected, while
a recall score of 1.00 dictates that all relevant digital artifacts were detected in the target
data set
3) F1 − measure (F1): Provides an equally weighted average (harmonic mean) of recall
and precision scores
4) Accuracy (A): Measures ability of the system to perform digital artifact classification
(tp, tn, fp, fn) during artifact matching. Low scores (e.g., 0.30) indicates that a high
number of digital artifacts were incorrectly classified during processing, while a per-
fect score (e.g., 1.00) indicates that all digital artifacts were correctly classified during
matching.
6.2.6.2 Efficiency Metrics
A total of two efficiency metrics were previously outlined (see Section 4.3.5), including: 1)
absolute speed; and 2) relative speed. To provide a baseline on which to evaluate system
efficiency the following score interpretations have been provided:
1) Absolute speed: Measures the time taken to process and analyse the target data set,
represented in time (minutes). Absolute speed only provides an indication of computa-
tional efficiency when comparison to a similar solution for the same data set is available;
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for example, comparing the absolute speed of another tool to the solution presented in
this research using the same data set. When available, efficiency results from the solution
presented in this research will be compared to other forensic analysis tools.
2) Relative speed: Measures the average rate that the tool can analyse the target com-
pared to the rate at which data can be read from the source device. Relative speed
provides a useful measurement of the system efficiency without any comparative results
from other research. A relative speed value of 1.00 dictates that the system can perform
complete processing and analysis of the target data set at the same speed at which the
data can be read from the source device. A relative speed of 2.00 dictates that the sys-
tem can perform complete processing at the twice the speed at which data can be read,
while a relative speed of 0.50 dictates that the system can perform complete processing
at half the speed at which data can be read. Overall, the higher the relative speed, the
more computationally efficient.
6.2.7 Testing Environment Summary
This section has outlined and discussed experimental testing for system demonstration (and
later evaluation) of the design with the use of VMs as a reliable and secure testing environ-
ment. Data generation and collection to create application profiles was specified including a
documented procedure for recreating specific application life cycle phases. It was deemed that
immutable VM disks would ensure that the same testing system would be in place for all ap-
plication profile creation. The data generation and collection method for creating known data
sets was then specified and points of difference from the application profile creation method
were outlined. A method to establish ground truth for each data set was detailed including
data requirements and a method to determine digital artifacts from application software on a
target data set. Finally, an overview of effectiveness and efficiency metrics were revisited and
examples of score interpretation provided to help determine system performance.
6.3 System Demonstration: Creating Application Profiles
The first stage of the system design is focussed on creating application profiles. System
demonstration of the implementation of the LiveDiff tool and APXML data abstraction
for this stage is now needed to test if the lower-level research objectives one and two can be met
(see Section 4.2.2.2 and Section 4.2.2.3). To briefly reiterate, this involves: 1) Effective and
efficient automated identification of relevant digital artifacts from anti-forensic tools; and 2)
An effective data abstraction to store, distribute and automate processing of digital artifacts
from anti-forensic tools. This section demonstrates the use of LiveDiff to reverse engineer
a selection of three anti-forensic tools. The goal is automated identification of digital artifacts
and subsequent population into an application profile.
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6.3.1 Anti-forensic Tool Selection
Anti-forensic tools are especially relevant to this study and were therefore chosen as the
input application software. Three anti-forensic tools have been previously selected for system
demonstration (see Section 4.3.2), which are: CCleaner, Eraser and TrueCrypt. Testing
a number of different tools is essential to ascertain whether the proposed solution is suitable for
different scenarios, in this case, different application software. Table 6.5 displays an overview
of the selected anti-forensic tools including the tool name, version number, tool installer file
name and the Message Digest version 5 (MD5 ) cryptographic hash value of the installer file.
Table 6.5: Overview of the anti-forensic tools selected for application profile testing
Tool Version File name MD5 hash value
CCleaner 5.09.5343 ccsetup509.exe f119524883af4bac56581ed77ceef828
Eraser 6.2.0.2970 Eraser 6.2.0.2970.exe adac90074e564f36f8b51eae5fa5eb86
TrueCrypt 7.1a TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe 7a23ac83a0856c352025a6f7c9cc1526
6.3.2 Overview of Created Application Profiles
LiveDiff version 1.0.06 was used to create 25 application profiles for each of the anti-forensic
tools. This resulted in a total of 75 application profiles. Multiple profiles were required in
anticipation of this number being needed as input for later testing of the application profile
intersection theory to filter irrelevant digital artifacts (see Section 3.2.3.3). The application
life cycle phases (see Table 6.4 and Figure 6.4) were recreated for each anti-forensic tool
and data collected using LiveDiff. Table 6.6 displays an overview of average counts for the
generated application profiles including the average clock time taken to author each profile and
the average APXML document size in kilobytes (KB). All counts are averaged and rounded
to integer values.
Table 6.6: Average digital artifact counts for created application profiles (count values have
been rounded to whole numbers)
Tool Dirs Files Keys Values Total Time (sec) File size
CCleaner 19 391 96 453 959 243 2,413 KB
Eraser 25 333 201 2,117 2,676 260 3,436 KB
TrueCrypt 15 226 154 523 918 240 2,251 KB
Total 950 59 451 3,093 4,553
In terms of performing data collection, LiveDiff proved to be very effective at generating
application profiles. However, to learn how efficient the system design is, a comparison to a
similar solution needs to be presented. The NIST Diskprint project creates reference sets for
application software using a post-mortem data collection method accomplished by collecting
6LiveDiff version 1.0.0 was used for demonstration of application profile creation and is publicly available
from: https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/LiveDiff/releases/tag/LiveDiff-1.0.0.
170
forensic images of VM disks (see Section 3.3.4). While there is no information regarding
efficiency of the Diskprint generation method, it can be estimated based on the documented
procedure. According to Microsoft (2016), the smallest hard drive size for Windows 7 32-bit is
16 GB. Using the Diskprint method a forensic disk image is collected for each application life
cycle phase. This would entail creating 6 disk images (one for each application life cycle phase
and a ground truth image), a total of 96 GB. Solely copying the data, without any analysis,
would take 1600 seconds, or 26.67 minutes. This assumes a hard drive read/write speed of
60 MB/s. In comparison, the clock time to create an application profile using LiveDiff
was 248 seconds, or 4.13 minutes (averaged from the 75 generated profiles). This includes
generating and collecting data for the five different application life cycle phases (install, open,
close, uninstall and reboot). It highlights the speed and efficiency at which LiveDiff can
author profiles using an automated data collection procedure on a live operating system.
The total number of identified digital artifacts varied for each anti-forensic tool. The
Eraser tool has approximately three times the total number of digital artifacts (2,676)
when individually compared to CCleaner and TrueCrypt. As seen in Table 6.6, this
was mainly due to Eraser creating over 2,100 Registry value entries. Based on these results,
Eraser can be considered a more complex application that creates a higher number of digital
artifacts. Even so, the application profile creation time was very similar compared to the
other anti-forensic tools. CCleaner created the highest number of data files (391) and
manual analysis determined this was primarily caused by the number of language packs (e.g.,
lang-1025.dll) that are included with the application (approximately 50). In comparison
to the numbers of identified data files created by all of the tools (950), the number of identified
file system directories was low (between 15 and 25). The same general trend was observed for
Registry entries, where a much higher total number of Registry values were identified (3,093)
when compared to Registry keys (451).
In terms of application profile size, all profiled anti-forensic tools had a very similar file
size, between 2.3 and 3.4 MBs. It can be concluded that Eraser had a higher file size due
to storing more than twice as many digital artifacts (2,676), compared to CCleaner and
TrueCrypt which had a total of 959 and 918 respectively.
Manual review of the created application profiles discovered digital artifacts that were
not unique to the profiled anti-forensic tools. This content was classified as operating system
artifacts caused by system noise. In an attempt to remove unrelated digital artifacts, the
proposed data reduction methods of application profile intersection and dynamic blacklisting
were next subjected to experimental testing and evaluated.
6.4 Filtering Irrelevant Artifacts from Application Profiles
Previous research has found that system-level reverse engineering typically produces a high
number of irrelevant results, usually operating system files and Registry entries, that are
not uniquely associated with an application (see Section 3.2.3 and Section 4.2.1.1). These
irrelevant entries are primarily due to the complexity of modern operating systems. Even
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when a system appears idle there are many processes and services running in the background.
This simply means that created application profiles will be littered with a high number of
irrelevant operating system artifacts that are not unique to the anti-forensic tool causing false
positive matches when invoked against a target data set. This is problematic when attempting
to detect digital artifacts of forensic interest. However, the issue can potentially be solved by
implementing data reduction techniques to filter irrelevant known operating system content.
Similar research studies have implemented set intersection to remove irrelevant operating
system artifacts but such a strategy has not been exhaustively examined for effectiveness (see
Section 3.2.3). Set intersection will now be referred to as application profile intersection,
as each profile is treated as a unique set. The system design also proposed the use of dy-
namic blacklisting in an attempt to filter known operating system files and Registry entries
(see Section 5.2.4.1). In order to evaluate both of these proposed solutions the created ap-
plication profiles need to be demonstrated by analysing both techniques to determine overall
effectiveness and efficiency.
6.4.1 Application Profile Intersection
Set theory is a fundamental mathematical concept, where a set is a collection of unique
objects. In set theory, the intersection (∩) of two sets (A ∩ B) is a new set of objects that
reside in both sets. Simply, the intersection of two sets contains the unique objects that reside
in both sets. Application profile intersection uses this concept to determine the objects that
reside in both profiles (APXML documents); for example, when performing intersection of
two application profiles the output is a profile which only contains digital artifacts that are in
both input profiles. Application profile intersection was performed in this research with the
aim of removing irrelevant digital artifacts, the premise being that only digital artifacts that
are present in every application profile are unique to the anti-forensic tool.
6.4.1.1 Application Profile Intersection Method
Intersection was performed by comparing application profiles from each independent anti-
forensic tool. The input ranged from 2 to 25 application profiles. Intersection was accom-
plished by authoring a Python script, named APXMLIntersection.py, which harnesses
the automated processing capabilities of the APXML API (See Section 5.3.4). The full
APXMLIntersection.py script is available in Appendix C.3. The script ingests two or
more APXML documents, performs intersection of all digital artifacts and produces three out-
puts: 1) A newly constructed APXML document containing only digital artifacts present in
all application profiles; 2) A Comma Separated Values (CSV) file of all file system entries and
associated metadata; and 3) A CSV file of all Registry entries and associated metadata. Both
CSV files include the observed number of occurrences that each digital artifact appeared in the
input profiles. The set intersection strategy implemented in the APXMLIntersection.py
script follows simple logic:
1) Parse each application profile to an APXMLObject using apxml.py
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2) First pass: Iterate each FileObject and CellObject from the first profile, add a
count for each object
3) Subsequent passes: Iterate each subsequent profile:
a) For each FileObject and CellObject perform a comparison of all digital
artifact properties (e.g., for files this includes file name, size, hash value, allocation
status and application life cycle phase) to all previously processed objects
b) If a match is found, increase the count
c) Or else if the object is new, add a count for the new object
4) After processing all application profiles, return entries in a newly constructed APXML
document, but only when entries are present in all input profiles
6.4.1.2 Application Profile Intersection Results
Application profile intersection was performed using the 75 created application profiles (25
for each of the three anti-forensic tools). Table 6.7 displays the percentage decrease to the
total digital artifact count when performing intersection of 2, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 profiles; for
example, the five (5) column is the percentage decrease after performing intersection of five
APXML documents. In this example, the percentage of digital artifacts from the CCleaner
application profile was reduced by approximately 38%.
Table 6.7: Summary of the percentage decrease to total digital artifact count for the intersec-
tion of varying numbers of application profiles
Tool 2 5 10 15 20 25
CCleaner 30.85% 38.07% 40.04% 40.59% 40.70% 42.12%
Eraser 11.15% 12.14% 12.14% 12.22% 12.22% 12.71%
TrueCrypt 23.39% 26.67% 27.57% 27.57% 28.93% 28.93%
Overall, the results show a decrease in the total digital artifact count when performing in-
tersection of two application profiles for all tools (between approximately 11% and 30% total
reduction in digital artifacts). Although profile intersection continues to decrease the total
digital artifact count as input of profiles increases, the method yields marginal differences
with each additional application profile; for example, in the TrueCrypt tool, intersection of
two application profiles reduces the total digital artifact count by approximately 23%, while
intersection of 25 application profiles reduces the total digital artifact count by approximately
29%. This is a further reduction of around 6%, requires authoring 23 additional application
profiles for TrueCrypt as input, taking an extra 92 minutes based on presented figures. A
similar trend was observed for all three tools.
Overall, performing application profile intersection was efficient due to the automated
APXMLIntersection.py script which does not require user intervention, operation or man-
ual decision making. However, authoring multiple application profiles is time consuming, as
each single application profile takes approximately four minutes to create (see Table 6.6). The
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following example and discussion uses the results from profiling the TrueCrypt tool. Cre-
ating two (2) application profiles takes approximately 8 minutes and performing intersection
removes approximately 23% irrelevant digital artifacts. Creating five (5) application profiles
takes approximately 20 minutes and performing intersection removes approximately 27% ir-
relevant digital artifacts. Creating twenty five (25) application profiles takes approximately
100 minutes (or 1 hour and 40 minutes) and performing intersection removes approximately
29% irrelevant digital artifacts. The reduction of irrelevant digital artifacts plateaus when
additional profiles are used and minimal data reduction is achieved in comparison to the time
factor involved. Figure 6.7 is a visual representation of the total digital artifact count for all
three anti-forensic tools when performing application profile intersection from a single profile
to all 25 profiles7.
Figure 6.7: Summary of application profile intersection results displaying the total digital
artifact count for the three anti-forensic tools using from 1 to 25 application profiles
Figure 6.7 illustrates the diminishing returns when more application profiles are used as input
to intersection, the major trend being that the number of filtered irrelevant artifacts decreases.
Nevertheless, the indication is that application profile intersection is capable of removing
unrelated results. However, further analysis of the data reduction technique is required to
give insight to the artifact types (directories, files, keys and values) that were removed to
determine those that are predominantly associated with operating system noise; for example,
do Registry value changes encompass the majority of operating system noise.
Further investigation was performed using TrueCrypt as an example. Figure 6.8 presents
a summary of intersection results for TrueCrypt while also identifying the outcome for each
of the four different digital artifact types8.
A series of important trends are evident. Firstly, there was only one directory removed
from the intersection of all TrueCrypt profiles and this occurred when using only two profiles
7The purpose of Figure 6.7 is to display the overall trend resulting from application profile intersection.
Full digital artifact counts are displayed in Appendix C.4 including Tables C.4, C.5 and C.6.
8Similar to Figure 6.7, the purpose of Figure 6.8 is to display the overall trend resulting from application
profile intersection. Full digital artifact counts are displayed in Appendix C.4, specifically Table C.6.
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Figure 6.8: Summary of application profile intersection results for TrueCrypt using 1 to 25
application profiles
as input. Therefore, it can concluded that directories are less dynamic in terms of creation
due to operating system noise. Secondly, a high number of data files were removed when
performing intersection. The first profile had 210 data files and intersection of 25 profiles
reduced this to 167 data files (a reduction of 43 irrelevant data files). However, 18 of these
were removed with the intersection of only two profiles, 24 were removed with the intersection
of five profiles, and thereafter only one was removed. Thirdly, in comparison to data files,
fewer Registry keys were removed, from 153 to 140. A total of 10 of these were removed
from the intersection of only two profiles. Again, this result highlights the effectiveness of
intersecting only two profiles. Lastly, Registry values were determined to be highly dynamic
and constituted a large number of irrelevant entries. The first profile contained over 500
Registry values and intersection of two profiles reduced this number to approximately 300, a
reduction of 200 irrelevant values. Most of these irrelevant results were due to modification of
Registry value data and not creation of a new Registry value. Overall, the results dictate that
data files and Registry values proved to account for the majority of irrelevant digital artifacts
in the TrueCrypt application profiles. Further analysis of the output from application profile
intersection was then deemed necessary to manually examine the profile content.
6.4.1.3 Analysis of Application Profile Intersection Output
Analysis was performed on the output from application profile intersection to investigate how
the contents of the application profiles were effected by intersection. This was accomplished
by reviewing the CSV output files from the APXMLIntersection.py script to determine
the following: 1) The digital artifacts removed; and 2) The digital artifacts remaining after
performing set intersection. Analysis was first conducted by individually investigating each
digital artifact. The author’s knowledge of the Microsoft Windows operating system was
175
utilised to classify digital artifacts; for example, if a specific digital artifact was the result
of a running Windows service. In addition, a variety of Internet sources and digital forensic
resources were also used to obtain information about specific file system andWindows Registry
entries. However, the primary source was the Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN)9 which
documents information for Microsoft product developers, testers and programmers.
The first step of analysis is to determine the digital artifacts that were removed by in-
tersection and if they were correctly or incorrectly removed. Analysis revealed that very few
digital artifacts that were unique to the profiled anti-forensic tools were removed, while a high
number of irrelevant operating system artifacts were discovered in all authored application
profiles. This is a good result, as irrelevant operating system artifacts were removed while still
retaining unique application software artifacts. However, two data file types and one Registry
value type, all of forensic interest, were incorrectly removed during profile intersection.
Directories: Analysis revealed that no file system directories were incorrectly removed and
the low number that were removed were manually classified as correct. This is explained by
the fact that file system directories have no associated variable content (e.g., data file content
represented by the hash value) which reduces system-level modification changes, ultimately
resulting in low (in this research none) false positive results.
Data files: Two file types were incorrectly removed after intersection. Windows Shortcut
files (e.g., TrueCrypt.lnk) were incorrectly removed because they have a variable hash
value and, therefore, the correlation of all digital artifact properties cannot be achieved.
Windows Shortcut files have a variable hash caused by dynamic content in the file metadata;
for example, embedded timestamp information which changes on every application installation
(Metz, 2016b). Windows Prefetch files (e.g., TRUECRYPT.EXE-33CC2C25.pf) were also
incorrectly removed due to a variable hash value, as well as a variable file name caused by a
random suffix value (e.g., -33CC2C25.pf) (Metz, 2016c).
Registry keys: Analysis revealed that no Registry keys were incorrectly removed and the
low number that were removed were manually classified as correct. These results are similar to
file system directory results and derive from the same behaviour, that Registry keys have no
associated variable content which results in limited false positive system-level modifications.
Registry values: One Registry value type, UserAssist entries, were incorrectly removed
after profile intersection. This was caused by similar content-based problems observed during
incorrect data file removal. UserAssist Registry entries are designed to track application usage
and have dynamic content which contains a last execution timestamp. Therefore, the data
content varies based on when the application was executed. This results in variable data
content and failure to match all properties when performing intersection.
Remaining incorrect digital artifacts: Although intersection did remove a high number
of irrelevant digital artifacts, there were many remaining digital artifacts that were identified
9See: https://msdn.microsoft.com/
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during analysis as not being uniquely associated with the specific anti-forensic tool. These
operating system artifacts were not removed as they were present in every authored profile. A
primary example is Registry hive files. Since an anti-forensic tool made Registry changes, the
actual Registry hive file (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE) also appeared
in identified file system changes. However, performing digital artifact matching using a Reg-
istry hive file is not appropriate, as every Windows operating system will have the same hive
file. Another example is a high number of irrelevant operating system artifacts were found from
Windows services; for example, the Windows Search service. A number of Windows Prefetch
files were also not removed from intersection as they appeared in every profile; for example, the
Windows Command Prefetch file (e.g., C:\Windows\Prefetch\CMD.EXE-4A81B364.pf)
was found in every TrueCrypt profile authored because the tool utilises the Windows com-
mand prompt during application installation.
Profile intersection testing revealed both positive and negative effects on performing data
reduction and removing irrelevant digital artifacts. Three digital artifact types were incor-
rectly removed due to variable file/value data content: 1) Windows Shortcut files; 2) Windows
Prefetch files; and 3) UserAssist Registry values. A variety of known operating system artifacts
(not unique to the profiled application) were not removed as they appeared in all application
profiles, including: 1) Registry hive files; and 2) Irrelevant Windows Prefetch files. Testing
and results achieved from the second data reduction technique of dynamic blacklisting follows.
6.4.2 Application Profile Blacklisting
A blacklisting technique was designed and implemented based on the specified system re-
quirements (see Section 5.2.4.1) and experimental testing of the solution was undertaken to
determine the capability of removing irrelevant operating system artifacts. Functionality was
included in LiveDiff to perform a system snapshot and generate a blacklist of known oper-
ating system artifacts prior to data collection. The blacklist was implemented to include the
full logical path of: 1) Data files; and 2) Registry values. Directories and Registry keys were
not included as LiveDiff performs recursive scanning and as such, blacklisting directories
or Registry keys would also remove their contents (nested data files or Registry values). Pre-
vious results from application profile intersection showed that both directories and Registry
keys are much less dynamic and produce minimal false positive results included with the au-
thored application profiles. This reflects the design decision of blacklisting to only include
data files and Registry values. The method to determine blacklisting effectiveness follows with
a summary of results from testing and analysis of the results achieved.
6.4.2.1 Application Profile Blacklisting Method
Usually LiveDiff stores the dynamically generated blacklist in volatile memory. How-
ever, a function was written and included to save a text file of all blacklist entries to enable
post-mortem analysis of experimental testing results without adversely affecting run-time per-
formance. The earlier selection of 75 application profiles used to perform application profile
intersection were used (a total of 25 application profiles for each of the three anti-forensic
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tools). A simple Python script, named APXMLBlacklist.py, was authored to perform
post-mortem blacklisting which was implemented using the APXML API (apxml.py). The
full script is available in Appendix C.5. The script ingests an APXML document and the
associated text file containing blacklisted entries. The APXMLBlacklist.py script is sim-
ilar to the set intersection script in that it produces three outputs: 1) A newly constructed
APXML document containing non-blacklisted digital artifacts; 2) A CSV file of all file sys-
tem entries, associated metadata and a blacklist status for each entry; and 3) A CSV file of
all Registry entries, associated metadata and a blacklist status for each entry. The blacklist
strategy implemented in the script follows simple logic:
1) Parse the application profile to an APXMLObject using apxml.py
2) Parse the blacklist into a Python dictionary mapping full path to the actual object
3) Iterate each FileObject and CellObject in the profile
4) Perform a dictionary lookup using the object’s full path. If the path is found the object
is deemed blacklisted and irrelevant
6.4.2.2 Application Profile Blacklisting Results
The APXMLBlacklist.py script implements the same logic as dynamic blacklisting imple-
mented in LiveDiff, the only difference being it is not conducted during run-time. Blacklist
testing was performed using all 75 generated application profiles. However, each profile was
individually used as input to the APXMLBlacklist.py script and the results averaged for
each anti-forensic tool. Table 6.8 displays an overview of the data files and Registry value
counts before and after performing blacklisting as well as the percentage decrease resulting
from blacklisting. As stated, all counts are averaged for each tested tool.
Table 6.8: Summary of blacklisting effectiveness for each anti-forensic tool
Data files Registry values
Tool Before After Decrease Before After Decrease
CCleaner 391 234 40% 453 240 47%
Eraser 333 213 36% 2117 1008 52%
TrueCrypt 225 172 24% 523 227 57%
The results from blacklisting showed a consistent reduction in the total number of digital
artifacts for each anti-forensic tool profile. For all three tools the number of data files reduced
after blacklisting was between 24% and 40%, while the number of Windows Registry values
also reduced between 47% and 57%. Therefore, it can be concluded that blacklisting filtered
a large proportion of irrelevant application profile entries. From the 75 created application
profiles the total number of data files was 25,183; of these, 15,460 were blacklisted and a total
of 9,723 data files remained, an overall reduction of a little over 61%. In terms of Registry
value entries, there were a total of 62,986 Registry values from all 75 application profiles;
of these, 25,212 were blacklisted and a total of 37,774 Registry values remained, an overall
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reduction of approximately 40%. This largely demonstrates that blacklisting reduced the
number of irrelevant data files and Registry values by classifying many as known operating
system artifacts.
Figure 6.9 displays a visual representation of the results from implementing dynamic
blacklisting. The average for each anti-forensic tool profile before performing blacklisting is
displayed (blue) and the average after performing blacklisting is shown (orange). Error bars
are included which specify the standard deviation based on the difference observed from the
averaged profile contents for each anti-forensic tool.
Figure 6.9: Averaged application profile counts before and after dynamic blacklisting
It is visually evident that the digital artifact count is reduced when performing blacklisting.
The number of digital artifacts for each anti-forensic tool was reduced by over approximately
50%. However, analysis of the blacklisted digital artifacts is now required to determine if any
entries were incorrectly removed and the type of digital artifacts that were filtered.
6.4.2.3 Analysis of Application Profile Blacklisting
Although the presented data reduction statistics illustrate effective removal of digital artifacts,
analysis of the blacklisted entries is essential to determine which application profile entries
were removed and if entries were removed that are actually unique to the application. This
section analyses and discusses correctly and incorrectly removed digital artifacts observed from
testing the dynamic blacklisting design. Detailed tables are included which outline blacklisted
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digital artifact types and classification based on the operating system functionality that each
provides.
Blacklisted data files: Analysis of blacklisted data files revealed that no digital artifacts
that were unique to an application were removed. The results indicate that dynamic black-
listing removed a large number of irrelevant data files from a variety of Windows services
and processes. Prominent examples of blacklisted data files include: 1) Windows Updates
that had been previously downloaded, installed and were removed during application profile
creation time; 2) Normal Windows event log activity; 3) Modified Registry hive files; 4) Data
files created by the Windows Search service; 5) The Windows CryptoAPI certificate cache
(CryptnetURLCache); 6) Windows Prefetch files (e.g., TASKHOST.EXE-7238F31D.pf) and
Prefetch databases (e.g., AgGlFgAppHistory.db); and 7) Windows log files. Each of these
classifications (except log files) had in excess of 1,000 data files blacklisted from all of the 75
created application profiles. A variety of other operating system files were also discovered
but most had fewer entries. Table 6.9 presents an overview of the most prominent blacklisted
data files including classification, a total count of occurrence and an example of the file system
location.
Table 6.9: Blacklisted data files classified on logical file system location
Classification Count Example location
Windows Updates 1,965 C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\DataStore
C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download
Event Logs 1,902 C:\Windows\System32\winevt
Registry hives 1,809 C:\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE
C:\Users\%USERNAME%\NTUSER.DAT
Search service 1,446 C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Search\Data
C:\Users\All Users\Microsoft\Search\Data
CryptnetURLCache 1,307 AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache10
Prefetch files 1,288 C:\Windows\Prefetch




Windows Defender 99 C:\Users\All Users\Microsoft\Windows Defender
Pagefile 75 C:\pagefile.sys
Blacklisted Registry values: Analysis of blacklisted Registry entries revealed no entries
were removed that were unique to the anti-forensic tools. Similar to the results from blacklist-
ing data files, the results illustrated that the blacklisted Registry values were known Windows
10The displayed CryptnetUrlCache path has been shortened. The full CryptnetURLCache path is:
C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache
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operating system processes and services. Table 6.10 presents an overview of blacklisted Reg-
istry value entries including classification, a count of occurrence and an example of the full
Registry entry path.
Table 6.10: Blacklisted Registry values classified on logical Registry hive path
Classification Count Example path




Control Set 1,968 SYSTEM\%CONTROLSET%\Control
1,691 SYSTEM\%CONTROLSET%\Enum
1,834 SYSTEM\%CONTROLSET%\services




Windows Search 1,114 SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Search
Potential blacklist failure: After designing, implementing and testing the dynamic black-
listing technique various lessons were learned regarding operation and functionality. Although
not witnessed during testing, it is hypothesised that blacklisting may fail in the following sce-
nario; for example, where a data file or Registry value exists, is included in the blacklist, but
later modified by the application. Since the entry is already blacklisted it will not appear in
differential analysis results. A good example is Windows Registry hive files. Each hive file
(e.g., C:\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE) exists on all Windows system and will
be present when initially running LiveDiff, therefore, will be populated into the dynamic
blacklist. Most applications will modify the SOFTWARE hive and write Registry entries to
provide application configuration. However, since the SOFTWARE hive file was blacklisted,
it will not appear in differential analysis results. In this example, the fact that the hive file
itself is blacklisted in of no consequence because the Registry contents are processed during
differential analysis and the associated data file is not of interest. However, take the example
of a log file. If a log file exists during LiveDiff blacklist generation, it is added to the
blacklist and then the application modifies the log file and will not be included in differential
analysis results. This is because no lower-level processing is conducted by LiveDiff (like
Registry differencing), and thus, potential system-level differences are not included. Another
data file example is the Windows pagefile.sys. To include pagefile information in the
application profile, the pagefile would need to be independently processed at a high-level of
abstraction, similar to Windows Registry processing.
The implementation and testing of dynamic blacklisting revealed a number findings in
terms of data reduction capabilities. Although blacklisting removed no unique digital arti-
facts, it can be concluded that the technique may fail in some scenarios. However, blacklisting
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successfully removed a high proportion of irrelevant digital artifacts that were manually clas-
sified as irrelevant operating system noise caused by known operating system services and
processes.
6.4.3 Discussion of Data Reduction Findings
Two data reduction techniques to remove irrelevant digital artifacts were tested, namely ap-
plication profile intersection and dynamic blacklisting. Both have the same goal, to remove
digital artifacts not unique to the anti-forensic tool being reverse engineered; for example,
known operating system files created by constant system noise. Two different techniques were
implemented and tested to determine the effectiveness of each strategy. Each technique can
be used individually or in conjunction with each other.
The findings from application profile intersection and dynamic blacklisting revealed that
multiple digital artifact types were present in the application profiles that were not unique
to the anti-forensic tools. It is important to note that many of these digital artifacts were
actually created by the anti-forensic tool itself, but are not unique to the tool so are not useful
when creating a reference set to compare against a target; for example, every anti-forensic tool
made changes to the pagefile.sys. However, if it was included in the application profile
it would be found on every target running Microsoft Windows as the actual pagefile.sys
file is present on every Windows NT system.
Both techniques used to filter irrelevant operating system artifacts proved effective at
performing data reduction of the created application profiles. However, both had some dis-
advantages especially the removal of digital artifacts that were manually classified as being
unique to the profiled application. The major drawback from performing application profile
intersection is that the method requires multiple profiles and thus extra time. However, the
testing results show that LiveDiff is efficient at creating application profiles. The average
real elapsed time to author an application profile was approximately 4 minutes, compared to
an estimated minimum 26 minutes for similar application reference set solutions. This speed
is primarily due to data collection being performed on a live system using an automated pro-
cedure with minimal user intervention. Therefore, the efficiency of LiveDiff lends itself to
creating multiple profiles for comparison.
Overall, blacklisting known operating system artifacts (known data files and Registry
values) proved more effective than profile intersection at removing irrelevant results. However,
there is one possible scenario (not witnessed during testing) that may irreversibly affect results
when an existing file or Registry value is blacklisted and then modified by an application.
After manual review of the results from both techniques it can be concluded that to achieve
the best effectiveness at removing irrelevant results, both application profile intersection and
dynamic blacklisting should be used in conjunction when creating application profiles. This
is because each technique was capable of removing different types of irrelevant digital arti-
facts; for example, while intersection failed to remove Registry hive files, blacklisting correctly
removed these entries.
This section has demonstrated, tested and discussed data reduction techniques using the 75
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created application profiles. Irrelevant digital artifacts were found when using intersection and
dynamic blacklisting which removed a proportion of these operating system artifacts. These
techniques aided in automating the creation of application profiles with unique application
software artifacts. A revised method now needs to be developed and tested for creating
application profiles based on the findings achieved.
6.5 System Demonstration: Recreated Application Profiles
The investigation and outcome of filtering irrelevant artifacts from application profiles has
now initiated a new method of profile creation. This method is now tested to determine
effectiveness by creating and analysing the contents of three recreated application profiles. A
final iteration is then performed and a new technique called static blacklisting is added to
LiveDiff so that the small number of irrelevant operating system artifacts still remaining
may be removed. The final result is three application profiles, one for each anti-forensic tool,
ready for demonstration of the digital artifact matching stage of the system design against
the known data set.
6.5.1 Revised Application Profile Generation Method
The demonstration of application profile creation provided findings on which to reliably further
design an improved method. Specifically, results were obtained that highlight the applicability
of the data generation method used and the effectiveness of various data reduction techniques.
These findings led to a revised application profile creation method.
Application profile intersection proved to be effective at removing irrelevant digital
artifacts and experimental results determining the most effective number of profiles to achieve
the best outcome was tested. However, a balance between effectiveness and time efficiency
is needed. The findings aided in specifying that five (5) application profiles is an optimum
number of profiles needed to reduce irrelevant profile entries while still maintaining efficiency.
Results from implementing and testing dynamic blacklisting also proved an effective data
reduction technique and did not remove any relevant application profile entries. Additionally,
the results from dynamic blacklisting also removed all digital artifacts from the reboot appli-
cation life cycle, meaning none were unique to the anti-forensic tool. Therefore, the reboot
life cycle phase has been removed from any further experimental testing. These results have
led to the following revised method for application profile generation:
1) Create five application profiles using LiveDiff in application profile mode with dy-
namic blacklisting and MD5/SHA1 file hashing enabled
2) Perform data collection for the following application life cycle phases: install, open,
close, uninstall
3) Perform intersection of the five application profiles using APXMLIntersection.py
4) Perform a manual analysis of the final application profile to verify document contents
and potentially identify irrelevant operating system artifacts
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The revised application profile creation method needs to be demonstrated to reassess the mod-
ifications. Furthermore, the effectiveness of combining dynamic blacklisting with application
profile intersection also needs to be investigated.
6.5.2 Overview of Recreated Application Profiles
The findings presented thus far resulted in modifications to the system design. These mod-
ifications required that application profiles needed to be recreated using the revised method
(see Section 6.5.1). Therefore, three new application profiles were authored for the three
selected anti-forensic tools (CCleaner, Eraser, and TrueCrypt). Table 6.11 displays an
overview comparing the originally created and revised application profiles. The original ap-
plication profiles (top) are the profiles created without intersection or dynamic blacklisting
(taken from Table 6.6), while the revised application profiles (bottom) were created using the
revised method. The table includes counts for each digital artifact type (directory, files, keys
and values) as well as the total digital artifact count. The file size column provides the file
size in kilobytes (KB) for each application profile.
Table 6.11: Overview and comparison of original versus revised application profiles








l CCleaner 19 391 96 453 959 2,413 KB
Eraser 25 333 201 2,117 2,676 3,436 KB







d CCleaner 7 130 62 113 312 353 KB
Eraser 15 72 88 189 364 431 KB
TrueCrypt 6 31 117 169 323 367 KB
When compared to the original unfiltered application profiles, the revised method using dy-
namic blacklisting coupled with intersection resulted in profiles with a much lower digital
artifact count. The resultant file size of all profiles was also much smaller than that from
initial creation, due to the removal of irrelevant digital artifacts.
As per the specified revised application profile creation method, the final step entailed
that the resultant contents of application profiles be manually reviewed for potential erroneous
digital artifacts. Even after application profile intersection and dynamic blacklisting, a number
of known operating system artifacts were still present. Out of the total 999 digital artifacts
from all three revised application profiles, approximately 60 operating system artifacts were
located. All of these entries were previously observed in data reduction results (see Table 6.9
and Table 6.10). However, these entries were not removed due to the following problems: 1)
The entries were present in every profile, resulting in profile intersection not removing the
entry; and 2) The irrelevant entries were created after dynamic blacklist generation, resulting
in the entry not being blacklisted. To overcome the problem of continual irrelevant operating
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system artifacts not being filtered, new functionality was added to LiveDiff in the form
of a static blacklist populated with known irrelevant file system and Registry locations
discovered during data reduction testing.
6.5.3 Further Data Reduction: Static Blacklist Implementation
In order to combat the remaining irrelevant operating system artifacts the dynamic black-
listing technique was extended to provide the functionality to populate a selection of static
entries defined by the user. Therefore, a static blacklist was authored and support added
to LiveDiff to include these entries in the blacklisting procedure. This was a relatively
straightforward task as blacklisting was already a component of the LiveDiff tool. The
static blacklist is a text file that contains a list of known irrelevant file system and Registry
locations. The static blacklist was manually populated by entering the irrelevant file system
and Registry paths discovered from the revised application profiles and results obtained from
experimental testing. Listing 6.8 displays the format of the static blacklist with a collection
of example entries. The full static blacklist is provided in Appendix C.6.
# LIVEDIFF STATIC BLACKLIST
# Any line starting with a "#" is a comment
# The following prefixes are defined:
# DIR= Specify a directory and contents to be excluded
# FILE= Specify a file to be excluded
# KEY= Specify a Registry key, sub-key and values to be excluded.
# VALUE= Specify a Registry value to be exluded.
########## FILE SYSTEM ENTRIES
# Windows Defender program data
DIR=C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender
DIR=C:\Users\All Users\Microsoft\Windows Defender
# Entries related to the Windows Search service
DIR=C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Search
DIR=C:\Users\All Users\Microsoft\Search







Listing 6.8: Example of LiveDiff static blacklist structure and entries
The static blacklist uses a prefix for any specified paths to provide support to blacklist di-
rectories (DIR=), files (FILE=), Registry keys (KEY=) and Registry values (VALUE=).
Each prefix is followed by the absolute path of each file system or Registry entry; for ex-
ample, DIR=C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender specifies the Windows
185
Defender application data directory and all child contents to be excluded during the snapshot
process. A command line argument was added to LiveDiff to provide support to include
a static blacklist. The -f argument can be specified, followed by the static blacklist name.
If specified, the static blacklist is parsed and populated into the appropriate blacklist already
implemented in LiveDiff (see Section 5.2.4.1).
Given the changes to the system implementation, application profiles were created again
to test the final method. To briefly reiterate, the finalised method involves creating five appli-
cation profiles for each tool with dynamic blacklisting enabled, inclusion of static blacklisting
and then performing intersection using all five profiles as input. Table 6.12 displays a further
review of profile contents comparing the original, revised and final application profile creation
methods. Included are the counts for each of the digital artifact types, a total count of all
digital artifacts and the final profile size (in KB)11.
Table 6.12: Overview and comparison of original versus revised application profiles








l CCleaner 19 391 96 453 960 2,413 KB
Eraser 25 333 201 2,117 2,676 3,436 KB







d CCleaner 7 130 62 113 312 353 KB
Eraser 15 72 88 189 364 431 KB






CCleaner 6 123 36 92 257 310 KB
Eraser 15 72 76 187 350 419 KB
TrueCrypt 6 30 116 169 321 364 KB
A manual analysis of application profile contents was, again, performed. The inclusion of the
static blacklist was deemed successful at removing the remaining irrelevant operating system
artifacts as there were no operating system-specific entries discovered. The successful finalised
application profile method has resulted in three application profiles that are ready for testing
against known data sets.
6.5.4 Application Profile Creation Summary
The system demonstration phase of the DSRM process model has worked towards a thor-
oughly tested first stage of the system design, that is, creation of application profiles. Firstly,
the original method for the creation of application profiles was performed (see Section 6.3),
investigation regarding two filtering techniques to remove irrelevant operating systems entries
from application profiles was then conducted (see Section 6.4) and, finally, recreation of ap-
plication profiles was achieved based on the findings, lessons learned and associated system
11Full application profile metadata contents are provided in Appendix C.7.
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modification made (see Section 6.5). A final selection of profiles were thus recreated using
all of the proposed filtering techniques, namely: application profile intersection, dynamic
blacklisting and static blacklisting. This has resulted in three application profiles that are
completely free of irrelevant operating system artifacts and ready for the next stage of system
testing. Demonstration of the second main stage of the system design; that is, digital artifact
matching using the created application profiles, is now carried out.
6.6 System Demonstration: Digital Artifact Matching
Digital artifact matching is the process of correlating digital artifacts between the application
profile(s) and the target data set. The purpose is to automate detection of known digital
artifacts and determine the presence, or absence, of anti-forensic tools. The aim of this section
is to outline the data set used for the experimental testing method to demonstrate digital
artifact matching. The section begins with an overview of a specifically authored data set
with known content created in a laboratory controlled environment. A brief summary of the
method used to perform experimental testing is followed by the establishment of the ground
truth contents of the known data set to enable calculation of the prescribed effectiveness
metrics and determine system performance at detecting digital artifacts of forensic interest.
6.6.1 Overview of Known Data Set
A method to author known data sets was previously specified (see Section 6.2.4). The only
change to the prescribed data generation and collection method is that the reboot application
life cycle phase was removed because no unique application software artifacts were discovered
in this life cycle phase during demonstration of application profile creation. Therefore, each
anti-forensic tool has a total of four application life cycle phases that are to be tested: 1)
Install; 2) Open; 3) Close; and 4) Uninstall. Additionally, one ground truth system was also
included in the known data set corpus. This target data set was installed with Microsoft Win-
dows 7 and used to create the additional VMs as needed and will be used as an experimental
testing baseline. The result is a total of 13 target data sets; that is, four forensic disk images
for each anti-forensic tool and one ground truth disk image. Table 6.13 displays an overview
of the forensic disk images that comprise the known data set corpus including the scenario
(anti-forensic tool), disk naming convention and application life cycle phase.
Prior to performing experimental testing, the known data set was analysed to determine
the size and complexity of the content in terms of file system and Registry entries. Each of
the thirteen scenarios that comprise the known content data set are a forensic disk image
(bit-by-bit copy) of a 10 GB virtual disk. This equates to a total data set size of 130 GB of
uncompressed data stored in the raw disk format.
Additional analysis of the file system and Registry entry content was performed to deter-
mine the number and type of digital artifacts in the known data set. This was accomplished
using two Python scripts authored during the course of this research. FileSystemStats.py
parses a forensic disk image and counts all file system entries (and also extracts Registry hive
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Table 6.13: Overview of the created forensic disk images from the known data set
Scenario Name Phase













files). RegistryStats.py parses the extracted Registry hive files and counts all Registry
entries. Both scripts are available in Appendix C.8 and C.9. Table 6.14 displays an overview
of the contents of the disk images from the known data set. The total count and average
count per disk image is displayed for both file system and Registry hive artifacts, as well as
information regarding the data set size. Full statistics for each disk image from the known
data set is available in Appendix C.10.
Table 6.14: Overview of the M57-Patents scenario content
Property Total Average per disk









Data files 641,082 49,314
Other 38,128 2,933
Allocated entries 1,021,679 78,591
Unallocated entries 40,291 3,099
Total 1,061,970 81,690






Registry keys 1,545,232 118,864
Registry values 2,738,568 210,659
Allocated entries 4,178,359 321,412
Unallocated entries 105,441 8,111
Total 4,283,800 329,523
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6.6.2 Experimental Testing Method
Each of the 13 known data set scenarios were used for experimental testing. To accomplish
this, each forensic disk image was used as input to the Vestigium tool. Listing 6.9 displays
an example of how Vestigium was invoked to perform automated digital artifact matching.
The listing displays the command invoked to perform testing against the CCleaner disk
image where the tool had been installed; that is, the known data set scenario named CC-
01. Tool output is saved to the user-specified output directory (TC-01-output). Testing
was performed using all three application profiles for the selected anti-forensic tools. Again,
the listing specifies new line characters (ˆ) and comments (REM) using Windows command
conventions.
$ C:\Python34\python.exe Vestigium.py ^
D:\KDS\CC-01.RAW ^ REM Forensic disk image
D:\KDS\CC-01-output ^ REM Output folder
CCleaner-5.09-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM CCleaner profile
Eraser-6.2.0.2970-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM Eraser profile
TrueCrypt-7.1a-6.1.7601.apxml REM TrueCrypt profile
Listing 6.9: Command line example to invoke Vestigium against the known data set
The code snippet above invokes Vestigium to process the CCleaner forensic disk image
image (CC-01.RAW) using all three (3) application profiles as input. Testing each scenario
using all three application profiles was undertaken to establish if any digital artifacts were
incorrectly detected from a different anti-forensic tool than that present on the specified
known data set scenario; for example, if an entry from the Eraser profile was detected on
the CCleaner installation scenario it can be concluded that the detected Eraser artifact is
a false positive. Additionally, all three application profiles were used as input since, in most
digital investigations, analysts will want to search for the existence of any anti-forensic tool
wherever present.
6.6.3 Establishing Known Data Set Ground Truth
The experimental testing method specified that the ground truth needs to be established so
that the digital artifacts of forensic interest on the data sets used for testing can be determined
(see Section 6.2.5). This information provides a baseline on which to evaluate the effectiveness
of the digital artifact matching stage of the system design. Simply put, the ground truth
specifies what digital artifacts are present, and should be detected, on each data set. A
method was specified for determining ground truth (see Section 6.2.5.3), but is not required
for known data set testing as the content of the data sets are already known. Ground truth can
be established based on the application profile contents because the same operating system
(Microsoft Windows 7), the same anti-forensic tool, and the same tool version has been used
for both application profile creation and known data set generation. This culminates in the
fact that the digital artifacts present in the application profile and the associated known data
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set should be the same; for example, the Eraser profile should have the same installation
footprint (and associated digital artifacts) as the ER-01 scenario. However, before testing was
undertaken an informal check was performed to confirm the data set contents and ensure that
the data was generated correctly.
A manual analysis was conducted on each forensic disk image to determine the digital
artifacts present on the system. Various de facto computer forensic tools were used to analyse
the forensic images and browse the file system and Windows Registry for known applica-
tion software artifacts. Manual analysis was performed using two widely accepted computer
forensic tools from the well known Access Data12 company: 1) FTK Imager version 3.4.2 to
browse and search file system entries; and 2) Registry Viewer version 1.8.1.3 to browse
and search the extracted Windows Registry hive files. The manual analysis procedure in-
volved reviewing the contents of the application profile for each associated known data set
scenario and manually searching for digital artifacts. The known data set scenario was con-
firmed correct if the entries in the application profile were locatable. Using this procedure
there were no errors found in the generated known data set and, thus, were deemed ready
for experimental testing. Table 6.15 displays an overview of digital artifact counts for the
ground truth information on the created known data set. For each testing scenario (forensic
disk image, anti-forensic tool and application life cycle phase) a count is provided for each
digital artifact type, including a total count of all digital artifacts.
Table 6.15: Overview of ground truth information for the known data set
Name Tool Phase File System Registry Total
GT-01 N/A N/A 0 0 0
CC-01 CCleaner install 65 50 115
CC-02 CCleaner open 66 73 139
CC-03 CCleaner close 66 79 145
CC-04 CCleaner uninstall 66 79 145
ER-01 Eraser install 41 127 168
ER-02 Eraser open 42 136 178
ER-03 Eraser close 45 136 181
ER-04 Eraser uninstall 48 139 187
TC-01 TrueCrypt install 16 142 158
TC-02 TrueCrypt open 18 144 162
TC-03 TrueCrypt close 19 145 164
TC-04 TrueCrypt uninstall 22 146 168
Total 514 1,396 1,910
The pertinent experimental testing environment and the method to be performed for known
data set testing has now been set out. An overview of the created known data set was
provided, followed by the method used to invoke the Vestigium tool against the forensic
12See: http://accessdata.com/
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disk images from the known data set. Finally, the ground truth information was established
and digital artifact counts provided to aid in calculating the prescribed effectiveness metrics.
Coupled with the finalised application profiles, this information puts forward all the necessary
variables to execute experimental testing and demonstrate the effectiveness of the digital
artifact matching stage of the system design.
6.6.4 Known Data Set Testing
Experimental testing on the known data set was performed by invoking Vestigium against
each of the thirteen disk image scenarios. For each disk image, all three application profiles
were used as input. Digital artifact matching was accomplished by matching the file system
entries and Registry entries from the input application profiles against all the corresponding
entries from each disk image.
This section proceeds to outline the effectiveness results from known data set testing with
reference to the calculated metrics. Efficiency results are not included in known data set
testing as there are no comparative results available. Instead, efficiency results are presented
for two data sets in the evaluation chapter (see Chapter 7). A discussion of the results
outlines the successes, failures and lessons learned from experimental testing in the laboratory
controlled environment. This leads to system design and implementation refinement before
proceeding to system evaluation as per the cyclical nature of the design science research
methodology.
6.6.4.1 Matching Effectiveness: File System Entries
Matching file system entries incorporates the correlation of file system directories and data
files between the application profile(s) and the target data set. Table 6.16 displays an overview
of the results from file system matching. The table conveys all file system entries from the
target data set that have been categorised as one of the four digital artifacts classifiers:
tp, tn, fp, fn. This was achieved by comparison to ground truth information. The binary
matrix classification system provides the capability to calculate each of the four prescribed
effectiveness metrics (P, R, F1, A) which are outlined in Section 4.3.4. Further information
regarding the digital artifact classification scheme is available in Section 4.3.4.2 and score
interpretation examples are available in Section 6.2.6.
The Vestigium tool with input from the finalised application profiles proved highly
effective when executed against the selection of disk images from the known data set. Digital
artifact matching was effective in terms of detection of relevant digital artifacts from the
application profiles, while also reporting no false positive matches. There were no digital
artifacts detected in the ground truth (GT-01) disk image, a good result meaning that no
anti-forensic tool artifacts were present on the disk image, a default installation of Microsoft
Windows 7 without added software. Furthermore, no digital artifacts from an anti-forensic
tool were detected on a data set where the tool was not introduced; for example, no CCleaner
entries were detected on a TrueCrypt disk image.
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Table 6.16: Effectiveness results for file system matching for the known data set
Name Phase tp tn fp fn P R F1 A
GT-01 N/A 0 80,551 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CC-01 install 65 80,629 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CC-02 open 66 80,629 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CC-03 close 66 80,636 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CC-04 uninstall 59 80,602 0 7 1.00 0.89 0.94 1.00
ER-01 install 41 83,494 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ER-02 open 42 83,489 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ER-03 close 45 83,523 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ER-04 uninstall 35 83,524 0 13 1.00 0.73 0.84 1.00
TC-01 install 16 81,092 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TC-02 open 18 81,094 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TC-03 close 19 81,096 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TC-04 uninstall 20 81,099 0 2 1.00 0.91 0.95 1.00
Average 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00
The overall F1–measure (F1) score for all disk images used for known data set testing was
0.98. This score is a harmonic mean of the combined precision (P ) and recall (R) scores. A
perfect accuracy score (1.00) was achieved, meaning that no digital artifacts were incorrectly
classified by Vestigium. A perfect precision score (1.00) was also achieved for all 13 tar-
get disk images, meaning that no false positive matches were erroneously detected. This is
important as the results presented from the Vestigium tool contain no incorrect matches
that would require manual analysis to determine correctness. In terms of detection capability,
Vestigium automated the detection of 492 file system entries out of a possible total of 514
entries from the application profiles. This resulted in a average recall score of 0.96, or 96% of
all digital artifacts present in the target data set. The only reductions to recall scores were
observed in the uninstallation phase for all three anti-forensic tools. Further analysis of the
uninstallation phase is therefore required.
Manual analysis of Vestigium output was performed on each disk image for the unin-
stallation life cycle phase (CC-04, ER-04 and TC-04). Testing revealed that a number of false
negatives were present on each disk image, meaning that a digital artifact that was present
in the application profile was not found in the target data set. Investigation showed that
the inability to detect all digital artifacts was caused by some file system entries on the tar-
get data set having incomplete metadata; for example, files of interest were discovered with
missing file size, meta_type and hash values (both MD5 and SHA1 ). Furthermore, some
directories were discovered with an incorrect meta_type; for example, the TrueCrypt user
configuration folder was discovered with a meta_type of 3 (an input/output file type), when
in fact it is a directory with a meta_type of 2. Listing 6.10 displays two FileObjects that























Listing 6.10: Example FileObjects with missing and incorrect metadata properties
The same problems were observed for the CCleaner and Eraser tools. However, a higher
number of digital artifacts from both tools was not detected in the target disk images. A total
of 7 and 13 file system entries were not detected on the CCleaner and Eraser uninstallation
disk images respectively. From these results it can be concluded, that in some scenarios
metadata correlation is not a robust method for detection of deleted digital artifacts. The
reason for missing metadata properties is caused by incomplete file system metadata after
deletion, where 100% of the content is not recoverable by the fiwalk tool. Nevertheless, a
high number of digital artifacts were still detected from all uninstalltion disk images, with
recall scores ranging from 0.73 to 0.91. This means that 73% to 91% of all deleted file system
entries were still detected even after tool uninstallation. Since each digital artifact is unique
to the anti-forensic tool, this is compelling digital evidence that reliably supports the presence
of an anti-forensic tool on the target system and that it had also been uninstalled.
6.6.4.2 Matching Effectiveness: Registry Entries
Matching Registry entries incorporates the correlation of Registry entries (keys and values)
between the application profile(s) and the target data set. Table 6.17 displays an overview
of the results from Registry artifact matching. Similar to file system matching, the results
table conveys the classified digital artifacts (tp, tn, fp, fn) and each of the four prescribed
effectiveness metrics (P, R, F1, A).
Once again, the Vestigium tool with input from the finalised application profiles proved
highly effective when executed against the selection of disk images from the known data set.
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Table 6.17: Effectiveness results for Registry matching for the known data set
Name Phase tp tn fp fn P R F1 A
GT-01 N/A 0 322,070 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CC-01 install 50 321,680 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CC-02 open 73 321,657 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CC-03 close 79 321,651 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CC-04 uninstall 67 321,589 0 12 1.00 0.85 0.92 1.00
ER-01 install 127 319,563 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ER-02 open 136 319,558 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ER-03 close 136 319,562 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ER-04 uninstall 88 319,654 0 51 1.00 0.63 0.78 1.00
TC-01 install 136 348,774 0 6 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00
TC-02 open 138 348,777 0 6 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00
TC-03 close 139 348,866 0 6 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00
TC-04 uninstall 102 349,003 0 44 1.00 0.70 0.82 1.00
Average 1.00 0.92 0.96 1.00
Digital artifact matching was effective in terms of detection of relevant Registry entries from
the application profiles, while also reporting no false positive matches. Again, no digital
artifacts were detected in the ground truth (GT-01) disk image and no entries from an anti-
forensic tool were detected on a data set where the tool was not introduced. These are
expected results. The overall F1–measure (F1) score for all disk images used for known data
set testing was 0.96. The result is slightly lower than that of file system matching (0.98).
However, this is still a good result. Again, a perfect accuracy score was obtained. Registry
analysis resulted in automated detection of 1,271 entries, while only missing 125. Again,
a perfect precision score (1.00) was achieved, meaning that no false positive matches were
erroneously detected. The average recall score for all disk images was 0.92, meaning that
92% of all Registry entries were detected successfully. Similar to the results from file system
analysis, perfect recall scores were observed in the install, open and close life cycle phases,
apart from TrueCrypt which had six false negative results.
Further analysis was conducted and unusual Registry entry behaviour was found for the
six entries for TrueCrypt that were not detected, even though they were present in the
application profile. Manual analysis revealed these entries did not exist in the target data set.








Research revealed that the six Registry entries were all related to starting a new service
or initialisation of a new device on the Windows operating system (Carvey, 2011). Further
informal testing revealed that the six Registry entries are created when installing TrueCrypt
but deleted soon after installation (usually after a set time or system reboot). Therefore, the
entries were present in the application profile but not in the target data set. Since the entries
have a short life-span, their inclusion in the application profile is not required.
Further analysis of Vestigium output was performed on each disk image from the unin-
stallation life cycle phases (CC-04, ER-04 and TC-04). Similar to file system matching, this
was conducted in an attempt to determine the reasoning for the high number of false negatives
(entries that were not detected). Once again, the reason was due to incomplete metadata for
deleted entries. However, the missing metadata properties were different from that observed
in file system matching. The main problem with deleted Registry entry correlation was due
to incomplete Registry path information; for example, the TrueCryptFormat Registry key
was recovered, but the full Registry path (software\classes\truecryptformat) was
not included in the recovered information. Since only the key name was recovered, Registry
path matching could not be achieved. In this example, it could be possible to detect the recov-
ered entry as the key name (TrueCryptFormat) is unique and known to be associated with
TrueCrypt. However, not all recovered entries have the same unique properties available.
Listing 6.11 displays two recovered Registry entries with incomplete metadata. The second
CellObject provides an example on an entry that would not be able to be correlated, as
the recovered value name (AccessPermission) is not unique to TrueCrypt. Therefore,
the situation of incomplete metadata for Registry entries is a difficult matching scenario with
no robust solution available in the system implementation. Listing 6.11 does not include the














<data>01 00 04 80 30 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 02
00 1C 00 01 00</data>
</cellobject>
Listing 6.11: Example CellObjects with incomplete metadata properties
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6.6.5 Discussion of Findings
The overall outcome from known data set testing in a laboratory controlled environment
proved a successful system design and implementation has been achieved. A high recall score
was observed for both file system matching and Registry matching, 0.96 and 0.92 respectively.
Simply put, approximately 92-96% of all possible digital artifacts were successfully detected.
Furthermore, a perfect precision score (1.00) was achieved in every testing scenario. The only
observed weakness in the system implementation was seen in the uninstallation phase for all
anti-forensic tools in both file system and Registry matching. Even so, the recall scores were
still quite high, ranging from 0.63 to 0.91. Given the uniqueness of the detected anti-forensic
tool artifacts, even 63% recovery of deleted digtial artifacts provide compelling digital evidence
of both anti-forensic tool presence on the target data set and evidence of tool uninstallation
by the potential suspect. This evidence is particularly useful in a scenario where a suspect
may attempt to hide evidence of malicious tool usage by removing and/or deleting the tool.
Previous reference set solutions commonly use file hashes to detect application software
usage. This research uses rich metadata correlation to perform automated digital artifact
detection; for example, the inclusion of digital artifact name, path, size and allocation status
to aid detection. This technique has proved to be functionally capable of aiding detection
and able to determine the state of detected digital artifacts; for example, the ability to auto-
matically know if a digital artifact has been deleted and report this useful information to the
investigator.
There are no reference set solutions are available to automate forensic analysis, in partic-
ular to detect application software. The solution implemented in this research has proven to
be effective at detecting a high number of relevant and interesting digital artifacts. Further-
more, there have been no robust solutions previously developed or tested to achieve recovery
and matching of deleted Registry entries. The CellXML-Registry tool was specifically
authored in this project to recover deleted Registry entries. Based on the results achieved,
the implementation can be considered a success by providing an automated analysis technique
to detect a high proportion of relevant digital artifacts.
The results gained from the known data set testing in a laboratory controlled environ-
ment has demonstrated the functionality of the system implementation. However, during
experimental testing a number of problems were encountered that require system modifica-
tion before progressing to the next phase of the design science process model; that is, system
evaluation.
6.6.6 Design Modifications to Digital Artifact Matching
Feedback on the system implementation was achieved through experimental testing on the
disk images that comprised the known data set. The input data was approximately 130 GB
which contained over 1 million file system entries and over 4 million Registry entries. Testing
digital artifact matching on such a large number of file system and Registry entries provided
insight on a number of programming bugs in the Vestigium tool, as well as the underlying
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CellXML-Registry tool. During known data set testing the encountered programming
bugs were resolved.
A variety of programming bugs in Vestigium arose which caused the software to unex-
pectedly crash during processing. A number of these problems were triggered by lack of error
checking when processing digital artifact metadata properties; for example, it was expected
that all FileObjects would have a file size property and error checking neglected to be
included. Testing revealed that some unallocated (deleted) data files lacked a file size prop-
erty, causing Vestigium to crash when attempting to query the file size. To combat this
problem, extensive error checking was included when a problem was witnessed during testing
by simply checking that a FileObject or CellObject has data populated in a metadata
property before performing any action. This was achieved by checking the metadata property
available; for example, the Python statement: if datafile.filesize checks that the
datafile variable has content.
A variety of XML bugs were also discovered in Vestigium, most of which caused the
program to crash during target data set processing. XML processing is very strict. Any
malformed XML element or any XML element with the incorrect data type (e.g., string instead
of integer) caused Vestigium to crash. XML processing errors were not encountered during
file system process using fiwalk. However, a number of errors did arise during Registry
processing using CellXML-Registry. One example was special characters found in the
Registry value basename property. Although special character checks were included for the
cellpath property, the basename property was overlooked. All encountered errors were then
fixed and the updated version of CellXML-Registry was able to process every Registry
hive file without encountering any processing errors.
6.7 Overview of Achieved Research Objectives
System demonstration has progressed towards solving the high-level and various lower-level
objectives specified in this research project. The experimental testing results have solved
lower-level research objectives one and two, while also providing preliminary results for lower-
level research objective three and four. This section has outlined the progress made thus far
for each stated research objective.
Lower-level Research Objective One: To enable effective and efficient auto-
mated identification of relevant digital artifacts from application software
Demonstration has produced experimental testing results to prove that the LiveDiff tool
was functionally capable of automated identification of relevant digital artifacts. Section
6.3 created a selection of application profiles using the implemented software based on the
system design. Initial application profile creation judged the solution highly efficient when
compared to other solutions presented in similar research (see Section 6.3.2). Section 6.4
worked towards identification of only relevant digital artifacts that are unique to each
anti-forensic tool using two filtering techniques, both of which proved effective at removing
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irrelevant application profile entries. Section 6.5.1 outlined further refinements to the design
and resulted in a finalised enhancements to LiveDiff, which was again tested via application
profile creation. The outcome was three application profiles containing only relevant digital
artifacts, suitable for identification of known content on a target data set.
Lower-level Research Objective Two: To design an effective data abstraction
for storing, distributing and automating the processing of different digital artifact
types from application softwares.
This chapter demonstrated the design and implementation of the Application Profile XML
(APXML) data abstraction to store, distribute and automate processing of identified digital
artifacts from reverse engineering. The APXML data abstraction provides the functionality
to store both file system and Registry entries while at the same time has the ability to
distribute to other researchers or practitioners. Furthermore, the associated APXML API
(apxml.py) proved effective at providing automated processing functionality of application
profile contents. This was demonstrated in filtering irrelevant digital artifacts from the created
application profile using simple Python scripts to perform automated intersection (see Section
6.4.1.1) and automated blacklisting (see Section 6.4.2.1). Furthermore, the APXML data
abstraction was again leveraged to aid automated digital artifact matching when parsing the
application profile for comparison against the target data set.
Lower-level research objectives one and two are now considered solved. In addition, lower-
level research objectives three and four have, in part, been addressed in the known data set
testing portion of system demonstration (see Section 6.6.4). Lower-level objective three spec-
ified an effective and efficient automated technique to generate a metadata representation
of the target data set. This chapter has demonstrated the functionality of Vestigium to
achieve this, coupled with the fiwalk and CellXML-Registry tools. However, further
experimental testing and a thorough evaluation is still required to determine overall effec-
tiveness of the developed solution. In addition, efficiency results have not yet been presented
but will be covered in detail in the system evaluation chapter (see Chapter 7). Lower-level
objective four specified for effective and efficient automated methods to correlate different
digital artifact types between an application profile and target data set. Again, this chapter
has demonstrated the implemented Vestigium tool is able to achieve the desired functional-
ity in a controlled laboratory environment. Nevertheless, further experimental testing is still
required followed by a thorough evaluation of the system implementation.
6.8 Conclusion
The goal of the fourth element of the DSRM process model is to demonstrate the functionality
of the designed and implemented system in a controlled laboratory environment. Operation of
all tools (computer software) authored in this research was detailed, each used as an individual
component in the implemented system. An experimental testing method prescribed an envi-
ronment using virtual machines to perform data generation and collection while a method to
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establish the ground truth digital artifacts on the prescribed data sets was outlined. Testing
metrics were revisited and score interpretation examples provided.
The system design was demonstrated firstly, to test the creation of application profiles
using LiveDiff, including the use of filtering techniques to only identify relevant file system
and Registry entries. A revised creation method was specified, refinements to LiveDiffmade
and three finalised application profiles were created. Secondly, demonstration was used to test
digital artifact matching functionality. A data set was created, populated with known content
and the digital artifact matching stage tested using the Vestigium tool. Effectiveness metrics
proved the functionality of the implemented system and led to refinements. Finally, a selection
of lower-level research objectives were reviewed, some were solved in full, others in part, leading
to further experimental testing. Comprehensive evaluation of the refined system against a





The final element in the Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) process model is the
evaluation of the implemented system. According to Peffers et al. (2007), evaluation includes
observing and measuring how well the designed artifact supports a solution by comparing
the research objectives to the observed results using relevant analysis techniques and met-
rics. Therefore, this chapter describes the experimental testing performed leading to system
evaluation. Two data sets were selected to perform evaluation: 1) A publicly available data
set designed for digital forensics research to enable reproducible findings; and 2) A real-world
data set comprised of second-hand hard drives with diverse and unpredictable data. Each
data set was used as input to the Vestigium tool, digital artifact matching executed and
metrics calculated to evaluate the system effectiveness and efficiency. Comparisons are made
to de facto forensic analysis techniques to evaluate the system compared to existing solutions.
The first half of the chapter is dedicated to public data set testing using the M57-Patents
scenario. An overview is provided including the testing method and establishment of ground
truth. Testing is conducted and results presented for effectiveness and efficiency of the overall
system. The findings are discussed and refinements made to the system based on the problems
and limitations. The second half of the chapter is dedicated to real-world data set testing
using a selection of second-hand hard drives. An overview of the data set is provided including
a selection criteria and a summary of the experimental testing method. Findings are again,
presented in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Finally, a section is dedicated to a discussion
on the evaluation of the system to solve the prescribed research objectives.
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7.1 Public Data Set Overview: M57-Patents Scenario
The first data set used for system evaluation is the publicly available M57-Patents scenario
(see Section 4.3.3.2). A public data set was selected because it offers research reproducibility;
specifically the capability for other researchers, tool developers and forensic practitioners to
test, evaluate, verify and/or build on the findings presented in this research. An overview
of the M57-Patents scenario, the implemented experimental testing method and a summary
of the established ground truth of the data set is outlined. The information provides insight
into the data set contents and leads to the next two sections which convey the results from
experimental testing.
7.1.1 Overview of M57-Parents Scenario
According to Digital Corpora (2011), the M57-Patents scenario was created in 2009 by the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, United States. The M57-Patents scenario
is freely available for download from the Digital Corpora website1. The scenario features a
fictitious patent research company, m57.biz that consists of four employees: 1) Pat McGoo,
the company CEO; 2) Terry Johnson the IT administrator; 3) Jo Smith a patent researcher;
and 4) Charlie Brown another patent researcher. The data set was created over a 17-day
period between November 16th, 2009 (2009-11-16) and December 11, 2009 (2009-12-11) which
excludes weekends and holidays2.
This research aims to detect application software artifacts from desktop computer systems
running versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Therefore, the material from
the M57-Patents scenario that is now of use for the evaluation of this system design is the 79
forensic images from desktop computer systems of the four users running different Microsoft
Windows operating systems. Table 7.1 provides an overview of desktop systems in the M57-
Patents scenario based on the computer user. The user is displayed with the associated
number of disk images in the data set, the size of the hard disk (HDD) and the Microsoft
Windows version.
Table 7.1: High-level overview of the M57-Patents scenario based on user
User Disk Images HDD Size Windows Version
Pat 19 12 GB Windows XP
Terry 20 19-38 GB3 Windows Vista
Jo 21 12-14 GB4 Windows XP
Charlie 19 9.5 GB Windows XP
1See: http://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/scenarios/m57-patents-scenario
2Any discussion regarding individual disk images from the M57-Patents scenario uses the user name and
date to identify the specific disk images from the data set; for example, charlie-2009-11-12 is a disk image from
the user Charlie which was collected on the 12th of November, 2009. ISO 8601 date conventions (YYYY-MM-
DD) are used as they correlate to the naming method used by the M57-Patents scenario.
3The initial size of Terry’s hard drive was 19 GB, which increased to 38 GB on 2009-11-19.
4The initial size of Jo’s hard drive was 12 GB, which increased to 14 GB on 2009-11-20.
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The M57-Patents scenario includes two Microsoft Windows operating system versions: Win-
dows XP and Windows Vista. This is important to consider during system evaluation as
the created application profiles were authored on a system running Microsoft Windows 7. It
presents a significant challenge for the application profiling system and will aid in producing
findings to determine achievement, or otherwise, of lower-level research objectives five and six
(see Section 4.2.2.4).
Prior to performing experimental testing, the M57-Patents scenario was analysed to de-
termine the size and complexity of the data set. This was achieved by using the same two
Python scripts authored to determine known data set content (see Section 6.6.1). The file
system statistics script (FileSystemStats.py) and Windows Registry statistics script
(RegistryStats.py) are available in Appendix C.8 and C.9. Table 7.2 presents an overview
of the M57-Patents scenario including the size of the data set (disk images) and summary
information regarding the number and type of file system and Windows Registry entries. The
average per disk (of the 79 disks) for each property is also provided. Appendix D.1 provides
more in-depth information regarding M57-Patents scenario content.
Table 7.2: Overview of the M57-Patents scenario content
Property Total Average per disk









Data files 3,711,083 46,976
Other 124,688 1,578
Allocated entries 4,890,757 61,908
Unallocated entries 347,743 4,402
Total 5,238,500 66,310






Registry keys 10,382,107 131,419
Registry values 18,956,843 239,960
Allocated entries 28,699,932 363,290
Unallocated entries 639,018 8,089
Total 29,338,950 371,379
The 79 forensic disk images from the M57-Patents scenario equate to approximately 1.5 Ter-
abytes (TB) of raw data. The data set is distributed in the Expert Witness Format (EWF),
commonly known by the .E01 file extension. The ewfinfo tool from the libewf project5
revealed that the forensic images were compressed using the deflate compression method and
best compression option selected. The total size of the compressed forensic disk images equates
to approximately 454 GB. Compression of the target data set is important to note as it may
adversely affect the performance (computational efficiency) achieved during testing since the
5See: https://github.com/libyal/libewf/
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forensic image needs to be decompressed on the fly when processing.
Each of the 79 forensic disk images from the M57-Patents scenario will be used in dif-
ferent aspects of testing the digital artifact matching component of the system design (the
Vestigium tool). However, before undertaking experimental testing, the ground truth of
the data set needs to be established to determine the anti-forensic tool presence, or absence,
on the disk images from the data set.
7.1.2 Experimental Testing Method
The experimental testing method used for the M57-Patents scenario is the same as imple-
mented for known data set testing (see Section 6.6.2). The Vestigium tool is used to corre-
late digital artifacts between the application profiles (APXML documents) and the target data
set (each forensic disk image from the M57-Patents scenario). Listing 7.1 provides an example
of the command to invoke Vestigium using one disk image (charlie-2009-11-12.E01)
and a user-specified output folder (charlie-2009-11-12-output). All three application
profiles are included for every disk image tested. The listing specifies new line characters (ˆ)
and comments (REM) using Windows command conventions.
$ C:\Python34\python.exe Vestigium.py ^
D:\M57\charlie-2009-11-12.E01 ^ REM Forensic disk image
D:\M57\charlie-2009-11-12-output ^ REM Output folder
CCleaner-5.09-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM CCleaner profile
Eraser-6.2.0.2970-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM Eraser profile
TrueCrypt-7.1a-6.1.7601.apxml REM TrueCrypt profile
Listing 7.1: Command example to invoke Vestigium against the M57-Patents scenario
Although the M57-Patents scenario provides DFXML reports generated by fiwalk for all
forensic disk images6, the reports were not used as input during testing. The reasoning is
that a DFXML report is not always available for investigations. Reports were provided for
this data set because the authors of the fiwalk tool are from the same academic institution
as the authors of the M57-Patents data set. Therefore, DFXML metadata generation should
be performed during tool run-time to provide an accurate representation of tool efficiency.
7.1.3 Establishing Ground Truth for the M57-Patents Scenario
The only official documentation included with the M57-Patents scenario are student exer-
cises, associated instructor material and fictitious legal documents7. Therefore, in terms of
installed application software, the M57-Patents scenario has no documentation that specifies
the content of the data set; for example, information relating to applications that are present
on each user’s system, dates the applications were installed, a list of actions performed, and,





some information regarding the presence of specific applications; for example, TrueCrypt
is known to be installed on at least one user’s system: Roussev and Quates (2012) stated
that, using the sdhash tool, they discovered a user (Jo) had used the TrueCrypt software.
However, Roussev and Quates (2012) were attempting to discover illegal digital images and
their analysis was not focussed on detecting anti-forensic tools. The available documentation
of the M57-Patents scenario is therefore incomplete and lacks sufficient detail to establish
reliable and accurate information regarding anti-forensic tool presence, or even absence. As
a consequence, ground truth needs to be established to provide a baseline count of relevant
digital artifacts to determine effectiveness of the implemented system.
The process of establishing ground truth (see Section 6.2.5) involves examining each disk
image and: 1) Determining the Windows operating system version (already known); 2) Deter-
mining anti-forensic tool presence; and 3) Determining the digital artifacts uniquely associated
with each anti-forensic tool and documenting the findings. Using this information a ground
truth application profile can be created with which results can be compared.
7.1.3.1 Determining Anti-forensic Tool Presence
Initial analysis was conducted by performing a keyword search on each forensic disk image
in the M57-Patents scenario. Performing keyword searching aids in identifying disk images
that may have a specific anti-forensic tool on the system; for example, searching for the
keyword truecrypt will likely yield search hits if the tool is present on the target system.
To accomplish this, each forensic image was first converted to the raw disk image format8
using the ewfexport utility from the libewf project. Each converted disk image was then
subjected to a keyword search using the strings and grep utilities. Three keywords were
used: 1) ccleaner; 2) eraser; and 3) truecrypt. The following commands demonstrate how the
disk images were converted and subsequently searched. In the example, the keyword truecrypt
was explicitly searched using the -i flag to perform a case insensitive search.
$ ewfexport -f raw D:\M57\charlie-2009-11-12.E01
$ strings D:\M57\charlie-2009-11-12.raw | grep -i "truecrypt"
The search output from each disk image was then analysed to determine positive or negative
identification. This was achieved by manually analysing the context surrounding each keyword
search hit as well as the number of search hits returned. It should be noted that searching
raw data does not provide any results to indicate which file system entry or Registry entry
the search hit was discovered from. It is also important to note that this search technique
will only work with a unique application name. The result from the initial analysis identified
thirteen (13) potential disk images (out of a total of 79) that may have at least one of the
three selected anti-forensic tools9. Table 7.3 displays the interesting forensic images from the
8As previously noted, all the forensic images in the M57-Patents scenario are distributed as compressed
EWF files, meaning a disk image cannot be directly searched as any potential keywords (strings) will be
compressed. Therefore, each forensic image needs to be uncompressed and then searched.
9A total of eight potentially interesting forensic images were discovered from the user Terry. However,
three disk images contained keyword search hits from both CCleaner and Eraser tools. This results in a
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M57-Patents scenario including the username, operating system version, inclusive dates of
interesting content, count of forensic images and the associated keyword search hit.
Table 7.3: Potentially interesting forensic disk images from the M57-Patents scenario
User OS Dates Count Keyword
Jo XP 2009-12-03 to 2009-12-11 8 truecrypt
Terry Vista 2009-12-08 to 2009-12-11 5 ccleaner
Terry Vista 2009-12-10 to 2009-12-11 3 eraser
7.1.3.2 Determining and Documenting Anti-forensic Tool Artifacts
Further investigation was conducted on the 13 interesting disk images from keyword searching.
DFXML and RegXML reports were generated for all 13 disk images using the specified ground
truth method (see Figure 6.6). Once again, the grep utility was invoked, this time to search
all metadata reports for the specified keywords, as displayed in the command example below.
$ grep -r -i -n "truecrypt" D:\M57\charlie-2009-11-12\*.xml
The output from metadata searching provided additional evidence of anti-forensic tool pres-
ence, as well as helping to determine the tool version found on the disk images. Tool version
information was found by manually examining the version number embedded in tool installer
files (e.g., TrueCrypt Setup 6.3a.exe), as well as the version number stored in varying
Registry values. Table 7.4 provides a comparison overview of the anti-forensic tools used for
the created application profiles versus the anti-forensic tool versions discovered on the M57-
Patents scenario. The anti-forensic tool name, version and operating system is displayed for
all three tools.
Table 7.4: Anti-forensic tool versions for application profiles versus the M57-Patents scenario
Created M57-Patents
Tool Version OS Version OS
CCleaner 5.09.5343 Windows 7 2.26.1050 Windows Vista
Eraser 6.2.0.2970 Windows 7 5.7.8 Windows Vista
TrueCrypt 7.1a Windows 7 6.3a Windows XP
Knowledge of the operating system and anti-forensic tool version provides the ability to create
a new application profile (using LiveDiff) that matches the identified anti-forensic tool, the
tool version and operating system version; for example, Eraser version 5.7.8 was discovered
on the M57-Patents scenario (on Terry’s system) running Microsoft Windows Vista. There-
fore, a new application profile was created for Eraser version 5.7.8 using Windows Vista as
the host operating system. This new application profile should have the same contents as
total of 13 interesting disk images.
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appear on the target data set, but comparison should be made to confirm this. Therefore,
the entries from the newly created application profile were compared to the contents of the
target data set. Any entries deemed a match are then copied to a new application profile
(APXML document) which retains the digital artifact metadata taken directly from the tar-
get data set. This document contains the actual file system and Registry entries that appear
in the disk image and provide an accurate metadata representation of ground truth for the
selected anti-forensic tool. Table 7.5 displays a summary of digital artifact counts for each of
the identified disk images where one of the three anti-forensic tools were present. The disk
image name, anti-forensic tool name and anti-forensic tool version are displayed. The digital
artifact count is also provided for directories, files, Registry keys and Registry values and a
total digital artifact count.
Table 7.5: Overview of ground truth information for the M57-Patents scenario
Name Tool Version Dirs Files Keys Values Total
jo-2009-12-03 TrueCrypt 6.3a 4 14 11 26 55
jo-2009-12-04 TrueCrypt 6.3a 4 14 15 39 72
jo-2009-12-07 TrueCrypt 6.3a 4 14 15 39 72
jo-2009-12-08 TrueCrypt 6.3a 4 14 15 39 72
jo-2009-12-09 TrueCrypt 6.3a 4 14 15 39 72
jo-2009-12-10 TrueCrypt 6.3a 4 14 15 40 73
jo-2009-12-11-001 TrueCrypt 6.3a 4 14 15 40 73
jo-2009-12-11-002 TrueCrypt 6.3a 4 14 15 40 73
terry-2009-12-08 CCleaner 2.26 3 50 14 25 92
terry-2009-12-09 CCleaner 2.26 3 50 14 25 92
terry-2009-12-10 CCleaner 2.26 3 49 14 25 91
terry-2009-12-11-001 CCleaner 2.26 3 48 14 25 90
terry-2009-12-11-002 CCleaner 2.26 3 47 14 25 89
terry-2009-12-10 Eraser 5.7.8 3 15 49 86 153
terry-2009-12-11-001 Eraser 5.7.8 3 14 49 86 152
terry-2009-12-11-002 Eraser 5.7.8 3 14 49 86 152
Total 56 399 333 685 1,473
The information obtained has resulted in accurate documentation of ground truth for the
M57-Patents scenario for the three selected anti-forensic tools. For each disk image and
associated tool, an APXML document has been manually created which contains a metadata
representation of the unique digital artifacts associated with each anti-forensic tool. This
results in a machine-readable document to aid experimentation and system evaluation. These
generated reports have been made publicly available for other researchers and practitioners
to aid future development10.
10See: https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/Vestigium/tree/master/M57-GroundTruth
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7.2 M57-Patents Scenario: Effectiveness Testing and Results
This section presents the effectiveness results from public data testing using the M57-Patents
scenario. Firstly, the three created application profiles from the selected anti-forensic tools are
executed against the selected 13 interesting disk images from the M57-Patents scenario and ef-
fectiveness measured. Comparisons of file system matching and Registry matching success are
compared to de facto forensic analysis techniques to provide insight into system effectiveness.
Secondly, the three application profiles are executed against the remaining non-interesting
disk images (a total of 66) from the M57-Patents data set to determine potential false posi-
tive detection rates where all three anti-forensics tool are known to be absent. Thirdly, due
to the lack of uninstalled anti-forensic tools present in the initial experiments, an additional
test is conducted on an anti-forensic tool known to be installed and subsequently uninstalled
during the scenario. A newly created application profile for the XP Advanced Keylogger
tool is additionally used against the 19 disk images from the user Pat. This provides the
ability to evaluate the implemented system design using a longitudinal data set to determine
residual digital artifact detection. The results are compared against a similar research study
by Jones et al. (2015) that also performed testing using the M57-Patents scenario. The pro-
posed and implemented path normalisation technique is then investigated to determine the
effectiveness in regards to aiding file system path and Registry path correlation on different
Windows operating system versions. Finally, the Windows Registry processing technique,
specifically the CellXML-Registry tool, is analysed to determine effectiveness at repre-
senting the original Registry evidence source, as well as the ability to recover deleted Registry
entries. Comparisons are made to a similar solution by Nelson (2012), which also performed
testing using the M57-Patents scenario.
7.2.1 Detecting Anti-forensic Tools using Vestigium
The first experiment using the M57-Patents data set was conducted to determine the overall
effectiveness of the implemented system to detect the three selected anti-forensic tools, namely:
1) CCleaner; 2) Eraser; and 3) TrueCrypt. A total of 13 disk images from the M57-
Patents scenario were selected for testing as they were previously manually analysed and
deemed interesting, having at least one of the three selected anti-forensic tools installed (see
Table 7.5). Each disk image was used as input to the Vestigium tool.
Output from Vestigium indicated the presence of all three anti-forensic tools on at least
one of the selected disk images. The user Jo was found to have installed TrueCrypt on
2009-12-03 and the tool was present on Jo’s system until 2009-12-11 (the end of the scenario).
The user Terry was found to have installed CCleaner on 2009-12-08 and Eraser on 2009-
12-10 (again, both tools were present until the end of the scenario). These results indicate
successful detection of all anti-forensic tools on a total of 13 disk images from two users. Table
7.6 provides a high-level overview of the results from the M57-Patents scenario including the
user, operating system, date range of detected tools, count of the number of disk images with
anti-forensic tools, the tool detected and the application life cycle phases found.
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Table 7.6: High-level overview of Vestigium results for the M57-Patents scenario
User OS Dates Count Profile Detected Phases
Jo XP 12-03 to 12-11 8 TrueCrypt install, open, close
Terry Vista 12-08 to 12-11 5 CCleaner install, open, close
Terry Vista 12-10 to 12-11 3 Eraser install, open, close
In order to establish the overall performance of Vestigium, the 13 interesting forensic im-
ages were analysed further and findings reported in detail. The following subsections outline
and discuss the effectiveness of the implemented system divided into file system matching
effectiveness followed by Windows Registry matching effectiveness.
7.2.1.1 File System Matching Effectiveness
Matching file system entries incorporates the correlation of file system directories and data
files between the application profile(s) and the target data set. Table 7.7 displays the results
from file system matching for target disk images from the M57-Patents scenario. The disk
image name is provided with the associated application profile name and version number. The
four classifiers for digital artifacts are included: 1) True positive (tp); 2) True negative (tn);
3) False positive (fp); and 4) False negative (fn). The four prescribed effectiveness metrics
are also provided: 1) Precision (P); 2) Recall (R); 3) F1-measure (F1); and 4) Accuracy (A).
Further information regarding the digital artifact classification scheme is available in Section
4.3.4.2, effective metrics are outlined in Section 4.3.4 and score interpretation examples are
available in Section 6.2.6.
The overall results from file system matching indicate an effective system implementa-
tion in terms of automated detection of relevant file system entries. All 13 interesting disk
images were discovered to have file system entries uniquely associated with one of the three
anti-forensic tool profiles. For all 13 disk images a perfect precision score (1.00) was achieved,
meaning that no digital artifacts were incorrectly detected and reported to the user. This
means that Vestigium did not detect any digital artifacts that were not directly relevant to
the application profile and, ultimately, the associated anti-forensic tool. This is an excellent
result as there is no need for a practitioner to perform additional manual analysis on tool
output to determine correct and incorrect matches. The complete lack of false positive results
(perfect precision score) was achieved due to the refined and accurate contents of the created
application profiles. Data reduction techniques (see Section 6.4 and Section 6.5) proved ef-
fective at identifying and subsequently populating each application profile with only digital
artifacts deemed unique to the anti-forensic tool. This in turn resulted in a clean application
profile without erroneous entries. The matching methods implemented in Vestigium also
aided in returning no false positive rates. Matching multiple metadata properties has proven
effective at detecting relevant entries while those digital artifacts that are not a match are not
detected.
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Table 7.7: Effectiveness results for file system matching for the M57-Patents Scenario
Name Profile tp tn fp fn P R F1 A
jo-2009-12-03 TrueCrypt-7.1a 17 33485 0 1 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00
jo-2009-12-04 TrueCrypt-7.1a 17 33454 0 1 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00
jo-2009-12-07 TrueCrypt-7.1a 17 33434 0 1 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00
jo-2009-12-08 TrueCrypt-7.1a 17 33422 0 1 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00
jo-2009-12-09 TrueCrypt-7.1a 17 33326 0 1 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00
jo-2009-12-10 TrueCrypt-7.1a 17 35317 0 1 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00
jo-2009-12-11-001 TrueCrypt-7.1a 17 35341 0 1 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00
jo-2009-12-11-002 TrueCrypt-7.1a 17 35400 0 1 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00
terry-2009-12-08 CCleaner-5.09 50 118113 0 3 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00
terry-2009-12-09 CCleaner-5.09 50 118231 0 3 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00
terry-2009-12-10 CCleaner-5.09 50 118017 0 2 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-001 CCleaner-5.09 50 118019 0 1 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-002 CCleaner-5.09 50 117209 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
terry-2009-12-10 Eraser-6.2.0 3 118051 0 15 1.00 0.17 0.29 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-001 Eraser-6.2.0 2 118053 0 15 1.00 0.12 0.21 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-002 Eraser-6.2.0 2 117242 0 15 1.00 0.12 0.21 1.00
Average 1.00 0.80 0.84 1.00
Overall, the average recall score for all disk images was 0.80, meaning that 80% of all ground
truth digital artifacts were detected. For CCleaner and TrueCrypt recall was higher, an
average of 0.95, or 95% of the total digital artifacts. In contrast, the average recall for Eraser
was 0.14. This means that only 14% of the known ground truth digital artifacts were detected
(reasoning for this result is discussed below in detail). The overall average F1-measure score
was 0.84 and represents a balanced score of recall and precision. All accuracy scores achieved
a perfect score (1.00) as no digital artifacts were incorrectly classified by Vestigium which
would alter the accuracy score outcome.
The high recall score dictates that Vestigium was able to detect digital artifacts from
an application profile authored on a different operating system using a different anti-forensic
tool version. This was achieved by the functionality of Vestigium to correlate multiple
digital artifact properties (e.g., file system path, hash value, allocation status) and not relying
directly on the data file hash value for correlation. In addition, path normalisation proved
effective at detecting digital artifacts with a file system path that had slight variations between
the application profile and target data set (see Section 5.5.3.1). Listing 7.2 displays three
data files that were only detectable using the implemented path normalisation technique. In
each example the full path of the file system entry is displayed for both the target data set
(jo-2009-12-03.E01), the application profile (TrueCrypt-7.1a-6.1.7601.apxml)
and the associated normalised file system path. As displayed, there were variations between
each file system path for the target and application profile. However, in each case the file
path was able to be correlated using path normalisation. This technique resulted in providing
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a generalised value that is able to be correlated between different targets. A good example
of the flexibility of path normalisation was the ability to detect a file system path with an
embedded username (see the first example in the listing). A full analysis of path normalisation
effectiveness is presented later in Section 7.2.4.
Target Data Set: C:\Users\forensic\AppData\Roaming\TrueCrypt
Application Profile: C:\Documents and Settings\Jo\Application Data\TrueCrypt
Normalised Path: %APPDATA%/TrueCrypt
Target Data Set: C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Desktop\TrueCrypt.lnk
Application Profile: C:\Users\Public\Desktop\TrueCrypt.lnk
Normalised Path: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%/Desktop/TrueCrypt.lnk
Target Data Set: C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\TRUECRYPT.EXE-3A2A0F93.pf
Application Profile: C:\Windows\Prefetch\TRUECRYPT.EXE-009A2E5A.pf
Normalised Path: %PREFETCH%/TRUECRYPT.EXE.pf
Listing 7.2: Comparison of file system path differences between the target data set and
application profiles
CCleaner: The overall results for CCleaner showed a high recall and perfect precision score
(0.96 and 1.00 respectively). The results indicate the capability to detect the CCleaner tool
using an application profile authored on a different Windows-based operating system (Window
7 versus Windows XP). Furthermore, the CCleaner version was also different (version 5.09
versus version 2.26). As stated, these results were achievable due to the advanced digital
artifact matching methods and path normalisation implemented in the Vestigium tool. A
total of three file system entries (out of 53) were not detected in the target data set: 1) A
Windows Prefetch file with a different embedded application version number; 2) A Windows
Shortcut file that existed in the target data set but not in the application profile; and 3)
Another Windows Shortcut file that was stored in a different file system location. Both
Windows Shortcut file differences were caused by the way CCleaner created Shortcut files
between each application version. In CCleaner version 2.26, the Shortcut file was created for
the user who installed the application, while in version 5.09, the Shortcut file is automatically
created for every user (using the All Users user profile). An example of the varying normalised
file path for this scenario is displayed below.
Target Data Set: %USERPROFILE%/Desktop/CCleaner.lnk
Application Profile: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%/Desktop/CCleaner.lnk
Eraser: The overall results for Eraser showed a low recall score (average of 0.14). The
results were investigated and research conducted in an attempt to determine the cause of
the low scores. It was discovered that major changes to Eraser had occurred between
the version used for creating the application profile (version 6.2.0) versus the version on the
target data set (version 5.7.8). Basically, Eraser was rewritten between the two versions;
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version 5.7.8 was authored in Visual C++, while version 6.2.0 is authored in C# using the
.NET framework11. The dramatic changes to application redesign and operation resulted in a
considerable difference in digital artifacts created by the software. Ultimately, these changes
effected a low recall rate as the digital artifacts present in the application profile were not
present on the target data set. An additional experiment was conducted using an application
profile authored on Windows 7 using Eraser version 5.7.8. The results are displayed in Table
7.8.
Table 7.8: Overview of file system matching results for Eraser version 5.7.8
Name Profile tp tn fp fn P R F1 A
terry-2009-12-10.E01 Eraser-5.7.8 18 118051 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-001.E01 Eraser-5.7.8 17 118053 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-002.E01 Eraser-5.7.8 17 117242 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
The results from the newly authored Eraser profile using version 5.7.8 returned perfect scores
for recall and precision, 1.00 and 1.00 respectively. All file system entries were discovered in
each of the three data sets from the user Terry that were known to have Eraser installed
(established from ground truth data set information). Creating an application profile for
every application version is not feasible. However, in this case Eraser had undergone such
dramatic changes that the application could be classified as a different tool. Nevertheless, in
circumstances such as this, an application profile needs to be created for each tool version.
This is an excellent example of real-world application development and the impact it can have
on digital forensic techniques.
TrueCrypt: The overall results for TrueCrypt showed a high recall and perfect precision
scores, 0.94 and 1.00 respectively. Detailed investigation was performed to determine the only
digital artifact (out of 18) that was not detected, a Windows Prefetch file. The listing below
displays the actual and normalised file path for both the target data set file and application
profile file:
Target Data Set: C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\TRUECRYPT SETUP 6.3A.EXE-05F795CC.pf
Normalised path: %PREFETCH%/TRUECRYPT SETUP 6.3A.EXE.pf
Application Profile: C:\Windows\Prefecth\TRUECRYPT SETUP 7.1A.EXE-9732BAC6.pf
Normalised path: %PREFETCH%/TRUECRYPT SETUP 7.1A.EXE.pf
The comparison identifies that even with path normalisation, the Windows Prefetch file could
not be automatically detected due to the embedded version number in the anti-forensic tool
installer file (7.1a version 6.3a). The same problem was previously discovered and discussed for
CCleaner. Apart from the identified prefetch file all other file system entries for TrueCrypt
were detected correctly.
11The only reference found by the author regarding the changes made to Eraser development is available
from: http://eraser.heidi.ie/forum/threads/for-the-greater-good-of-eraser.4302/
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In summary, the results from file system matching dictate that the implemented system design
proved effective at detecting file system entries in a target data set. Furthermore, detection
was possible even where the application version and host operating system were different.
The variation between file system paths were observed and correlation achieved using path
normalisation. The only low score was the recall rate for Eraser. Investigation revealed
that the application had been completely rewritten and resulted in a considerable difference
between the tool versions and the digital artifacts created by each version. The following
subsection provides a comparison of file system entry detection to a similar solution, that is,
file hashing.
7.2.1.2 File System Matching Effectiveness Comparison: Hash Sets
The file system matching method presented in this research can be compared to the industry
standard forensic analysis technique to automate detection of known data files, namely: hash
analysis, also known as known file filtering (see Section 3.3.1). Hash analysis involves
generating a set of known interesting file hashes and comparing them to every data file on
the target data set. In this research the application profile has a hash value for every data
file known to be associated with each of the three anti-forensic tools. A list of hashes can be
extracted and used to compare to the target data set to attempt to identify entries of forensic
interest.
In order to practically accomplish this, a simple Python script was authored to ingest an
APXML document, create a set of known file hashes (known_md5s) and compare these to
all the data files on the target data set. Listing 7.3 displays the script used to locate hash
value matches.
# Import required Python modules
import sys, apxml, Objects
# Read Application Profile XML document
apxml_object = apxml.iterparse(sys.argv[1])
# Create a dictionary of known MD5 hashes from application profile
known_md5s = { f.md5: f
for f in apxml_object
if isinstance(f, Objects.FileObject) and
f.meta_type == 1 }
# Locate known files from target disk image
for (event, obj) in Objects.iterparse(sys.argv[2]):
if isinstance(obj, Objects.FileObject):
if (obj.md5 in known_md5s):
print(obj.filename, obj.md5)
Listing 7.3: Example of the script used to locate MD5 hash matches
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The authored script was executed against the same 13 interesting disk images from the M57-
Patents scenario. The results from testing revealed only a single data file was detected from
the TrueCrypt application profile; the same file was detected on 8 disk images, all from the
user Jo. The detected data file was deemed a true positive based on the ground truth data.
The following listing displays the file name (truncated due to length) and associated MD5
hash value of the discovered file.
File name: Start Menu/Programs/TrueCrypt/TrueCrypt Website.url
MD5 hash: 9cda3a91cf04824781bbebf415fe5211
Only one file (out of total of 455) was discovered due to the different versions of the anti-
forensic tool present on the M57-Patents scenario compared to the version used to create the
application profile (see Table 7.4). The solution presented in this research was able to detect
a total of 393 file system entries, while hash set analysis was only able to detect 8 file system
entries. Nevertheless, no false positives were detected from hash analysis and the only result
was the 8 occurrences of the same data file across 8 disk images. The one data file that was
detectable was because the file content did not change between tool versions, resulting in the
same hash value. As indicated by the results, this is not a common occurrence (based on the
tested applications) and will only happen when a file is not modified between versions.
The findings from performing a review comparing detection capabilities using hash analysis
clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of the system design implemented in this research. The
ability to detect a different application software version than that present on the target data
set is evident in the comparative results. Hash analysis fails to detect sufficient evidence.
This is important, as creating an application profile (or hash set) for every software version
is not feasible. The next stage in evaluating the effectiveness of the matching component of
the system design is Windows Registry matching.
7.2.1.3 Registry Matching Effectiveness
Matching Windows Registry entries incorporates the correlation of Registry keys and values
between the application profile(s) and the target data set. Table 7.9 displays the results from
Registry matching for target disk images from the M57-Patents scenario. The disk image
name is provided with the associated application profile name and version number. The four
digital artifacts classifiers are included (tp, tn, fp, fn) as well as the four effectiveness metrics
(P, R, F1, A).
The overall results from Registry matching indicate an effective system design to automate
detection of Windows Registry entries directly relevant to the selected anti-forensic tools. The
same 13 interesting disk images used for file system matching were identified to have Registry
entries from one of the three anti-forensic tool profiles. The results were very similar to those
achieved for file system matching. However, the average recall scores were lower: 0.72 for
Registry matching compared to 0.80 for file system matching. Once again, recall scores were
lowered by the inability to detect entries from Eraser, even though they were present on three
disk images from the user Terry. This was caused by the same problem faced in file system
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Table 7.9: Effectiveness results for Registry matching for the M57-Patents Scenario
Name Profile tp tn fp fn P R F1 A
jo-2009-12-03 TrueCrypt 34 290268 0 3 1.00 0.92 0.96 1.00
jo-2009-12-04 TrueCrypt 49 290523 0 5 1.00 0.91 0.95 1.00
jo-2009-12-07 TrueCrypt 49 290718 0 5 1.00 0.91 0.95 1.00
jo-2009-12-08 TrueCrypt 49 290732 0 5 1.00 0.91 0.95 1.00
jo-2009-12-09 TrueCrypt 49 291461 0 5 1.00 0.91 0.95 1.00
jo-2009-12-10 TrueCrypt 49 291555 0 6 1.00 0.89 0.94 1.00
jo-2009-12-11-001 TrueCrypt 49 291555 0 6 1.00 0.89 0.94 1.00
jo-2009-12-11-002 TrueCrypt 49 291702 0 6 1.00 0.89 0.94 1.00
terry-2009-12-08 CCleaner 33 206943 0 6 1.00 0.85 0.92 1.00
terry-2009-12-09 CCleaner 33 207279 0 6 1.00 0.85 0.92 1.00
terry-2009-12-10 CCleaner 33 207595 0 6 1.00 0.85 0.92 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-001 CCleaner 33 207608 0 6 1.00 0.85 0.92 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-002 CCleaner 33 208429 0 6 1.00 0.85 0.92 1.00
terry-2009-12-10 Eraser 0 207499 0 135 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-001 Eraser 0 207512 0 135 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-002 Eraser 0 208333 0 135 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Average 1.00 0.72 0.76 1.00
matching, in that Eraser was rewritten and the changes resulted in completely different
digital artifacts present in the application profile compared to the target data sets. Again,
a perfect precision score (1.00) was achieved for all tested disk images. The overall average
F1-measure score was 0.76, representing a harmonic mean of precision and recall scores.
A limitation of the Vestigium tool was discovered when attempting to match UserAssist
Registry values. Attempts were made to correlate UserAssist entries using path normalisation
for the full path and basename of Registry entries (see Section 5.5.3.1). However, problems
were discovered during M57-Patents testing due to discrepancies between the normalised
path properties. The following listing illustrates discrepancies between normalised Registry
entries from Windows XP and Windows 7. The first comparison displays differences in the
UserAssist key between Windows versions, while the second comparison displays differences
in the basename (the actual Registry value name) between Windows versions.
Example of UserAssist key path differences:
Windows XP: ...\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count
Windows 7: ...\UserAssist\{CEBFF5CD-ACE2-4F4F-9178-9926F41749EA}\Count
Example of UserAssist value name differences:
Windows XP: HRZR_EHACNGU:P:\Hfref\VRHfre\Qrfxgbc\ppfrghc226.rkr
Windows 7: P:\Hfref\VRHfre\Qrfxgbc\ppfrghc226.rkr
As illustrated, the UserAssist key varies between Windows XP and Windows 7; this is a hard-
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coded Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) value. Additionally, a Windows XP UserAssist value
name (basename) has a hard-coded prefix (HRZR_EHACNGU:), while a Windows 7 UserAssist
value name has no prefix. Both of these inconsistencies have been discovered in previous
research (Stevens, n.d.), but were not known to the author at the time of system design and
software development. Modifications can be made to the path normalisation implementation
(CellPathNormaliser.py) to resolve these problems and normalise the key path and value
names to allow correlation between Windows versions. A summary of findings for Windows
Registry matching for each tool is outlined in the following paragraphs.
CCleaner: The overall results for CCleaner showed a high recall score and perfect precision
score (0.85 and 1.00 respectively). This means that 85% of all Registry entries present in the
5 disk images where CCleaner was installed were correctly detected. However, a total of
six Registry entries (out of 39) were not detected correctly. One was a UserAssist Registry
value (as discussed above), while five other Registry entries were not discovered (not in the






Further investigation of the missing Registry entries concluded that the newer version of
CCleaner (version 5.09) did not create these entries when installing and were unique to
older versions of the application on the target data set (version 2.26). Therefore, this problem
was not caused by the Windows operating system version difference (Vista vs. 7), rather were
due to tool version differences and changes that have been made to the CCleaner tool.
Eraser: Similar to file system matching, the results for Eraser did not align with the other
anti-forensic tool results. A total 135 Registry entries were determined to be ground truth
for the Eraser tool, but none were detected during testing. It resulted in an average recall
score of 0.00 for all 3 disk images from the user Terry. As previously stated, this was caused
by a complete re-write of Eraser between versions 5.7.8 (present on the data set) and 6.2.0
(used for creating the application profile). An additional test was again conducted using the
new profile created for additional file system matching testing using Eraser version 5.7.8.
Table 7.10 displays the results from the newly created application profile.
Table 7.10: Overview of Windows Registry matching results for Eraser version 5.7.8
Name Profile tp tn fp fn P R F1 A
terry-2009-12-10 Eraser-5.7.8 132 117917 0 3 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-001 Eraser-5.7.8 132 118051 0 3 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-002 Eraser-5.7.8 132 117917 0 3 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
Average 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
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The results from the newly authored Eraser profile proved to be much more effective, with
a high recall score (0.98) and perfect precision score (1.00). A total of only three Registry
entries were not discovered (out of 135), all UserAssist Registry values. Each UserAssist entry
was not able to be detected due to the discrepancies between the versions of Windows for the
data set and application profile (as previously discussed).
TrueCrypt: The overall results from TrueCrypt showed a high recall and perfect precision
score (0.90 and 1.00 respectively). A total of six Registry entries were not detected (this
number varied based on the disk image date, see Table 7.9). Two were UserAssist entries,
present due to the problem detecting UserAssist keys on different Windows versions. The
other four were, in fact, only two Registry values that were twice present on the data set.
Two Registry entries were created by TrueCrypt version 6.3a that are not present in version
7.1a. A duplicate of each entry was discovered as both entries are present in the SYSTEM





The results of Windows Registry matching indicates an effective system implementation to
automate the detection of Registry entries using the authored application profiles. Again,
the system was effective when correlating Registry entries between different operating system
versions and anti-forensic tool versions. The very low score of the Eraser tool was attributed
to the tool being completely re-written between the tool version of the data sets and the tool
version used to create the application profile. Nevertheless, an average recall score of 0.72, or
72% of all relevant Registry entries was still discovered. If Eraser results are not included,
the recall score is increased to 0.88, or 88% of all possible Registry entries.
7.2.1.4 Registry Matching Effectiveness Comparison: Searching
There are no similar solutions available as a comparison for the detection of Registry entries.
The Vestigium tool extracts, processes and searches multiple hive files using previously
established known Registry entries (from the application profile). This is a reference set
solution. Existing forensic tools for Registry analysis do not perform such an examination,
rather they provide an interface for the user to carry out manual investigation by locating
known entries of interest; for example, an analyst can investigate values under the UserAssist
key to determine recently run applications or analyse the Users key to determine the last
user logon time. Normally, these keys are manually analysed using a Registry tool that have
a similar interface provided by the Microsoft Windows regedit utility. In contrast, this
research uses an automated metadata correlation searching function. Nevertheless, most of
the currently available Registry analysis tools do have a search function which provides the
ability to query Registry content using user-defined keywords.
Since the forensic analysis approach used in this research is fundamentally different to
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previous approaches it is difficult to perform a direct comparison to other solutions. However,
to provide a baseline to establish effectiveness, a comparison was conducted between the results
from this research solution and the use of keyword searching to identify relevant content. To
achieve this, the reglookup tool was used to parse Registry hive files and the output searched
using the grep tool. The keywords specified are case insensitive names of each anti-forensic




The Registry hive files were sourced from the output from Vestigium which had previously
extracted all hives from the 13 interesting target disk images. The following method provides
an example of the processing technique implemented. The reglookup tool is used to parse
each Registry hive file and produce a Comma Separated Value (CSV) file format written to
standard output. This output is redirected (using the pipe character), processed by grep and
keyword matching is performed. In the following example, the keyword truecrypt is searched
for and matches appended to a text file for later manual analysis.
$ reglookup m57_allhives\jo-2009-12-11-002\WINDOWS-system32-config-software ^
| grep -i -n truecrypt >> jo-2009-12-11-002_TC_matches.txt
The prescribed method was executed against the selected disk images. The output was man-
ually analysed and compared to the previously established ground truth information. Table
7.11 displays the results for the four prescribed information retrieval metrics.
The overall results for Registry keyword searching proved effective at detecting Registry
entries of forensic interest. The average recall score was 0.81, or 81% of all present Registry
entries that were correctly detected. A perfect precision score was achieved (1.00), meaning
no false positive results were detected and the F1-measure score was 0.87. In general, the
effectiveness metric results were high. The F1-measure score was higher for Registry keyword
searching (0.87) compared to the solution presented in this research (0.76). The lower score
for the results from this research was caused by the anomaly of the low recall scores for the
Eraser tool. This result reflects that differences in tool versions did not effect Registry key-
word searching results. When including the results from the revised Eraser profile (version
5.7.8), the average F1-measure score for this research then increased to 0.95, higher than that
achieved for the Registry keyword searching method (0.87).
It is proposed that the results from Registry keyword searching were high due to the
uniqueness of the keywords used. All three keywords (truecrypt, ccleaner and eraser) can be
considered unique; that is, it is unlikely that the keyword would appear on a default Windows
operating system installation or with Registry entries created by other application software
that may be installed on the system. This is a scenario that other application software may
not share; for example on a default Windows operating system install, a number of Registry
entries would most likely contain the microsoft office or simply office keywords, even when
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Table 7.11: Overview of Registry keyword search analysis on the M57-Patents scenario
Name Keyword tp tn fp fn P R F1 A
jo-2009-12-03 truecrypt 35 290302 0 1 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.00
jo-2009-12-04 truecrypt 54 290572 0 1 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
jo-2009-12-07 truecrypt 54 290767 0 1 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
jo-2009-12-08 truecrypt 54 290781 0 1 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
jo-2009-12-09 truecrypt 54 291510 0 1 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
jo-2009-12-10 truecrypt 54 291604 0 1 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
jo-2009-12-11-001 truecrypt 54 291604 0 1 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
jo-2009-12-11-002 truecrypt 54 291751 0 1 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
terry-2009-12-08 ccleaner 30 206976 0 9 1.00 0.77 0.87 1.00
terry-2009-12-09 ccleaner 30 207312 0 9 1.00 0.77 0.87 1.00
terry-2009-12-10 ccleaner 30 207628 0 9 1.00 0.77 0.87 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-001 ccleaner 30 207641 0 9 1.00 0.77 0.87 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-002 ccleaner 30 208462 0 9 1.00 0.77 0.87 1.00
terry-2009-12-10 eraser 54 207499 0 81 1.00 0.40 0.57 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-001 eraser 54 207512 0 81 1.00 0.40 0.57 1.00
terry-2009-12-11-002 eraser 54 208333 0 81 1.00 0.40 0.57 1.00
Average 1.00 0.81 0.87 1.00
the application is not installed. A further test is needed to prove this premise.
The ground truth data set (GT-01.RAW) from known data set testing was used to search
for a variety of anti-forensic tool names in an attempt to discover false positive Registry key-
word search results. The ground truth disk image was used as it contains a default Microsoft
Windows 7 operating system install, without any additional application software; meaning
that if an application keyword is detected, it can be assured that it is a false positive. The
same Registry keywords search technique was leveraged using the following keywords that rep-
resent either anti-forensic tools or other common application software names: putty, sdelete,
chrome, safari, office, microsoft office, perl and python.
Five out of eight keywords were detected on the ground truth image using the prescribed
software names, including: putty, sdelete, office, microsoft office and perl. The number of
results for each keyword varied. The listing below highlights some interesting keyword search
results, where the keyword is in bold face (all Registry paths have the root key removed).




The results indicate that Registry keyword searching does have limitations for detection of
anti-forensic tools as well as other application software. Ultimately, the solution is not as
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robust as the system implementation in this research, because the system design herein detects
Registry entries using multiple metadata properties, providing a more reliable and accurate
correlation method.
7.2.2 False Positive Detection Rate using Vestigium
An effective system design and implementation has been established for detecting anti-forensic
tool presence from known interesting disk images from the M57-Patents scenario; that is, disk
images that are known to have at least one of the selected anti-forensic tools installed on
them. All the results presented thus far show a perfect precision score (1.00), meaning that
no false positive digital artifacts were erroneously detected. However, experimental testing
was only conducted for 13 interesting disk images from the M57-Patents scenario, while there
are a total of 79 disk images available in the data set. The next stage in experimental testing
using the M57-Patents scenario is to again execute the Vestigium tool, this time against
the remaining 66 disk images available to determine if any false positive digital artifacts are
detected. Since ground truth has already been established (see Section 7.1.3), any digital
artifact detected on the non interesting disk images can be classified as a false positive result.
Table 7.12 displays the results from file system matching using Vestigium against the
remaining 66 non-interesting disk images. The same four digital artifact classifiers are pro-
vided (tp, tn, fp, fp). However, effectiveness metrics are not included as true positive and
false negative detection are absent, both of which are required for the specified metrics. Due
to space restrictions, the name column provides a range of disk images where false positives
were detected; for example, terry-2009-11-19 to terry-2009-12-11-002 represents a total of 15
disk images from the user Terry during that date range.
Table 7.12: Cumulated false positive results for file system matching using the non-interesting
M57-Patents scenario disk images
Name Profile tp tn fp fn
terry-2009-11-19 to CCleaner 0 2,188,432 30 0
terry-2009-12-11-002
Testing file system matching against the remaining non-interesting disk image resulted in
detection of a total of 30 false positive matches, all from the user Terry. These matches
stemmed from two false positive data files which were detected on a total of 15 different
disk images, ranging from 2009-11-19 to 2009-12-11. Both false positive files were from the
CCleaner application profile. An example of the file system path for both erroneously
detected data files are displayed below:
Windows/Prefetch/AU_.EXE-746367D6.pf
Users/terry/AppData/Local/Temp/~nsu.tmp
Further investigation regarding the detected false positives was performed and discovered
that both data files could be attributed to the Nullsoft Install System (NSIS), an
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open source system to create application installers for Microsoft Windows systems12. Further
analysis revealed that CCleaner used the NSIS tool to build the tool installer and was
therefore included in the application profile. However, numerous other applications also use
the NSIS tool to package installer files and was, therefore, discovered on additional systems
from the M57-Patents scenario. Manual analysis could not determine the exact application
which created the two false positive data files on Terry’s system. However, a collection of well
known applications use the NSIS system including Mozilla for Firefox, Thunderbird and
FileZilla, as well as the Open Office suite and Flickr Uploader application13.
Analysis of the non-interesting disk images was also examined in terms of Registry artifact
matching. Table 7.13 displays the results from Registry matching using Vestigium against
the remaining 66 non-interesting disk images. Again, the same digital artifact classifiers are
provided, effectiveness metrics not included and the name column provides a range of disk
images where false positives were detected.
Table 7.13: Cumulated false positive results for Registry matching using the non-interesting
M57-Patents scenario disk images
Name Profile tp tn fp fn
charlie-2009-11-12 to CCleaner 0 5,535,932 38 0
charlie-2009-12-11
jo-2009-11-12 to CCleaner 0 1,989,885 14 0
jo-2009-12-20-oldComputer
pat-2009-11-12 to CCleaner 0 5,485,186 38 0
pat-2009-12-11
Total 0 13,011,003 90 0
As witnessed in the false positive results from file system matching, the erroneously detected
Registry entries were, again, from the CCleaner tool. No other false positives were detected
from either Eraser or TrueCrypt. The listing below displays the two Registry keys that
were detected on a total of 45 different disk images from the M57-Patents scenario.
SOFTWARE\Google
SOFTWARE\Google\No Toolbar Offer Until
Investigation revealed that the two Registry keys are related to the Google Chrome web
browser which is bundled with the CCleaner tool. During installation of CCleaner, the
user is presented with the option to also install the Chrome browser. During application profile
creation, the input box for installing Chrome was unselected and, consequently, resulted in
the two Registry keys being created. The reasoning for the Registry key appearing in systems
without CCleaner installed is that the entry is not specific to the tool. Other applications




Overall, a low number of false positive results were detected when testing included all 79 disk
images from the M57-Patents scenario. Of the interesting disk image no false positives were
detected during experimental testing. However, four unique digital artifacts were discovered
when testing the remaining 66 non-interesting disk images. Two data files and two Registry
keys were found, both from the CCleaner tool. It should be noted that the resultant false
positive digital artifacts are not an issue with Vestigium, rather they are digital artifacts
included in the application profile which are not unique to the anti-forensic tool.
All four entries were manually removed from the CCleaner profile. However, this issue
has a simple automated solution. The LiveDiff static blacklist was updated to include all
four discovered false positive results so that any additionally created profiles would not include
these entries. Nevertheless, this result provides further evidence of potential difficulties in
identification of unique and relevant digital artifacts during application profile creation. Such
issues, however, can be solved and overcome by the robust design and functionality of the
LiveDiff tool.
7.2.3 Detecting Residual Digital Artifacts using Vestigium
The results presented thus far have evaluated the functionality to correlate digital artifact
metadata to enable automated detection of anti-forensic tools on a target data set using
application profiles. However, a limitation of the experimental testing presented in Section
7.2.1 is centred around the lack of residual digital artifacts; for example, file system or Registry
entries that are associated with the uninstallation phase of the application life cycle. This
is because each anti-forensic tool was found to be installed (specifically: installed, opened
and closed) during the course of the M57-Patents scenario, but none were uninstalled. This
means no results were found to realise the capability to detect deleted, or residual, digital
artifacts. This is important to evaluate as a suspect may have carried out a malicious action
with a tool, then uninstalled the tool in an attempt to remove the evidence of this activity.
Therefore, additional testing is required to investigate this context.
The primary requirement for additional testing is, therefore, to select and perform de-
tection of an anti-forensic tool (or another application software type) known to be installed
and then removed from a system (uninstalled) at some point during the scenario. In previous
research, Jones et al. (2015) investigated past activity of application software from partial dig-
ital artifacts using the M57-Patents scenario as one of the testing data sets. More specifically,
the authors performed block hashing of data files uniquely associated with an application and
attempted to detect the same blocks in the disk images from the M57-Patents scenario. An
experiment outlined in the research investigated the presence and persistence after uninstal-
lation of an anti-forensic tool named XP Advanced Keylogger, a keylogger tool produced
by XP Tools. The results presented by Jones et al. (2015) illustrated that XP Advanced
Keylogger had been installed by the user Pat on 2009-12-03 and subsequently uninstalled
on 2009-12-07. After uninstallation, there were still four days remaining in the scenario and
a disk image was captured for each of these days. This provides an excellent experimental
testing scenario to determine the effectiveness of the solution implemented in this research to
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detect deleted digital artifacts using metadata correlation.
The creation of a new application profile for the XP Advanced Keylogger tool now
follows with a brief overview of the testing methodology to be used. Testing will be performed
using the new application profile against selected disk images of the user Pat from the M57-
Patents scenario.
7.2.3.1 Application Profile Creation: XP Advanced Keylogger
Detecting residual and deleted artifacts using Vestigium on selected disk images of the
M57-Patents scenario required a new application profile to be authored for the XP Advanced
Keylogger tool. The tool installer was sourced with the following details:
• Tool name: XP Advanced Keylogger
• Tool version: 2.1
• Installer file name: xpadvancedkeylogger.exe
• Installer MD5 hash value: f53bafd255f5505f5350fd91b97e0664
For reasons of simplicity, the remainder of this section uses the term XP Keylogger to refer
to the XP Advanced Keylogger tool. The finalised application profile creation method
was implemented (see Section 6.5.1 and Section 6.5.3). To reiterate, this involved creating
five application profiles with dynamic and static blacklisting enabled, performing application
profile intersection using the five profiles as input and finally a manual review to assess profile
contents. Table 7.14 displays a summary of the application profile created for XP Keylogger
including counts for each digital artifact type, the time (in seconds) to create all five profiles
used for intersection and the final file size of the application profile in kilobytes (KB).
Table 7.14: Overview of the application profile created for XP Keylogger
Tool Dirs Files Keys Values Total Time File size
XP Keylogger 9 54 574 687 1,321 472 1,530 KB
The output from application profile creation was a new APXML document to represent the
digital artifacts uniquely associated with the XP Keylogger tool. The efficiency of the
application profile creation method using LiveDiff was evident when generating this new
profile, taking 472 seconds, or just under 8 minutes, to create all five profiles. The profiles were
ingested to the APXMLIntersection.py script which resulted in a finalised application
profile ready for testing. The real-world elapsed time was measured which resulted in a
total time of 14 minutes to create a finalised application profile for the XP Keylogger
tool. This includes starting virtual machines, performing data collection using LiveDiff
and performing post-processing tasks including profile intersection. Full application profile
metadata contents are provided in Appendix C.7.
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7.2.3.2 Testing Methodology
The experimental testing method used to investigate residual digital artifacts follows the same
process as specified for all M57-Patent scenario testing (see Section 7.1.2). The Vestigium
tool is used to correlate digital artifacts between the target data set and application pro-
file(s). In this experiment, only the XP Keylogger profile was used as input. Following the
information specified by Jones et al. (2015), the selected disk images from the M57-Patents
scenario are a total of 19 disk images from the user Pat which have the Microsoft Windows
XP operating system installed.
7.2.3.3 Residual Digital Artifact Detection Results
Table 7.15 presents an overview of the results from residual digital artifact detection on the
19 disk images from the user Pat from the M57-Patents scenario. Only disk images with one
or more detected digital artifacts are displayed, a total of seven disk images. The disk image
name is provided with the accompanying application profile name and the four digital artifacts
classifiers are included (tp, tn, fp, fn) as well as the four effectiveness metrics (P, R, F1, A).
To reiterate, previous research states that XP Keylogger was installed on 2009-12-03 and
uninstalled before the disk image was collected on 2009-12-07 (Jones et al., 2015).
Table 7.15: Overview of file system (top) and Registry (bottom) matching for XP Keylogger
on Pat’s disk images from the M57-Patents scenario
Name Profile tp tn fp fn P R F1 A
pat-2009-12-03 XPKeylogger-2.1 27 40296 0 3 1.00 0.90 0.95 1.00
pat-2009-12-04 XPKeylogger-2.1 27 40279 0 3 1.00 0.90 0.95 1.00
pat-2009-12-07 XPKeylogger-2.1 9 44364 0 25 1.00 0.26 0.41 1.00
pat-2009-12-08 XPKeylogger-2.1 9 44371 0 25 1.00 0.26 0.41 1.00
pat-2009-12-09 XPKeylogger-2.1 7 44441 0 27 1.00 0.21 0.35 1.00
pat-2009-12-10 XPKeylogger-2.1 7 44398 0 27 1.00 0.21 0.35 1.00
pat-2009-12-11 XPKeylogger-2.1 7 44402 0 27 1.00 0.21 0.35 1.00
Average 1.00 0.42 0.54 1.00
pat-2009-12-03 XPKeylogger-2.1 625 286133 0 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
pat-2009-12-04 XPKeylogger-2.1 626 285795 0 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
pat-2009-12-07 XPKeylogger-2.1 383 287322 0 283 1.00 0.58 0.73 1.00
pat-2009-12-08 XPKeylogger-2.1 383 287299 0 283 1.00 0.58 0.73 1.00
pat-2009-12-09 XPKeylogger-2.1 32 287809 0 634 1.00 0.05 0.10 1.00
pat-2009-12-10 XPKeylogger-2.1 32 287994 0 634 1.00 0.05 0.10 1.00
pat-2009-12-11 XPKeylogger-2.1 32 288088 0 634 1.00 0.05 0.10 1.00
Average 1.00 0.47 0.54 1.00
The results from residual digital artifact detection provides significant insight to the effective-
ness of the implemented system to detect deleted and residual digital artifacts from application
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software using a metadata correlation approach. The findings confirm that XP Keylogger
was installed by the user Pat on 2009-12-03 and subsequently uninstalled on 2009-12-07.
These dates correspond with the results reported by Jones et al. (2015). The following dis-
cussion details the results of the longitudinal analysis of Pat’s disk image starting with the
installation of XP Keylogger until the end of the M57-Patents scenario.
pat-2009-12-03: The XP Keylogger tool was installed. A total of 27 file system entries
and 625 Registry entries were detected. Vestigium returned matches for install, open and
close application life cycle phases. Therefore, the tool had been installed and executed by the
user Pat. Registry entries were discovered in Pat’s NTUSER.DAT hive file to support that
Pat (or someone using Pat’s user account) executed the tool.
pat-2009-12-04: XP Keylogger is still present on Pat’s system. A MUICache Registry
entry was detected indicating the tool was executed again on this date.
pat-2009-12-07: The XP Keylogger tool was uninstalled. A total of 9 file system
entries still remained on the system. However, only one was found to be in an unallocated
state, meaning that almost all metadata linking the deleted file system entries had already
been overwritten by new data. This means that 8 of the file system entries were residual (not
removed during uninstallation and still in an allocated state in the file system). A Windows
Prefetch file (TOOLKEYLOGGER.EXE-2986F3DF.pf) was still present. The tool licensing
component also still existed in the Windows system32 directory.
A total of 383 Registry were detected. Of these, 351 were found in an unallocated state
(deleted) which demonstrates the functionality of the system (CellXML-Registry) to de-
tect deleted Registry artifacts. An additional 32 residual Registry entries were detected, 31
allocated entries in the SOFTWARE hive file and one MUICache entry in Pat’s NTUSER.DAT
hive file. These 32 residual entries were not removed by the tool uninstaller.
pat-2009-12-08: One day after uninstallation of the XP Keylogger tool. Results found
that the same number of file system and Registry entries were present. This shows that
residual digital artifacts persist in the file system and Registry a day after tool uninstallation,
even with the user performing regular daily activities.
pat-2009-12-09: Two days after tool uninstallation. The Windows Prefetch file and
one unallocated file ($OrphanFiles/Password.gif) no longer exist in the file system
metadata. The tool licensing component is still present and still in an allocated state. It
appears that the tool uninstaller does not remove these entries. A total of seven file system
entries are still detected. All previously detected unallocated Registry entries (a total of 351)
are no longer recoverable. The residual 32 Registry entries are still present on the system,
again, the tool uninstaller appears to not remove these entries correctly. One UserAssist
Registry entry still exists in the NTUSER.DAT hive file for the user Pat. This is remaining
evidence that the tool was executed by the user.
pat-2009-12-10 to pat-2009-12-11-002: Three to five days after tool uninstal-
lation. The same residual file system and Registry entries still exist that were recorded on
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2009-12-09. These entries are still allocated and will remain on the system until manually
deleted by a user.
The longitudinal analysis of the XP Keylogger tool on the disk images from the user Pat
has resulted in useful and interesting findings. Vestigium was able to detect deleted (unallo-
cated) and residual (remained after uninstallation) digital artifacts. Detection of unallocated
Registry entries was only possible using the CellXML-Registry tool authored specifically
for this research. However, the findings from the experiment indicate that the life span of
unallocated Registry entries can be short, in this case two days of normal system activity. The
life span of the file system metadata can be even shorter. Only one unallocated file system
entry was detected using file system metadata, even though it is highly likely that residual
fragments still exist. Results presented by Jones et al. (2015) support this premise, where
some data file fragments were still able to be detected after unsintallation.
In this experiment it was also noted that the tool uninstaller failed to delete all file system
and Registry entries associated with the tool. A collection of file system and Registry entries
remained in an allocated state even after uninstallation for the remainder of the scenario,
five days after tool uninstallation. These entries will remain until manually removed by the
user, an event which may be unlikely to occur. Overall, the results obtained are potentially
useful evidence in a digital investigation. The Vestigium tool provided evidential proof that
XP Keylogger was installed and executed on a specific date, linked a specific user account
with the tool (through the NTUSER.DAT hive file), was able to detect unallocated entries
indicating the tool was uninstalled on a specific date and was able to detect residual digital
artifacts that remained five days after tool uninstallation. All of these findings are extremely
useful in practice when determining application software usage in a digital investigation.
Comparison to a similar study, that by Jones et al. (2015), is next conducted as it is
advantageous to determine the effectiveness of the implemented system design when compared
to other forensic analysis methods.
7.2.3.4 Comparison of Findings to Jones et al. (2015)
To establish the relative effectiveness of the implemented system design a comparison should
be made to similar approaches to automate detection of digital artifacts from application
software. A comparison of findings to perform residual digital artifact detection is therefore
conducted between this research solution (which uses a metadata matching approach) and the
research conducted by Jones et al. (2015) (which uses a binary block-based hashing matching
approach).
Figure 7.1 illustrates the results obtained in this research when compared to a similar
research solution presented by Jones et al. (2015)14. Each disk image from the user Pat is
shown with the corresponding percentage of the profile contents that were detected. The
three different results are: 1) The percentage of the application profile entries detected for
14The purpose of Figure 7.1 is to display the overall trend resulting from testing. Results from this research
are available in Table 7.15. Also, see Jones et al. (2015) for additional details
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this research (blue); 2) The percentage of detected blocks from Jones et al. (2015) (orange);
and 3) The percentage of detected files from Jones et al. (2015) (green). All results are
presented based on the percentage of the application profile (or reference set) detected for all
experimental tests; that is, the proportion of the entries in the profile which were detected on
the target data set. The results are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Figure 7.1: Longitudinal detection capabilities for XP Keylogger on the M57-Patents sce-
nario for the user Pat. Results are presented for the Vestigium tool and compared against
findings from Jones et al. (2015) including sector and file percentages
According to Jones et al. (2015), the created profile for XP Keylogger contained a total of
23 data files comprised of 4,716 blocks, each 512 bytes in length. Thus, the profile has 4,716
block hashes generated using the MD5 hashing algorithm. As displayed, the XP Keylogger
tool was detected on pat-2009-12-03 with approximately 83% matching blocks, and 67% of
the files in the profile.
The results of the solution used in this current research discovered approximately 99% of
all profile contents including 27 file system entries (directories and data files) and 625 Registry
entries (keys and values). This is a total of 652 digital artifacts. Compared to only 23 data
files of the Jones et al. (2015) project, the number detected in the solution for this research is a
much higher number of unique application software artifacts. The research and findings from
Jones et al. (2015) reported similar results for the next day (2009-12-04) as those observed
for 2009-12-03.
All results correspond with the XP Keylogger tool being uninstalled on 2009-12-07. It
resulted in a decrease in detected digital artifacts for this research, as well as a decrease in
detected blocks and file percentage for the similar solution. This is expected, as data was
deleted and subsequently overwritten by new data making 100% recovery highly unlikely.
However, both studies continued to report detection of residual evidence. Regarding the
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pat-2009-12-07 disk image, this research solution detected 56% of the profile contents with
most digital artifacts discovered in an unallocated (or deleted) state. The results from Jones
et al. (2015) show a similar decrease in detection rates, approximately 20% of sectors were
recovered, and 39% of files were detected.
Results from the next disk image (pat-2009-12-08) illustrates a continual decrease in de-
tected digital artifacts. However, on the following day in the scenario (pat-2009-12-09) a
dramatic decrease was found in this research solution (dropping to 5.6% detection), and sec-
tor recovery for Jones et al. (2015) dropping to approximately 0.5%. Interestingly, the file
percentage detected for Jones et al. (2015) maintained an approximate 35% of detected files
for the remainder of the disk images from the scenario. However, it is also evident that
the percentage of detected files is skewed by false positive prevalence. Between the dates of
pat-2009-11-12 to pat-2009-12-02 (a total of 11 disk images) the file percentage detected was
approximately 4-5%. This is seen in Figure 7.1 between the date 2009-11-12 and 2009-12-
01. As the XP Keylogger was not present on the system between these dates, it can be
concluded that these are false positive results, thus, incorrectly increasing file detection rates
by around 4-5% for all dates. Unfortunately, the raw data is unavailable to either prove, or
disprove, this premise.
A further analysis was conducted on the final disk image from the user Pat from the
M57-Patents scenario (disk image name: pat-2009-12-11). The selected disk image was
collected five days after XP Keylogger was uninstalled. For this disk image Jones et al.
(2015) detected 8 out of the 23 data files in their profile. However, out of the total 4,716
block hashes only 24 were discovered (a sector detection rate of 0.51%). Furthermore, the
file detection percentage was 34.78% which means at least one sector was discovered from a
total of 8 out of 24 files. Given a false positive file detection rate of 4–5% on dates without
XP Keylogger present, this could mean a lower detection rate of approximately 30% or ap-
proximately 20 sector hashes. In comparison, the solution presented in this research detected
7 data files as compared to 8. Furthermore, a total of 32 residual Registry artifacts were also
detected on the last disk image from the user Pat. Given the nil false positive rate of the
solution implemented in this research, it can be concluded that each detected digital artifact
(total of 37) is a true positive and, ultimately, a correctly recovered residual digital artifact.
Overall, both solutions were able to detect the presence of the XP Keylogger tool, before
and after uninstallation. The solution presented in this research yielded a much higher count
of relevant digital artifacts as it also incorporates four digital artifacts type (directories, data
files, Registry keys and values) in comparison to Jones et al. (2015) which only includes data
files. Block hashing can only be used for data files and does not encompass other digital
artifact types.
An in-depth longitudinal analysis of the detection of anti-forensic tool persistence after
uninstallation together with a comparison to a similar solution has hereby been provided.
Findings that are relevant to the effectiveness of the path normalisation technique imple-
mented in this research to aid digital artifact metadata matching now follows.
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7.2.4 Effectiveness of Path Normalisation Technique
The system design proposed the use of path normalisation to transform the full path, or
absolute path, of file system and Windows Registry entries into a generalised value (see
Section 5.5.3.1). The goal of path normalisation was to improve digital artifact matching
effectiveness in complex matching scenarios; for example, detecting file system entries with
a variable username or detecting Windows Registry entries that have variations between
Microsoft Windows versions. Results have suggested that path normalisation has proved
effective at aiding detection of digital artifacts on a different Windows operating system
version than that of the created application profile (see Section 7.2.1). However, a targeted and
thorough analysis of the designed and implemented path normalisation technique is required
to determine overall effectiveness.
Thus far, path normalisation proved effective at detecting digital artifacts with a file
system path that had slight variations between the application profile and target data set; for
example, the following listing displays the full path of a file system directory from the target
data set (jo-2009-12-03), application profile (TrueCrypt) and the normalised equivalent
of both file system paths.
Target Data Set: C:\Documents and Settings\Jo\Application Data\TrueCrypt
Application Profile: C:\Users\forensic\AppData\Roaming\TrueCrypt
Normalised Path: %APPDATA%/TrueCrypt
In the above example, a file system path match was only achieved by the implementation
of path normalisation. In this example, path normalisation removed the variable username
value (Jo vs. forensic) and transformed the user profile path difference between Windows
XP (C:\Documents and Settings) and Windows 7 (C:\Users). The final result was
a transformed path value (%APPDATA%/TrueCrypt).
In-depth analysis of path normalisation to determine the effectiveness of the implemented
solution for both file system and Windows Registry entries will be carried out using two
selected disk images from the M57-Patents scenario: 1) jo-2009-12-11-002; and 2) terry-2009-
12-11-002. The two disk images chosen for testing have each of the three selected anti-forensic
tools installed and provide the ability to test digital artifact detection using the original actual
path from the application profile and the normalised path from the target data set. The
code was derived and modified from the Vestigium tool to perform this testing scenario. Two
Python scripts were authored for additional testing: 1) FSPathDetection.py to detect
file system entries using the filename and filename_norm metadata properties; and 2)
REGPathDetection.py to detect Registry entries using the cellpath, cellpath with
the root key removed, and cellpath_norm metadata properties. Both scripts are available
in Appendix D.2.
7.2.4.1 Path Normalisation Results for File System Entries
The findings from testing path normalisation effectiveness for file system entries discovered
variable results for each anti-forensic tool. However, in all instances an increased number of
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detected file system paths was observed.
Table 7.16 displays the comparison of results for path normalisation effectiveness for the
two selected disk images from the M57-Patents scenario. The disk image name and associated
anti-forensic tool profile are displayed including the number of actual (non-normalised) file
system paths detected, the number of normalised file system paths detected and the percentage
increase of path detection when normalisation is implemented.
Table 7.16: Overview of file system path detection rates using actual versus normalised path
for selected M57-Patents scenario disk images
Name Tool Actual Normalised % Increase
jo-2009-12-11-002 TrueCrypt-7.1a 8 17 112.50
terry-2009-12-11-002 CCleaner-5.09 46 51 10.87
terry-2009-12-11-002 Eraser-5.7.8 14 17 21.43
All tested anti-forensic tools showed an increase in detection rates using file path normalisa-
tion. However, the results were variable for each tool. Analysis of all file system entries from
each application profile revealed that the variable results were caused by the differences in
anti-forensic tool operation; that is, the file system entries created.
Some tools created more file paths (a total of 9) which had variable user content; for exam-
ple, TrueCrypt created a high number of file system paths with file paths that had an embed-
ded variable username value (e.g., C:\Users\forensic\AppData\Roaming\TrueCrypt,
where forensic is the variable username content). Therefore, for TrueCrypt, a higher num-
ber of file system paths were detected with path normalisation when compared to detection
using the actual file path. In contrast, CCleaner created very few (a total of 5) file system
entries with variable user content. Similar trends were observed for Eraser, which only had
3 file system entries with variable user content.
The differences showed varying results for each tool, with a percentage increase of detec-
tion using path normalisation that ranged from approximately 10% for CCleaner to 112%
for TrueCrypt. In addition to variable user content, path normalisation also detected one
Windows Prefetch file for each anti-forensic tool by removing the variable file name suffix.
Listing 7.4 displays the additional file system paths that were only detectable using path nor-
malisation (duplicates have been removed and all paths are displayed after path normalisation
was performed on the actual path value).
The results from path normalisation for file system entries indicate an effective design
and implementation. This was observed in the increase of the number of detectable file sys-
tem paths that would not have been matched without path normalisation. One interesting
scenario, not witnessed in public data set testing of path normalisation, was the introduc-
tion of variations to the Windows Program Files directory. On Microsoft Windows 64-bit
systems, an additional Program Files (x86) directory is provided to store 32-bit appli-
cations running on a 64-bit system. Path normalisation included functionality to convert both
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Program Files directory naming conventions to the normalised value of %PROGRAMFILES%.
However, this scenario was not evident in the M57-Patents scenario as all systems were run-
ning 32-bit operating systems. Additional analysis was performed to investigate this situation
and it was discovered that all three anti-forensic tools would install application information
into the Program Files (x86) directory if installed on a 64-bit system. In this event, us-
ing the actual file system path for detection would not detect any file system entries because
the entries that were detected without path normalisation were all located in the Program
Files directory. This result highlights the success of file system path normalisation, a so-
lution that provides the functionality to match file system paths with variable user content
and variable path locations that differ between a Windows operating system version (e.g.,

















Listing 7.4: List of additional file system paths detected using path normalisation
7.2.4.2 Path Normalisation Results for Registry Entries
Similar to the results from path normalisation for file system entries, the findings from testing
path normalisation effectiveness for Registry entries discovered variable results for each anti-
forensic tool. Again, for all tools it was observed that path normalisation resulted in an
increased detection rate. This was due to two Registry path variables: 1) Windows Registry
root key values which vary for different Windows operating system versions; and 2) Variables
in Registry paths due to user-specific content as well as differences in Registry path between
Windows versions. The following listing reiterates the differences in the root key for the





Given the Registry hive root key differences, it is not possible to perform a comparison
equality check for the same Registry entry on different operating system versions. Therefore,
path normalisation effectiveness testing performed matched Registry path entries using three
techniques:
• The actual path (cellpath) without normalisation
• The actual path (cellpath) with the root key removed
• A fully normalised path (cellpath_norm) as implemented in Vestigium
Table 7.17 displays an overview of results from Registry path normalisation. The disk image
name and anti-forensic tool name are displayed. The count of detected actual paths, the actual
paths with the root key removed and a fully normalised path are displayed. The percentage
increase in detection rate between a path with the root key removed to a fully normalised
path is also provided.
Table 7.17: Overview of Registry path normalisation results for selected M57-Patents scenario
disk images
Actual Root key Normalised Percentage
Name Tool path removed path increase
jo-2009-12-11-002 TrueCrypt 0 19 49 157.89
terry-2009-12-11-002 CCleaner 0 28 34 21.43
terry-2009-12-11-002 Eraser 0 100 132 32.00
The results discovered that not a single Registry entry was able to be detected using the
actual Registry path from the application profile. This is because the operating system ver-
sion on the target data set (Windows XP and Vista) is different from the application profile
(Windows 7). This means a different root key was present in every Registry path and ul-
timately resulted in no detected entries being made. When the root key was removed (i.e.,
stripping $$$PROTO.HIV from the Registry path) a number of Registry entries were able
to be detected. This is a similar technique to how fiwalk represents file system paths, by
removing the Windows drive letter (e.g., C:\) from the file path. When comparing root key
removal to fully normalised Registry paths, full path normalisation detected an average of
70% more entries. This demonstrates the effectiveness of path normalisation for detecting
Registry entries between operating system versions. However, variable results were again re-
ported for each anti-forensic tool with the percentage increase ranging from approximately
21% for CCleaner to 157% for TrueCrypt. This is similar to the results from file path nor-
malisation caused by more user-specific content in the TrueCrypt application. Furthermore,
TrueCrypt had a high number of ControlSet entries which were not detectable without
normalisation. A total of 30 additional Registry entries were detected from the SYSTEM
Registry hive under one of the ControlSet keys. All entries were unable to be detected
without path normalisation as the application profile had a different ControlSet key name
compared to the target data set, as seen in the following listing.
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Target Data Set: $$$PROTO.HIV\ControlSet001\enum\root\LEGACY_TRUECRYPT
Application Profile: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\enum\root\LEGACY_TRUECRYPT
Normalised Path: system\%controlset%\enum\root\legacy_truecrypt
An interesting result from CCleaner was a collection of Registry entries from the shell
Registry sub-key and the Registry values it stores. Six additional Registry paths were de-
tected using full normalisation due to case inconsistencies between different operating system
versions. The target data set (Windows Vista) represents shell Registry values in sentence
case (Shell), while the application profile (Windows 7) represents the same sub-key in lower
case (shell). A similar case inconsistency was discovered in the Eraser results for the
ShellEx Registry key. Path normalisation solved both these inconsistencies by converting
the Registry key path to lower case which is possible because Registry key paths are case
insensitive (discussed in Section 5.5.3.1). The listing below displays examples of the two case
inconsistency scenarios witnessed, and specify the path for the target data set, application
profile and the resultant normalised path (some Registry entries have been truncated due to
length).
Target Data Set: Classes\CLSID\{645FF0 ... 2F954E}\Shell\Run CCleaner
Application Profile: Classes\CLSID\{645FF0 ... 2F954E}\shell\Run CCleaner
Normalised Path: classes\clisd\{645FF0 ... 2F954E}\shell\Run CCleaner
Target Data Set: Classes\Folder\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\Erasext
Application Profile: Classes\Folder\ShellEx\ContextMenuHandlers\Erasext
Normalised Path: classes\folder\shellex\contextmenyhandlers\Erasext
7.2.4.3 Discussion of Path Normalisation Results
The overall results from path normalisation effectiveness has demonstrated and evaluated
the capabilities of path normalisation to aid in automated detection of file system paths as
well as Registry paths. The implementation of path normalisation was able to transform
full path values to a generalised value and remove user-specific information, inconsistencies
between operating versions and inconsistencies between operating system platform (system
architecture).
In terms of file system entries, an average detection rate increase of 48% was achieved using
path normalisation. The results for TrueCrypt were generally higher as the tool stores more
application configuration data in user directories, all of which require normalisation to remove
user-specific information. However, all tested anti-forensic tools benefited from performing
path normalisation. Additionally, path normalisation provided the functionality to detect
Windows Prefetch files which would have been undetectable without removing the variable
file name suffix.
In respect of Registry entries, stripping the Registry hive root key was discovered as
essential to correlate path information between different Windows versions. Results from full
path normalisation (including root key transformation) indicate an effective implementation,
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increasing path detection rates by approximately 70%. Case inconsistencies were discovered
between Windows versions and transforming Registry key paths to lower case solved this
issue. Overall, path normalisation results indicate an effective technique to allow correlation
of file system and Registry entries using a normalised full path value.
Figure 7.2 provides a graphic representation of the combined results from file system and
Registry path normalisation matching results between the actual paths (blue) and normalised
paths (orange). The increased number of combined file system and Registry paths detected
in both scenarios is visually evident.
Figure 7.2: Overview of actual paths versus normalised paths matching results for file system
and Registry entries
7.2.5 Effectiveness of the Windows Registry Processing Technique
The target data set processing component of the system design required the functionality
to parse and represent Windows Registry entry metadata to allow later correlation against
the application profile(s). This research developed a new technique to represent Registry
entries using a revised RegXML CellObject syntax (see Section 5.3.2.2). The design re-
quired that a new Registry parsing tool be implemented to produce output based on the
revised RegXML structure, as well as providing the functionality to recover deleted Registry
entries to facilitate detection of uninstalled application software. The resultant implemented
solution was the CellXML-Registry tool, authored specifically in this research to provide
the required functionality. Testing and analysis of the new Registry processing technique is
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required to determine the overall effectiveness, as well as effectiveness when compared to a
similar solution.
Testing was performed using all extractable Registry hives from the 79 forensic disk images
that comprise the M57-Patents scenario. CellXML-Registry was executed against all
1,272 Registry hive files extracted from the M57-Patents scenario. Results were analysed
and compared to previous findings put forward by Nelson (2012), who created the original
RegXML structure using the pre-existing hivexml tool coupled with a Python framework
to completely automate Registry processing (regxml_extractor). Table 7.18 presents a
comparison of different statistics for extracted Registry hive files and their contents from
the M57-Patents scenario. For each descriptive statistic a count is provided for the results
obtained using CellXML-Registry in this research and the hivexml tool as reported by
Nelson (2012).
Table 7.18: Comparison of Registry parsing between CellXML-Registry and hivexml
CellXML-Registry hivexml Description
79 79 Number of processed disk images
1272 1041 Number of extracted hive files
1270 1016 Number of hives processed without error
2 25 Number of hives processed with error
29,339,058 16,238,06 Total entry count (keys and values)
1,384,137 0 Total unallocated entry count (keys and values)
The comparison between this research and Nelson (2012) highlights disparity in results achieved.
Both methods processed the same 79 disk images from the M57-Patents scenario. Differences
were discovered in the number of Registry hive files extracted, in this research a total of
1,272 hive file were extracted by Vestigium (more specifically, by the HiveExtractor.py
module included in Vestigium), while the regxml_extractor tool extracted only 1,041.
Compared to the 25 hive files that were not able to be parsed using the hivexml tool, only
two hive files were not able to be parsed by CellXML-Registry. The two hive files only
failed when CellXML-Registry attempted to recover deleted entries. Without recovery be-
ing specified, both of these hive files were processed without error. The issue is an underlying
problem with the Registry parser project and more information regarding this matter
can be found on the CellXML-Registry Issues listing15.
In addition to the difference in extractable Registry hive files, the results indicate varia-
tion in the total number of Registry entries (keys and values) processed. The output from
CellXML-Registry resulted in approximately 29 million Registry entries, while hivexml
only reported just over 16 million. Further investigation of the discrepancy is beyond the
scope of this research project. Finally, CellXML-Registry was able to recover approxi-
mately 1.3 million unallocated (deleted) Registry entries. In contrast, hivexml reported no
unallocated entries as it does not provide support for recovery of deleted content. Overall,
15See: https://github.com/thomaslaurenson/CellXML-Registry/issues/1
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the results indicate that Vestigium in conjunction with CellXML-Registry proved more
effective at extracting Registry entries compared to results presented by Nelson (2012) using
regxml_extractor and hivexml.
This section has described and presented results pertaining to effectiveness of the imple-
mented system design. The Vestigium tool was subjected to numerous experimental testing
scenarios using a public data set. The next phase of M57-Patents scenario testing involves
evaluating the efficiency of the system design.
7.3 M57-Patents Scenario: Efficiency Testing and Findings
The tools used to perform forensic analysis need high computational efficiency due to the
requirements of processing a potentially large number of targets that are increasing in size
and complexity (see Section 2.3.1 and Section 2.3.2). Therefore, an efficient system is pivotal
to solving the challenges of current digital investigations. Furthermore, the high-level research
objective specified for a solution capable of meeting digital forensic triage requirements. To
reiterate, triage is a preliminary digital examination to determine the intelligence value of dig-
ital devices and prioritisation of further in-depth analysis under significant time and resource
constraints.
This section presents efficiency results from public data testing using the M57-Patents
scenario. Firstly, the efficiency metrics and testing method are briefly outlined. All 79 forensic
disk images from the M57-Patents scenario are then used as input to the implemented system
(Vestigium) and metrics calculated to determine system efficiency. It becomes apparent
that the initial results do not meet digital forensic triage requirements. Based on the results,
therefore, system design enhancements are proposed, implemented and tested. Finally, a
comparison to other automated forensic analysis and triage solutions is presented to provide
a baseline for system evaluation.
7.3.1 Efficiency Metrics and Testing Method
Two efficiency metrics have been previously proposed: 1) Absolute speed, the clock time
required to process the target data set; and 2) Relative speed, the average rate that the tool
can analyse data compared to the rate at which data can be read from the source device. Both
efficiency metrics have been outlined and discussed (see Section 4.3.5) and score interpretations
provided (see Section 6.2.6.2). The following hardware and software specifications were used
for all M57-Patents scenario efficiency testing:
• Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3570K CPU @ 3.40GHz
• 8 GB DDR3 1333 MHz
• Western Digital Green 2.0 TB SATA 3 desktop 3.5-inch hard drive
• Microsoft Windows 7 Professional 64-bit
To determine the relative speed of the Vestigium tool, the read speed of the hard drive
containing the actual target data set needs to be established. Using the prescribed testing en-
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vironment, the hard disk read speed was ascertained using the Microsoft Windows winsat16
utility which reports hardware performance capability. The following listing provides an ex-
ample of the command used to determine the sequential read speed of the target hard disk:
$ winsat disk -seq -read -drive f -count 10
To establish a reliable hard drive read speed, multiple tests were executed. A total of 10
hard drive benchmark tests were performed and an average value determined. Additional
information including hard drive read speeds for each test are documented in Appendix D.3.
The benchmark results provide the ability to calculate the relative speed to aid in determining
system efficiency. The results showed that the average disk read speed was 119.6 Megabytes
per second (MB/s).
7.3.2 System Efficiency Results
The specified metrics were calculated based on the processing times reported by Vestigium
to: 1) Perform file system metadata generation and matching; and 2) Perform Registry meta-
data generation and matching. Individual processing times were collected at both processing
stages. This was achieved by adding functionality to record the time for each Vestigium
function using the Python timeit17 module. Table 7.19 displays an overview the efficiency
of Vestigium to process all 79 disk images from the M57-Patents scenario. The absolute
speed (elapsed clock time) and relative time (rate of data processing compared to sequentially
reading the entire disk image) to perform file system and Registry processing are shown, as
well as an average for each metric per disk.
Table 7.19: Overview of system efficiency for the M57-Patents scenario (all results are dis-
played in minutes apart from relative speed which is the fraction of time taken compared to
sequential hard drive read speed)
Vestigium Processing Efficiency Metrics
File System Registry Absolute Speed Relative Speed
Total 350.10 124.59 474.69 0.48
Average 4.43 1.58 6.01 0.48
As previously stated, the M57-Patents scenario disk images are stored in the EWF format
using the best compression method, with a total compressed size of 454 GB18. When uncom-
pressed, the data set equates to almost 1.5 terabytes (TB) of raw data, while the average
uncompressed size per disk is approximately 19 GB. All following efficiency metrics are re-
ported using the uncompressed data set size.
Absolute speed: Vestigium took 474 minutes (7.9 hours) to process all 79 disk images,
an average of 6 minutes per disk. File system processing took a total of approximately 350
16See: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc770542(v=ws.11).aspx
17See: https://docs.python.org/3.4/library/timeit.html
18Compared to RAW disk images without compression, compressed disk images take longer to process as
they need to be decompressed on-the-fly when processing
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minutes (5.8 hours), while Registry processing took almost 125 minutes (a little over 2 hours).
These results show that file system processing and matching took approximately 74% of the
total elapsed time, while Registry processing and matching took approximately 26%.
Relative speed: Based on absolute speed and input data set size, the average processing
speed (see Equation 4.9) was calculated to be 57.5 MB/s, meaning Vestigium analysed all
input data at an average of 57.5 MB/s. The disk read speed was previously calculated at 119.6
MB/s. Given these two variables, the overall relative speed was 0.48. Simply put, it took
Vestigium approximately twice as long to analyse all data than the time it would take to
simply read the data sequentially from the evidence hard drive. Based on expectations, the
relative speed result and the time taken to analyse data is disappointing and not considered
to be efficient based on digital forensic triage requirements. The expected relative speed
to be achieved in the research objective was at least 1.00, the same time it would take to
sequentially read all input data. Modifications and refinements were therefore essential to
increase efficiency of the implemented system.
Additional analysis of system efficiency was conducted to ascertain more detailed information
regarding each step of file system and Registry processing. To achieve this, the processing
performed by Vestigium was further divided into separate steps and metrics recalculated.
There are a total of four individual processing steps performed by Vestigium: 1) Parse
the target disk image using the fiwalk tool to generate a DFXML representation of the
file system; 2) Perform file system matching; 3) Parse extracted Registry hive files using
the CellXML-Registry tool to generate a RegXML representation of the Registry; and
4) Perform Registry matching. Individual processing times were determined to establish
efficiency at each of the four steps of target data set processing. Table 7.20 provides a summary
of the four specified steps of Vestigium processing and the absolute speed (elapsed time)
for each step is provided, as well as the percentage of processing time to complete each step.
Table 7.20: Overview of efficiency results of the four separate Vestigium processing steps
using the M57-Patents scenario (absolute speed is displayed in minutes)
File System Registry
Generation Matching Generation Matching
Absolute Speed 333.34 16.77 19.84 104.75
Percentage 70.22% 3.53% 4.18% 22.07%
The results reveal that 70% of total processing time was taken to generate metadata for file
system entries using the fiwalk tool. In comparison, Registry metadata generation tool took
a little over 4% of total processing time using the CellXML-Registry tool. File system
matching took approximately 3.5% of total processing time, while Registry matching took
22% of the total processing time. The discrepancy of efficiency between the matching steps
can be explained by the amount of data that required processing. The input to Registry
matching was approximately six times as many entries compared to the input to file system
matching (see Table 7.2). Approximately, 30 million Registry entries required processing,
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while approximately only 5 million file system entries required processing equating to six times
the time taken to complete matching. However, based on the overall processing time, matching
methods were deemed to be efficient to perform triage. In contrast, further refinements
to improve overall system efficiency and, ultimately, achieve the performance requirements
needed for rapid forensic triage. Therefore, the techniques used to process the target data set
and generation of metadata requires modification.
7.3.3 Improving Vestigium Efficiency
The initial results from efficiency testing fielded informative feedback on each processing step
performed by Vestigium. Enhancing overall system efficiency by improving the processing
steps executed by Vestigium and the underlying tools used to parse and generate target
data set metadata (fiwalk and CellXML-Registry) is now a priority.
7.3.3.1 Improving File System Metadata Generation Efficiency
The efficiency results revealed that approximately 70% of total processing time was taken to
parse the file system of the target data set and generate a DFXML metadata report. File
system metadata generation has the potential to provide rapid processing of entries as the
data size usually includes only 1-5% of the total hard drive size (depending on the amount
and type of data stored). However, the results from efficiency testing indicated that file
system metadata generation (which includes file hashing) took longer than the time required
to sequentially read the data from the hard drive. Further testing was therefore specified to
evaluate the fiwalk tool that is used to generate file system metadata. A range of different
scenarios required testing to implement a revised and more efficient system: 1) Reporting
data file location of the disk image; 2) Enabling file hashing; 3) Disabling file hashing; and 4)
Using one or both hashing algorithms. Generating metadata was performed using fiwalk
for five different Test Cases (TC) with the following configuration options:
TC01: Parsing all entries without accessing data location or performing hashing19
TC02: Parsing all entries and reporting data location (byte_runs) without file hashing
TC03: Parsing all entries, reporting data location with MD5 file hashing
TC04: Parsing all entries, reporting data location with SHA1 file hashing
TC05: Parsing all entries, reporting data location with MD5 and SHA1 file hashing
Each of the prescribed test cases were executed on a single disk image from the M57-Patents
scenario (jo-2009-12-11-002) to provide an indication of efficiency in each test case sce-
nario. Table 7.21 displays an overview of the results from invoking fiwalk to perform
metadata generation. Different command line arguments (flags) were specified to achieve the
19The fiwalk tool required modification to perform metadata extraction without reporting data location
or hashing files. This was caused by a bug found in the tool that incorrectly parsed the supplied command
line arguments resulting in fiwalk accessing and reporting data location even when specifically requested
not to. Additional information, including source code modification is covered in Appendix D.4
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desired functionality as specified by the prescribed test cases. Each test was performed 10
times on the same system to ensure a reliable and accurate result20.
Table 7.21: Overview of fiwalk metadata generation performance for the last disk image
from the user Jo from the M57-Patents scenario (named jo-2009-12-11-002)
Test case Flags Hash algorithm Absolute time
TC01 -x -z -g -b None 7.95
TC02 -x -z None (but get byte_runs) 62.23
TC03 -x -z -M MD5 73.88
TC04 -x -z -1 SHA1 81.02
TC05 -x MD5 & SHA1 95.79
The results show that including the reporting of data location and/or performing file hashing
increases absolute processing time. This was entirely expected as both require additional
processing time to determine each property. However, what the testing does provide is infor-
mative results of performance thus aiding the selection of an alternative solution. Parsing the
file allocation table only is comparatively fast, taking approximately 8 seconds. When access-
ing the data location, processing time increases by more than 680%, taking approximately
62 seconds. Adding MD5 hashing further increases the processing time by an additional 11
seconds, while including SHA1 hashing adds nearly 20 seconds being computationally more
intensive compared to the MD5 algorithm. Calculating both file hashing algorithms and
reporting data location took the most time, almost 96 seconds.
Parsing the file system allocation table and not reporting data location or performing
file hashing is by far the most computationally efficient option available (approximately 8
seconds for a disk image with a 6 GB compressed file size). However, Vestigium requires
data location (the byte_runs element) to extract Registry hive files and to perform file
hashing (both are essential for effective digital artifact matching). Nevertheless, modifications
to file system processing, especially metadata generation, must be addressed based on triage
requirements.
Based on the results achieved thus far and the author’s knowledge of potential solutions,
it has been proposed that the fastest file system processing method will be implemented; that
is, processing the file system allocation table without fetching data location or performing file
hashing (represented by Test Case 01). Obviously, the limitations of this approach are that
not reporting file location or performing file hashing will be achieved, but can be overcome
with the following two solutions:
1) Since data location will not be available to aid extraction of Registry hive files, the
icat tool (from The Sleuth Kit, a pre-existing Vestigium dependency) will be
used to extract hive files using the available file system inode number to determine
data location.
20See Appendix D.3 for complete results
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2) A modified and selective file hashing method, which the author has dubbed selective
file hashing, is proposed. This method will enable more efficient processing by only
hashing specific files of potential interest, identified based on a known file size (from the
application profile) instead of hashing every file on the target data set.
Extracting file location is easily achievable using the icat tool. This removed the need for
fiwalk to extract the byte_runs information for every file. Since the inode number is
extracted when only parsing the file allocation table this information is readily available. The
revised technique was implemented in Vestigium and informal testing conducted to con-
firm functionality. This required adding a number of new programming functions, including
support to check for icat availability on the running system, and to extract each Registry
hive file using the icat tool.
Performing efficient file hashing is a more complex scenario when attempting to minimise
processing time and increase efficiency. The original implementation required that every data
file was hashed, a normal practice in digital investigations. However, as results indicate, this
is a time consuming process compared to solely extracting file system metadata. Results
revealed that file hashing takes 820% longer than just parsing file system metadata (see Table
7.21, specifically TC01 compared to TC03). To combat this issue, the author proposes to
enhance file system processing performance by specifying the data files that require hashing.
This is achieved because knowledge is readily available in terms of the data files that are
attempted to be detected on the target data set. The information is, therefore, accessed from
the application profile; specifically, the file size of known data files. The author has named
the proposed method selective file hashing, as only potentially interesting or useful data
files are subjected to hash value calculation. The premise is centred on the following fact of
secure hash algorithms:
That when performing hash value correlation, only two data files with exactly the
same file size will produce the same cryptographic hash value
Cryptographic hashing will only find the same hash value for exactly the same data that
is input to the algorithm. If the same hash value is found for different sized inputs, the
algorithm is inherently flawed. Since the system design is searching for known data files
from the application profile, there is ground truth information available that includes a file
size metadata property for every data file of interest. Therefore, only data files from the target
data set with a matching file size will be subjected to file hashing. Theoretically, this should
result in reduced numbers of data files needing to be hashed, ultimately, decreasing processing
time and increasing system efficiency. The following procedure outlines a high-level overview
of the selective file hashing method:
• Parse application profile and create a Python set of known file sizes
• Parse file system using revised method, specifically, only extract metadata from the file
allocation table using fiwalk
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• For each target data file, only fetch file data and calculate MD5 hash value if the file
size is present in the list of known file sizes from the application profile
The specified functionality to perform selective file hashing is not implemented in fiwalk
or any other digital forensic file system metadata generation/hashing tools known to the
author. Therefore, additional programming code was written and included in Vestigium to
achieve the desired functionality. This was implemented by creating a set of all file sizes when
parsing the input application profile(s). This results in a set of known file size of interest.
When processing each data file from the target data set, the filesize property of each
FileObject is checked for existence in the set of known file sizes. If the file size is found,
the data file is subjected to MD5 file hashing. Since data location is not reported, the icat
tool is leveraged and the file extracted into a Python BytesIO object and hashed using the
Python built-in hashlib file hashing library. This method allows for hash value calculations
without actually extracting and saving the data file which could potentially increase processing
time.
7.3.3.2 Improving Registry Metadata Generation Efficiency
The efficiency results showed that approximately 4% of total processing time was taken to
generate Registry metadata. This result was comparatively efficient compared to other pro-
cessing steps performed by Vestigium. However, the author noted performance limitations
of CellXML-Registry during informal testing in comparison to other Registry tools using
the same data set. Therefore, formal testing was performed and analysed to determine the
efficiency of the solution implemented in this research compared to other solutions.
A comparison of tool performance for absolute speed (processing time) was conducted
for CellXML-Registry against other similar tools. The hivexml tool was selected as
it also generates RegXML. However, it does not include deleted Registry entry support.
The reglookup tool was used in conjunction with reglookup-recover to provide a
solution with the capability to extract allocated and unallocated (deleted) Registry entries.
Similar to file hash performance comparison, each test was conducted ten times to provide
an average result. The same disk image from the M57-Patents scenario, that was used
for file system efficiency testing, was again used to test Registry processing performance
(jo-2009-12-11-002). The system had a total of 18 Registry hive files equating to a total
size of 31.9 MB. Table 7.22 displays the comparative efficiency results of the three selected
tools to perform Registry processing. The reglookup tools were tested on two operating
system types, namely Linux and Windows, to determine any differences in efficiency.
Overall, the hivexml tool was the fastest Registry processing tool tested, taking a total of
approximately 4.5 seconds to process all 18 Registry hive files from the jo-2009-12-11-002
disk image. However, hivexml does not have the functionality to recover deleted Registry
entries, which would require additional processing time to scan and attempt recovery. The
combination of reglookup and reglookup-recover provides functionality for deleted
Registry entry recovery, but both tools need to be consecutively invoked against each hive
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Table 7.22: Overview of Registry processing tools for the M57-Patents disk image: jo-2009-
12-11-002 (absolute time is displayed in seconds)
Tool Version Platform Absolute Speed
CellXML-Registry 1.2.0 Windows 14.52
hivexml 1.3.9 Linux 4.45
reglookup & reglookup-recover 1.0.1 Linux 5.88
reglookup & reglookup-recover 1.0.1 Windows 7.10
file. Nevertheless, even with executing two tools on each hive file the reglookup combination
proved efficient, taking only slightly longer than hivexml to process all input with the Linux
option proving to be the most efficient at just over 5 seconds. The CellXML-Registry
tool (authored specifically for this research) took more than twice as long compared to other
solutions, a total of approximately 14.5 seconds to process all hive files. This test and the
achieved results confirmed the efficiency limitations of the CellXML-Registry tool.
While observing CellXML-Registry performance, the RegXML generation phase (sav-
ing XML syntax to an output file) took much longer compared to the other solutions. Inter-
estingly, the other two tools output to standard output (stdout) and redirection is required
to save the resultant output. CellXML-Registry does not implement this technique, and
instead, by default, saves all entries into an XML file format. This is achieved using the .NET
framework StreamWriter.WriteLine() function and the technique was adopted as the
Registry parser project uses it for all tool output. Given the performance issue surround-
ing XML generation the following refinements were proposed to the CellXML-Registry tool
based on testing results and the author’s knowledge:
1) Re-write existing tool output to print Registry metadata to standard output instead of
writing to an XML file
2) Improve XML writing performance by using a standardised library specifically designed
for printing XML syntax
Additional research was conducted to re-implement the existing output method used in
CellXML-Registry. Support was added to produce XML syntax to standard output us-
ing the .NET framework System.Xml library designed specifically for XML processing. It
also includes support for encoding, special character handling and general production of well-
formed XML documents21. The Console.WriteLine() function was used to replace all
occurrences of the original output function (StreamWriter.WriteLine()) to achieve redi-
rection of XML to standard output. Functionality was retained to write RegXML metadata
to an XML file, but this was also updated to use the newly implemented System.Xml library.
In addition to the revised XML output, Vestigium was updated to now directly ingest
CellXML-Registrymetadata directly from standard output. The same solution is available
for fiwalk in combination with the DFXML Objects.py API. Informal testing indicated
21See: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff647804.aspx#
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that directly parsing standard output from each tool is significantly faster than creating an
XML file and parsing the resultant file.
7.3.3.3 Improving Digital Artifact Matching Efficiency
Thus far, refinements have been proposed, designed and implemented into the tools used to
perform target data set processing; specifically, metadata generation for the file system and
Registry evidence sources. In terms of digital artifact matching, file system matching took
3.5% of the total time processing time, while Registry matching took approximately 22% of
total processing time. A number of trials were made in an endeavour to improve digital artifact
matching efficiency for file system and Registry entries. This included implementing and
informally testing a collection of different programming looping techniques to iterate objects
including Python list comprehension, dictionary comprehension and third-party dictionary
libraries. However, no major increase in efficiency was obtained for matching. Additionally,
informal testing was conducted using the original DFXML dfxml.py API which implemented
the Simple API for XML (SAX) parser. This implementation proved to be more efficient,
but lacks the required functionality provided by the Objects.py solution using the Python
ElementTree library. Eventually, the originally implemented techniques were made without
changes the Vestigium matching framework was left unmodified.
7.3.4 Revised System Efficiency Results
The investigation of efficiency at each stage of target data set processing and digital artifact
matching performed by Vestigium was undertaken. Various refinements were proposed,
designed and implemented into both the Vestigium tool and the underlying target data set
processing tools (fiwalk and CellXML-Registry). Specifically, a revised technique was
implemented to achieve faster file system metadata generation by only extracting file alloca-
tion table metadata and performing selective file hashing based on known file sizes extracted
from the application profile. Furthermore, modifications were made to CellXML-Registry
to achieve faster Registry metadata generation by changing output generation to use a spe-
cialised XML processing library. Informal testing throughout the various revised developments
indicated improved system efficiency. However, further formal testing is now required to de-
termine the improvements gained. Additionally, thorough testing is also required to assess
any adverse effects on system effectiveness that may have occurred as a result of system
modification; primarily, the introduction of selective file hashing.
The revised version of Vestigium was again subjected to experimental testing using all
disk images from the M57-Patents scenario. Table 7.23 displays the results with comparison
to the original efficiency results (as previously displayed in Table 7.19).
The original results from efficiency testing determined an absolute speed of 474 minutes
(7.9 hours) to process all 79 disk image from the M57-Patents scenario, while relative pro-
cessing speed was calculated at 0.48, meaning that the system took twice as long to process
all data when compared to the time required to solely read the data.
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Table 7.23: Overview of revised system efficiency results for the M57-Patents scenario (all
results are displayed in minutes apart from relative speed which is the fraction of time taken
compared to sequential hard drive read speed)
Efficiency Metrics
Vestigium Processing Absolute Relative
File System Registry speed speed
Total (original) 350.10 124.59 474.69 0.48
Average (original) 4.43 1.58 6.01 0.48
Total (revised) 95.62 85.62 178.25 1.15
Average (revised) 1.17 1.08 2.26 1.15
Absolute speed: The revised system reduced absolute speed by more than half, taking
a total of 190 minutes (a little under 3 hours) to process all input. The results dictate a
success in improving efficiency, obtaining a 60% decrease in processing time and, ultimately,
an increase in system efficiency. The average absolute speed to process a disk image was
reduced from 6 minutes to 2.2 minutes. Furthermore, the results show that the time taken
to process each evidence source (file system and Registry) is much closer than the original
implementation, taking approximately 85-95 minutes in total for each.
Relative speed: The revised system implementation increased average analysis speed from
57.5 MB/s to 137.24 MB/s; meaning Vestigium was able to analyse input data at a rate
of approximately 137 MB/s. Given this value, the revised relative speed was calculated to
be 1.15. This result exceeds the original system requirement of 1.00 and, ultimately, means
that the revised system implementation is capable of analysing all disk images from the M57-
Patents scenario slightly faster that the time required to solely read disk contents sequentially.
Although this seems logically impossible, processing faster than disk read speed is achievable
due to Vestigium utilising only metadata for digital artifact matching and, therefore, remov-
ing the requirement to read all disk contents. Overall, relative speed results dictate that the
performance enhancements and resultant revised implementation was successful at improving
efficiency to the requirements specified by the research objective.
Even with an increase in efficiency due to the modifications, it is important that as a result
there was no change to the reported effectiveness findings. Analysis of the output from
Vestigium revealed there was no change in digital artifact matching effectiveness. All results
maintained the same as previously reported in Section 7.2.
The revised file system processing technique, specifically selective file hashing, produced
higher overall system efficiency. However, the implemented technique does have a potential
limitation. Since all data files are not hashed by Vestigium, the resultant DFXML report of
all file system metadata will lack complete file hash information; that is, only data files with a
corresponding file size that was observed in the input application profile will have a hash value.
This means that the metadata report is less useful for post-processing, specifically, to perform
additional file hash analysis; for example, the DFXML report generated by Vestigium
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cannot be used to perform additional file hash searches and each non-hashed file would require
additional processing. This is a trade-off between performance and coverage. Since this
research specified a solution capable of forensic triage, the author decided that efficiency of
the system was more important than providing a complete file system metadata report for
post-processing. Nevertheless, the original method of complete data file hashing could be
easily re-implemented in Vestigium if required. No other limitations were observed.
7.4 M57-Patents Scenario: Discussion and Observations
The results from M57-Patents scenario testing were presented in terms of effectiveness (see
Section 7.2) and efficiency (see Section 7.3) of the implemented system. The testing has re-
sulted in a thorough evaluation using a public data set which is readily available for research
reproducibility, allowing other researchers and practitioners to verify or build on the results
presented in this research. This section presents a summary discussion of the implemented
system in terms of effectiveness and efficiency based on the prescribed research objectives.
The results obtained are discussed and conclusions drawn based on the findings from exper-
imental testing. Furthermore, identified system limitations encountered during the course of
experimental testing are also noted.
7.4.1 System Effectiveness
Effectiveness indicates the functionality to automate the detection of digital artifacts from
a target data set using an application profile of known content. The overall effectiveness of
the system design was evaluated in terms of file system entry detection (see Section 7.2.1.1)
and Windows Registry entry detection (see Section 7.2.1.3). The results indicate an effective
system when compared to similar existing solutions commonly used to perform digital forensic
analysis (see Section 7.2.1.2 and Section 7.2.1.4).
To reiterate, recall measures the ability to correctly detect relevant digital artifacts, while
precision measures the ability to only detect relevant digital artifacts from the target data
set. Overall, a high recall score was achieved for automated detection of digital artifacts
between the authored application profiles and disk images from the M57-Patents scenario.
Recall scores were approximately 0.92, or 92% of all possible digital artifacts, for all testing
scenarios apart from the Eraser tool. Investigation revealed that the low recall rates for
Eraser was due to the application being rewritten between the version on the data set
(5.7.8) and the application profile (6.2.0).
Perfect precision scores (1.00) were obtained for all interesting disk image testing scenarios,
while testing on the non-interesting disk image detected a total of 30 file system entries
and 90 Registry entries that were false positive. This only impacts on effectiveness metrics
for precision scores. All false positives were caused by non-unique digital artifacts in the
CCleaner application profile. This was solved by updating the static blacklist used by
the LiveDiff tool. The low false positive rate returned by Vestigium is advantageous
to investigators as further manual analysis to determine correctness is not required. High
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precision scores were thus obtained using the strict metadata matching methods while still
maintaining the effective detection of relevant digital artifacts in a variety of complex matching
scenarios (e.g., using different application versions and different operating system versions).
The effectiveness of Vestigium was achievable, in part, due the created application
profiles and the low number of irrelevant or non-unique entries. Data reduction techniques
had previously been implemented and tested to remove irrelevant operating system noise
observed during profile creation. The effectiveness results further illustrate that the profiles
contained mainly unique digital artifacts from each anti-forensic tool.
The methods and associated tools authored to recover deleted (unallocated) entries proved
effective at detecting residual digital artifacts (see Section 7.2.3). A longitudinal analysis was
performed and results indicated that both deleted and residual file system and Registry entries
were detectable even after anti-forensic tool uninstallation. However, the life span of deleted
evidence was observed to be short (2 days) in the tested scenario. The CellXML-Registry
tool authored in this research proved effective at recovering deleted Registry entries and
enabled correlation and detection of unallocated entries.
The technique of path normalisation was designed and implemented to aid detection of file
system and Registry paths (absolute paths) to aid matching entries between operating system
versions and application versions. File system path normalisation resulted in an increase in
detectable entries by removing user-specific variables and normalising path differences between
operating system versions. Registry path normalisation was also effective as the technique
aided in matching entries where Registry root key values differed for all Windows operating
system versions. Case sensitivity issues were also discovered in Registry entries and were again
solved by path normalisation. Overall, the path normalisation technique can be considered
successful, ultimately increasing digital artifact detection rates.
7.4.2 System Efficiency
Efficiency indicates the performance of the implemented system to execute digital artifact
detection in a timely manner to achieve rapid triage requirements. Overall, the efficiency
of the implemented system proved to maintain acceptable performance standards based on
the requirements of digital forensic triage as specified in the high-level research objective.
Initial efficiency results were deemed unacceptable to achieve this goal and various perfor-
mance enhancements were thus made. A technique of selective file hashing was proposed and
implemented with the aim of increasing system efficiency. Results obtained from testing the
refined system demonstrated that Vestigium was able to analyse the entire M57-Patents
scenario at a relative speed of 1.15; meaning that it took less time to analyse all evidence
compared to solely read this actual data. Take the example of a 20 GB disk image which
takes 10 minutes to sequentially read all data. Vestigium can perform a complete analysis
in less than 10 minutes; that is, less time than it would take to only read the data. This is
possible by just processing logical data of interest. Overall, Vestigium completely analysed
the entire M57-Patent scenario in a little under 3 hours. It included processing the target data
set, extracting file system entries, Registry hives and associated Registry entries, generating
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metadata for all evidence sources, performing matching using three application profiles and
reporting the findings to the investigator.
A vital output of digital forensic triage is the production of processed evidence that can
be reused during later in-depth forensic analysis, if required. Not only have triage efficiency
requirements been met by Vestigium, but output from initial examination is produced
which is of use for later analysis. Target data set processing resulted in machine-readable
metadata reports that can easily be reprocessed using a variety of reliable forensic analysis
tools.
7.4.3 System Design Modifications
The experimental testing of the M57-Patents scenario provided a total of 79 disk images
containing over 5 million file system entries, over 30 million Registry entries at a total uncom-
pressed data set size of approximately 1.5 terabytes. Testing on such a large data set provided
insight regarding design issues in terms of system effectiveness and efficiency, as well as iden-
tification of a variety of software bugs. The following list highlights each of the identified
problems discovered during testing that, as a result, have been solved for each implemented
software tool.
• Vestigium: A variety of bugs were discovered due to a lack of error checking, all
of which have been remedied before proceeding to the next stage of testing. Updated
target data set processing was implemented to only parse file allocation table metadata
and file extraction implemented using the icat tool coupled with the Python BytesIO
module. Selective file hashing was also designed and implemented.
• fiwalk: The version used for testing was available on Windows but was out of date
and had operation bugs found during testing. Modifications were made to fiwalk
source code and the revised version cross-compiled for Microsoft Windows.
• CellXML-Registry: Slow RegXML generation was observed during testing and a
revised output method implemented and tested. A collection of XML parser errors were
discovered when ingesting XML output with Vestigium including incorrectly escaped
special characters and Unicode control characters. All issues were rectified by updating
the XML output checking functions.
• LiveDiff: Six false positive CCleaner application profile entries were found during
testing and the static blacklist updated to exclude these discovered erroneous results.
The listed software limitations, issues and bugs were all satisfactorily resolved before proceed-
ing to the next stage of experimental testing; that is, system evaluation using a real-world
data set.
7.5 Real-World Data Set Overview: Second Hand Hard Drives
Performing experimental testing to evaluate a system design to aid digital forensic analysis
using a real-world data set is advantageous due to data diversity and unpredictability, thereby,
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providing more robust research findings (Garfinkel et al., 2009). Therefore, the third and final
data set selected for system evaluation is a range of second-hand used hard drives sourced
from Internet auction websites (see Section 4.3.3.3). The specific purpose of real-world data
set testing is to aid further development and validation of the system and associated forensic
tools developed in this research and to discover bugs from processing diverse data. This
section outlines an overview of the real world data set employed in this research including
hard drive sources, hard drive selection criteria, a high-level overview of data set content and
a brief summary of testing method.
7.5.1 Real-World Data Set Sources
The real word data set was compiled from two sources: 1) Previous research conducted
at the same university in the same department as the author; and 2) Additional used digital
devices purchased by the author specifically for this research. A total of 100 second-hand hard
drives were sourced from previous research conducted by Roberts (2013) at the Department of
Information Science, University of Otago. Roberts (2013) originally collected the hard drives
from three sources: 1) Company A who supplied 50 drives; 2) Company B who supplied
19 drives; and 3) The New Zealand based online auction website TradeMe22 where 31 extra
drives were purchased. In 2013, additional second-hand hard drives were purchased by the
author. All items were purchased from the TradeMe website. The criteria for purchasing the
additional second-hand hard drives was as follows:
1) Must be a digital storage device that is likely to have a desktop operating system. This
results in targeting hard drives with the following specifications: 3.5” and 2.5” internal
hard drives with an IDE, SATA or SCSI interface
2) The hard drives must be listed as second-hand (used)
A total of 95 second-hand HDDs were purchased by the author using the specified require-
ments. This resulted in a combined total of 195 hard drives to be included in the real-world
data set testing portion of this research. A complete list of all sourced hard drives is available
in Appendix D.5.
7.5.2 Selection Criteria for Real-World Data Sets
The criteria for selecting hard drives to form a real-world data set is to identify applicable and
usable devices for this research project; for example, not all hard drives sourced were readable
and, therefore, had to be excluded from experimental testing. The following list documents
the criteria to select suitable disk images for experimental testing:
1) The hard drive must be readable
2) The hard drive must have a valid file system
3) The hard drive must be installed with a Microsoft Windows operating system
22See: http://www.trademe.co.nz/
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Adherence to the specified selection criteria is considered by using a linear approach; the order
in which they are specified. If a hard drive cannot be forensically imaged using the dc3dd
tool23, the hard drive is deemed unreadable and not suited for testing. Table 7.24 displays a
summary of the hard drives in terms of readability status for the hard drives sourced from
Roberts (2013) and the hard drives purchased by the author.
Table 7.24: Overview of the hard drives sourced for real-world data set testing
Source Total Unreadable Readable
Roberts (2013) 100 22 78
Purchases drives 95 17 78
Total 195 39 156
The first selection criterion resulted in 156 hard drives that were classified as readable; a
total of 78 from Roberts (2013) and 78 purchased for this research. Two more criteria are
required for selection for testing. The system design was implemented to perform forensic
analysis using file system (and Windows Registry) metadata. The system design was also
implemented to target a Microsoft Windows operating system. Therefore, the target hard
drive must have both a valid file system and a Microsoft Windows operating system installed.
Technically, the Vestigium tool has the functionality to process any readable hard drive or
forensic disk image with, or without, a file system. However, if no file system metadata is
present the tool would return no results.
Table 7.25: Overview of the hard drives selected for real-world data set testing
File System
Source NTFS FAT Other None Has Windows
Roberts (2013) 21 17 3 37 23
Purchased drives 38 9 1 30 32
Total 59 26 4 67 55
A file system check was performed using the fiwalk tool which provides support for com-
monly encountered desktop file systems including FAT, NTFS, EXT and HFS. Only forensic
images that could be parsed by fiwalk and produce a valid DFXML report were selected
for testing. Furthermore, the determined file system must be either: 1) File Allocation Table
(FAT) or a member of the FAT file system family (FAT16, FAT32 etc.); or 2) New Technology
File System (NTFS). Both file systems are specified as supported by Microsoft Windows for
operating system installation24. A final check was performed to determine if the hard drive
had a Microsoft Windows operating system installed. A rudimentary test was performed to
scan the DFXML report output from fiwalk and search for a Windows directory in the root
directory. Table 7.25 displays an overview of the 156 readable HDDs as shown in Table 7.24




with details of the file system type and a count to indicate how many HDDs potentially have
a Microsoft Windows operating system installed.
Table 7.26: Overview of the content of hard drives selected for real-world data set testing
Property Total Average per disk









Data files 3,629,294 65,987
Other 204,107 3,711
Allocated entries 3,181,491 57,845
Unallocated entries 1,367,809 24,869
Total 4,549,300 82,714






Registry keys 5,572,600 101,320
Registry values 10,591,395 192,571
Allocated entries 15,785,832 287,015
Unallocated entries 378,163 6,876
Total 16,163,995 293,891
As displayed in Table 7.25, a total of 59 out of the 156 readable hard drives had a valid NTFS
file system, while 26 had a valid FAT file system. A total of 67 hard drives were readable
and able to be forensically acquired, but did not have a valid file system. Finally, a total of 4
hard drives had a non-Windows supported file system (including two HFS, one UFS and one
EXT file system). From the total of 85 hard drives with a valid file system; that is, 38 from
Roberts (2013) and 47 from purchases, not all potentially had a Microsoft Windows operating
system. Consequently, a total of 55 second-hand hard drives were found to have a valid FAT
or NTFS partition as well as a Windows folder in the root directory. These were selected for
experimental testing.
7.5.3 Overview of Selected Hard Drives from Real-World Data Set
Prior to performing experimental testing the size and complexity of the data set was investi-
gated and determined. Similar to known data set and public data set testing this was achieved
using the same two Python scripts authored to determine data set content (see Section 6.6.1).
The file system statistics script (FileSystemStats.py) and Windows Registry statistics
script (RegistryStats.py) are available in Appendix C.8 and C.9. Table 7.26 displays
an overview of the content of the data set for all 55 disk images and also an average value
per disk. The data set size is provided, file system counts in terms of allocated and unallo-
cated (deleted) entries, and pertinent Windows Registry counts including number of hive files
and the count of allocated and unallocated entries. Appendix D.6 provides more in-depth
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information regarding real-world data set content.
The 55 disk images from the real-world data set equate to approximately 2.2 terabytes of
raw uncompressed data (2,268 GB), while the average size for each disk image is approximately
41 GB. This is much larger than the disk image sizes encountered in the M57-Patents scenario,
which had an average uncompressed size of approximately 18 GB. The total compressed size
for the real-world data set was 975 GB, an average compressed size of approximately 18 GB
per disk. Similar to the M57-Patents scenario, the real-world data set was stored in the EWF
format using the deflate compression algorithm and best compression method.
The total number of all file system entries is a little over 4.5 million, with approximately
3 million allocated and 1.25 million unallocated file system entries. A total of 1,247 Registry
hive files were extracted from the 55 disk images, an average of approximately 22 per disk.
From the extracted hive files, a total of over 16 million Registry entries were present, with
just under 16 million allocated Registry entries and almost 400 thousand unallocated Registry
entries recovered.
7.5.4 Real-World Data Set Experimental Testing Method
The experimental testing method used for real-world data set testing follows the same proce-
dure implemented for M57-Patents scenario testing (see Section 7.1.2). The Vestigium tool
is used to correlate digital artifacts between the application profiles (APXML documents)
and the target data set (each of the 55 selected forensic disk image from the real-world data
set). The initial three anti-forensic tool profiles were used for testing, as well as the ap-
plication profile authored during M57-Patents testing for the XP Keylogger tool. Listing
7.5 displays an example of the command used to invoke Vestigium against one disk im-
age (TM0101ST.E01) from the real-world data set with a user-specified output directory
(D:\RWDS\TM0101ST-output) and all three application profiles. The listing specifies new
line characters (ˆ) and comments (REM) using Windows command conventions.
$ C:\Python34\python.exe Vestigium.py ^
D:\RWDS\TM0101ST.RAW ^ REM Forensic disk image
D:\RWDS\TM0101ST-output ^ REM Output folder
XPAdvancedKeylogger-2.1-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM XP Keylogger profile
CCleaner-5.09-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM CCleaner profile
Eraser-6.2.0.2970-6.1.7601.apxml ^ REM Eraser profile
TrueCrypt-7.1a-6.1.7601.apxml REM TrueCrypt profile
Listing 7.5: Command line example to invoke Vestigium against the real-world data set
In contrast to M57-Patents scenario testing, no ground truth information for the real-world
data set was established. This is because the primary purpose of this testing is to determine
functionality of the implemented system in a diverse and unpredictable data set.
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7.6 Real-World Data Set Findings
This section presents the findings from experimental testing using the real-world data set. A
real-world investigation scenario is intended to model, as near as possible, the testing of a data
set that replicates diverse and random content that would be excepted in an actual digital
investigation. From the available 156 second-hand hard drives sourced for testing, a total of
55 were selected for testing. This section reports the results from executing the Vestigium
tool with all four created application profiles (CCleaner, Eraser, TrueCrypt and XP
Keylogger) against the selected hard drives. Effectiveness results in terms of detecting
known digital artifacts, followed by results of testing system efficiency. A further investigation
regarding efficiency is performed to ascertain differences when Vestigium is executed on a
field laptop, this being a common practice in digital forensic triage. Finally, a discussion of
results is put forward.
7.6.1 Detecting Anti-forensic Tools using Vestigium
The Vestigium tool was invoked using the prescribed experimental testing method against
the compiled real-world data set. As used in all effectiveness testing evaluations, the same
four digital artifact classifiers (tp, tn, fp, fn) and four effectiveness metrics (P, R, F1, A) were
calculate. Table 7.27 displays the results for file system matching for target disk images from
the real-world data set where one or more digital artifacts were detected.
Table 7.27: Effectiveness results for file system matching for the real-world data set
Name Profile tp tn fp fn P R F1 A
IDE_91 CCleaner-5.09 2 160,356 0 63 1.00 0.03 0.06 1.00
Vestigium reported one disk image from the real-world data set that contained at least
one digital artifact match. The hard drive, named IDE_91, was found to have two file sys-
tem entries; that is, two true positives that were matched against the CCleaner application
profile. The IDE_91 hard drive was originally sourced from the Roberts (2013) data set.
Using the created CCleaner application as ground truth, effectiveness metrics were calcu-
lated. Overall, the recall score achieved was 0.03 and can be considered low compared to
other effectiveness results presented in M57-Patents scenarios testing. There were no false
positives detected on any of the 55 hard drives, again, demonstrating the functionality of the
implemented matching methods. The following listing displays the full file system path for
both detected digital artifacts:
%PROGRAMFILES%/CCleaner
%PROGRAMFILES%/CCleaner/uninst.exe
Further analysis was performed on IDE_91 to determine the CCleaner version number.
However, neither the file system nor Registry revealed any details, but file timestamp infor-
mation indicates the tool was installed on 2005-08-06, and last accessed (executed) on 2006-
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12-08. This confirms that digital artifacts were still detectable on the target data set when
using an application profile authored more than ten years later. Considering the uniqueness
of the application profile entries it can be concluded that, while only two file system entries
were detected, Vestigium was still able to detect the presence of the anti-forensic tool on
the hard drive. In the remaining 54 hard drives from the real-world data set there we no other
true positive matches detected.
The results from Windows Registry matching against the real-world data set are displayed
in Table 7.28.
Table 7.28: Effectiveness results for Registry matching for the real-world data set
Name Profile tp tn fp fn P R F1 A
IDE_91 CCleaner-5.09 6 685,393 00 109 1.00 0.05 0.10 1.00
The IDE_91 hard drive, as with file system matching, was the only hard drive that contained
detected artifacts in the results reported by Vestigium. Again, effectiveness scores were low
for recall and F1-measure, due to detection of a low proportion of application profile contents.
Precision and accuracy had perfect scores (1.00) as there were no false positives detected while
also maintaining correct classification of all processed digital artifacts. A total of six Registry
entries were detected, all from the SOFTWARE Registry hive file. The listing below specifies







Overall, the effectiveness results from real-world data set testing were low, with only one hard
drive containing the CCleaner tool. However, it was never expected that a high number
of digital artifacts would be detected. Real-world data set testing was primarily included
in system evaluation to provide a data set that would more closely resemble a real-world
investigation scenario. With that said, efficiency testing presents a more crucial aspect of the
real-world data set testing process and is now covered in the following subsection.
7.6.2 System Efficiency Results
Current digital forensic challenges include the need to analyse a potentially large number of
targets for each case which are also increasing in size and complexity. This ultimately means
that forensic analysis solutions must be computationally efficient. Furthermore, forensic triage
has become an essential part of investigations to identify targets with potential evidential value
and prioritise further in-depth analysis of specific targets. Real-world data set testing provides
an excellent testing scenario as the contained data closely replicates investigation targets that
would be encountered in the field.
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The Vestigium tool was invoked against all 55 selected second-hand hard drives in the real-
world data set. The same experimental testing system, as utilised in M57-Patents scenario
testing, was implemented (see Section 7.3.1) and the same efficiency metrics were calculated.
To reiterate, absolute speed reports the elapsed clock time and relative speed reports the rate
of data processing compared to sequentially reading the entire disk image. Table 7.29 displays
the calculated efficiency metrics achieved during real-world data set processing. The absolute
speed and relative speed are provided, as well as the processing time taken for Vestigium
to complete the two stages of operation including file system and Registry processing and
matching.
Table 7.29: Overview of system efficiency for real-world data set processing (all results are
displayed in minutes apart from relative speed which is the fraction of time taken compared
to sequential hard drive read speed)
Vestigium Processing Efficiency Metrics
File System Registry Absolute Speed Relative Speed
Total 102.89 73.05 175.94 1.80
Average 1.87 1.33 3.20 1.80
As previously explained, the selected 55 hard drives that form the real-world data set were
forensically captured and stored in the EWF format using the deflate compression algorithm
and best compression option. The total uncompressed size of the data set is 2,268 GB (ap-
proximately 2.2 TB), while the total compressed size is 975 GB. This equates to an average
uncompressed size of just over 41 GB per disk. The overall size is therefore greater than the
M57-Patents scenario disk images, even though there are fewer disks in the real-world data
set (55 versus 79), thus presenting a more realistic data set to determine system efficiency (in
terms of current trends in data set size).
Absolute speed: Real-world data set processing took approximately 176 minutes, a little
under 3 hours with an average of 3.2 minutes for each hard drive processed. Complete file
system processing and matching by Vestigium took 102 minutes, while Registry processing
took 73 minutes.
Relative speed: The calculated relative speed for real-world data set testing was 1.80,
meaning Vestigium analysed all input data at almost twice the speed at which the target
data set could be sequentially read. Compared to M57-Patents data set efficiency metrics,
this is a better result, where the revised system produced a relative speed of 1.15. The average
processing speed also increased, from 137.24 MB/s in M57-Patents scenario testing to 215.01
MB/s in real-world data set testing.
The results from real-world data set efficiency testing, again, highlight the performance of the
Vestigium tool. Results show that a 2 TB data set was able to be analysed in less than 3
hours, almost twice as fast than the data could be forensically captured. However, additional
investigation is required to further determine the efficiency of the implemented system under
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constrained computing resources such as that experienced in a typical digital forensic triage
investigation.
7.6.3 System Efficiency Results: Disk Access Method and Analysis System
The system efficiency results presented for the M57-Patents scenario (see Section 7.3) and
the real-world data set (see Section 7.6.2) utilised a normal desktop Personal Computer (PC)
to replicate an investigator’s analysis system. However, the objective of this research is
for a system design and implementation to fulfil the requirements of digital forensic triage.
Therefore, further testing to determine the efficiency when using a computer system with
limited resources suitable for field triage needs to be undertaken.
A laptop computer would be a conventional platform on which to execute on-site triage
examination before further in-depth analysis is later performed on a more computationally
efficient system (e.g., a server with a fast multi-core processor and excessive RAM). When
using a triage field laptop there is no option for internal SATA connection of the target hard
drive. Therefore, the access method for the target disk also needs to be changed. This
is usually achieved by attaching the target hard drive via an external device. And so, a
final efficiency testing scenario was executed to determine the performance of the system
by: 1) Changing the disk access method to an external hard drive caddy (without changing
the analysis system); and then 2) Using a consumer grade laptop with limited processing
capabilities with the same external hard drive caddy.
The first step is to change the disk access method used to perform analysis. This test
was performed before also changing the analysis system, as changing two configurations on
the analysis system at once makes it difficult to determine the effect of each system change.
No other modifications to the original testing system were performed. The following external
HDD caddy was used:
• Welland Turbo Leopard 2.5"/3.5" SATA to USB 3.0 Dual Dock Enclosure
A test was performed to determine the difference in drive read speed when using the external
HDD caddy on the testing system compared to an internal SATA connection. The same hard
drive that contained the forensic disk images from the real-world data set was again used
(Western Digital Green 2.0 TB SATA 3). The same drive read speed tests were performed
using the winsat utility and a total of ten hard drive benchmark tests were performed and
an average value determined. The complete hard drive read speed test results are provided in
Appendix D.5. The results showed that the average disk read speed after changing the HDD
access method was 31.9 Megabytes per second (MB/s). The original testing system using
an internal SATA 3 connection achieved an average disk read speed of 119.6 Megabytes per
second (MB/s). The much lower speed can be explained by the USB 3.0 connection which
is much slower than an internal SATA 3 connection. The result from this test will be used
to compare to the drive read speed of the field triage laptop system. The second step of
additional efficiency testing was to perform more in-depth testing on a field triage laptop.
The specifications of the selected field triage laptop testing system are as follows:
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• Apple MacBook Retina 13 Early 2015
• Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU @ 3.10GHz
• 16 GB DDR3 1867 MHz
• Western Digital Green 2.0 TB SATA 3 desktop 3.5-inch hard drive
• Welland Turbo Leopard 2.5"/3.5" SATA to USB 3.0 Dual Dock Enclosure
• Microsoft Windows 7 Professional 64-bit (Boot Camp)
The experimental testing method to determine HDD read speed was the same as used during
M57-Patents scenario testing, specifically, the use of the winsat utility (see Section 7.3.1).
The results achieved determined that the sequential hard drive read speed for the field laptop
was 32.8 MB/s. Compared to the original desktop testing system (an average read speed
of 119.6 MB/s) this is significantly lower. Compared to the original desktop testing system
using the same external HDD caddy, the results are very similar (an average read speed of 31.9
MB/s). Thus, the major difference in performance results by changing the analysis systems
is due to the reduced hard drive read speed when using an external HDD caddy.
Once again, the same tests were performed by invoking Vestigium against the selected
disk images from the real-world data set. Table 7.30 displays a comparison of system efficiency
for the real-world data set using the original desktop analysis system versus the field triage
laptop using the external HDD caddy. The same efficiency metrics are displayed including
Vesitigum processing times for each evidence source, absolute speed and relative speed.
Table 7.30: Overview of system efficiency for real-world data set processing on field triage
laptop (all results are displayed in minutes apart from relative speed which is the fraction of
time taken compared to sequential hard drive read speed)
Vestigium Processing Efficiency Metrics




op Total 102.89 73.05 175.94 1.80




p Total 105.24 75.22 180.46 6.39
Average 1.91 1.37 3.28 6.39
The results for the field laptop testing scenario has provided a set of interesting results to
further evaluate system efficiency. The absolute speed to process all real-world data set input
was very close to the desktop system. The desktop system took approximately 176 minutes
compared to the field laptop system which only took approximately 4 extra minutes. However,
the achieved relative speed varied greatly between the two analysis systems. This is due to
the low drive read speed of the laptop system and HDD caddy. The desktop system had a
relative speed of 1.80, while the field laptop had a much higher relative speed of 6.39 (higher
relative speed is better). This means that the field laptop had better overall efficiency than the
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desktop system. In contrast, both analysis systems had a very similar average data analysis
speed of approximately 210 MB/s in both scenarios.
The comparison of computer systems used to execute Vestigium has revealed that the
tool does not require fast disk access. This is because of the metadata parsing approach
presented in this research which requires minimal processing power compared to other forensic
analysis solutions. This is both an advantage and a potential disadvantage in some scenarios.
Using a more powerful analysis system will not enhance efficiency of Vestigium, as the
solution does not lend itself to increased disk read speed or parallel processing. File system
and Registry parsing is not parallelised and the tools implemented in this research run on a
single CPU core. Informal testing using a server with high-specifications support this premise.
This may be problematic as faster performance is not achievable with more computing power,
but alternatively is a bonus as the solution can be efficiently run on a portable analysis system.
Nevertheless, the system in this research was designed specifically to be capable of running
with very low resources, proving a high suitability for forensic triage.
7.6.4 Discussion and Observations
The real-world data set provided unpredictable and diverse data on which to further evaluate
the system implemented in this research. The 55 selected second-hand hard drives encom-
passed approximately 2.2 TB of uncompressed data and included 4.5 million file system entries
and over 16 million Registry entries.
In terms of effectiveness, Vestigium detected one hard drive with digital artifacts related
to the CCleaner tool. The recall score for file system matching and Registry matching were
relatively low compared to both known data set testing and M57-Patents scenario testing.
Only two file system entries and six Registry entries were detected. However, it was anticipated
that very few digital artifacts would be found due to the inclusion of only four anti-forensic tool
profiles. The likelihood of these four tools being present on a small selection of second-hand
hard drives would be considered low. Nevertheless, no false positive matches were reported
for the entire data set, a good result given the diversity of digital artifacts encountered.
In terms of efficiency, the finalised system implementation is considered to meet the pre-
scribed triage requirements. It took under 3 hours to process a total of 2,268 GB of uncom-
pressed data. An average speed of over 200 MB/s was achieved and the calculated relative
speed was 1.80, meaning that Vestigium processed all data almost twice as fast than the time
required to solely read disk contents sequentially. This result was faster than that achieved
during M57-Patents scenario testing (1.15). The differences between relative speed can be
explained by a smaller number of logically grouped data (e.g., allocated and unallocated data
files, including Registry hive files). A final efficiency test was conducted using a laptop com-
puter in place of the specified desktop system used in all other efficiency testing. The test
was conducted to illustrate the speed and flexibility of the implemented system, being able
to be executed as a field-based response triage tool. It was shown that there were minimal
differences between efficiency results in the two systems, even when the laptop solution has a
disk read speed of only 32.8 MB/s, compared to 119.6 MB/s on the desktop system. However,
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there was a dramatic difference in relative speed, the field laptop reaching a score of over 6.00.
Ultimately, the metadata analysis approach implemented in this research has proven to be
efficient even when operating on a computer with minimal resources.
Real-world data set testing was the final step in the evaluation of the system design and
the final element of the Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) process model. The
specified research objectives first raised in Chapter 4 can now be addressed.
7.7 Overview of Achieved Research Objectives
The high-level and various lower-level objectives previously set out have been methodologically
worked through to a resolution. System demonstration earlier solved lower-level research
objectives one and two (see Section 6.7). The evaluation and associated experimental testing
results presented in this chapter has aided in providing results to address lower-level research
objectives three, four, five and six. This section outlines the progress made regarding each
stated research objective.
Lower-level Research Objective Three: To establish an effective and efficient
automated technique to generate a metadata representation of the target data set
Functionality of the method used to parse, extract and generate a metadata representation
for the file system and Windows Registry evidence sources was proven during demonstration.
A thorough evaluation of target data set processing was then performed in this chapter in-
cluding determining effectiveness of the underlying tools used in the system implementation
and efficiency of the implementation with comparison to other similar solutions. Overall,
the XML-based approach, using fiwalk and CellXML-Registry tools, can be considered
successful at generating a representation of both file system and Registry entries. File system
effectiveness was achieved using fiwalk, a robust and thoroughly tested file system parsing
tool. However, system efficiency was initially problematic due to the computational overhead
of hashing all entries. This was resolved by implementing selective file hashing which
reduced the time required to process file system entries while maintaining detection effective-
ness. In terms of Registry processing, CellXML-Registry proved effective at parsing and
generating the revised RegXML syntax for later matching. Specifically, CellXML-Registry
proved effective at recovering and detecting deleted Registry entries (see Section 7.2.3.3) from
the known uninstalled XP Keylogger tool from the M57-Patents scenario. Furthermore,
comparison to previous approaches indicated that CellXML-Registry extracted more cor-
rect Registry entries compared to the hivexml tool (see Table 7.18). Although some errors
were encountered in both tools, all were rectified during the course of the testing process.
Overall, the evaluation of target data set processing encompassed two large and diverse data
sets, thousands of Registry hive files and approximately 50 million Registry entries. Testing
on such a sizeable and varied data set proved that the solution presented in this research was
justifiably robust to carry out target data set processing.
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Lower-level Research Objective Four: To determine effective and efficient
automated methods to correctly detect relevant digital artifacts from a target data
set using the known content from a reference set
The system design included a total of eight matching methods (five for file system entries and
three for Registry entries) to perform detection of digital artifacts on the target data set using
the application profile of known content as a reference set (see Section 5.5.3). Each matching
method prescribed different metadata properties to achieve matching depending on the artifact
type. Functionality of the matching methods was observed during system demonstration and
results showed that only relevant digital artifacts were detected by Vestigium. Similar
results were achieved during system evaluation. A high proportion of correctly detected
digital artifacts was observed (true positives), while a low number of incorrctly detected
digital artifact was observed (false negatives). The only false positive results were due to
erroneous application profile entries for the CCleaner tool (see Section 7.2.2). This was
rectified by updating the static blacklist used in LiveDiff to exclude the known irrelevant
entries. Overall, the use of rich metadata correlation for detecting digital artifacts was a
technique previously not implemented but which has proven to be successful. The metadata
matching methods proved effective at detecting a high proportion of relevant artifacts, while
still providing enough flexibility to perform correlation in complex matching scenarios.
Lower-level research objectives five and six are related objectives. The objectives spec-
ified that digital artifact matching should be achievable in two complex matching scenar-
ios: 1) When detecting digital artifacts from different application software versions (e.g.,
TrueCrypt version 6.3a versus TrueCrypt version 7.1a); and 2) When detecting the same,
or different, application software version on different operating system versions (e.g., detecting
TrueCrypt on Windows XP and Windows Vista when the application profile was authored
on Windows 7). The primary goal of lower-level objectives five and six was to reduce the
requirement of creating an application profile for every application version on every operating
system version, a time-consuming process. Both objectives are discussed below.
Lower-level Research Objective Five: To determine effective and efficient
techniques to perform detection of digital artifacts created by different application
software versions
The results from M57-Patents scenario reported that Vestigium was able to detect a differ-
ent anti-forensic tool version on a different operating system for all tested anti-forensic tools.
However, CCleaner and TrueCrypt had much higher recall rates, while Eraser reported
low recall scores. Investigation revealed that this was caused by a complete tool rewrite be-
tween the tested Eraser versions. Nevertheless, Vestigium was still capable of detecting
digital artifacts from Eraser on the M57-Patents scenario, albeit a low number, even af-
ter the tool was completely re-authored. Since the detected digital artifacts are considered
unique to the tool, even a low detection rate provides sufficient evidence of anti-forensic tool
presence. Real-world data set testing detected CCleaner on one disk image with a different
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version than that used to author the application profile. Although a low recall score was
again reported, the uniqueness of the detected digital artifacts still determined anti-forensic
tool presence, the primary goal of the system created in this research. Compared to other
solutions, especially the de facto technique of hash set analysis, Vestigium proved much
more effective at performing digital artifact detection between application versions (see Sec-
tion 7.2.1.2). Overall, based on the findings achieved, lower-level research objective five is
considered solved.
The findings also provided interesting information regarding application software be-
haviour between released versions. Some software versions may introduce only slight changes
(e.g., TrueCrypt version 6.3a and 7.1a), while other software differ greatly between newly
revised versions (e.g., Eraser 5.8.7 and 6.2.0). Unfortunately, such variations are difficult to
gauge without in-depth knowledge of the application or thorough research. However, based
on the outcomes from this research, the author suggests that an application profile should be
created every 1–2 years for a specific anti-forensic tool (or other application software). This
time-frame should provide an application profile which continues to be effective in a range of
investigation scenarios.
Lower-level Research Objective Six: To determine effective and efficient tech-
niques to perform detection of application software artifacts on different Windows
operating system versions
Matching digital artifacts between Windows operating system versions is difficult to due
changes in where and how information is logically stored within the file system and Registry.
Lower-level research objective six called for the system to detect application software (anti-
forensic tools) between different Windows operating system versions. This was primarily
achieved using path normalisation to transform known variable content in the absolute
path for all application profile and target data set entries. Results showed that a much higher
proportion of both file system and Registry entries were detectable using the full path property
when path normalisation was used (see Figure 7.2). Given these results and effectiveness of
path normalisation, lower-level research objective six can be considered solved.
7.8 Conclusion
System evaluation has resulted in thorough experimental testing to determine the effectiveness
and efficiency of the solution proposed in this research. First, a public data set was used to
provide research reproducibility and the ability for other researchers to build on the material
presented during this thesis. Second, a real-world data set comprised of second-hand hard
drives was used to provide more diverse and unpredictable data, leading to a more robust
research output and rigorously tested forensic tools. Throughout the evaluation, comparisons
were made to other similar forensic analysis approaches highlighting the strengths and weak-
nesses of the system design. The results presented in this chapter were assembled to establish
if the research objectives had been satisfied. Based on all the testing and evaluation, the
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findings of the system design presented in this research can be considered successful; that
is, automating detection of digital artifacts from anti-forensic tools, leading to reporting the
presence of specific applications of a target data set. In addition, digital forensic triage re-
quirements have been met, maintaining acceptable levels of effectiveness and computational
efficiency, while also producing initial examination output.
The next chapter finalises the research conducted by reviewing the high-level research
objective and assessing the success of the system design. Future development of the authored
tools herein is an important extension and by-product of the research, while at the same time





Digital forensics is a branch of forensic science that involves the investigation of any digital or
electronic source. Digital forensic triage is an investigation technique that involves the iden-
tification of case targets of evidential value and their prioritisation for further analysis, most
often performed under significant time and resource constraints. This research has contributed
to advancement of the fundamental technology used to perform rapid and automated digital
forensic triage to detect the presence, or absence, of anti-forensic tools on a target system. It
enables an investigator to quickly identify systems which contain anti-forensic tools, hacking
tools or any other software that may be potentially misused. Once identified, further in-depth
analysis can be performed on the identified and prioritised targets of forensic interest.
This research project was undertaken using the Design Science Research Methodology
(DSRM) process model (Peffers et al., 2007). The model specifies for research to be conducted
in a sequence of stages based on process elements. Firstly, the research area was introduced
including a high-level overview of research motivation, methodology, contribution and docu-
ment structure (see Chapter 1). Pertinent background information regarding digital forensics
and anti-forensics then followed (see Chapter 2) augmented by further literature that related
specifically to the selected topic of interest including previous anti-forensic detection research,
system-level reverse engineering and automated forensic analysis techniques (see Chapter 3).
A research methodology was subsequently documented, identifying research problems from
the literature review, formulating research objectives and informaing the development of an
experimental testing method (see Chapter 4).
The objective of this research was to design and implement a solution to perform auto-
mated detection of digital artifacts from application software (specifically, anti-forensic tools)
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on a target data set, which, to reiterate, led to the high-level research objective as follows:
High-level Research Objective: To enable effective, automated detection of
relevant digital artifacts to identify application software presence on a target data
set. The solution must adhere to digital forensic triage requirements including high
system efficiency and initial forensic examination output
In order to achieve the high-level research objective, a system architecture was proposed,
thereafter designed and implemented. The system is comprised of two main stages: 1) Auto-
mated identification of relevant digital artifacts from anti-forensic tools leading to the creation
of an application profile of known, relevant and unique digital artifacts; and 2) Automated
correlation between the application profile(s) and a target data set leading to detection of dig-
ital artifacts and evidence of anti-forensic presence, or absence (see Chapter 5). The system
design was then developed in the form of software, specifically, a collection of forensic tools.
The demonstration phase of the process took place in a laboratory controlled environment
to confirm that the functionality did indeed address the research objective (see Chapter 6).
Application profiles were created for three anti-forensic tools and a collection of data reduction
techniques were trialled to filter irrelevant operating system noise. From the results of testing
and lessons learned a revised method was proposed which led to a final set of profiles being
created for experimental testing. A known data set, authored in a laboratory environment
to demonstrate the digital artifact matching stage of the system implementation, led to the
achievement of the low-level research objectives relating to effectiveness of application profile
creation methods (see Section 6.7).
According to Peffers et al. (2007), the evaluation phase of design science includes observing
and measuring how well the designed artifact, in this case, the computer software, supports
a solution by comparing the research objectives to the observed results using relevant met-
rics and analysis techniques. The system was thus evaluated to determine effectiveness and
efficiency in a real-world investigation scenario (see Chapter 7). Two data sets were used for
evaluation: 1) A public data set to provide research reproducibility; and 2) A real-world data
set comprised of second-hand hard drives with unknown content providing unpredictable and
diverse data.
A selection of system requirements were specified on which to aid the subsequent evalua-
tion of the research objective (see Section 4.2.2.1). In addition, criteria to determine system
effectiveness and efficiency were also specified and then applied (see Section 4.2.5). Through-
out the evaluation phase, effectiveness and efficiency metrics were calculated to determine the
capability of the implemented system, and the following outcomes were accomplished:
• Effectiveness: The system was able to detect a high-number of relevant digital artifacts
from target data sets in a variety of investigation scenarios. Ultimately, the results
dictated that the system was capable of determining the presence (or absence) of anti-
forensic tools with a significant level of effectiveness.
• Efficiency: The system was able to operate at a satisfactory level of efficiency when
processing the target data sets during system evaluation. The results showed that
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an overall relative speed of 0.53 was obtained, meaning the system is able to analyse
evidence at a rate faster than that required to only perform a forensic acquisition of the
target device.
• Automation: The system design was focused on a high-level of automation for digital
artifact identification and detection. The only stage of the system design which requires
manual intervention was during application profile creation, where the application life
cycle must be manually created. This was earlier anticipated to be the case, and overall,
the system provides a highly automated analysis solution.
• Triage: The requirements of performing a partial forensic examination output was
achieved by the system design, producing metadata reports for file system and Reg-
istry evidence sources for later post-processing and in-depth analysis. Furthermore, the
system is capable of the fundamental triage requirement of identification of targets of
interest by detecting anti-forensic tool presence.
Based on the system requirements, evaluation criteria and observed evaluation metrics the
high-level research objective can be deemed achieved given the results and outcomes attained
in this research.
8.1 Tool Development Contributions
The implemented system has required the creation of a number of tools to accomplish the
desired functionality, specified based on the system design, as well as advancement of pre-
existing tools. This section provides a summary of all software tools produced throughout the
course of the research and then specifies future development opportunities for each tool.
1) Vestigium: an automated forensic analysis framework designed to ingest application
profile(s) and a target data set (forensic disk image). The tool generates metadata
reports to represent the original evidence sources and performs digital artifact matching
on each input
2) LiveDiff: a portable live file system-level differencing tool for the Microsoft Windows
platform, specifically designed to automate reverse engineering of application software
for forensic analysis purposes
3) apxml.py: an Application Programming Interface (API) written in Python to pro-
vide read and write functionality to the APXML data abstraction, namely application
profiles. Additionally, a collection of scripts are included with the project to automate
processing of APXML documents including tools to perform application profile inter-
section and post-mortem dynamic blacklisting testing
4) CellXML-Registry: a portable Windows Registry parsing tool for the Microsoft
Windows platform, designed to extract allocated and unallocated (deleted) Registry
entries and populate in the standardised RegXML data abstraction
The Vesitigum tool was designed as a proof-of-concept tool to provide the functionality
to automate various independent components of the system design. At the conclusion of
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this research it is thought that future development by the author for the Vestigium tool
is unlikely. Instead, the author envisions implementing the techniques used in Vestigium,
especially file system matching, into other tools to provide run-time detection as well as multi-
platform analysis; for example, fiwalk could be extended to ingest APXML documents and
search file system metadata while extracting entries. This could also provide a multi-platform
solution capable of OS X and Linux analysis. Nevertheless, Vestigium will remain publicly
available for other researchers to build on its advanced metadata matching methods.
The overall effectiveness of the LiveDiff tool in cooperation with the APXML data
abstraction was evident in various testing scenarios presented in this research. Compared
to previous approaches, LiveDiff provides an exceptionally simple and rapid approach to
reverse engineering application software using differential analysis to determine file system-
level and Registry-level changes. The automated data collection proved a great deal more
efficient compared to currently available post-mortem techniques, while still retaining effective
digital artifact identification. Furthermore, the APXML data abstraction provides extensive
metadata, especially when compared to other output from similar reverse engineering tools, for
example Regshot. Given the advantages of LiveDiff, the author fully expects continued
development of the tool will take place. Supplementary to the functionality discussed in this
research, the author has already further advanced the utility of the tool. Support has been
included for block-based hashing of data files1 and inclusion of entropy calculation for each
block segment2. These additions provide the ability to create an application profile with
512 or 4096 byte size block hashing using the MD5 algorithm. Informal testing has already
been performed and the resultant APXML document can be directly read into the hashdb
tool and subsequently processed using bulk_extractor. These scenarios demonstrate the
performance prospects and potential future usefulness of the LiveDiff tool. In addition, any
modifications to LiveDiff would likely result in needed updates to the apxml.py modules,
another project the author is keen to promote.
The CellXML-Registry tool proved effective and efficient at extracting and docu-
menting Windows Registry entries in the RegXML data abstraction. The revised RegXML
CellObject format implemented in CellXML-Registry provided more functionality than
the previous nested structure and proved easy to parse and search. Continued development
would be an advantage to future research, especially to implement changes when the underly-
ing Registry parser library is updated. However, the author does not envisage any major
functionality updates as the software itself provides the required Registry parsing capability.
The fiwalk tool was used in this research to perform file system processing, specifically to
parse the file allocation table and generate metadata for each entry. While the tool was not
developed in this research, bug fixes and modifications were performed and a cross-compilation
method for Microsoft Windows was documented. According to the tool creator, Simson
Garfinkel, development of fiwalk has ceased and requires continued development to fully




has decided on, and begun, further development of the tool including the following goals:
1) Development of a Visual Studio project for native Windows compilation; 2) Support for
64-bit binaries; 3) Inclusion of a more efficient file hashing implementation; and 4) Potential
multi-threading support to improve computational efficiency.
8.2 Research Limitations
As with any research project, there were limitations on what and how much was possible to
accomplish due to time and resource constraints. During the course of the work, a number
of limitations were identified by the author in terms of system design and implementation.
Additionally, due to the research scope, various experimental testing limitations were also
apparent during demonstration and evaluation of the implemented system. The following
subsections provide an overview of the limitations encountered.
8.2.1 System Design and Implementation Limitations
The primary system design limitation identified by the author is that the solution was designed
specifically for the Microsoft Windows XP operating system and newer versions. This is true
for both stages of the system design; that is, digital artifact identification using LiveDiff
and digital artifact matching using Vestigium. Inclusion of the Windows Registry as an
evidence source is only feasible on Windows-based operating systems (as it is a Windows-only
component) and the solution cannot be easily transferred to other operating system types;
for example, Apple OS X uses property lists (plists) to store system, user and application
configuration information. The underlying concepts to perform the file system portion of
differencing and matching are transferable to other operating system types, but would require
modification to the authored tools.
Another limitation of the presented system design is the inclusion of only two evidence
sources; that is, the file system and Windows Registry. Other researchers have stated that
additional sources of evidence would potentially augment detection of application software
(Garfinkel, 2010). Two examples are volatile memory (e.g., RAM dumps) and network traffic
(e.g., network packet captures). Another consideration is that suitable forensic data abstrac-
tions (similar to DFXML) have yet to be authored that are able to reliably represent each
evidence source. The same problem exists for property lists, where no forensic data abstrac-
tions are available to suitably represent and process the contained evidence. Nevertheless,
this research did amalgamate four digital artifact types (directories, files, Registry keys and
values) into a reference set and provided a highly automated processing method. Similar
solutions in digital forensics perform matching by solely using files and hash values.
In terms of data file matching, more advanced hashing functions have recently been devel-
oped and slowly integrated into existing known and reliable forensic analysis techniques (see
Section 3.3.2). It is conceivable that the use of block-based hashing or approximate match-
ing (using similarity digests) may have the potential to aid data file detection, especially in
complex matching scenarios, such as with data files that differ between versions. However,
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present research using either solution has not been addressed as a means of application soft-
ware detection. Instead, researchers have focussed on the use of block-based hashing to detect
residual data files (Jones et al., 2015), and similarity digests to detect similar versions of com-
mon document formats and images (Garfinkel & McCarrin, 2015). The primary reason for
excluding advanced hashing algorithms was that the objective in this research specified for a
solution that would be suitable for rapid triage, a goal that would be difficult to achieve with
modern hashing solutions that have low efficiency (compared to traditional hash functions).
The detection of portable application software was also not included in the system design.
Portable applications do not require installation and are invoked directly from a transferable
executable file. The LiveDiff and CellXML-Registry tools authored in this research are
examples of portable applications, requiring no installation and a single executable to operate
both tools. Since portable applications can be stored in any file system location, detection
using full path values would require modification. However, a new matching method could
be added to Vestigium which would be similar to the File Deleted and File Hash matching
methods. Detection of similar files would be difficult as the new method would require an exact
hash match, however, a potential solution would be inclusion of block-based or approximate
matching algorithms in this scenario. A related limitation is varying file system paths that a
user may install software to; that is, not using the default application installer path. If a user
installed software in a non-default location this may cause detection issues. An additional
method could solve the detection problem but would require further research.
Neither the LiveDiff or Vestigium tool provide complete multi-platform support.
LiveDiff is a Windows only tool. Vestigium has potential for multi-platform support as
the primary language is written in Python and available on most modern desktop computer
systems. However, the underlying CellXML-Registry tool used for parsing Registry hive
files is Windows only, due to reliance on the .NET framework. Providing support for investi-
gators to operate forensic analysis tools on any major platform (e.g., Windows, Linux and OS
X) is definitely an advantage, but due to scope and time constraints, multi-platform support
was not feasible for this research project.
The resultant software artifacts produced in this research were authored as proof-of-
concept tools and although all were tested on three data sets, millions of digital artifacts
and on different Windows versions, the tools are still experimental and potentially not con-
sidered to be fully reliable for real-world digital investigations. Further testing and community
feedback would greatly add to future development, tool refinement and undiscovered bugs.
Finally, design and implementation of a Graphical User Interface (GUI) would likely ease
technical requirements of operating all of the developed tools. However, the purpose of this
research was development and testing of a solution for the identified problem area, not devel-
opment of a solution applicable for investigators with low technical knowledge.
8.2.2 System Demonstration, Evaluation and Testing Limitations
In addition to the limitations outlined for the designed and implemented system, a variety of
limitations were also identified in the experimental testing portion of this research. Again,
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the limitations were due to scope of the research conducted, as well as what was achievable
in the available time frame.
A range of data sets were used for experimental testing including: 1) A laboratory con-
trolled testing environment using specifically authored known content; 2) A publicly available
data set to provide reproducible results; and 3) A real-world data set with diverse and un-
predictable data to provide more robust research output. Even though the data sets used
for experimental testing were varied and contained a large number of investigation scenarios,
testing will always benefit from the inclusion of additional data sets and the different testing
scenarios that they would present (though to what extent this would confirm or shift the
research conclusions is unknown).
A more important experimental testing limitation centers around the fact that a limit
of three anti-forensic tools were selected and used for testing (four in later testing when
xp-keylogger was included). The author decided to perform a thorough in-depth analysis
of a small number of tools rather than opting to perform a lesser analysis of an increased
number of tools. Selecting three primary tools allowed the author to perform a very rigorous
review of each tool, as well as the inclusion of testing multiple phases in the application life
cycle. Detailed analysis was also performed on the detection of deleted and residual digital
artifacts, a scenario rarely covered in similar research, which again was only possible given
that only three tools were included. Nevertheless, the research conducted would benefit by
widening the scope and challenge with experimental testing of more anti-forensic tools, as well
as other types of application software. This is true for both the digital artifact identification
and the digital artifact matching stages. Further testing of a wider range of software may yield
interesting findings and ultimately inform overall improvements to the implemented system
in terms of both effectiveness and efficiency.
Another experimental testing limitation was not including analysis of Solid State Drives
(SSDs), especially in terms of the ability to automate detection of residual (deleted) data. The
prevalence of SSDs in digital investigations introduces challenges during forensic examination
and analysis, especially in terms of the recovery of deleted data files, and also deleted Registry
entries. General digital forensics data recovery techniques also suffer from this issue, and it
was decided to not include this topic primarily to the scope of the research performed. In
addition to forensic analysis of SSDs as target devices, it is likely in the future that SSDs will
become common-place in investigator’s analysis systems – providing dramatically increased
hard drive read speed capabilities and combating sequential read speed issues observed in
traditional hard drives. Again, this was not investigated due to the research scope.
8.3 Future Research
The preceding discussion regarding research limitations has provided insight regarding inter-
esting aspects of the research performed and has highlighted areas that would benefit from
future research. This section now focusses on prospective research areas for continued devel-
opment and extension of the solution presented in this research. Furthermore, other practical
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uses of the research output are put forward regarding the integration of the techniques de-
signed in this research for forensic analysis projects.
Adopting the LiveDiff tool designed in this research may benefit the NIST Diskprint
project as, according to Jones et al. (2015), enhanced computation is specified as a future
research goal. Compared to the post-mortem data collection method implemented in the
Diskprint project, automated live data collection using LiveDiff could accelerate Diskprint
creation time. It was also stated that another future goal related to operating system noise re-
duction during data collection. The techniques of application profile intersection and dynamic
blacklisting designed in this research have demonstrated proven effectiveness and efficiency
and would easily be transferable to the Diskprint project.
Grier and Richard III (2015) proposed a new approach to digital evidence acquisition
using a technique called sifting collectors. Regions of a disk with expected forensic value
are selectively collected using profiles to specify digital artifacts of potential forensic value;
for example, a profile for collecting email information may contain: 1) Known file extensions
(e.g., .pst, .ost and .pab); 2) Known directories (e.g., Thunderbird/profiles); and
3) Registry hives (e.g., NTUSER.DAT). It is envisioned that contributions made in this
research could be leveraged to aid sifting collectors. Application profiles could be readily
used to generate a sifting collector profile for anti-forensic tools which would extract only
potentially relevant artifacts during data acquisition. Also, sifting collectors may benefit from
the path normalisation technique designed herein, allowing a sifting collector profile to be
executed against different Windows versions where file locations differ.
Performing forensic analysis using metadata is a common investigation technique due to
performance efficiency. Furthermore, it is an advantage to process metadata and extract log-
ically grouped data (e.g., documents and emails) as it represents how people view electronic
data. While this research used metadata to represent logically grouped data to provide iden-
tification of application software presence, further research is required to prove the reliability
of metadata generation tools. Nelson, Steggall, and Long (2014) performed a comparative
analysis of metadata generation tools for the XBOX 360 file system. They discovered discrep-
ancies in how tools processed file system entries and reported the data, finding inconsistencies
in reported file locations. Furthermore, a co-operative mode was specified where output of
multiple metadata generation tools could verify correct evidence representation using a con-
sensus approach. The solutions presented in this research (CellXML-Registry), and other
digital forensic metadata generations tools, would benefit from additional testing and compar-
ison of resultant extracted metadata. Specifically, the author noted discrepancies in Windows
Registry parsing tools which would benefit from a similar metadata comparison study.
Finally, the use of advanced forensic hashing techniques (block-based hashing and approximate
matching) requires investigation for applicability to detect similar files from different versions
of application software. This could include executables (e.g., .exe), installers (e.g., .exe),
libraries (e.g., .dll) and shortcut files (e.g., .lnk). Thus far, none of the mentioned file types
have been analysed to determine suitability of block-based hashing or approximate matching
to perform detection. Future research could analyse data files created by different application
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versions and determine if either solution could aid detection.
8.4 Conclusion
This research has contributed to advancement of the fundamental technology used to perform
automated forensic triage of investigation targets to identify and prioritise digital evidence
sources of potential value. Specifically, this research aimed to perform automated effective
and efficient identification of anti-forensic tools on a target data set. It provides the capability
to execute the implemented system against a potentially large number of investigation targets
and be returned results of possible latent anti-forensic tool activity. It also enables identifi-
cation of potentially interesting targets and the prioritisation of further in-depth analysis on
forensically interesting devices.
A new method for application profile creation was implemented and tested that provides
a high level of automation for both profile creation and the removal of irrelevant operating
system noise. Based on results achieved, the solution is both more effective and more efficient
when compared to previous and current solutions used the field of digital forensics. A new
method for automated digital artifact correlation was implemented and tested that performs
detection of anti-forensic tools to determine the presence, or otherwise, on a target data set.
In contrast to similar solutions, the system uses rich metadata to perform digital artifact
matching, thus enabling more effective detection than de facto hash set analysis techniques
as well as inclusion of more evidence sources such as the evidence-rich Windows Registry.
A collection of novel theoretical contributions have been made throughout this project
with experimental testing results to prove capability. Contributions include: 1) An automated
system-level reverse engineering method to rapidly create application profile reference sets; 2)
Dynamic blacklisting to filter irrelevant operating system noise when performing system-level
reverse engineering to identify digital artifacts from application software; 3) Advanced digital
artifact matching methods to correlate file system and Registry artifacts and perform matching
in complex scenarios. Furthermore, all system design elements have been implemented in the
form of computer software which are available under open source licenses to promote further
advancement for improvements, research and development.
The 21st century has seen a huge gain in the momentum of the information age, a time in
human history that is greatly influenced by computerisation that affects most aspects of our
society. In the 1980s personal computers had become widespread. Soon after, the Internet
was born and has now expanded into being part of everyday life. It is now commonplace to
carry a portable Internet-enabled personal computer in one’s pocket, a smart phone, or have
instant connection for a myriad of digital devices such as tablet and laptop computers. Due to
this rapidly changing technological ecosystem, computer related crime has become pervasive.
Although a relatively new field, digital forensic investigation is now the accepted norm in civil
and criminal cases. Continued research and development is vital to combat cybercrime and
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Appendix A provides supplementary material concerning the research methodology specified
in this project. Figure A.1 documents the original ethical approval granted by the University
of Otago for the analysis of second-hand hard drives. Figure A.2 documents the addition of
the author to the approved project.
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Figure A.1: Ethical approval granted for research involving second-hand hard drives
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Appendix B provides additional relevant documentation regarding the system design presented
in Chapter 5. The following list specifies all included material:
1. Section B.1 documents the complete Registry differential analysis algorithm used in
LiveDiff
2. Section B.2 documents a comparison between Regshot and LiveDiff source code
3. Section B.3 documents additional APXML data abstraction information including ex-
amples of the creator and metadata elements and a working example of a populated
APXML document for the TrueCrypt tool
4. Section B.4 provides additional information regarding the apxml.py API for process-
ing APXML documents including an example script to print statistics from an input
APXML document and an example script to convert an APXML document to the CSV
file format
5. Section B.5 provides the full source code for the HiveExtractor.pymodule to extract
Registry hive files from a target data set
6. Section B.6 documents source code and programming functions added to the Registry
parser library used in the CellXML-Registry tool
7. Section B.7 provides the complete source code for the path normalisation modules de-
signed and implemented for use in the Vestigium tool
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B.1 Windows Registry Differencing Algorithm
Algorithm 2 Differential analysis strategy for Windows Registry entries
1: procedure CompareRegistry
2: for each KEYCONTENT in Snapshot1 (KC1) do
3: for each KEYCONTENT in Snapshot2 (KC2) do
4: if (KC2 has previously been matched) then skip KC2
5: else KC2 is a matching key
6: end if
7: for each VALUECONTENT in KC1->FisrtVC (V C1) do
8: for each VALUECONTENT in KC2->FisrtVC (V C2) do
9: if (V C2 has not been matched) then continue
10: end if
11: if (V C2 type does not equal V C1 type) then continue
12: end if
13: if (V C2 name does not equal V C1 name) then continue
14: end if
15: if (V C2 data equals V C1 data) then V C2 is matched
16: else V C2 is modified
17: end if




22: for each VALUECONTENT in KC2->FisrtVC (V C2) do
23: if (V C2 is not matched) then V C2 is new value
24: end if
25: end for
26: if (KC1->FisrtSubKC OR KC2->FisrtSubKC then ComapreRegistry()
27: end if
28: end for
29: if (KC2 is null) then KC1 is deleted
30: for each VALUECONTENT in KC1->FisrtVC (V C1) do





36: for each KEYCONTENT in Snapshot2 (KC2) do
37: if (KC2 has previously been matched) then skip KC2
38: end if
39: for each VALUECONTENT in KC2->FisrtVC (V C2) do






B.2 Comparison of LiveDiff versus Regshot
LiveDiff is authored in the C programming language. The source code from the Regshot
project was used as a foundation on which to build LiveDiff. Three source code files from
the Regshot project were identified and modified to create LiveDiff: 1) fileshot.c to
collection a snapshot of the local file system and compare two snapshots; 2) regshot.c to
collection a snapshot of the HKLM and HKU Registry hive files and compare two snapshots;
and 3) global.h contains global methods, structures and variables. A total of four source
code files were authored specifically for LiveDiff: 1) blacklist.c; 2) dfxml.c; 3)
livediff.c; and 3) output.c.
It is important to ascertain the differences between the amount of copied source code and
re-implemented (or modified) source code taken from Regshot to build LiveDiff. The
following listing provides a count of the number of lines for each source code file (either a .c
or .h file) from the LiveDiff tool:









The following listing provides a count of the number of lines for each source code file (either
a .c or .h file) from the Regshot tool:














The first Regshot source code file used was global.h. The following listing displays the
source code line counts for each global.c file from LiveDiff and then Reghsot. In total,
global.h has 347 lines added and 322 lines removed from the source code file. This is
approximately half of the entire source code. The remaining unmodified code is primarily
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the structures used for data storage during application operation (e.g., FILECONTENT,
KEYCONTENT, VALUECONTENT struct definitions).
$ diff -b -u livediff/global.h regshot/global.h | grep -E ’^\+’ | wc -l
347
$ diff -b -u regshot/global.h livediff/global.h | grep -E ’^\+’ | wc -l
322
The modifications made to fileshot.c and regshot.c were much more detailed. Table
B.1 displays an overview of the code modifications for each programming function in the
fileshot.c source code file. The table includes the programming function name, if it is
included in Regshot and/or LiveDiff, lines added from modification and lines removed
after modification.
Table B.1: Overview of fileshot.c functions
Function Name RegShot LiveDiff Added Lines Removed Lines
CalculateSHA1() 3 61 0
ClearFileMatchFlags() 3 3 0 0
ClearHeadFileMatchFlags() 3 3 0 0
CompareFiles() 3 3 35 20
CompareHeadFiles() 3 3 0 0
DirChainMatch() 3 3 0 0
FileShot() 3 3 18 3
FindDirChain() 3 3 0 0
FreeAllFileContents() 3 3 1 12
FreeAllHeadFiles() 3 3 0 0
GetFilesSnap() 3 3 67 65
GetWholeFileName() 3 3 0 0
LoadFiles() 3 3 39 20
LoadHeadFiles() 3 3 0 0
SaveFiles() 3 3 33 29
SaveHeadFiles() 3 3 7 6
SearchDirChain() 3 3 0 0
Total 261 155
Table B.2 displays an overview of the code modifications for each programming function in
the regshot.c source code file. The table includes the programming function name, if it
is included in Regshot and/or LiveDiff, lines added from modification and lines removed
after modification.
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Table B.2: Overview of regshot.c functions
Function Name RegShot LiveDiff Added Lines Removed Lines
AdjustBuffer() 3 3 0 0
CheckShotsChronology() 3 7 0 65
ClearRegKeyMatchFlags() 3 3 0 0
CompareRegKeys() 3 3 17 21
CompareShots() 3 3 2 22
CreateNewResult() 3 3 2 3
DisplayResultInfo() 3 7 0 26
DisplayShotInfo() 3 7 0 45
EmptyFileBuffer() 3 7 0 7
FreeAllCompResults() 3 3 13 3
FreeAllKeyContents() 3 3 14 5
FreeAllValueContents() 3 3 5 3
FreeCompareResult() 3 3 2 2
FreeShot() 3 3 7 2
GetRegistrySnap() 3 3 76 56
GetValueDataType() 7 3 17 0
GetWholeKeyName() 3 3 5 9
GetWholeValueData() 3 7 0 81
GetWholeValueName() 3 3 6 22
LoadRegKeys() 3 3 28 20
LoadShot() 3 3 128 44
OutputComparisonResult() 3 7 0 187
ParseValueData() 7 3 108 0
RegShot() 7 3 46 0
ResultToString() 3 7 0 115
SaveRegKeys() 3 3 48 33
SaveShot() 3 3 69 24
Shot() 3 7 0 71
SwapShots() 3 7 0 7
TransData() 3 7 0 161
TransformValueData 7 3 150 0
WriteFileBuffer() 3 7 0 82
Total 28 21 743 1,116
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B.3 APXML Data Abstraction
This section provides supplementary information regarding the Application Profile XML
(APXML) data abstraction. Additionally, a short working example of a partially populated
APXML document for the TrueCrypt tool is also provided. Listing B.1 displays an unpop-
ulated creator element with all available XML tags.
1 <c r ea t o r version=’ 1 .0 ’>
2 <program>LiveD i f f . exe</program>
3 <version>1 . 0 . 0</version>
4 <build_environment>
5 <compi ler></ compi le r>




10 <os_re l ea se></ os_re l ea se>






17 </ c r e a t o r>
Listing B.1: Example of the Application Profile XML creator element
Listing B.2 displays an example of an populated metadata element with all available XML
tags. The listing provides the default XML namespace attributes that are required to correctly
parse an APXML document.
1 <metadata
2 xmlns:dfxml=’ h t tp : //www. f o r e n s i c sw i k i . org /wik i /
Category:Digital_Forensics_XML ’
3 xmlns:regxml=’ h t tp : //www. f o r e n s i c sw i k i . org /wik i /RegXML ’
4 xmlns :de l ta=’ h t tp : //www. f o r e n s i c sw i k i . org /wik i /
Forens ic_Disk_Dif ferenc ing ’
5 xmlns :x s i=’ h t tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema−i n s t anc e ’
6 xmlns:dc=’ h t tp : // pur l . org /dc/ e lements /1 .1/ ’ >
7 <dc : type>Appl i ca t ion P r o f i l e</ dc : type>
8 <dc : pub l i s h e r>thomaslaurenson . com</ dc : pub l i s h e r>
9 <dc :date>2015−07−31T10:30:10 −0800</ dc :date>
10 <app l i c a t i o n name="TrueCrypt" version=" 7 .1 a"></ app l i c a t i o n>
11 <metadata>
Listing B.2: Example of the Application Profile XML metadata element
Listing B.3 displays a partially populated APXML document for the TrueCrypt anti-forensic
tool. Two FileObjects and two CellObjects are provided.
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1 <?xml version=" 1 .0 " ?>
2 <apxml version=" ’ 1 . 0 . 0 ’ " xmlns=" h t t p s : // github . com/ thomaslaurenson /
apxml_schema" xmlns:dc=" ht tp : // pur l . org /dc/ e lements /1 .1/ " xmlns :de l ta="
ht tp : //www. f o r e n s i c sw i k i . org /wik i / Forens ic_Disk_Dif ferenc ing " xmlns :x s i="
ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema−i n s t anc e ">
3 <f i l e o b j e c t d e l t a : n ew_f i l e="1">








12 <app_state>i n s t a l l</app_state>
13 </ f i l e o b j e c t>
14 </ f i l e o b j e c t>
15 <c e l l o b j e c t de l t a :new_ce l l="1">
16 <c e l l p a t h>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Cla s s e s \AppID\TrueCrypt Format . exe</ c e l l p a t h>
17 <cellpath_norm>so f tware \ c l a s s e s \appid\ t ruec rypt format . exe</cellpath_norm
>
18 <name_type>k</name_type>
19 <a l l o c>1</ a l l o c>
20 <mtime>2016−01−28T19:37:02Z</mtime>
21 <app_name>TrueCrypt</app_name>
22 <app_state>i n s t a l l</app_state>
23 </ c e l l o b j e c t>
24 <c e l l o b j e c t de l t a :new_ce l l="1">
25 <c e l l p a t h>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Cla s s e s \AppID\TrueCrypt Format . exe \AppId</
c e l l p a t h>




29 <a l l o c>1</ a l l o c>
30 <data_type>REG_SZ</data_type>
31 <data>{777DCDFD−C330−480B−B582−B02B57580CC9}</data>
32 <data_raw>7B 00 37 00 37 00 37 00 44 00 43 00 44 00 46 00 44 00 2D 00 43
00 33 00 33 00 30 00 2D 00 34 00 38 00 30 00 42 00 2D 00 42 00 35 00
38 00 32 00 2D 00 42 00 30 00 32 00 42 00 35 00 37 00 35 00 38 00 30
00 43 00 43 00 39 00 7D 00 00 00</data_raw>
33 <app_name>TrueCrypt</app_name>
34 <app_state>i n s t a l l</app_state>





Listing B.3: Working example of TrueCrypt APXML document
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B.4 APXML API: apxml.py
The APXML document has an associated API, named apxml.py. This supplementary
appendix provides two working examples of apxml.py usage: 1) APXMLPrintStats.py
parses an APXML document and prints high-level information regarding the count for each
digital artifacts type; and 2) APXML2CSV.py parses and APXML document and converts
the contents to the CSV file format for viewing in Microsoft Excel, or similar spreadsheet
applications. Listing B.4 provides the full source code for APXMLPrintStats.py.






7 except ImportError :
8 print ( "The dfxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
9 print ( "Now Exit ing . . . " )




14 except ImportError :
15 print ( "The Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
16 print ( "Now Exit ing . . . " )




21 except ImportError :
22 print ( "The apxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
23 print ( "Now Exit ing . . . " )
24 sys . e x i t (1 )
25
26 SUFFIXES = {1000: [ ’KB’ , ’MB’ , ’GB’ , ’TB ’ , ’PB ’ , ’EB ’ , ’ZB ’ , ’YB’ ] ,
27 1024 : [ ’KB’ , ’MB’ , ’GiB ’ , ’TiB ’ , ’PiB ’ , ’EiB ’ , ’ ZiB ’ , ’YiB ’ ] }
28
29 ########################################################################
30 def approximate_size ( s i z e , a_kilobyte_is_1024_bytes=True ) :
31 ’ ’ ’ Convert a f i l e s i z e to human−r eadab l e form ’ ’ ’
32 i f s i z e < 0 :
33 raise ValueError ( ’ Input must be non−negat ive ’ )
34 mu l t ip l e = 1024 i f a_kilobyte_is_1024_bytes else 1000
35 for s u f f i x in SUFFIXES [ mu l t ip l e ] :
36 s i z e /= mul t ip l e
37 i f s i z e < mul t ip l e :
38 return ’ { 0 : . 1 f } {1} ’ . format ( s i z e , s u f f i x )




42 i f __name__==’__main__ ’ :
43 import argparse
44 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n= ’ ’ ’ APXMLPrintStats . py . ’ ’ ’ ,
45 fo rmatte r_c la s s = argparse . RawTextHelpFormatter )
46 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ p r o f i l e ’ , help = ’APXML document ’ )
47 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
48
49 f i = args . p r o f i l e
50 apxml_obj = apxml . i t e r p a r s e ( f i )
51 apxml . generate_stat s ( apxml_obj )
52
53 i f apxml_obj . rusage . end_date i s not None :
54 s t a r t = apxml_obj . c r e a t o r . execution_environment . start_date
55 end = apxml_obj . rusage . end_date
56 process ing_time = end − s t a r t
57 time = int ( process ing_time . tota l_seconds ( ) )
58
59 f i l e s i z e = os . s t a t ( f i )
60 a p_ f i l e s i z e = approximate_size ( f i l e s i z e . s t_s i z e )
61
62 name = os . path . basename ( f i )
63
64 print ( "%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s " % (name ,
65 " { : , } " . format ( apxml_obj . s t a t s . d i r s ) ,
66 " { : , } " . format ( apxml_obj . s t a t s . f i l e s ) ,
67 " { : , } " . format ( apxml_obj . s t a t s . keys ) ,
68 " { : , } " . format ( apxml_obj . s t a t s . va lue s ) ,
69 " { : , } " . format ( apxml_obj . s t a t s . a l l ) ,
70 time ,
71 a p_ f i l e s i z e ) )
Listing B.4: Full source code listing for APXMLPrintStats.py
Listing B.5 provides the full source code for APXML2CSV.py, used to convert an APXML
document to the CSV file format.






7 except ImportError :
8 print ( "The dfxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
9 print ( "Now Exit ing . . . " )





14 except ImportError :
15 print ( "The Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
16 print ( "Now Exit ing . . . " )




21 except ImportError :
22 print ( "The apxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
23 print ( "Now Exit ing . . . " )
24 sys . e x i t (1 )
25
26 ########################################################################
27 def make_csv_fi les ( f i l e s ) :
28 # Create CSV fo r f i l e system en t r i e s
29 f i l e s_ c s v = " f i l e s . csv "
30
31 with open( f i l e s_c sv , ’w ’ ) as f :




36 " f i l ename " ,
37 " filename_norm" ,
38 "basename" ,
39 "basename_norm" ,
40 " f i l e s i z e " ,
41 "meta_type" ,
42 "alloc_name" ,
43 " a l loc_inode " ,
44 " sha1" ) )
45 for f i in f i l e s :
46 f . wr i t e ( "%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s \n" % (
47 f i . app_name ,
48 f i . app_state ,
49 f i . annos ,
50 f i . f i l ename ,
51 f i . filename_norm ,
52 f i . basename ,
53 f i . basename_norm ,
54 f i . f i l e s i z e ,
55 f i . meta_type ,
56 f i . alloc_name ,
57 f i . a l loc_inode ,
58 f i . sha1 ) )
59
60 def make_csv_cells ( c e l l s ) :
61 # Create CSV fo r Reg i s t r y e n t r i e s
62 c e l l s_c sv = " c e l l s . csv "
63
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64 with open( ce l l s_csv , ’w ’ ) as f :




69 " c e l l p a t h " ,
70 " cellpath_norm" ,
71 "basename" ,
72 "basename_norm" ,
73 " a l l o c " ,
74 "data_type" ,
75 "data" ,
76 "data_raw" ) )
77 for co in c e l l s :
78 f . wr i t e ( "%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s \n" % (
79 co . app_name ,
80 co . app_state ,
81 co . annos ,
82 co . c e l l pa th ,
83 co . cellpath_norm ,
84 co . basename ,
85 co . basename_norm ,
86 co . a l l o c ,
87 co . data_type ,
88 co . data ,
89 co . data_raw ) )
90
91 ########################################################################
92 i f __name__==’__main__ ’ :
93 import argparse
94 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n= ’ ’ ’APXML2CSV. py ’ ’ ’ ,
95 fo rmatte r_c la s s = argparse . RawTextHelpFormatter )
96 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ p r o f i l e ’ , help = ’APXML document ’ )
97 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
98
99 f i l e s = l i s t ( )
100 c e l l s = l i s t ( )
101
102 apxml_obj = apxml . i t e r p a r s e ( args . p r o f i l e )
103
104 for obj in apxml_obj :
105 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
106 f i l e s . append ( obj )
107 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . Ce l lObject ) :
108 c e l l s . append ( obj )
109
110 make_csv_fi les ( f i l e s )
111 make_csv_cells ( c e l l s )
Listing B.5: Full source code listing for APXML2CSV.py
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B.5 Registry Hive Extraction: HiveExtractor.py
Listing B.6 displays the complete source code listing for the HiveExtractor.py script used
to parse a target file system, identify Registry hive files and export the detected hive files to
a user-specified directory.
1 #!/ usr / b in /env python3
2
3 # >>>>>> DISCLAIMER <<<<<<
4 # This so f tware i s h e a v i l y de r i v ed from the regxml_extrac tor p r o j e c t
5 # o r i g i n a l l y researched and wr i t t en by Alex Nelson . The p r o j e c t web s i t e
6 # i s a v a i l a b l e a t : h t t p s :// g i t hu b . com/ a jne l s on / regxml_extrac tor
7 # The f o l l ow i n g f i l e s from the p r o j e c t were used f o r r e f e r ence :
8 # 1) rx_extrac t_hives . py
9 # 2) regxml_extrac tor . sh
10 #
11 # The o r i g i n a l p r o j e c t r e qu e s t s the f o l l ow i n g copy r i g h t be r e t a ined :
12 # Copyright ( c ) 2012 , Regents o f the Un i v e r s i t y o f Ca l i f o rn i a
13 # Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
14
15 """
16 Author : Thomas Laurenson
17 Email : thomas@thomaslaurenson . com
18 Website : thomaslaurenson . com
19 Date : 2016/04/21
20
21 Descr ip t i on :
22 HiveExtrac tor . py i s a s c r i p t to e x t r a c t Windows Reg i s t r y h i ve f i l e s from
23 a t a r g e t f o r e n s i c image ( ev idence f i l e ) us ing a DFXML repor t genera ted
24 by the f i w a l k program . Two outpu t s are produced :
25 1) Direc tory o f e x t r a c t e d h i v e f i l e s
26 2) DFXML repor t o f f i l e system and f i l e metadata f o r e x t r a c t e d h i ve f i l e s
27
28 Copyright ( c ) 2016 , Thomas Laurenson
29
30 ######################################################################
31 This program i s f r e e so f tware : you can r e d i s t r i b u t e i t and/or modify
32 i t under the terms o f the GNU General Pub l i c License as pub l i s h ed by
33 the Free Sof tware Foundation , e i t h e r ve r s i on 3 o f the License , or
34 ( a t your opt ion ) any l a t e r ve r s i on .
35
36 This program i s d i s t r i b u t e d in the hope t ha t i t w i l l be u s e f u l ,
37 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; wi thou t even the imp l i ed warranty o f
38 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
39 GNU General Pub l i c License f o r more d e t a i l s .
40
41 You shou ld have r e c e i v ed a copy o f the GNU General Pub l i c License










51 import i o
52 import s h u t i l
53 import hash l i b
54 import datet ime
55 import plat form




60 except ImportError :
61 print ( ’ Error : DFXML Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed ’ )
62 print ( ’You can download from : https : // github . com/simsong/dfxml ’ )
63 print ( ’Now Exi t ing . . . ’ )
64 sys . e x i t (1 )
65
66 ######################################################################
67 class HiveExtractor :
68 def __init__( s e l f , image=None , xml=None , outd i r=None , a l l o c=False ) :
69 s e l f . imag e f i l e = image
70 s e l f . xm l f i l e = xml
71 s e l f . outputd i r = outd i r
72 s e l f . a l l o c a t e d = a l l o c
73 s e l f . h i v e s = l i s t ( )
74 s e l f . target_f i_count = 0
75
76 def proces s_target ( s e l f ) :
77 """ Process the t a r g e t image """
78 print ( ’ \n>>> Proce s s ing t a r g e t image f o r h ive f i l e s . . . ’ )
79 for ( event , obj ) in Objects . i t e r p a r s e ( s e l f . xm l f i l e ) :
80 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
81 s e l f . ext ract_hives ( obj )
82 return
83
84 def extract_hives ( s e l f , f i ) :
85 """ Match h i v e s based on f i l e names from DFXML. Hive f i l e names are
86 taken from : Windows Reg i s t r y Forens ics by Carvey (2011 , p .18 ) ,
87 which i s r e f e r enced in the regxml_extrac tor p r o j e c t . """
88 # I f f i l e name i s None s k i p f i l e o b j e c t
89 i f f i . f i l ename i s None :
90 return
91 fn = f i . f i l ename . lower ( )
92 s e l f . target_f i_count += 1
93 i f s e l f . target_f i_count % 5000 == 0 :
94 print ( " Processed %d f i l e s from ta rg e t DFXML f i l e "
303
95 % s e l f . target_f i_count )
96 # Li s t o f known h ive f i l e names
97 hive_names = [ ’ ntuser . dat ’ ,
98 ’ r e p a i r /sam ’ ,
99 ’ r e p a i r / s e c u r i t y ’ ,
100 ’ r e p a i r / so f tware ’ ,
101 ’ r e p a i r / system ’ ,
102 ’ system32/ con f i g /sam ’ ,
103 ’ system32/ con f i g / s e c u r i t y ’ ,
104 ’ system32/ con f i g / so f tware ’ ,
105 ’ system32/ con f i g / system ’ ,
106 ’ system32/ con f i g /components ’ ,
107 ’ l o c a l s e t t i n g s / app l i c a t i o n data/mi c ro so f t /windows/ u s r c l a s s . dat ’ ]
108 # Find h i ve f i l e s us ing f i l e name matching from f iw a l k DFXML output
109 for hive_name in hive_names :
110 i f ( fn . endswith ( hive_name )
111 and ( s e l f . a l l o c a t e d
112 and f i . i s_a l l o c a t ed ( ) ) ) :
113 s e l f . e x t r a c t ( f i )
114 e l i f not a l l o c a t e d and fn . endswith ( hive_name ) :
115 s e l f . e x t r a c t ( f i )
116
117 def ex t r a c t ( s e l f , f i ) :
118 out_fn = f i . f i l ename
119 out_fn = out_fn . r ep l a c e ( ’ / ’ , ’− ’ ) . r ep l a c e ( ’ ’ , ’− ’ )
120 out_fpath = os . path . j o i n ( s e l f . outputdir , out_fn )
121 # Open output f i l e and wr i t e f i l e con ten t s
122 with open( out_fpath , ’wb ’ ) as f :
123 contents = f i . byte_runs . i t e r_content s ( s e l f . imag e f i l e )
124 contents = b"" . j o i n ( contents )
125 f . wr i t e ( contents )
126 f . c l o s e ( )
127 # Check the SHA−1 o f f i l e o b j e c t VS ex t r a c t e d h i v e
128 i f f i . sha1 i s not None :
129 sha1 = s e l f . s ha1_f i l e ( out_fpath )
130 i f sha1 != f i . sha1 :
131 print ( " Warning : SHA−1 hash mismatch f o r : %s "
132 % os . path . basename ( out_fpath ) )
133 # Add ex t r a c t e d h i v e f i l e to ’ h i v e s ’ l i s t
134 s e l f . h i v e s . append ( f i )
135
136 def sha1_f i l e ( s e l f , f i ) :
137 """ Helper method to SHA−1 hash e x t r a c t e d h i v e f i l e """
138 hasher = hash l i b . sha1 ( )
139 with open( f i , ’ rb ’ ) as f :
140 buf = f . read ( )
141 hasher . update ( buf )
142 return hasher . hexd ige s t ( )
143
144 def dfxml_report ( s e l f ) :
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145 """ Generate a DFXML repor t """
146 dc = {"name" : os . path . basename (__file__) ,
147 " type" : "Hash L i s t " ,
148 "date " : datet ime . datet ime . now( ) . i s o f o rmat ( ) ,
149 "os_sysname" : p lat form . system ( ) ,
150 "os_sysname" : p lat form . system ( ) ,
151 " os_re l ea se " : p lat form . r e l e a s e ( ) ,
152 " os_vers ion " : p lat form . ve r s i on ( ) ,
153 "os_host" : p lat form . node ( ) ,
154 "os_arch" : p lat form . machine ( ) }
155 dfxml = Objects .DFXMLObject( command_line = " " . j o i n ( sys . argv ) ,
156 sourc e s = [ s e l f . imag e f i l e ] ,
157 dc = dc ,
158 f i l e s = s e l f . h i v e s )
159 # Write a temp DFXML f i l e , format i t , then wr i t e to l o g f i l e
160 temp_fi = i o . Str ingIO ( dfxml . to_dfxml ( ) )
161 xml_fi = xml .dom. minidom . parse ( temp_fi ) \
162 report_fn = os . path . basename ( s e l f . imag e f i l e )
163 report_fn = os . path . s p l i t e x t ( report_fn ) [ 0 ] + " . xml"
164 report_fn = os . path . j o i n ( s e l f . outputdir , report_fn )
165 print ( "\n>>> DFXML Report : %s \n" % report_fn )
166 with open( report_fn , ’w ’ ) as f :
167 f . wr i t e ( xml_fi . toprettyxml ( indent=" " ) )
168
169 ######################################################################
170 i f __name__==’__main__ ’ :
171 import argparse
172 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n="""
173 HiveExtrac tor . py i s a s c r i p t to e x t r a c t Windows Reg i s t r y h i ve f i l e s
174 from a t a r g e t f o r e n s i c image ( ev idence f i l e ) us ing a DFXML repor t
175 genera ted by the f i w a l k program . Two outpu t s are produced :
176 1) Direc tory o f e x t r a c t e d h i v e f i l e s
177 2) DFXML repor t o f f i l e system and f i l e metadata f o r e x t r a c t e d h i ve f i l e s """
178 , f o rmatte r_c la s s = argparse . RawTextHelpFormatter )
179 par s e r . add_argument ( " imag e f i l e " ,
180 help = "Target d i sk image ( e . g . t a r g e t . E01 ) " )
181 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ outputd i r ’ ,
182 help = ’Output d i r e c t o r y ’ )
183 par s e r . add_argument ( "−−dfxml" ,
184 metavar = ’DFXML’ ,
185 ac t i on = ’ s t o r e ’ ,
186 help = "Prev ious ly generated DFXML repor t " )
187 par s e r . add_argument ( "−a" ,
188 help = "Only ex t r a c t a l l o c a t e d hive f i l e s " ,
189 ac t i on = " store_true " ,
190 d e f au l t = False )
191 par s e r . add_argument ( "−z" ,
192 help = "Zap ( d e l e t e ) the output d i r i f i t e x i s t s " ,
193 ac t i on = " store_true " ,
194 d e f au l t = False )
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195
196 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
197
198 imag e f i l e = args . imag e f i l e
199 outputd i r = args . outputd i r
200 xm l f i l e = args . dfxml
201 a l l o c a t e d = args . a
202 zapd i r = args . z
203
204 # Make output d i r e c t o r y
205 i f os . path . e x i s t s ( outputd i r ) :
206 i f zapd i r :
207 s h u t i l . rmtree ( outputd i r )
208 os . makedirs ( outputd i r )
209 e l i f not os . path . e x i s t s ( outputd i r ) :
210 os . makedirs ( outputd i r )
211
212 # Check f o r DFXML input , genera te i f not s upp l i e d
213 i f xm l f i l e == None :
214 print ( "\n>>> No f iwa l k DFXML repor t provided " )
215 print ( " Running f iwa l k now . . . " )
216 print ( " This may take a long time depending on ta r g e t s i z e . . . " )
217 xm l f i l e = os . path . s p l i t e x t ( imag e f i l e ) [ 0 ] + " . xml"
218 command = " f iwa l k −X " + xm l f i l e + " " + imag e f i l e
219 sy s r c = os . system (command)
220 i f s y s r c :
221 print ( "\nAn e r r o r occured when running f iwa l k . " )
222
223 # Extrac t Reg i s t r y h i v e f i l e s
224 r e g i s t r y_ f i s = l i s t ( )
225 print ( " −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−" )
226 print ( ">>> EXTRACTING REGISTRY HIVES" )
227 print ( " −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−" )
228 he = HiveExtractor ( image = image f i l e ,
229 xml = xml f i l e ,
230 outd i r = outputdir ,
231 a l l o c = a l l o c a t e d )
232 he . proces s_target ( )
233 he . dfxml_report ( )
Listing B.6: Full source code listing for HiveExtractor.py
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B.6 CellXML-Registry Source Code
The CellXML-Registry tool utilised the underlying functionality provided by the Registry
parser project created by Eric Zimmerman.1 However, source code additions were re-
quired to the Registry parser library to provide functionality to export to the prescribed
RegXML syntax. This section documents the changes made to the Registry parser li-
brary, specifically modifications to the original RegistryHive.cs source code file2. Due
to the difficulty in determining the changes made to the library by the author, this appendix
section documents all additional programming functions added. Listing B.7 displays the two
added functions for checking XML output strings for special XML characters and Unicode
control characters.
1 p r i va t e s t r i n g SpecialXMLCharacterCheck ( s t r i n g XMLstring ) {
2 i f (XMLstring . ToLowerInvariant ( ) . IndexOf ( ’& ’) != −1)
3 {
4 XMLstring = XMLstring . Replace ( "&" , "&amp ; " ) ;
5 }
6 i f (XMLstring . ToLowerInvariant ( ) . IndexOf ( ’ < ’) != −1)
7 {
8 XMLstring = XMLstring . Replace ( "<" , "&l t ; " ) ;
9 }
10 i f (XMLstring . ToLowerInvariant ( ) . IndexOf ( ’ > ’) != −1)
11 {
12 XMLstring = XMLstring . Replace ( ">" , "&gt ; " ) ;
13 }
14 i f (XMLstring . ToLowerInvariant ( ) . IndexOf ( ’ " ’ ) != −1)
15 {
16 XMLstring = XMLstring . Replace ( "\"" , "&quot ; " ) ;
17 }
18 i f (XMLstring . ToLowerInvariant ( ) . IndexOf ( ’ \ ’ ’ ) != −1)
19 {
20 XMLstring = XMLstring . Replace ( " ’ " , "&apos ; " ) ;
21 }
22 return XMLstring ;
23 }
24
25 p r i va t e s t r i n g ControlXMLCharacterCheck ( s t r i n g XMLstring ) {
26 char [ ] arrForm = XMLstring . ToCharArray ( ) ;
27 S t r i ngBu i l d e r bu f f e r = new St r i ngBu i l d e r (XMLstring . Length ) ;
28 foreach ( char ch in arrForm )
29 i f ( ! Char . I sCont ro l ( ch ) ) bu f f e r . Append( ch ) ;
30
31 return bu f f e r . ToString ( ) ;
32 }




Listing B.8 displays the ExportDataToXMLFormat() function which was added to provide
support for RegXML output.
1 pub l i c void ExportDataToXMLFormat ( s t r i n g o u t f i l e , bool de letedOnly )
2 {
3 var KeyCount = 0 ;
4 var ValueCount = 0 ;
5 var KeyCountDeleted = 0 ;
6 var ValueCountDeleted = 0 ;
7
8 Console . WriteLine ( " > Sta r t i ng XML genera t i on . . . " ) ;
9
10 var header = new St r i ngBu i l d e r ( ) ;
11 us ing ( var sw = new StreamWriter ( o u t f i l e , f a l s e ) )
12 {
13 sw . AutoFlush = true ;
14
15 sw . Write ( header . ToString ( ) ) ;
16
17 sw . WriteLine ( "<hive>" ) ;
18
19 i f ( de letedOnly == f a l s e )
20 {
21 // Write XML f o r Reg i s t ry ROOT key
22 i f (Root . LastWriteTime != nu l l )
23 {
24 KeyCount = 1 ;
25 sw . WriteLine ( "<c e l l o b j e c t root=’1’>" ) ;
26 sw . WriteLine ( " <ce l l pa th >{0}</ce l l pa th>" , Root . KeyPath ) ;
27 sw . WriteLine ( " <name_type>k</name_type>" ) ;
28 sw . WriteLine ( " <mtime>{0}</mtime>" , Root . LastWriteTime . Value
. UtcDateTime . ToString ( "o" ) ) ;
29 sw . WriteLine ( " <a l l o c >1</a l l o c >" ) ;
30 sw . WriteLine ( " <byte_runs>" ) ;
31 sw . WriteLine ( " <byte_run f i l e _ o f f s e t=\"{0}\" l en=\"{1}\"/>
" , Root . NKRecord . Abso luteOf f set , (Root . NKRecord . S i z e −
Root . NKRecord . Padding . Length ) ) ;
32 sw . WriteLine ( " </byte_runs>" ) ;
33 sw . WriteLine ( "</c e l l o b j e c t >" ) ;
34 }
35
36 // Write XML f o r Reg i s t ry ROOT va lues ( i t i s unusal to have
va lue s here )
37 foreach ( var va l in Root . Values )
38 {
39 ValueCount += 1 ;
40 sw . WriteLine ( "<c e l l o b j e c t >" ) ;
41 sw . WriteLine ( " <ce l l pa th >{0}\\{1}</ ce l l pa th>" , Root . KeyPath ,
va l . ValueName) ;
42 sw . WriteLine ( " <basename>{0}</basename>" , va l . ValueName) ;
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43 sw . WriteLine ( " <name_type>v</name_type>" ) ;
44 i f ( va l . VKRecord . I sFree )
45 {
46 sw . WriteLine ( " <a l l o c >0</a l l o c >" ) ;




51 sw . WriteLine ( " <a l l o c >1</a l l o c >" ) ;
52 ValueCount += 1 ;
53 }
54 sw . WriteLine ( " <data_type>{0}</data_type>" , va l . VKRecord .
DataType ) ;
55 sw . WriteLine ( " <data>{0}</data>" , BitConverter . ToString ( va l .
VKRecord . ValueDataRaw) . Replace ( "−" , " " ) ) ;
56 sw . WriteLine ( " <byte_runs>" ) ;
57
58 i f ( va l . VKRecord . DataType != VKCellRecord . DataTypeEnum .
RegNone )
59 {
60 // Two byte_run elements are wr i t t en because :
61 // 1 s t : Points to the abso lu t e o f f s e t o f the VK record
62 // 2nd : Points to the ac tua l o f f s e t where the data i s
63 sw . WriteLine ( " <byte_run f i l e _ o f f s e t=\"{0}\" l en=\"
{1}\"/>" , va l . VKRecord . Abso luteOf f set , ( ( va l . VKRecord .
S i z e ) ∗ (−1) − va l . VKRecord . Padding . Length ) ) ;
64 sw . WriteLine ( " <byte_run f i l e _ o f f s e t=\"{0}\" l en=\"
{1}\"/>" , ( va l . VKRecord . OffsetToData + 4096) , va l .
VKRecord . ValueDataRaw . Length ) ;
65 }
66 sw . WriteLine ( " </byte_runs>" ) ;
67 sw . WriteLine ( "</c e l l o b j e c t >" ) ;
68 }
69 // Now s t a r t r e c u r s i v e l y dumping subkeys from the ROOT key
70 DumpKeyXMLFormat(Root , sw , r e f KeyCount , r e f ValueCount , r e f
KeyCountDeleted , r e f ValueCountDeleted ) ;
71 }
72
73 var theRest = Cel lRecords .Where ( a => a . Value . I sRe f e r enced == f a l s e ) ;
74 //may not need to i f we do not care about orphaned va lue s
75
76 foreach ( var keyValuePair in theRest )
77 {
78 //Console . WriteLine ( "{0}\n\n" , keyValuePair . ) ;
79 t ry
80 {
81 i f ( keyValuePair . Value . S ignature == "vk" )
82 {
83 ValueCountDeleted += 1 ;
84 var va l = keyValuePair . Value as VKCellRecord ;
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85
86 s t r i n g data = BitConverter . ToString ( va l . ValueDataRaw) .
Replace ( "−" , " " ) ;
87
88 // Check the c e l l path ( key + value name) f o r :
89 // 1) Spe c i a l cha ra c t e r s
90 // 2) Unicode con t r o l cha ra c t e r s
91 s t r i n g KeyCellpath = SpecialXMLCharacterCheck ( va l .
ValueName) ;
92 KeyCellpath = ControlXMLCharacterCheck ( KeyCellpath ) ;
93
94 // Write Ce l lObject
95 sw . WriteLine (@"<c e l l o b j e c t >
96 <ce l l pa th ></ce l l pa th>
97 <basename>{0}</basename>
98 <name_type>v</name_type>




103 <byte_run f i l e _ o f f s e t=""{4}"" l en=""{5}""/>
104 <byte_run f i l e _ o f f s e t=""{6}"" l en=""{7}""/>
105 </byte_runs>
106 </c e l l o b j e c t >" ,
107 KeyCellpath ,
108 Convert . ToInt32 ( va l . I sFree ) ,
109 va l . DataType ,
110 data ,
111 va l . Abso luteOf f set ,
112 ( ( va l . S i z e ) ∗ (−1) − va l . Padding . Length ) ,
113 ( va l . OffsetToData + 4096) ,
114 va l . DataLength ) ;
115 }
116
117 i f ( keyValuePair . Value . S ignature == "nk" )
118 {
119 // t h i s should never be once we re−enable de l e t ed key
r ebu i l d i n g
120
121 KeyCountDeleted += 1 ;
122 var nk = keyValuePair . Value as NKCellRecord ;
123 var key = new RegistryKey (nk , nu l l ) ;
124
125 s t r i n g KeyCellpath = SpecialXMLCharacterCheck ( key . KeyPath
) ;
126 KeyCellpath = ControlXMLCharacterCheck ( KeyCellpath ) ;
127 sw . WriteLine (@"<c e l l o b j e c t >




131 <a l l o c >0</a l l o c >
132 <byte_runs>
133 <byte_run f i l e _ o f f s e t=""{2}"" l en=""{3}""/>
134 </byte_runs>
135 </c e l l o b j e c t >" ,
136 KeyCellpath ,
137 key . LastWriteTime . Value . UtcDateTime . ToString ( "o" ) ,
138 key . NKRecord . Abso luteOf f set ,
139 ( key . NKRecord . S i z e − key . NKRecord . Padding . Length ) ) ;
140
141 DumpKeyXMLFormat( key , sw , r e f KeyCount , r e f ValueCount , r e f
KeyCountDeleted , r e f ValueCountDeleted ) ;
142 }
143 }
144 catch ( Exception ex )
145 {
146 _logger .Warn( "There was an e r r o r expor t ing f r e e record at
o f f s e t 0x {0 :X} . Error : {1}" ,
147 keyValuePair . Value . Abso luteOf f set , ex . Message ) ;
148 }
149 }
150 sw . WriteLine ( "</hive>" ) ;
151 _logger . In f o ( ">>> tota l_keys : {0}" , KeyCount ) ;
152 _logger . In f o ( ">>> tota l_va lue s : {0}" , ValueCount ) ;
153 _logger . In f o ( ">>> tota l_deleted_keys : {0}" , KeyCountDeleted ) ;
154 _logger . In f o ( ">>> tota l_de le ted_values : {0}" , ValueCountDeleted ) ;
155 }
156 }
Listing B.8: RegXML output function added to RegistryHive.cs
Listing B.9 displays the DumpKeyXMLFormat() function which was added to provide support
RegXML output. The function recursively exports a Registry key, it’s sub-key and associated
values to the RegXML syntax.
1 p r i va t e void DumpKeyXMLFormat( RegistryKey key , StreamWriter sw , r e f i n t




4 // I t e r a t e through each subkey
5 foreach ( var subkey in key . SubKeys )
6 {
7 // Write XML f o r Reg i s t ry subkey entry
8 sw . WriteLine ( "<c e l l o b j e c t >" ) ;
9
10 // Perform a s p e c i a l cha rac t e r check
11 s t r i n g KeyCellpath = SpecialXMLCharacterCheck ( subkey . KeyPath ) ;
12 KeyCellpath = ControlXMLCharacterCheck ( KeyCellpath ) ;
13 sw . WriteLine ( " <ce l l pa th >{0}</ce l l pa th>" , KeyCellpath ) ;
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14
15 sw . WriteLine ( " <name_type>k</name_type>" ) ;
16 sw . WriteLine ( " <mtime>{0}</mtime>" , subkey . LastWriteTime . Value .
UtcDateTime . ToString ( "o" ) ) ;
17 i f ( subkey . NKRecord . I sDe l e t ed )
18 {
19 sw . WriteLine ( " <a l l o c >0</a l l o c >" ) ;




24 sw . WriteLine ( "<a l l o c >1</a l l o c >" ) ;
25 keyCount += 1 ;
26 }
27 sw . WriteLine ( " <byte_runs>" ) ;
28 sw . WriteLine ( " <byte_run f i l e _ o f f s e t=\"{0}\" l en=\"{1}\"/>" ,
subkey . NKRecord . Abso luteOf f set , ( subkey . NKRecord . S i z e − subkey .
NKRecord . Padding . Length ) ) ;
29 sw . WriteLine ( " </byte_runs>" ) ;
30 sw . WriteLine ( "</c e l l o b j e c t >" ) ;
31
32 // I t e r a t e through each value
33 foreach ( var va l in subkey . Values )
34 {
35 // Write XML f o r Reg i s t ry value entry
36 sw . WriteLine ( "<c e l l o b j e c t >" ) ;
37
38 // Perform a s p e c i a l cha rac t e r check
39 s t r i n g ValueKeypath = SpecialXMLCharacterCheck ( subkey . KeyPath ) ;
40 ValueKeypath = ControlXMLCharacterCheck (ValueKeypath ) ;
41 s t r i n g ValueBasename = SpecialXMLCharacterCheck ( va l . ValueName) ;
42 ValueBasename = ControlXMLCharacterCheck (ValueBasename ) ;
43 s t r i n g ValueCel lpath = St r ing . Join ( "\\" , new St r ing [ ] {
ValueKeypath , ValueBasename }) ;
44 sw . WriteLine ( " <ce l l pa th >{0}</ce l l pa th>" , ValueCel lpath ) ;
45 sw . WriteLine ( " <basename>{0}</basename>" , ValueBasename ) ;
46 sw . WriteLine ( " <name_type>v</name_type>" ) ;
47 i f ( va l . VKRecord . I sFree )
48 {
49 sw . WriteLine ( " <a l l o c >0</a l l o c >" ) ;




54 sw . WriteLine ( " <a l l o c >1</a l l o c >" ) ;
55 valueCount += 1 ;
56 }
57 sw . WriteLine ( " <data_type>{0}</data_type>" , va l . VKRecord .
DataType ) ;
58 sw . WriteLine ( " <data>{0}</data>" , BitConverter . ToString ( va l .
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VKRecord . ValueDataRaw) . Replace ( "−" , " " ) ) ;
59 sw . WriteLine ( " <byte_runs>" ) ;
60
61 i f ( va l . VKRecord . DataType != VKCellRecord . DataTypeEnum . RegNone )
62 {
63 // Two byte_run elements are wr i t t en because :
64 // 1 s t : Points to the abso lu t e o f f s e t o f the VK record
65 // 2nd : Points to the ac tua l o f f s e t where the data i s
66 sw . WriteLine ( " <byte_run f i l e _ o f f s e t=\"{0}\" l en=\"{1}\"/>
" , va l . VKRecord . Abso luteOf f set , ( ( va l . VKRecord . S i z e ) ∗
(−1) − va l . VKRecord . Padding . Length ) ) ;
67 sw . WriteLine ( " <byte_run f i l e _ o f f s e t=\"{0}\" l en=\"{1}\"/>
" , ( va l . VKRecord . OffsetToData + 4096) , va l . VKRecord .
ValueDataRaw . Length ) ;
68 }
69 sw . WriteLine ( " </byte_runs>" ) ;
70 sw . WriteLine ( "</c e l l o b j e c t >" ) ;
71 }
72
73 // Fin i shed with t h i s key , p roce s s the next subkey
74 DumpKeyXMLFormat( subkey , sw , r e f keyCount , r e f valueCount , r e f
keyCountDeleted , r e f valueCountDeleted ) ;
75 }
76 }
Listing B.9: RegXML generation function added to RegistryHive.cs
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B.7 Path Normalisation Modules
Two Python modules (libraries that can be imported and the functions utilised) were authored
to perform path normalisation. Listing B.10 displays the complete source code listing for the
FilePathNormaliser.py module used to perform file system path normalisation in the
Vestigium tool.
1 # !/ usr / b in /python
2
3 __version__ = " 1 . 0 . 0 "
4
5 import c o l l e c t i o n s
6
7 #############################################################################
8 class Fi lePathNormal i ser ( ) :
9 def __init__( s e l f ) :
10 """ I n i t i a l i s e Fi lePathNormal i ser o b j e c t . """
11 s e l f . var iab le_paths = c o l l e c t i o n s . OrderedDict ( )
12 s e l f . var iab le_paths [ " p rog r amf i l e s " ] = [
13 "Program F i l e s " ,
14 "Program F i l e s ( x86 ) " ]
15
16 s e l f . var iab le_paths [ " a l l u s e r s p r o f i l e " ] = [
17 "Documents and Se t t i n g s /Al l Users " ,
18 "ProgramData" ,
19 "Users /Publ ic " ]
20
21 s e l f . var iab le_paths [ " u s e r p r o f i l e " ] = [
22 "Users " ,
23 "Documents and Se t t i n g s " ]
24
25 s e l f . var iab le_paths [ " loca lappdata " ] = [
26 "%USERPROFILE%/Local S e t t i n g s /Appl i cat ion Data" ,
27 "%USERPROFILE%/AppData/Local " ]
28
29 s e l f . var iab le_paths [ "appdata" ] = [
30 "%USERPROFILE%/Appl i ca t ion Data" ,
31 "%USERPROFILE%/AppData/Roaming" ]
32
33 s e l f . var iab le_paths [ " startmenu" ] = [
34 "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%/Star t Menu" ,
35 "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%/Microso f t /Windows/ Star t Menu" ,
36 "%APPDATA%/Microso f t /Windows/ Star t Menu" ,
37 "%USERPROFILE%/Star t Menu" ,
38 "%USERPROFILE%/%APPDATA%/Microso f t /Windows/ Star t Menu" ]
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48 s e l f . var iab le_paths [ " p r e f e t ch " ] = [
49 "%WINDIR%/pr e f e t ch " ,
50 "%WINDIR%/Pre f e tch " ]
51
52 def normal ize ( s e l f , f u l l p a t h ) :
53 """ Normalize a l o g i c a l f i l e system path va lue o f a t a r g e t f i l e """
54 # Check roo t d i r e c t o r y
55 i f f u l l p a t h . s t a r t sw i t h ( "C:\\ " ) :
56 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h [ 3 : ]
57
58 # Check/ r ep l a c e ba c k s l a s h charac t e r s in path
59 temp = fu l l p a t h . s p l i t ( "\\" )
60 f u l l p a t h = "/" . j o i n ( temp)
61
62 # Now, normal ize f u l l path
63 for key in s e l f . var iab le_paths :
64 for name in s e l f . var iab le_paths [ key ] :
65 # Normalize Program F i l e s path
66 i f key == " prog ramf i l e s " :
67 i f f u l l p a t h . s t a r t sw i t h (name) :
68 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h . r ep l a c e (name , "%PROGRAMFILES%" )
69 # Normalize A l l Users path
70 e l i f key == " a l l u s e r s p r o f i l e " :
71 i f f u l l p a t h . s t a r t sw i t h (name) :
72 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h . r ep l a c e (name , "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%" )
73 # Normalize Local App Data path
74 e l i f key == " loca lappdata " :
75 i f f u l l p a t h . s t a r t sw i t h (name) :
76 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h . r ep l a c e (name , "%LOCALAPPDATA%" )
77
78 # Normalize Windows d i r e c t o r y path
79 i f key == "windir " :
80 i f f u l l p a t h . s t a r t sw i t h (name) :
81 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h . r ep l a c e (name , "%WINDIR%" )
82 # Normalize Windows System Root path
83 i f key == " systemroot " :
84 i f f u l l p a t h . s t a r t sw i t h (name) :
85 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h . r ep l a c e (name , "%SYSTEMROOT%" )
86 # Normalize Windows Pre f ec th path ( and f i l ename )
87 i f key == " pr e f e t ch " :
88 i f f u l l p a t h . s t a r t sw i t h (name) :
89 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h . r ep l a c e (name , "%PREFETCH%" )
90 # Also normal ise p r e f e t c h name ( remove random number
91 # s t r i n g s u f f i x to a l l ow path matching )
92 i f f u l l p a t h . endswith ( " . pf " ) :
93 index = fu l l p a t h . index ( " . pf " ) − 9
315
94 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h [ 0 : index ] + " . pf "
95 # Normalize User P r o f i l e path (home d i r e c t o r y )
96 i f key == " u s e r p r o f i l e " :
97 i f f u l l p a t h . s t a r t sw i t h (name) :
98 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h . r ep l a c e (name , "%USERPROFILE%" )
99 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h . s p l i t ( "/" )
100 # Remove <username> then re−j o i n path s t r i n g
101 i f len ( f u l l p a t h ) > 1 :
102 del f u l l p a t h [ 1 ]
103 f u l l p a t h = ’ / ’ . j o i n ( f u l l p a t h )
104 # Normalize Local App Data path
105 i f key == "appdata" :
106 i f f u l l p a t h . s t a r t sw i t h (name) :
107 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h . r ep l a c e (name , "%APPDATA%" )
108 # Normalize S t a r t Menu path
109 i f key == "startmenu" :
110 i f f u l l p a t h . s t a r t sw i t h (name) :
111 f u l l p a t h = fu l l p a t h . r ep l a c e (name , "%STARTMENU%")
112 return f u l l p a t h
Listing B.10: Full source code listing for FilePathNormaliser.py
Listing B.11 displays the full source code for the CellPathNormaliser.py module used
to transform the full cell_path of Registry entries to a normalised representation.
1 # !/ usr / b in /python
2





8 import Fi lePathNormal i ser
9 except ImportError :
10 print ( ’ The Fi l ePathNormal i ser . py module i s r equ i r ed . ’ )
11 print ( ’ Now Exi t ing . . . ’ )
12 sys . e x i t (1 )
13
14 #############################################################################
15 class Cel lPathNormal i ser ( ) :
16 def __init__( s e l f ) :
17 """ I n i t i a l i s e Ce l lPathNormal i ser o b j e c t """
18 s e l f . f i l e_path_normal i se r = Fi lePathNormal i ser . F i l ePathNormal i ser ( )
19 s e l f . act ive_rootkey = None
20
21 def normal i ze_pro f i l e_co ( s e l f , c e l l p a t h ) :
22 """ Normalize the c e l l p a t h o f the P r o f i l e Ce l lOb j e c t (PCO) . """
23 normpath = c e l l p a t h
24 # Remove Reg i s t r y h i v e naming convent ion
25 i f normpath . s t a r t sw i t h ( "HKLM\\" ) :
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26 normpath = normpath [ 5 : ]
27 i f normpath . s t a r t sw i t h ( "HKU\\" ) :
28 normpath = normpath [ 4 : ]
29 normpath = normpath . s p l i t ( "\\" )
30 del normpath [ 0 ]
31 normpath = "\\" . j o i n ( normpath )
32 normpath = "NTUSER.DAT\\" + normpath
33 return normpath
34
35 def normal ize_rootkey ( s e l f , c e l l pa th , rootkey ) :
36 """
37 Normalize the c e l l p a t h roo tkey o f the Target Ce l lOb j e c t (TCO)
38 Before : CMI−CreateHive {F10156BE . . . . 5 DA29D131144}\Contro lSet001 \
39 After : SYSTEM\Contro lSet001 \
40 """
41 # Normalise h i v e rootkey , or re turn i f None
42 i f c e l l p a t h :
43 normpath = c e l l p a t h . s p l i t ( "\\" )
44 normpath [ 0 ] = rootkey
45 normpath = "\\" . j o i n ( normpath )
46 return normpath
47 else :
48 return c e l l p a t h
49
50 def normal i ze_ce l lpath ( s e l f , c e l l pa th , rootkey ) :
51 """ Normalize the c e l l p a t h o f the Target Ce l lOb j e c t (TCO) . """
52
53 # Sp l i t a c e l l p a t h on back s l a she s , or re turn i f None
54 i f c e l l p a t h :
55 normpath = c e l l p a t h . s p l i t ( "\\" )
56 else :
57 return c e l l p a t h
58
59 # System h ive norma l i sa t ion
60 i f rootkey == "system" :
61 control_names = [ " con t r o l s e t 0 01 " ,
62 " con t r o l s e t 0 02 " ,
63 " con t r o l s e t 0 03 " ,
64 " cu r r e n t c on t r o l s e t " ,
65 " c lone " ]
66 # I f path has " con t r o l s e t " name , normal ise t a r g e t path
67 # See : h t t p :// suppor t . mic ro so f t . com/kb /100010
68 #for name in control_names :
69 i f len ( normpath ) >= 2 :
70 i f normpath [ 1 ] in control_names :
71 normpath [ 1 ] = "%con t r o l s e t%"
72
73 # Join the s p l i t normal ised path and re turn




77 def normalise_basename ( s e l f , basename ) :
78 """ I f the basename i s a path , normal ize us ing the normal ize
79 f unc t i on from the Fi lePathNormal i ser module """
80
81 basename_norm = None
82
83 # Decrypt a UserAss i s t en try ( ’P: ’ equa te s to ’C: ’ us ing rot13 )
84 i f basename . s t a r t sw i t h ( "P: " ) :
85 basename_norm = codecs . decode ( obj . basename , " rot_13" )
86
87 # St r i p UserAss i s t p r e f i x in o l d e r windows v e r s i on s
88 e l i f basename . s t a r t sw i t h ( "HRZR_EHACNGU" ) :
89 basename_norm = basename [ 1 2 : ]
90
91 else :
92 basename_norm = basename
93
94 # I f basename_norm s t a r t s wi th C:
95 i f basename_norm . s t a r t sw i t h ( "C: " ) :
96 basename_norm = basename_norm [ 3 : ]
97
98 # Replace ba c k s l a s h wi th forward s l a s h
99 basename_norm = basename_norm . r ep l a c e ( ’ \\ ’ , ’ / ’ )
100
101 # Now normlaise us ing f i l e path normal i ser modules
102 basename_norm = s e l f . f i l e_path_normal i se r . normal ize (basename_norm)
103
104 return basename_norm




Appendix C provides additional relevant documentation regarding the system demonstration
presented in Chapter 6. The following list specifies all included material:
1. Section C.1 provides the Python script used to detect the Windows operating system
version of the target data set
2. Section C.2 provides an overview of all 75 created application profiles for system demon-
stration
3. Section C.3 provides the Python script used to perform application profile intersection
4. Section C.4 documents full results from application profile intersection
5. Section C.5 provides the Python script used to perform post-mortem blacklist, as used
in experimental testing
6. Section C.7 documents the contents of the final application profiles created during sys-
tem demonstration and evaluation
7. Section C.8 and C.9 provides the Python script used to determine the file system and
Registry content of all data sets used in this research
8. Section C.10 documents the digital artifacts counts observed in the known data set
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C.1 Detecting Windows Presence: DetectWindows.py
Listing C.1 displays a simple Python script authored to automatically determine if the Mi-
crosoft Windows operating system is present on a target data set with unknown content.
1 # !/ usr / b in /python
2




7 except ImportError :
8 print ( ’ Error : DFXML dfxml . py module i s r equ i r ed ’ )
9 print ( ’You can download from : https : // github . com/simsong/dfxml ’ )
10 print ( ’Now Exi t ing . . . ’ )




15 except ImportError :
16 print ( ’ Error : DFXML Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed ’ )
17 print ( ’You can download from : https : // github . com/simsong/dfxml ’ )
18 print ( ’Now Exi t ing . . . ’ )
19 sys . e x i t (1 )
20
21 ######################################################################
22 def check_f i l e sys tem ( f i ) :
23 # Check f i l ename e x i s t s , then e x t r a c t roo t f o l d e r
24 i f f i . f i l ename :
25 root = f i . f i l ename . s p l i t ( "/" ) [ 0 ]
26 else :
27 return






34 def extract_software_hive ( f i ) :
35 # Check f i l ename e x i s t s , then e x t r a c t roo t f o l d e r
36 i f f i . f i l ename :
37 i f f i . f i l ename . lower ( ) . endswith ( " system32/ con f i g / system" )
38 out_fpath = f i . f i l ename . r ep l a c e ( ’ / ’ , ’− ’ ) . r ep l a c e ( ’ ’ , ’− ’ )
39 with open( out_fpath , ’wb ’ ) as f :
40 contents = f i . byte_runs . i t e r_content s ( s e l f . imag e f i l e )
41 contents = b"" . j o i n ( contents )
42 f . wr i t e ( contents )





47 def extract_windows_version ( co ) :
48 i f co . c e l l p a t h :
49 i f "Microso f t \CurrentVers ion \ProductName" in co . c e l l p a t h :
50 print ( " > ProductName : %s " % co . data )
51 i f "Microso f t \CurrentVers ion \CSDVersion" in co . c e l l p a t h :
52 print ( " > CSDVersion : %s " % co . data )
53 i f "Microso f t \CurrentVers ion \ProductId " in co . c e l l p a t h :
54 print ( " > ProductId : %s " % co . data )
55
56 ######################################################################
57 i f __name__=="__main__" :
58 import argparse
59 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n= ’ ’ ’ DetectWindows . py ’ ’ ’ )
60 par s e r . add_argument ( " t a r g e t " ,
61 help = "Target d i sk image or DFXML repor t " )
62 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
63
64 # Check f i l e system fo r roo t "windows" f o l d e r
65 for ( event , obj ) in Objects . i t e r p a r s e ( t a r g e t ) :
66 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
67 has_windows = check_f i l e sys tem ( obj )
68 i f has_windows :
69 print ( ">>> Windows root f o l d e r detec ted . . . " )
70 break
71
72 # Extrac t so f tware h i ve f i l e
73 for ( event , obj ) in Objects . i t e r p a r s e ( t a r g e t ) :
74 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
75 software_hive = extract_software_hive ( obj )
76 i f software_hive :
77 print ( ">>> SOFTWARE hive f i l e detec ted and ext rac t ed . . . " )
78 break
79
80 # Locate Reg i s t r y key , and e x t r a c t r e qu i r ed va l u e s
81 for ( event , obj ) in Objects . i t e rpa r s e_Ce l lOb j e c t s ( software_hive ) :
82 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . Ce l lObject ) :
83 extract_windows_version ( obj )
Listing C.1: Full source code listing for DetectWindows.py
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C.2 Created Application Profiles
The first phase of system demonstration involved creating application profiles using the im-
plemented system design, namely, the LiveDiff tool. Three anti-forensic tools were selected
to create application profiles: 1) CCleaner; 2) Eraser; and 3) TrueCrypt. Five separate
application life cycles were recreated and data collection performed, including: 1) Install; 2)
Open; 3) Close; 4) Uninstall; and 5) Reboot.
Three tables are included in this subsection. Each table presents a summary of application
profile contents and metadata for each of the three selected anti-forensic tools. For each anti-
forensic tool the following information is provided:
1) A count for each digital artifact type: directory, file, Registry key and Registry value
2) A total count of all digital artifact types
3) The time taken to create the application profile (presented in seconds)
4) The file size of the resultant application profile (APXML document)
5) The average of all properties
6) The total of all properties
The following tables are included:
1) Table C.1 presents a summary of application profile contents for CCleaner
2) Table C.2 presents a summary of application profile contents for Eraser
3) Table C.3 presents a summary of application profile contents for TrueCrypt
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Table C.1: Summary of application profile contents for CCleaner version 5.09
Tool Dirs Files Keys Values Total Time (sec) File size
CC01 19 415 96 447 977 241 2.2 MB
CC02 19 403 96 462 980 246 2.2 MB
CC03 19 405 96 435 955 245 2.2 MB
CC04 19 406 96 490 1,011 250 2.4 MB
CC05 19 403 96 462 980 249 2.2 MB
CC06 19 411 97 455 982 335 2.3 MB
CC07 19 386 97 441 943 250 2.2 MB
CC08 19 395 95 444 953 245 2.2 MB
CC09 19 382 96 455 952 240 2.2 MB
CC10 19 376 96 440 931 240 2.1 MB
CC11 19 383 96 439 937 244 2.2 MB
CC12 19 385 96 464 964 243 2.4 MB
CC13 19 370 95 430 914 231 2.1 MB
CC14 19 405 96 467 987 230 3.5 MB
CC15 19 385 96 455 955 234 2.2 MB
CC16 19 404 96 471 990 238 3.5 MB
CC17 19 401 96 433 949 230 2.2 MB
CC18 19 396 96 463 974 230 2.2 MB
CC19 19 383 96 458 956 238 2.2 MB
CC20 19 369 97 482 967 231 2.2 MB
CC21 13 359 97 451 920 237 2.1 MB
CC22 19 390 96 456 961 230 2.2 MB
CC23 19 382 95 430 926 236 2.1 MB
CC24 19 386 95 442 942 234 2.2 MB
CC25 19 407 96 460 982 243 2.2 MB
Average 19 391 96 453 960 242.8 2.3 MB
Total 469 9,787 2,400 11,332 23,988 6,070 57.7 MB
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Table C.2: Summary of application profile contents for Eraser version 6.2.0.2970
Tool Dirs Files Keys Values Total Time (sec) File size
ER01 25 301 201 2,112 2,639 257 3.2 MB
ER02 25 380 201 2,102 2,708 272 3.2 MB
ER03 25 292 194 2,108 2,619 255 3.1 MB
ER04 25 309 203 2,104 2,641 260 3.2 MB
ER05 25 350 203 2,114 2,692 261 3.2 MB
ER06 25 350 201 2,119 2,695 269 3.2 MB
ER07 25 312 203 2,108 2,648 262 3.3 MB
ER08 25 384 203 2,111 2,723 263 3.2 MB
ER09 25 299 201 2,110 2,635 259 3.2 MB
ER10 25 418 201 2,124 2,768 265 3.2 MB
ER11 25 316 203 2,132 2,676 265 3.4 MB
ER12 25 340 200 2,111 2,676 257 3.3 MB
ER13 25 297 200 2,106 2,628 257 3.2 MB
ER14 25 355 203 2,130 2,713 254 3.2 MB
ER15 25 389 201 2,116 2,731 266 3.2 MB
ER16 25 355 203 2,131 2,714 259 3.2 MB
ER17 25 437 203 2,117 2,782 268 3.2 MB
ER18 25 299 200 2,110 2,634 259 3.2 MB
ER19 25 301 201 2,113 2,640 263 3.2 MB
ER20 25 291 202 2,117 2,635 256 3.2 MB
ER21 25 310 201 2,117 2,653 263 3.2 MB
ER22 25 309 203 2,115 2,652 256 3.2 MB
ER23 25 294 201 2,145 2,665 252 3.4 MB
ER24 25 317 201 2,126 2,669 255 4.5 MB
ER25 25 312 203 2,115 2,655 258 3.2 MB
Average 25 333 201 2,117 2,676 260 3.3 MB
Total 625 8,317 5,036 52,913 66,891 6,511 81.8 MB
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Table C.3: Summary of application profile contents for TrueCrypt version 7.1a
Tool Dirs Files Keys Values Total Time (sec) File size
TC01 15 232 153 526 926 245 2.4 MB
TC02 15 226 153 511 905 238 2.1 MB
TC03 15 233 153 511 912 239 2.1 MB
TC04 15 215 153 507 890 242 2.1 MB
TC05 15 236 154 529 934 240 2.1 MB
TC06 15 230 154 531 930 235 2.1 MB
TC07 15 237 154 532 938 240 2.3 MB
TC08 15 237 154 536 942 240 2.1 MB
TC09 15 220 154 524 913 241 2.1 MB
TC10 15 238 154 530 937 237 2.1 MB
TC11 15 220 154 526 915 239 2.1 MB
TC12 15 219 154 507 895 233 2.1 MB
TC13 15 210 153 507 885 231 2.1 MB
TC14 15 235 154 527 931 234 2.1 MB
TC15 15 236 154 512 917 236 2.1 MB
TC16 15 218 154 527 914 243 2.1 MB
TC17 15 228 153 533 929 247 2.4 MB
TC18 15 220 154 527 916 242 2.1 MB
TC19 15 220 154 528 917 240 2.1 MB
TC20 15 220 154 525 914 238 2.1 MB
TC21 15 221 155 523 914 244 2.1 MB
TC22 15 217 153 530 915 252 2.4 MB
TC23 15 229 154 516 914 236 2.1 MB
TC24 15 220 157 521 913 246 2.1 MB
TC25 15 220 154 523 912 241 2.1 MB
Average 15 225 154 523 917 240 2.1 MB
Total 375 5,637 3,847 13,069 22,928 5,999 53.6 MB
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C.3 Application Profile Intersection: APXMLIntersection.py
Listing C.2 displays the full source code for the APXMLIntersection.py script.
1 #!/ usr / b in /env python3
2
3 """
4 Author : Thomas Laurenson
5 Email : thomas@thomaslaurenson . com
6 Website : thomaslaurenson . com
7 Date : 2016/01/04
8
9 Descr ip t i on :
10 The APXMLIntersection . py Python module t a k e s an APXML document as input
11 and normal i ses F i l eOb j e c t s and Ce l lOb j e c t s p r o p e r t i e s .
12
13 Copyright ( c ) 2016 , Thomas Laurenson
14
15 #####################################################################
16 This program i s f r e e so f tware : you can r e d i s t r i b u t e i t and/or modify
17 i t under the terms o f the GNU General Pub l i c License as pub l i s h ed by
18 the Free Sof tware Foundation , e i t h e r ve r s i on 3 o f the License , or
19 ( a t your opt ion ) any l a t e r ve r s i on .
20
21 This program i s d i s t r i b u t e d in the hope t ha t i t w i l l be u s e f u l ,
22 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; wi thou t even the imp l i ed warranty o f
23 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
24 GNU General Pub l i c License f o r more d e t a i l s .
25
26 You shou ld have r e c e i v ed a copy o f the GNU General Pub l i c License










37 import i o




42 except ImportError :
43 print ( "Error : APXMLIntersection . py" )
44 print ( " The dfxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
45 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )





50 except ImportError :
51 print ( "Error : APXMLIntersection . py" )
52 print ( " The Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
53 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )




58 except ImportError :
59 print ( "Error : APXMLIntersection . py" )
60 print ( " The apxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
61 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )
62 sys . e x i t (1 )
63
64 #####################################################################
65 # In t e r s e c t i o n o b j e c t
66 class I n t e r s e c t i o n ( object ) :
67 def __init__( s e l f , p r o f i l e s L i s t ) :
68 s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t = l i s t ( )
69 s e l f . o rder = l i s t ( )
70
71 # DFXML and RegXML Objec t s to s t o r e F i l eOb j e c t s
72 # and Ce l lOb j e c t s found in the APXML documents
73 s e l f . dfxml_obj = Objects .DFXMLObject ( )
74 s e l f . regxml_obj = Objects . RegXMLObject ( )
75
76 # Keep record o f p r o f i l e name fo r output
77 s e l f . out_fn = os . path . basename ( p r o f i l e s L i s t [ 0 ] )
78 s e l f . out_fn = os . path . s p l i t e x t ( s e l f . out_fn ) [ 0 ]
79
80 # Parse each APXML f i l e to a OrderedDict
81 for i , p r o f i l e in enumerate( p r o f i l e s L i s t ) :
82 print ( " > %s" % p r o f i l e )
83 apxml_obj = apxml . i t e r p a r s e ( p r o f i l e )
84 apxml . generate_stat s ( apxml_obj )
85 # Sp l i t the f i l e system path f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n p r o f i l e
86 name = p r o f i l e . s p l i t ( ’ / ’ )
87 name = name [ 0 ]
88 #name = name [ l en (name) − 1 ]
89 #name = name . s p l i t ("−") [ 0 ]
90 apxml_obj . name = name
91 s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t . append ( apxml_obj )
92
93 def s o r t_p r o f i l e s ( s e l f , method ) :
94 """ Sort p r o f i l e s by s e l e c t e d method . """
95 i f method == None :
96 pass
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97 e l i f method == " h ighe s t " :
98 s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t . s o r t ( key=lambda x : x . s t a t s . al l , r e v e r s e=True )
99 e l i f method == " lowest " :
100 s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t . s o r t ( key=lambda x : x . s t a t s . al l , r e v e r s e=False )
101 e l i f method == " stacked " :
102 s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t . s o r t ( key=lambda x : x . s t a t s . al l , r e v e r s e=False )
103 low = l i s t ( s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t )
104 high = l i s t ( s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t )
105 low . s o r t ( key=lambda x : x . s t a t s . al l , r e v e r s e=Fal se )
106 high . s o r t ( key=lambda x : x . s t a t s . al l , r e v e r s e=True )
107 low = low [ 0 : 1 0 ]
108 high = high [ 0 : 1 0 ]
109
110 del s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t [ : ]
111 for (h , l ) in zip ( high , low ) :
112 s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t . append (h)
113 s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t . append ( l )
114
115 def f i r s t_pa s s ( s e l f ) :
116 """ Process the f i r s t p r o f i l e . """
117 s e l f . o rder . append ( s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t [ 0 ] )
118 for obj in s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t [ 0 ] :
119 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
120 obj . count = 1
121 s e l f . dfxml_obj . append ( obj )
122 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . Ce l lObject ) :
123 obj . count = 1
124 s e l f . regxml_obj . append ( obj )
125
126 def next_pass ( s e l f , count ) :
127 """ Prcoess each subsequent p r o f i l e . """
128 s e l f . o rder . append ( s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t [ count ] )
129 for obj in s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t [ count ] :
130 match = False
131 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
132 for f i in s e l f . dfxml_obj :
133 i f s e l f . compare_f i l e s ( f i , obj ) :
134 match = True
135 i f f i . count i s None :
136 obj . count = 1
137 s e l f . dfxml_obj . append ( obj )
138 else :
139 f i . count += 1
140 i f match == False :
141 obj . count = 1
142 s e l f . dfxml_obj . append ( obj )
143 e l i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . Ce l lObject ) :
144 for c e l l in s e l f . regxml_obj :
145 i f s e l f . compare_cel ls ( c e l l , obj ) :
146 match = True
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147 i f c e l l . count i s None :
148 obj . count = 1
149 s e l f . regxml_obj . append ( obj )
150 else :
151 c e l l . count += 1
152 i f match == False :
153 obj . count = 1
154 s e l f . regxml_obj . append ( obj )
155
156
157 def compare_f i l e s ( s e l f , f i 1 , f i 2 ) :
158 """ Compare a l l metadata p r o p e r t i e s between two F i l eOb j e c t s """
159 i f f i 1 . f i l ename . endswith ( " . lnk " ) :
160 # Compare ShortCut ( lnk ) f i l e s
161 # Do not compare SHA−1 hash va lue
162 return ( f i 1 . f i l ename == f i 2 . f i l ename and
163 f i 1 . meta_type == f i 2 . meta_type and
164 f i 1 . a l l oc_inode == f i 2 . a l l oc_inode and
165 f i 1 . alloc_name == f i 2 . alloc_name and
166 f i 1 . annos == f i 2 . annos and
167 f i 1 . app_state == f i 2 . app_state )
168
169 e l i f f i 1 . f i l ename . endswith ( " . pf " ) :
170 # Normalize Pre f e t ch f i l e f o r comparison , e . g . ,
171 # Before : C:\Windows\Pre f e t ch \TRUECRYPT.EXE−009A2E5A. p f
172 # After : C:\Windows\Pre f e t ch \TRUECRYPT.EXE
173 path1 = os . path . s p l i t e x t ( f i 1 . f i l ename ) [ 0 ]
174 path1 = path1 . s p l i t ( "−" ) [ 0 ]
175 path2 = os . path . s p l i t e x t ( f i 2 . f i l ename ) [ 0 ]
176 path2 = path2 . s p l i t ( "−" ) [ 0 ]
177 return ( path1 == path2 and
178 f i 1 . meta_type == f i 2 . meta_type and
179 f i 1 . a l l oc_inode == f i 2 . a l l oc_inode and
180 f i 1 . alloc_name == f i 2 . alloc_name and
181 f i 1 . annos == f i 2 . annos and
182 f i 1 . app_state == f i 2 . app_state )
183
184 # Defau l t i s to compare a l l o b j e c t p r o p e r t i e s
185 return ( f i 1 . f i l ename == f i 2 . f i l ename and
186 f i 1 . meta_type == f i 2 . meta_type and
187 f i 1 . sha1 == f i 2 . sha1 and
188 f i 1 . a l l oc_inode == f i 2 . a l l oc_inode and
189 f i 1 . alloc_name == f i 2 . alloc_name and
190 f i 1 . annos == f i 2 . annos and
191 f i 1 . app_state == f i 2 . app_state )
192
193 def compare_cel ls ( s e l f , co1 , co2 ) :
194 """ Compare a l l metadata p r o p e r t i e s between two Ce l lOb j e c t s """
195 i f "UserAss i s t " in co1 . c e l l p a t h :
196 return ( co1 . c e l l p a t h == co2 . c e l l p a t h and
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197 co1 . name_type == co2 . name_type and
198 co1 . a l l o c == co2 . a l l o c and
199 co1 . data_type == co2 . data_type and
200 co1 . annos == co2 . annos and
201 co1 . app_state == co2 . app_state )
202 return ( co1 . c e l l p a t h == co2 . c e l l p a t h and
203 co1 . name_type == co2 . name_type and
204 co1 . a l l o c == co2 . a l l o c and
205 co1 . data_type == co2 . data_type and
206 co1 . data == co2 . data and
207 co1 . annos == co2 . annos and
208 co1 . app_state == co2 . app_state )
209
210 def s t a t s ( s e l f , count ) :
211 f i s = l i s t ( s e l f . dfxml_obj )
212 cos = l i s t ( s e l f . regxml_obj )
213 i n t e r s e c t_ f i s = [ f i for f i in f i s i f f i . count == count + 1 ]
214 in t e r s e c t_co s = [ co for co in cos i f co . count == count + 1 ]
215
216 cCOUNT = count + 1
217 cALL = sum(1 for x in i n t e r s e c t_ f i s ) + sum(1 for x in i n t e r s e c t_co s )
218 cDIRS = len ( [ f i for f i in i n t e r s e c t_ f i s i f f i . meta_type == 2 ] )
219 cFILES = len ( [ f i for f i in i n t e r s e c t_ f i s i f f i . meta_type == 1 ] )
220 cKEYS = len ( [ co for co in i n t e r s e c t_co s i f co . name_type == "k" ] )
221 cVALUES = len ( [ co for co in i n t e r s e c t_co s i f co . name_type == "v" ] )
222




227 " { : , } " . format (cVALUES) ,
228 " { : , } " . format (cALL) ) )
229
230 def csv_output ( s e l f , count ) :
231 """ Create CSV output f o r i n t e r s e c t e d e n t r i e s . """
232 count += 1
233 f i l e s_ c s v = "n" + str ( count ) + "_FILES . csv "
234 c e l l s_c sv = "n" + str ( count ) + "_CELLS. csv "
235 # CSV fo r FILES
236 with open( f i l e s_c sv , ’w ’ ) as f :
237 f . wr i t e ( "count , s ta te , f i l ename , de l ta , meta_type , alloc_name ,
a l loc_inode , f i l e s i z e , sha1\n" )
238 for f i in s e l f . dfxml_obj :
239 f . wr i t e ( "%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s \n" % ( f i . count ,
240 f i . app_state ,
241 f i . f i l ename ,
242 "" . j o i n ( f i . annos ) ,
243 f i . meta_type ,
244 f i . alloc_name ,
245 f i . a l loc_inode ,
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246 f i . f i l e s i z e ,
247 f i . sha1 ) )
248 # CSV fo r CELLS
249 with open( ce l l s_csv , ’w ’ ) as f :
250 f . wr i t e ( "count , s ta te , c e l l pa th , de l ta , name_type , a l l o c , data_type ,
data\n" )
251 for co in s e l f . regxml_obj :
252 f . wr i t e ( "%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s \n" % ( co . count ,
253 co . app_state ,
254 co . c e l l pa th ,
255 "" . j o i n ( f i . annos ) ,
256 co . name_type ,
257 co . a l l o c ,
258 co . data_type ,
259 co . data ) )
260
261 def apxml_output ( s e l f , count ) :
262 """ Create APXML output f o r i n t e r s e c t e d e n t r i e s . """
263
264 apxml_out = s e l f . p r o f i l e L i s t [ 0 ]
265
266 # Remove a l l f i l e s and c e l l s from APXMLObject
267 del apxml_out . _ f i l e s [ : ]
268 del apxml_out . _ce l l s [ : ]
269
270 # Append f i l e s and c e l l s to new APXML
271 for f i in s e l f . dfxml_obj :
272 i f f i . count == count :
273 apxml_out . append ( f i )
274 for c e l l in s e l f . regxml_obj :
275 i f c e l l . count == count :
276 apxml_out . append ( c e l l )
277
278 # Write a temp APXML document
279 temp_fi = i o . Str ingIO ( apxml_out . to_apxml ( ) )
280 # Format APXML using minidom
281 xml_fi = xml .dom. minidom . parse ( temp_fi )
282 apxml_report = xml_fi . toprettyxml ( indent=" " )
283 # Set the f i l e output name
284 fn = s e l f . out_fn + "−n" + str ( count ) + "−INTERSECTION. apxml"
285 # Write out APXML document
286 with open( fn , "w" , encoding="utf−16− l e " ) as f :
287 #f . wr i t e ("<?xml ve r s i on = ’1.0 ’ encoding=’UTF−16’ ?>")
288 f . wr i t e ( apxml_report )
289
290 #####################################################################
291 i f __name__==’__main__ ’ :
292 import argparse
293 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n= ’ ’ ’ APXMLIntersection . py ’ ’ ’ ,
294 fo rmatte r_c la s s = argparse . RawTextHelpFormatter )
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295 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ p r o f i l e s ’ ,
296 help = ’ Appl i cat ion P r o f i l e s XML (APXML) ’ ,
297 nargs=’+’ )
298 par s e r . add_argument ( ’mode ’ ,
299 help = ’APXML order ( none , lowest , h ighest , s tacked ) ’
)
300 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
301
302 obj = I n t e r s e c t i o n ( args . p r o f i l e s )
303
304 # Sort p r o f i l e s based on t o t a l number or d i g i t a l a r t i f a c t s
305 # None = sor t ed based on argument p o s i t i o n
306 # lowes t = sor t ed based on low > high
307 # h i g h e s t = sor t ed based on high > low
308 obj . s o r t_p r o f i l e s ( args .mode)
309
310 # Parse the f i r s t p r o f i l e , and output
311 obj . f i r s t_pa s s ( )
312 print ( " pro f i l e_count , a l l , d i r s , f i l e s , keys , va lue s " )
313 obj . s t a t s (0 )
314 obj . csv_output (0 )
315
316 # Parse each subsequent p r o f i l e , and output
317 count = 1
318 pro f i l eCount = len ( args . p r o f i l e s )
319 while count < pro f i l eCount :
320 obj . next_pass ( count )
321 obj . s t a t s ( count )
322 obj . csv_output ( count )
323 count += 1
324
325 # Make an APXML document from f i n a l r e s u l t
326 obj . apxml_output ( count )
Listing C.2: Full source code listing for APXMLIntersection.py
C.4 Application Profile Intersection Results
Application profile intersection was tested to perform automated removal of irrelevant digital
artifacts from the created application profiles. A total of 25 application profiles were created
for each anti-forensic tool selected for testing. For each anti-forensic tool, profile intersection
was conducted by performing set intersection of all 25 application profiles. The following
tables display the count for each digital artifact type (directories, files, Registry keys and
Registry values) and the total count of all digital artifacts. Table C.4, C.5 and C.6 display
the resultant digital artifact counts from application profile intersection.
332
Table C.4: Application Profile Intersection Results for CCleaner version 5.09
Profile Dirs Files Keys Values Total
CC13 19 370 95 430 914
CC21 12 332 81 234 659
CC23 12 284 80 233 609
CC10 11 282 79 225 597
CC11 11 278 79 225 593
CC24 11 278 79 225 593
CC07 11 276 79 211 577
CC17 11 276 79 211 577
CC09 11 275 79 210 575
CC08 11 275 79 209 574
CC03 11 275 79 208 573
CC15 11 275 79 208 573
CC19 11 275 79 208 573
CC22 11 275 79 208 573
CC12 11 275 78 205 569
CC20 11 275 78 205 569
CC18 11 275 78 205 569
CC01 11 274 78 205 568
CC02 11 274 78 205 568
CC05 11 274 78 205 568
CC06 11 264 78 203 556
CC25 11 264 78 203 556
CC14 11 264 78 203 556
CC16 11 264 78 203 556
CC04 11 263 78 203 555
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Table C.5: Application Profile Intersection Results for Eraser version 6.2.0.2970
Profile Dirs Files Keys Values Total
ER03 25 292 194 2,108 2,619
ER13 15 243 181 1,915 2,354
ER18 15 242 181 1,909 2,347
ER09 15 242 181 1,909 2,347
ER20 15 242 181 1,890 2,328
ER01 15 242 181 1,889 2,327
ER19 15 242 181 1,889 2,327
ER04 15 242 181 1,888 2,326
ER07 15 242 181 1,888 2,326
ER22 15 242 181 1,888 2,326
ER21 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER25 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER23 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER24 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER11 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER12 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER05 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER06 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER02 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER14 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER16 15 240 181 1,888 2,324
ER08 15 239 181 1,888 2,323
ER15 15 239 181 1,888 2,323
ER10 15 239 181 1,888 2,323
ER17 15 239 181 1,876 2,311
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Table C.6: Application Profile Intersection Results for TrueCrypt version 7.1a
Profile Dirs Files Keys Values Total
TC13 15 210 153 507 885
TC04 14 202 143 349 708
TC12 14 201 143 330 688
TC02 14 196 143 326 679
TC03 14 196 143 326 679
TC25 14 196 143 322 675
TC09 14 196 143 322 675
TC24 14 195 143 319 671
TC16 14 195 143 319 671
TC20 14 195 143 319 671
TC21 14 195 143 319 671
TC23 14 195 143 319 671
TC11 14 195 143 319 671
TC22 14 195 143 319 671
TC18 14 195 143 319 671
TC15 14 195 143 319 671
TC19 14 195 143 319 671
TC01 14 187 140 318 659
TC17 14 187 140 318 659
TC06 14 187 140 318 659
TC14 14 187 140 318 659
TC05 14 187 140 318 659
TC10 14 187 140 318 659
TC07 14 187 140 318 659
TC08 14 187 140 318 659
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C.5 Application Profile Blacklisting: APXMLBlacklist.py
Listing C.3 displays the full source code for the APXMLBlacklist.py script.
1 import os
2 import i o
3 import glob
4 import copy
5 import c o l l e c t i o n s




10 except ImportError :
11 print ( "Error : APXMLBlacklist . py" )
12 print ( " The dfxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
13 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )




18 except ImportError :
19 print ( "Error : APXMLBlacklist . py" )
20 print ( " The Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
21 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )




26 except ImportError :
27 print ( "Error : APXMLBlacklist . py" )
28 print ( " The apxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
29 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )
30 sys . e x i t (1 )
31
32 #####################################################################
33 # B l a c k l i s t o b j e c t
34 class B l a c k l i s t ( object ) :
35 def __init__( s e l f , p r o f i l e , bFILES ,bHKLM,bHKU, working_dir , output_dir ) :
36 """ Here . """
37 s e l f . p r o f i l e = p r o f i l e
38 s e l f . basename = os . path . s p l i t e x t ( s e l f . p r o f i l e ) [ 0 ]
39 s e l f . bFILES = bFILES
40 s e l f .bHKLM = bHKLM
41 s e l f .bHKU = bHKU
42 s e l f . working_dir = working_dir
43 s e l f . output_dir = output_dir
44
45 s e l f . f i l e s B l a c k l i s t = l i s t ( )
46 s e l f . c e l l s B l a c k l i s t = l i s t ( )
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47
48 def pa r s e_b l a ck l i s t ( s e l f ) :
49 """ Open and read each L i v eD i f f b l a c k l i s t f i l e . """
50 with open( s e l f . bFILES , encoding="utf−16− l e " ) as f :
51 for l i n e in f :
52 l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( )
53 s e l f . f i l e s B l a c k l i s t . append ( l i n e )
54 with open( s e l f .bHKLM, encoding="utf−16− l e " ) as f :
55 for l i n e in f :
56 l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( )
57 s e l f . c e l l s B l a c k l i s t . append ( l i n e )
58 with open( s e l f .bHKU, encoding="utf−16− l e " ) as f :
59 for l i n e in f :
60 l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( )
61 s e l f . c e l l s B l a c k l i s t . append ( l i n e )
62
63 def parse_apxml ( s e l f ) :
64 """ Parse APXML repor t us ing apxml . py module . """
65 s e l f . apxml_obj = apxml . i t e r p a r s e ( s e l f . p r o f i l e )
66 apxml . generate_stat s ( s e l f . apxml_obj )
67
68 def b l a c k l i s t ( s e l f ) :
69 """ Perform b l a c k l i s t i n g . """
70 for obj in s e l f . apxml_obj :
71 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
72 i f obj . f i l ename in s e l f . f i l e s B l a c k l i s t :
73 obj . b l a c k l i s t e d = True
74 else :
75 obj . b l a c k l i s t e d = False
76
77 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . Ce l lObject ) :
78 i f obj . c e l l p a t h in s e l f . c e l l s B l a c k l i s t :
79 obj . b l a c k l i s t e d = True
80 else :
81 obj . b l a c k l i s t e d = False
82
83 def apxml_output ( s e l f ) :
84 """ Reconstruct b l a c k l i s t e d APXML document . """
85 new_apxml_obj = copy . deepcopy ( s e l f . apxml_obj )
86
87 del new_apxml_obj . _ f i l e s [ : ]
88 del new_apxml_obj . _ce l l s [ : ]
89
90 # Append f i l e s and c e l l s to new APXML
91 for obj in s e l f . apxml_obj :
92 i f not obj . b l a c k l i s t e d :
93 new_apxml_obj . append ( obj )
94
95 # Write a temp APXML document
96 temp_fi = i o . Str ingIO (new_apxml_obj . to_apxml ( ) )
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97 # Format APXML using minidom
98 xml_fi = xml .dom. minidom . parse ( temp_fi )
99 apxml_report = xml_fi . toprettyxml ( indent=" " )
100 # Set the f i l e output name
101 fn = s e l f . output_dir + "/" + + os . path . basename ( s e l f . basename )
102 fn = fn + "−b l a c k l i s t e d . apxml"
103 # Write out APXML document
104 with open( fn , "w" , encoding="utf−16− l e " ) as f :
105 f . wr i t e ( apxml_report )
106 f . c l o s e ( )
107
108 def csv_output ( s e l f ) :
109 """ Create CSV fo r b l a c k l i s t e d e n t r i e s . """
110 fn = s e l f . output_dir + "/" + os . path . basename ( s e l f . basename )
111 f i l e s_ c s v = fn + "_FILES . csv "
112 c e l l s_c sv = fn + "_CELLS. csv "
113 # CSV fo r FILES
114 with open( f i l e s_c sv , ’w ’ ) as f :
115 f . wr i t e ( " b l a c k l i s t e d , f i l ename , de l ta , meta_type , alloc_name ,
a l loc_inode , f i l e s i z e , sha1\n" )
116 for f i in s e l f . apxml_obj :
117 i f isinstance ( f i , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
118 i f not f i . b l a c k l i s t e d :
119 f . wr i t e ( "%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s \n" % ( "NO" ,
120 f i . f i l ename ,
121 "" . j o i n ( f i . annos ) ,
122 f i . meta_type ,
123 f i . alloc_name ,
124 f i . a l loc_inode ,
125 f i . f i l e s i z e ,
126 f i . sha1 ) )
127 e l i f f i . b l a c k l i s t e d :
128 f . wr i t e ( "%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s \n" % ( "YES" ,
129 f i . f i l ename ,
130 "" . j o i n ( f i . annos ) ,
131 f i . meta_type ,
132 f i . alloc_name ,
133 f i . a l loc_inode ,
134 f i . f i l e s i z e ,
135 f i . sha1 ) )
136 # CSV fo r CELLS
137 with open( ce l l s_csv , ’w ’ ) as f :
138 f . wr i t e ( " b l a c k l i s t e d , c e l l pa th , de l ta , name_type , a l l o c , data_type ,
data\n" )
139 for co in s e l f . apxml_obj :
140 i f isinstance ( co , Objects . Ce l lObject ) :
141 i f not co . b l a c k l i s t e d :
142 f . wr i t e ( "%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s \n" % ( "NO" ,
143 co . c e l l pa th ,
144 "" . j o i n ( f i . annos ) ,
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145 co . name_type ,
146 co . a l l o c ,
147 co . data_type ,
148 co . data ) )
149 e l i f co . b l a c k l i s t e d :
150 f . wr i t e ( "%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s \n" % ( "YES" ,
151 co . c e l l pa th ,
152 "" . j o i n ( f i . annos ) ,
153 co . name_type ,
154 co . a l l o c ,
155 co . data_type ,
156 co . data ) )
157
158 #####################################################################
159 i f __name__==’__main__ ’ :
160 import argparse
161 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n= ’ ’ ’
162 B l a c k l i s t S i n g l e . py . ’ ’ ’ ,
163 fo rmatte r_c la s s = argparse . RawTextHelpFormatter )
164 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ l i v ed i f f_ou tpu t ’ ,
165 help = ’ L iv eD i f f output d i r e c t o r y ’ )
166 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ output_dir ’ ,
167 help = ’Output d i r e c t o r y ’ )
168 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
169
170 working_dir = args . l i v ed i f f_ou tpu t
171 output_dir = args . output_dir
172 os . makedirs ( output_dir )
173
174 p r o f i l e = glob . g lob ( working_dir + " /∗ . apxml" ) [ 0 ]
175 bFILES = working_dir + "/ b l a c k l i s t−FILES . txt "
176 bHKLM = working_dir + "/ b l a c k l i s t−HKLM. txt "
177 bHKU = working_dir + "/ b l a c k l i s t−HKU. txt "
178 b l a c k l i s t i n g = B l a c k l i s t ( p r o f i l e , bFILES , bHKLM, bHKU, working_dir ,
output_dir )
179
180 b l a c k l i s t i n g . pa r s e_b l a ck l i s t ( )
181 b l a c k l i s t i n g . parse_apxml ( )
182
183 b l a c k l i s t i n g . b l a c k l i s t ( )
184
185 b l a c k l i s t i n g . apxml_output ( )
186 b l a c k l i s t i n g . csv_output ( )
Listing C.3: Full source code listing for APXMLBlacklist.py
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C.6 LiveDiff Static Blacklist
Listing C.4 displays the full static blacklist implemented in the LiveDiff tool.
1 # LIVEDIFF STATIC BLACKLIST
2 # Any l i n e s t a r t i n g wi th a "#" i s a comment
3 # The f o l l ow i n g p r e f i x e s are de f ined :
4 # DIR= Spec i f y a d i r e c t o r y and con ten t s to be exc luded
5 # FILE= Spec i f y a f i l e to be exc luded
6 # KEY= Spec i f y a Reg i s t r y key , sub−key and va l u e s to be exc luded .
7 # VALUE= Spec i f y a Reg i s t r y va lue to be ex luded .
8
9 ########## FILE SYSTEM ENTRIES
10 DIR=C:\ ProgramData\Microso f t \Windows Defender
11 DIR=C:\ ProgramData\Microso f t \RAC
12 DIR=C:\ ProgramData\Microso f t \ Search
13 DIR=C:\ Users \Al l Users \Mic roso f t \RAC
14 DIR=C:\ Users \Al l Users \Mic roso f t \ Search
15 DIR=C:\ Users \Al l Users \Mic roso f t \Windows Defender
16 DIR=C:\ Users \ f o r e n s i c \AppData\Local \Mic roso f t \ In t e rn e t Explorer
17 DIR=C:\ Users \ f o r e n s i c \AppData\Local \Mic roso f t \Windows\History \History . IE5
18 DIR=C:\ Users \ f o r e n s i c \AppData\Local \Mic roso f t \Windows\Temporary In t e rn e t
F i l e s \Content . IE5
19 DIR=C:\ Users \ f o r e n s i c \AppData\LocalLow\Microso f t \CryptnetUrlCache
20 DIR=C:\ Users \ f o r e n s i c \AppData\Roaming\Microso f t \Crypto
21 DIR=C:\ Users \ f o r e n s i c \AppData\Roaming\Microso f t \Windows\Recent\
CustomDestinations




26 DIR=C:\Windows\System32\ LogFi l e s
27 DIR=C:\Windows\System32\ con f i g \ s y s t empro f i l e \AppData\LocalLow\Microso f t \
CryptnetUrlCache
28
29 ########## WINDOWS REGISTRY ENTRIES
30 KEY=HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microso f t \ Secu r i ty Center
31 KEY=HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microso f t \ Sy s t emCer t i f i c a t e s \AuthRoot\ C e r t i f i c a t e s
32 KEY=HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microso f t \Windows\CurrentVers ion \ I n s t a l l e r \UserData
33 KEY=HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microso f t \Windows\CurrentVers ion \Group Po l i cy
34 KEY=HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microso f t \Windows\CurrentVers ion \WindowsUpdate
35 KEY=HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microso f t \Windows Search \Gather\Windows\SystemIndex
36 KEY=HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microso f t \Windows NT\CurrentVers ion \AppCompatFlags\Layers
37 KEY=HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microso f t \Windows NT\CurrentVers ion \ Schedule
38 KEY=HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microso f t \Windows NT\CurrentVers ion \SystemRestore \ Vo l a t i l e
39 KEY=HKLM\SYSTEM\Contro lSet001
40 KEY=HKLM\SYSTEM\Contro lSet002
41 KEY=HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentContro lSet \Control \Dev iceClas se s
42 KEY=HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentContro lSet \Enum\STORAGE
43 KEY=HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentContro lSet \Control \Class
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44 KEY=HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentContro lSet \Control \ Se s s i on Manager
45 KEY=HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentContro lSet \ s e r v i c e s \VSS
46 KEY=HKU\ .DEFAULT\Software \ C la s s e s \Local S e t t i n g s \MuiCache
47 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−18\Software \ C la s s e s \Local S e t t i n g s \MuiCache
48 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−21−884162780−2507285075−3001024006−1000_Classes \Local S e t t i n g s \
MuiCache
49 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−21−884162780−2507285075−3001024006−1000_Classes \Local S e t t i n g s \
Software \Microso f t \Windows\ Sh e l l
50 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−21−884162780−2507285075−3001024006−1000\ Software \ C la s s e s \Local
S e t t i n g s \MuiCache
51 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−21−884162780−2507285075−3001024006−1000\ Software \ C la s s e s \Local
S e t t i n g s \ Software \Microso f t \Windows\ Sh e l l
52 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−21−884162780−2507285075−3001024006−1000\ Software \Microso f t \
In t e rn e t Explorer \Main\WindowsSearch
53 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−21−884162780−2507285075−3001024006−1000\ Software \Microso f t \
Windows\CurrentVers ion \Explorer \ F i l eExt s
54 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−21−884162780−2507285075−3001024006−1000\ Software \Microso f t \
Windows\CurrentVers ion \Explorer \ StartPage2
55 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−21−884162780−2507285075−3001024006−1000\ Software \Microso f t \
Windows\CurrentVers ion \ In t e rn e t S e t t i n g s
56 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−21−884162780−2507285075−3001024006−1000\ Software \Microso f t \
Windows\CurrentVers ion \ Sh e l l Extens ions \Cached
57 KEY=HKU\S−1−5−21−884162780−2507285075−3001024006−1000\ Software \Microso f t \
Windows\CurrentVers ion \Action Center
Listing C.4: Full listing of the LiveDiff static blacklist
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C.7 Final Application Profiles
This section outlines and presents additional information and data regarding the final versions
of the application profiles that were created for testing against the known data set, public
data set (M57-Patents scenario) and the real-world data set.
Listing C.5 displays the full source code used to extract statistics from the finalised ap-
plication profiles.






7 except ImportError :
8 print ( "Error : APXMLPrintProfile . py" )
9 print ( " The dfxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
10 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )




15 except ImportError :
16 print ( "Error : APXMLPrintProfile . py" )
17 print ( " The Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
18 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )




23 except ImportError :
24 print ( "Error : APXMLPrintProfile . py" )
25 print ( " The apxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
26 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )
27 sys . e x i t (1 )
28
29 #####################################################################
30 i f __name__==’__main__ ’ :
31 import argparse
32 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n= ’ ’ ’ APXMLPrintProfile . py . ’ ’ ’ ,
33 fo rmatte r_c la s s = argparse . RawTextHelpFormatter )
34 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ p r o f i l e ’ ,
35 help = ’ p r o f i l e ’ )
36
37 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
38
39 f i = args . p r o f i l e
40
41 apxml_obj = apxml . i t e r p a r s e ( f i )
42 apxml . generate_stat s ( apxml_obj )
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43 print ( " State , Type ,New, Modif ied , Deleted , Total " )
44 d e l t a s = [ "new" , "modi f i ed " , " de l e t ed " ]
45 s t a t e s = [ " i n s t a l l " , "open" , " c l o s e " , " u n i n s t a l l " ]
46 for s t a t e in s t a t e s :
47 print ( "%s ,%s ,%d,%d,%d,%d" % ( state ,
48 "Dirs " ,
49 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _dirs [ s t a t e ] . count ( "new" ) ,
50 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _dirs [ s t a t e ] . count ( "modi f i ed " ) ,
51 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _dirs [ s t a t e ] . count ( " de l e t ed " ) ,
52 len ( apxml_obj . s t a t s . _dirs [ s t a t e ] ) ) )
53 print ( "%s ,%s ,%d,%d,%d,%d" % ( state ,
54 " F i l e s " ,
55 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _ f i l e s [ s t a t e ] . count ( "new" ) ,
56 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _ f i l e s [ s t a t e ] . count ( "modi f i ed " ) ,
57 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _ f i l e s [ s t a t e ] . count ( " de l e t ed " ) ,
58 len ( apxml_obj . s t a t s . _ f i l e s [ s t a t e ] ) ) )
59 print ( "%s ,%s ,%d,%d,%d,%d" % ( state ,
60 "Keys" ,
61 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _keys [ s t a t e ] . count ( "new" ) ,
62 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _keys [ s t a t e ] . count ( "modi f i ed " ) ,
63 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _keys [ s t a t e ] . count ( " de l e t ed " ) ,
64 len ( apxml_obj . s t a t s . _keys [ s t a t e ] ) ) )
65 print ( "%s ,%s ,%d,%d,%d,%d" % ( state ,
66 "Values " ,
67 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _values [ s t a t e ] . count ( "new" ) ,
68 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _values [ s t a t e ] . count ( "modi f i ed " ) ,
69 apxml_obj . s t a t s . _values [ s t a t e ] . count ( " de l e t ed " ) ,
70 len ( apxml_obj . s t a t s . _values [ s t a t e ] ) ) )
Listing C.5: Full listing of the APXMLPrintProfile.py script
Tables C.7, C.8, C.9 and C.10 provides a count of all application profile contents based on
digital artifact type (e.g., directory), application state (e.g., install), delta properties (e.g.,
new) and a total count.
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Table C.7: Summary of the final application profile for CCleaner version 5.09
State Type New Modified Deleted Total
install Dirs 3 0 0 3
install Files 62 0 0 62
install Keys 18 0 0 18
install Values 27 0 0 27
open Dirs 0 0 0 0
open Files 0 0 0 1
open Keys 2 0 0 2
open Values 21 0 0 21
close Dirs 0 0 0 0
close Files 0 0 0 0
close Keys 0 0 0 0
close Values 5 0 0 6
uninstall Dirs 0 0 3 3
uninstall Files 0 0 60 60
uninstall Keys 0 0 16 16
uninstall Values 1 0 37 38
Total 139 0 116 257
Table C.8: Summary of the final application profile for Eraser version 6.2.0
State Type New Modified Deleted Total
install Dirs 5 0 0 5
install Files 36 0 0 36
install Keys 34 0 0 34
install Values 93 0 0 93
open Dirs 0 0 0 0
open Files 1 0 0 1
open Keys 6 0 0 6
open Values 3 0 0 3
close Dirs 2 0 0 2
close Files 1 0 0 1
close Keys 0 0 0 0
close Values 0 0 0 0
uninstall Dirs 3 0 5 8
uninstall Files 0 0 34 34
uninstall Keys 2 0 34 36
uninstall Values 0 0 91 91
Total 186 0 164 350
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Table C.9: Summary of the final application profile for TrueCrypt version 7.1a
State Type New Modified Deleted Total
install Dirs 2 0 0 2
install Files 14 0 0 14
install Keys 58 0 0 58
install Values 84 0 0 84
open Dirs 1 0 0 1
open Files 1 0 0 1
open Keys 0 0 0 0
open Values 2 0 0 2
close Dirs 0 0 0 0
close Files 1 0 0 1
close Keys 0 0 0 0
close Values 0 0 0 1
uninstall Dirs 0 0 3 3
uninstall Files 1 0 13 14
uninstall Keys 0 0 58 58
uninstall Values 1 0 81 82
Total 165 0 155 321
Table C.10: Summary of the final application profile for XP Keylogger version 2.1
State Type New Modified Deleted Total
install Dirs 5 0 0 5
install Files 26 0 0 26
install Keys 295 0 0 295
install Values 350 0 0 350
open Dirs 0 0 0 0
open Files 0 0 0 0
open Keys 0 0 0 0
open Values 2 0 0 2
close Dirs 0 0 0 0
close Files 1 0 0 1
close Keys 0 0 0 0
close Values 0 0 0 0
uninstall Dirs 0 0 4 4
uninstall Files 1 0 23 24
uninstall Keys 0 0 279 279
uninstall Values 1 0 334 335
Total 681 0 640 1,321
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C.8 Determining Data Set Statistics: FileSystemStats.py






6 except ImportError :
7 print ( "Error : F i l eSystemStats . py" )
8 print ( " The dfxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
9 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )




14 except ImportError :
15 print ( "Error : F i l eSystemStats . py" )
16 print ( " The Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
17 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )
18 sys . e x i t (1 )
19
20 #####################################################################
21 # FSStats o b j e c t
22 class FSStats ( object ) :
23 def __init__( s e l f ) :
24 s e l f . a l l = 0
25 s e l f . d i r s = 0
26 s e l f . f i l e s = 0
27 s e l f . o ther = 0
28 s e l f . a l l o c = 0
29 s e l f . una l l o c = 0
30 s e l f . target_dir_count = 0
31 s e l f . ta rge t_f i l e_count = 0
32
33 def generate_stat s ( s e l f , f i ) :
34 i f f i . meta_type == 2 :
35 s e l f . target_dir_count += 1
36 e l i f f i . meta_type == 1 :
37 s e l f . ta rge t_f i l e_count += 1
38
39 s e l f . a l l += 1
40
41 i f f i . meta_type == 1 :
42 s e l f . f i l e s += 1
43 e l i f f i . meta_type == 2 :
44 s e l f . d i r s += 1
45 else :
46 s e l f . o ther += 1
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47
48 i f f i . i s_a l l o c a t ed ( ) :
49 s e l f . a l l o c += 1
50 else :
51 s e l f . una l l o c += 1
52
53 #####################################################################
54 i f __name__==’__main__ ’ :
55 import argparse
56 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n= ’ ’ ’ F i l eSys t emSta t s . py ’ ’ ’ ,
57 fo rmatte r_c la s s = argparse . RawTextHelpFormatter )
58 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ t a r g e t ’ ,
59 help = ’An imag e f i l e or DFXML repor t ’ )
60 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
61
62 s t a t s = FSStats ( )
63
64 for ( event , obj ) in Objects . i t e r p a r s e ( args . xm l f i l e ) :
65 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
66 s t a t s . generate_stat s ( obj )
67
68
69 print ( "%s \ t%d\ t%d\ t%d\ t%d\ t%d\ t%d" % ( os . path . basename ( args . xm l f i l e ) ,
70 s t a t s . al l ,
71 s t a t s . d i r s ,
72 s t a t s . f i l e s ,
73 s t a t s . other ,
74 s t a t s . a l l o c ,
75 s t a t s . una l l o c ) )
Listing C.6: Full source code listing for FileSystemStats.py
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C.9 Determining Data Set Statistics: RegistryStats.py







7 except ImportError :
8 print ( "Error : Reg i s t ryS ta t s . py" )
9 print ( " The dfxml . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
10 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )




15 except ImportError :
16 print ( "Error : Reg i s t ryS ta t s . py" )
17 print ( " The Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed to run t h i s s c r i p t " )
18 print ( " Now Exit ing . . . " )
19 sys . e x i t (1 )
20
21 #####################################################################
22 # REGStats o b j e c t
23 class REGStats ( object ) :
24 def __init__( s e l f ) :
25 s e l f . a l l = 0
26 s e l f . keys = 0
27 s e l f . va lue s = 0
28 s e l f . o ther = 0
29 s e l f . a l l o c = 0
30 s e l f . una l l o c = 0
31 s e l f . target_key_count = 0
32 s e l f . target_value_count = 0
33
34 def generate_stat s ( s e l f , co ) :
35 i f co . name_type == "k" :
36 s e l f . target_key_count += 1
37 e l i f co . name_type == "v" :
38 s e l f . target_value_count += 1
39
40 s e l f . a l l += 1
41
42 i f co . name_type == "k" :
43 s e l f . keys += 1
44 e l i f co . name_type == "v" :
45 s e l f . va lue s += 1
46 else :
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47 s e l f . o ther += 1
48
49 i f co . a l l o c == 1 :
50 s e l f . a l l o c += 1
51 else :
52 s e l f . una l l o c += 1
53
54 #####################################################################
55 i f __name__==’__main__ ’ :
56 import argparse
57 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n= ’ ’ ’ R e g i s t r yS t a t s . py ’ ’ ’ ,
58 fo rmatte r_c la s s = argparse . RawTextHelpFormatter )
59 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ xm l f i l e_d i r ’ ,
60 help = ’ Direc tory o f RegXML repo r t s ’ )
61 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
62
63 s t a t s = REGStats ( )
64 hive_count = 0
65
66 h ive s = glob . g lob ( args . xm l f i l e_d i r + " /∗ . xml" )
67
68 #pr in t ( h i v e s )
69
70 for hive in h ive s :
71 hive_count += 1
72 for ( event , obj ) in Objects . i t e rpa r s e_Ce l lOb j e c t s ( h ive ) :
73 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . Ce l lObject ) :
74 s t a t s . generate_stat s ( obj )
75
76 print ( "%s \ t%d\ t%d\ t%d\ t%d\ t%d\ t%d\ t%d" % ( args . xml f i l e_di r ,
77 hive_count ,
78 s t a t s . al l ,
79 s t a t s . keys ,
80 s t a t s . va lues ,
81 s t a t s . other ,
82 s t a t s . a l l o c ,
83 s t a t s . una l l o c ) )
Listing C.7: Full source code listing for RegistryStats.py
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C.10 Known Data Set Contents
Table C.11 displays the complete file system counts for the known data set including the
number of directories (dirs), files, other file system data types, allocated entries, unallocated
entries and a total count.
Table C.11: Overview of file system counts for the known data set
Name Dirs Files Other Alloc Unalloc Total
GT-01 28,713 48,747 3,091 77,062 3,489 80,551
CC-01 28,829 48,947 2,918 77,513 3,181 80,694
CC-02 28,827 48,951 2,917 77,530 3,165 80,695
CC-03 28,827 48,958 2,917 77,546 3,156 80,702
CC-04 28,827 48,923 2,918 77,444 3,224 80,668
ER-01 30,644 49,981 2,910 80,451 3,084 83,535
ER-02 30,630 49,992 2,909 80,445 3,086 83,531
ER-03 30,642 50,017 2,909 80,534 3,034 83,568
ER-04 30,637 50,019 2,916 80,467 3,105 83,572
TC-01 29,044 49,134 2,930 78,170 2,938 81,108
TC-02 29,047 49,136 2,929 78,179 2,933 81,112
TC-03 29,047 49,138 2,930 78,178 2,937 81,115
TC-04 29,046 49,139 2,934 78,160 2,959 81,119
Total 382,760 641,082 38,128 1,021,679 40,291 1,061,970
Average 29,443.08 49,314.00 2,932.92 78,590.69 3,099.31 81,690.00
Table C.12 displays the complete Registry count for the known data set including number of
hive files, keys, values, allocated entries, unallocated entries and a total count.
Table C.12: Overview of Registry counts for the known data set
Name Hives Keys Values Alloc Unalloc Total
GT-01 9 114,618 207,452 310,532 11,538 322,070
CC-01 9 114,796 206,934 311,344 10,386 321,730
CC-02 9 114,796 206,934 311,344 10,386 321,730
CC-03 9 114,796 206,934 311,344 10,386 321,730
CC-04 9 114,782 206,886 311,357 10,311 321,668
ER-01 9 115,290 204,400 317,725 1,965 319,690
ER-02 9 115,291 204,403 317,737 1,957 319,694
ER-03 9 115,292 204,406 317,741 1,957 319,698
ER-04 9 115,359 204,434 317,551 2,242 319,793
TC-01 9 127,541 221,375 337,943 10,973 348,916
TC-02 9 127,542 221,379 337,947 10,974 348,921
TC-03 9 127,542 221,469 337,965 11,046 349,011
TC-04 9 127,587 221,562 337,829 11,320 349,149
Total 117 1,545,232 2,738,568 4,178,359 105,441 4,283,800




Appendix D provides additional relevant documentation regarding the system evaluation pre-
sented in Chapter 7. The following list specifies all included material:
1. Section D.1 documents the digital artifact counts for the M57-Patents scenario data set
2. Section D.2 provides the Python scripts used to determine the effectiveness of path
normalisation for file system and Registry entries
3. Section D.3 documents the method used and results achieved to determine hard drive
read speed
4. Section D.4 documents modifications made to the fiwalk tool and cross-compilation
notes for compiling Windows binaries
5. Section D.5 documents all second-hand hard drives sources to compile the real-world
data set
6. Section D.6 documents the digital artifact counts for the real-world data set
D.1 M57-Patents Scenario Data Set Contents
Table D.1 displays the complete file system counts for the M57-Patents scenario data set
including the number of directories (dirs), files, other file system data types, allocated entries,
unallocated entries and a total count.
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Name Dirs Files Other Alloc Unalloc Total
charlie-2009-11-17 7,688 26,699 561 34,373 575 34,948
charlie-2009-11-18 7,769 27,031 566 34,785 581 35,366
charlie-2009-11-19 9,656 28,383 596 38,028 607 38,635
charlie-2009-11-20 9,330 28,467 608 36,380 2,025 38,405
charlie-2009-11-23 9,265 28,525 617 36,364 2,043 38,407
charlie-2009-11-24 9,155 28,559 617 36,783 1,548 38,331
charlie-2009-11-30 9,091 28,642 659 37,580 812 38,392
charlie-2009-12-01 9,091 28,811 672 37,891 683 38,574
charlie-2009-12-02 9,125 29,006 665 37,753 1,043 38,796
charlie-2009-12-03 9,099 28,997 663 37,942 817 38,759
charlie-2009-12-04 9,103 29,110 672 38,204 681 38,885
charlie-2009-12-07 9,130 29,352 673 38,459 696 39,155
charlie-2009-12-08 9,123 29,469 684 38,420 856 39,276
charlie-2009-12-09 9,285 29,898 690 39,175 698 39,873
charlie-2009-12-10 9,304 30,016 696 39,314 702 40,016
charlie-2009-12-11 9,320 30,055 699 39,373 701 40,074
jo-2009-11-12start 6,808 22,324 410 29,128 414 29,542
jo-2009-11-12 7,357 26,091 502 33,294 656 33,950
jo-2009-11-16 7,619 26,848 565 34,433 599 35,032
jo-2009-11-17 7,649 27,121 556 34,767 559 35,326
jo-2009-11-18 7,668 27,567 563 35,183 615 35,798
jo-2009-11-19 7,686 27,706 565 35,386 571 35,957
jo-2009-11-20-newComputer 6,563 22,012 376 28,570 381 28,951
jo-2009-11-20-oldComputer 8,926 28,106 617 37,010 639 37,649
jo-2009-11-23 7,031 25,702 477 32,727 483 33,210
jo-2009-11-24 8,948 27,131 543 36,073 549 36,622
jo-2009-11-30 9,504 29,620 598 39,091 631 39,722
jo-2009-12-01 9,060 29,815 613 37,055 2,433 39,488
jo-2009-12-02 8,841 29,887 612 37,199 2,141 39,340
jo-2009-12-03 8,838 29,967 606 37,189 2,222 39,411
jo-2009-12-04 8,809 29,915 622 37,318 2,028 39,346
jo-2009-12-07 8,831 29,881 624 37,432 1,904 39,336
jo-2009-12-08 8,954 29,823 629 37,862 1,544 39,406
jo-2009-12-09 8,951 29,716 631 38,432 866 39,298
jo-2009-12-10 9,017 31,519 797 40,532 801 41,333
jo-2009-12-11-001 9,028 31,524 811 40,357 1,006 41,363
jo-2009-12-11-002 9,041 31,575 814 40,501 929 41,430
pat-2009-11-12start 6,687 22,007 429 28,604 519 29,123
pat-2009-11-12 7,369 25,920 509 33,287 511 33,798
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. . . continued
Name Dirs Files Other Alloc Unalloc Total
pat-2009-11-16 7,679 31,036 624 38,671 668 39,339
pat-2009-11-17 7,713 31,564 618 39,269 626 39,895
pat-2009-11-18 7,749 32,581 642 40,260 712 40,972
pat-2009-11-19 8,107 33,597 653 41,684 673 42,357
pat-2009-11-20 7,668 33,721 670 40,238 1,821 42,059
pat-2009-11-23 7,335 34,003 703 41,306 735 42,041
pat-2009-11-24 7,384 34,231 706 41,599 722 42,321
pat-2009-11-30 7,693 36,381 772 43,936 910 44,846
pat-2009-12-01 7,683 36,445 773 44,126 775 44,901
pat-2009-12-02 7,717 36,659 791 44,373 794 45,167
pat-2009-12-03 7,694 36,936 794 43,499 1,925 45,424
pat-2009-12-04 7,604 36,941 802 44,542 805 45,347
pat-2009-12-07 7,838 41,011 745 44,219 5,375 49,594
pat-2009-12-08 7,869 41,008 744 44,397 5,224 49,621
pat-2009-12-09 8,065 40,990 758 44,881 4,932 49,813
pat-2009-12-10 8,029 40,965 754 45,152 4,596 49,748
pat-2009-12-11 8,046 40,960 756 45,247 4,515 49,762
terry-2009-11-12start 38,398 78,049 4,492 116,374 4,565 120,939
terry-2009-11-12 48,838 97,708 5,149 141,215 10,480 151,695
terry-2009-11-16 49,114 97,747 5,247 142,200 9,908 152,108
terry-2009-11-17 49,298 97,692 5,262 143,037 9,215 152,252
terry-2009-11-18 48,897 97,598 5,355 144,035 7,815 151,850
terry-2009-11-19 38,886 81,460 4,598 120,326 4,618 124,944
terry-2009-11-20 39,332 82,439 4,608 121,702 4,677 126,379
terry-2009-11-23 46,301 96,221 4,876 136,437 10,961 147,398
terry-2009-11-24 49,408 96,291 5,242 143,046 7,895 150,941
terry-2009-11-30 46,230 99,006 4,004 132,312 16,928 149,240
terry-2009-12-01 46,201 99,037 4,035 132,301 16,972 149,273
terry-2009-12-02 46,202 99,037 4,019 132,303 16,955 149,258
terry-2009-12-03 46,122 99,118 4,081 132,646 16,675 149,321
terry-2009-12-04 46,137 99,116 4,103 132,692 16,664 149,356
terry-2009-12-07 45,687 99,228 3,743 129,030 19,628 148,658
terry-2009-12-08 45,767 99,220 3,735 129,303 19,419 148,722
terry-2009-12-09 46,063 99,242 3,733 130,135 18,903 149,038
terry-2009-12-10 46,143 99,066 3,662 130,353 18,518 148,871
terry-2009-12-11-001 46,161 99,034 3,689 130,297 18,587 148,884
terry-2009-12-11-002 46,223 98,517 3,409 125,403 22,746 148,149
Table D.1: Overview of file system counts for the M57-Patents scenario
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Table D.2 displays the complete Registry count for the M57-Patents scenario data set including
number of hive files, keys, values, allocated entries, unallocated entries and a total count.
Name Hives Keys Values Alloc Unalloc Total
charlie-2009-11-12 18 103,115 179,971 283,066 20 283,086
charlie-2009-11-12start 18 102,082 178,397 280,458 21 280,479
charlie-2009-11-16 18 103,221 180,391 283,568 44 283,612
charlie-2009-11-17 18 103,509 181,118 284,583 44 284,627
charlie-2009-11-18 18 103,607 181,398 284,961 44 285,005
charlie-2009-11-19 18 106,196 185,103 291,255 44 291,299
charlie-2009-11-20 18 106,510 185,836 292,286 60 292,346
charlie-2009-11-23 18 106,540 185,931 292,400 71 292,471
charlie-2009-11-24 18 106,617 186,210 292,769 58 292,827
charlie-2009-11-30 18 107,243 187,302 294,448 97 294,545
charlie-2009-12-01 18 107,269 187,438 294,609 98 294,707
charlie-2009-12-02 18 107,273 187,475 294,635 113 294,748
charlie-2009-12-03 18 107,252 187,525 294,705 72 294,777
charlie-2009-12-04 18 107,256 187,533 294,725 64 294,789
charlie-2009-12-07 18 107,272 187,550 294,757 65 294,822
charlie-2009-12-08 18 107,271 187,555 294,764 62 294,826
charlie-2009-12-09 18 107,378 188,177 295,505 50 295,555
charlie-2009-12-10 18 107,395 188,302 295,647 50 295,697
charlie-2009-12-11 18 107,403 188,349 295,702 50 295,752
jo-2009-11-12 18 103,008 179,520 282,498 30 282,528
jo-2009-11-12start 18 101,875 177,641 279,485 31 279,516
jo-2009-11-16 18 103,116 179,947 283,036 27 283,063
jo-2009-11-17 18 103,241 180,424 283,636 29 283,665
jo-2009-11-18 18 103,337 180,615 283,923 29 283,952
jo-2009-11-19 18 103,372 180,782 284,110 44 284,154
jo-2009-11-20-newComputer 18 102,455 178,682 281,004 133 281,137
jo-2009-11-20-oldComputer 18 107,026 185,995 292,982 39 293,021
jo-2009-11-23 18 102,643 179,449 282,067 25 282,092
jo-2009-11-24 18 105,268 183,154 288,418 4 288,422
jo-2009-11-30 18 107,488 186,769 294,232 25 294,257
jo-2009-12-01 18 107,501 186,886 294,348 39 294,387
jo-2009-12-02 18 107,505 186,890 294,354 41 294,395
jo-2009-12-03 18 107,521 186,969 294,467 23 294,490
jo-2009-12-04 18 107,552 187,210 294,723 39 294,762
jo-2009-12-07 18 107,579 187,380 294,906 53 294,959
354
. . . continued
Name Hives Keys Values Alloc Unalloc Total
jo-2009-12-08 18 107,586 187,387 294,934 39 294,973
jo-2009-12-09 18 107,708 187,994 295,646 56 295,702
jo-2009-12-10 18 107,738 188,059 295,759 38 295,797
jo-2009-12-11-001 18 107,761 188,166 295,902 25 295,927
jo-2009-12-11-002 18 107,761 188,183 295,919 25 295,944
pat-2009-11-12 18 103,073 179,719 282,709 83 282,792
pat-2009-11-12start 18 101,960 177,896 279,837 19 279,856
pat-2009-11-16 18 103,284 180,553 283,818 19 283,837
pat-2009-11-17 18 103,523 181,306 284,794 35 284,829
pat-2009-11-18 18 103,630 181,724 285,310 44 285,354
pat-2009-11-19 18 104,702 183,274 287,926 50 287,976
pat-2009-11-20 18 104,823 183,590 288,190 223 288,413
pat-2009-11-23 18 104,862 183,788 288,412 238 288,650
pat-2009-11-24 18 104,862 183,894 288,567 189 288,756
pat-2009-11-30 18 105,281 184,718 289,941 58 289,999
pat-2009-12-01 18 105,281 184,754 290,002 33 290,035
pat-2009-12-02 18 105,312 184,964 290,219 57 290,276
pat-2009-12-03 18 105,637 185,317 290,648 306 290,954
pat-2009-12-04 18 105,521 185,093 290,406 208 290,614
pat-2009-12-07 19 105,985 186,211 291,587 609 292,196
pat-2009-12-08 19 105,987 186,186 291,557 616 292,173
pat-2009-12-09 19 105,891 186,793 292,618 66 292,684
pat-2009-12-10 19 105,917 186,951 292,820 48 292,868
pat-2009-12-11 19 105,940 187,022 292,904 58 292,962
terry-2009-11-12 10 207,109 402,147 568,856 40,400 609,256
terry-2009-11-12start 10 190,840 348,595 530,146 9,289 539,435
terry-2009-11-16 10 211,415 412,183 569,398 54,200 623,598
terry-2009-11-17 10 207,648 403,293 570,752 40,189 610,941
terry-2009-11-18 10 197,831 383,218 551,713 29,336 581,049
terry-2009-11-19 10 158,689 320,434 475,259 3,864 479,123
terry-2009-11-20 10 174,012 355,585 501,291 28,306 529,597
terry-2009-11-23 10 214,207 410,712 597,644 27,275 624,919
terry-2009-11-24 10 218,888 424,588 602,155 41,321 643,476
terry-2009-11-30 10 211,607 408,218 609,482 10,343 619,825
terry-2009-12-01 10 215,862 417,870 609,511 24,221 633,732
terry-2009-12-02 10 215,799 418,096 609,777 24,118 633,895
terry-2009-12-03 10 215,994 418,146 609,764 24,376 634,140
terry-2009-12-04 10 215,984 418,155 609,780 24,359 634,139
terry-2009-12-07 10 215,936 418,079 609,752 24,263 634,015
355
. . . continued
Name Hives Keys Values Alloc Unalloc Total
terry-2009-12-08 10 215,925 417,784 610,142 23,567 633,709
terry-2009-12-09 10 216,394 419,257 612,090 23,561 635,651
terry-2009-12-10 10 222,091 432,699 581,367 73,423 654,790
terry-2009-12-11-001 10 215,600 421,207 583,057 53,750 636,807
terry-2009-12-11-002 10 215,355 423,161 584,539 53,977 638,516
Table D.2: Overview of Registry counts for the M57-Patents scenario
D.2 Path Normalisation Testing
Listing D.1 displays the full source code for the FSPathDetection.py script used to per-
form a comparison of path normalisation effectiveness for file system entries.
1 # !/ usr / b in /python
2




7 import c o l l e c t i o n s
8
9 try :
10 import Fi lePathNormal i ser
11 except ImportError :
12 print ( ’ Error : FSPathDetection . py ’ )
13 print ( ’ The Fi l ePathNormal i ser . py module i s r equ i r ed . ’ )
14 print ( ’ Now Exi t ing . . . ’ )




19 except ImportError :
20 print ( ’ Error : FSPathDetection . py ’ )
21 print ( ’ The Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed . ’ )
22 print ( ’ Now Exi t ing . . . ’ )




27 except ImportError :
28 print ( ’ Error : FSPathDetection . py ’ )
29 print ( ’ The dfxml . py module i s r equ i r ed . ’ )
30 print ( ’ Now Exi t ing . . . ’ )





35 except ImportError :
36 print ( ’ Error : FSPathDetection . py ’ )
37 print ( ’ The apxml . py module i s r equ i r ed . ’ )
38 print ( ’ Now Exi t ing . . . ’ )
39 sys . e x i t (1 )
40
41 #####################################################################
42 class PathNormEffect iveness ( ) :
43 def __init__( s e l f , xm l f i l e=None , p r o f i l e=None ) :
44 """ I n i t i a l i s e PathNormEffect iveness o b j e c t . """
45
46 s e l f . xm l f i l e = xm l f i l e
47 s e l f . p r o f i l e = p r o f i l e
48
49 s e l f . p fo s = l i s t ( )
50 s e l f . pfos_norm = c o l l e c t i o n s . d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
51 s e l f . p fos_actua l = c o l l e c t i o n s . d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
52
53 # I n i t i a l i z e the f i l e path normal i ser o b j e c t
54 s e l f . f i l e_path_normal i se r = Fi lePathNormal i ser . F i l ePathNormal i ser ( )
55
56 s e l f . norm_matches = l i s t ( )
57 s e l f . actual_matches = l i s t ( )
58
59 s e l f . a l l _ f i l e s = 0
60
61 def process_apxml ( s e l f ) :
62 """ Process a l l APXML documents . """
63 apxml_obj = apxml . i t e r p a r s e ( s e l f . p r o f i l e )
64 for pfo in apxml_obj :
65 i f isinstance ( pfo , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
66 s e l f . p fo s . append ( pfo )
67 s e l f . pfos_norm [ pfo . filename_norm ] . append ( pfo )
68
69 i f pfo . f i l ename . s t a r t sw i t h ( "C: " ) :
70 pfo . f i l ename = pfo . f i l ename [ 3 : ]
71
72 s e l f . p fos_actual [ pfo . f i l ename ] . append ( pfo )
73
74 def proces s_target ( s e l f ) :
75 """ Parse the f i l e system of the t a r g e t data s e t . """
76 print ( "DFXML: %s" % os . path . basename ( s e l f . xm l f i l e ) )
77 print ( "APXML: %s" % os . path . basename ( s e l f . p r o f i l e ) )
78 # Process the t a r g e t data s e t
79 i f s e l f . xm l f i l e i s not None :
80 # I f DFXML from f iwa l k , parse us ing Objec t s . i t e r p a r s e
81 for ( event , obj ) in Objects . i t e r p a r s e ( s e l f . xm l f i l e ) :
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82 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . F i l eObjec t ) :
83 s e l f . p roce s s_targe t_f i ( obj )
84
85 def proce s s_targe t_f i ( s e l f , t f o ) :
86 """ Process each Target F i l eOb j e c t (TFO) """
87 # Check i f f i l e i s to be g e n e r i c a l l y exc luded
88 i f ( t f o . f i l ename . endswith ( " / . " ) or t f o . f i l ename . endswith ( " / . . " ) ) :
89 return
90
91 s e l f . a l l _ f i l e s += 1
92
93 t f o . filename_norm = s e l f . f i l e_path_normal i se r . normal ize ( t f o . f i l ename )
94 t f o . f i l ename = t f o . f i l ename . r ep l a c e ( "/" , "\\" )
95
96 i f t f o . filename_norm in s e l f . pfos_norm :
97 s e l f . norm_matches . append ( t f o )
98
99 i f t f o . f i l ename in s e l f . p fos_actua l :
100 s e l f . actual_matches . append ( t f o )
101
102 def r e s u l t s ( s e l f ) :
103 print ( "NORM MATCHES: %d" % len ( s e l f . norm_matches ) )
104
105 for t f o in s e l f . norm_matches :
106 print ( t f o . filename_norm )
107
108 print ( "ACT MATCHES: %d" % len ( s e l f . actual_matches ) )
109 for t f o in s e l f . actual_matches :
110 print ( t f o . f i l ename )
111
112 print ( "ALL: %d" % s e l f . a l l _ f i l e s )




117 i f __name__=="__main__" :
118 import argparse
119 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n= ’ ’ ’ FSPathDetection . py ’ ’ ’ )
120 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ apxml ’ ,
121 help = ’An APXML document ’ )
122 par s e r . add_argument ( "dfxml" ,
123 help = "A DFXML repor t " )
124
125 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
126
127 # Parse command l i n e arguments
128 xm l f i l e = args . dfxml
129 apxml f i l e = args . apxml
130
131 t e s t = PathNormEffect iveness ( xm l f i l e = xml f i l e ,
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132 p r o f i l e = apxml f i l e )
133 t e s t . process_apxml ( )
134 t e s t . proces s_target ( )
135 t e s t . r e s u l t s ( )
Listing D.1: Full source code listing for FSPathDetection.py
Listing D.2 displays the full source code for the REGPathDetection.py script used to
perform a comparison of path normalisation effectiveness for Registry entries.
1 # !/ usr / b in /python
2









12 except ImportError :
13 print ( ’ Error : REGPathDetection . py ’ )
14 print ( ’ The Objects . py module i s r equ i r ed . ’ )




19 except ImportError :
20 print ( ’ Error : REGPathDetection . py ’ )
21 print ( ’ The dfxml . py module i s r equ i r ed . ’ )




26 except ImportError :
27 print ( ’ Error : REGPathDetection . py ’ )
28 print ( ’ The apxml . py module i s r equ i r ed . ’ )
29 sys . e x i t (1 )
30
31 try :
32 import Fi lePathNormal i ser
33 except ImportError :
34 print ( ’ Error : REGPathDetection . py ’ )
35 print ( ’ The Fi l ePathNormal i ser . py module i s r equ i r ed . ’ )
36 sys . e x i t (1 )
37
38 try :
39 import Cel lPathNormal i ser
40 except ImportError :
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41 print ( ’ Error : REGPathDetection . py ’ )
42 print ( ’ The Cel lPathNormal i ser . py module i s r equ i r ed . ’ )
43 sys . e x i t (1 )
44
45 #####################################################################
46 class PathNormEffect iveness ( ) :
47 def __init__( s e l f , h i v e s=None , p r o f i l e=None ) :
48 """ I n i t i a l i s e PathNormEffect iveness o b j e c t . """
49 s e l f . h i v e s = h ive s
50 s e l f . p r o f i l e = p r o f i l e
51
52 s e l f . p fo s = l i s t ( )
53 s e l f . pfos_norm = c o l l e c t i o n s . d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
54 s e l f . p fos_actua l = c o l l e c t i o n s . d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
55
56 # I n i t i a l i z e the f i l e path normal i ser o b j e c t
57 s e l f . f i l e_path_normal i se r = Fi lePathNormal i ser . F i l ePathNormal i ser ( )
58
59 # I n i t i a l i z e the c e l l path normal i ser o b j e c t
60 s e l f . ce l l_path_normal i ser = Cel lPathNormal i ser . Ce l lPathNormal i ser ( )
61
62 s e l f . norm_matches = l i s t ( )
63 s e l f . actual_matches = l i s t ( )
64
65 s e l f . a l l _ c e l l s = 0
66
67 #Set o f t a r g e t h i v e f i l e s to proces s
68 s e l f . ta rget_hives = set ( )
69
70 # act i ve_h ive s p e c i f i e s the h i v e name be ing processed
71 s e l f . act ive_hive = None
72
73 # act i ve_roo tkey i s the common root key name (SOFTWARE, SYSTEM)
74 s e l f . act ive_rootkey = None
75
76 def process_apxml ( s e l f ) :
77 """ Process a l l APXML documents . """
78 apxml_obj = apxml . i t e r p a r s e ( s e l f . p r o f i l e )
79 for pco in apxml_obj :
80 i f isinstance ( pco , Objects . Ce l lObject ) :
81 s e l f . p fo s . append ( pco )
82 s e l f . pfos_norm [ pco . cellpath_norm ] . append ( pco )
83
84 normpath = pco . c e l l p a t h
85 i f normpath . s t a r t sw i t h ( "HKLM\\" ) :
86 normpath = normpath [ 5 : ]
87 i f normpath . s t a r t sw i t h ( "HKU\\" ) :
88 normpath = normpath [ 4 : ]
89 normpath = normpath . s p l i t ( "\\" )
90 del normpath [ 0 ]
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91 normpath = "\\" . j o i n ( normpath )
92 normpath = "NTUSER.DAT\\" + normpath
93 pco . c e l l p a t h = normpath
94
95 s e l f . p fos_actual [ pco . c e l l p a t h ] . append ( pco )
96
97 rootkey = pco . cellpath_norm . s p l i t ( "\\" ) [ 0 ]
98 s e l f . ta rget_hives . add ( rootkey )
99
100
101 def proces s_target ( s e l f ) :
102 """ Parse the f i l e system of the t a r g e t data s e t . """
103 print ( "REGXML: %s" % s e l f . h i ve s )
104 print ( "APXML: %s" % os . path . basename ( s e l f . p r o f i l e ) )
105
106 # Parse t a r g e t Reg i s t r y h i v e f i l e s
107 print ( ">>> Proce s s ing t a r g e t h ive s . . . " )
108 s e l f . to_process = c o l l e c t i o n s . d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
109
110 # Generate RegXML or f e t c h each needed t a r g e t h i v e f i l e
111 i f s e l f . h i v e s i s not None :
112 # Fetch a l l Reg i s t r y r e l a t e d f i l e s
113 r e g i s t r y_ f i l e s = glob . g lob ( s e l f . h i v e s + "∗" )
114
115 # C l a s s i f y r e qu i r ed t a r g e t h i v e s and h i ve f i l e s
116 regxml_count = 0
117 for f i in r e g i s t r y_ f i l e s :
118 for rootkey in s e l f . ta rget_hives :
119 i f f i . lower ( ) . endswith ( rootkey . lower ( ) + " . xml" ) :
120 s e l f . to_process [ rootkey ] . append ( f i )
121 regxml_count += 1
122
123 # Sta r t p roce s s ing each Reg i s t r y h i ve
124 for rootkey in s e l f . ta rget_hives :
125 for hive in s e l f . to_process [ rootkey ] :
126 s e l f . act ive_hive = hive
127 s e l f . act ive_rootkey = rootkey
128 for ( event , obj ) in Objects . i t e rpa r s e_Ce l lOb j e c t s ( h ive ) :
129 i f isinstance ( obj , Objects . Ce l lObject ) :
130 obj . rootkey = rootkey
131 s e l f . process_target_co ( obj )
132
133 def process_target_co ( s e l f , tco ) :
134 # Check i f f i l e i s to be g e n e r i c a l l y exc luded
135 s e l f . a l l _ c e l l s += 1
136
137 # Normalize the TCO rootkey
138 i f tco . c e l l p a t h i s not None :
139 # Normalise the TCO rootkey
140 tco . cellpath_norm = s e l f . ce l l_path_normal i ser . normal ize_rootkey (
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141 tco . c e l l p a t h . lower ( ) ,
142 s e l f . act ive_rootkey )
143
144 # Normlaize the TCO c e l l path ( f u l l path )
145 tco . cellpath_norm = s e l f . ce l l_path_normal i ser . normal i ze_ce l lpath (
146 tco . cellpath_norm ,
147 s e l f . act ive_rootkey )
148 else :
149 tco . cellpath_norm == None
150
151 # Normalize the TCO basename
152 tco . basename_norm = None
153 i f tco . basename :
154 i f ( tco . basename . s t a r t sw i t h ( "C: " ) or
155 tco . basename . s t a r t sw i t h ( "P: " ) or
156 tco . basename . s t a r t sw i t h ( "hrzr_ehacngu" ) ) :
157
158 # Transform the basename ( t h i s u l t ima t e l y c a l l s f i l e system
path normal i ser )
159 normbasename = s e l f . ce l l_path_normal i ser . normalize_basename (
160 tco . basename )
161
162 # Replace b l a c k s l a s h e s wi th f o rward s l a s h e s ( f o r cons i s t ency )
163 normbasename = normbasename . r ep l a c e ( ’ / ’ , ’ \\ ’ )
164 tco . basename_norm = normbasename
165
166 # Fina l l y update the cel lpath_norm fo r a basename
trans format ion
167 i f tco . cellpath_norm :
168 tco . cellpath_norm = tco . cellpath_norm . r ep l a c e (
169 tco . basename . lower ( ) ,
170 tco . basename_norm)
171
172 i f tco . c e l l p a t h :
173 normpath = tco . c e l l p a t h
174 normpath = normpath . s p l i t ( "\\" )
175 normpath [ 0 ] = s e l f . act ive_rootkey . upper ( )
176 normpath = "\\" . j o i n ( normpath )
177 tco . c e l l p a t h = normpath
178
179 i f tco . cellpath_norm in s e l f . pfos_norm :
180 s e l f . norm_matches . append ( tco )
181
182 i f tco . c e l l p a t h in s e l f . p fos_actua l :
183 s e l f . actual_matches . append ( tco )
184
185 def r e s u l t s ( s e l f ) :
186 print ( "NORM MATCHES: %d" % len ( s e l f . norm_matches ) )
187
188 for t f o in s e l f . norm_matches :
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189 print ( t f o . cellpath_norm )
190
191 print ( "ACT MATCHES: %d" % len ( s e l f . actual_matches ) )
192 for t f o in s e l f . actual_matches :
193 print ( t f o . c e l l p a t h )
194
195 print ( "ALL: %d" % s e l f . a l l _ c e l l s )
196 print ( )
197
198 #####################################################################
199 i f __name__=="__main__" :
200 import argparse
201 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( d e s c r i p t i o n= ’ ’ ’ REGPathDetection . py ’ ’ ’ )
202 par s e r . add_argument ( ’ apxml ’ ,
203 help = ’An APXML document ’ )
204 par s e r . add_argument ( " h ive s " ,
205 help = "Direc to ry o f RegXML repo r t s " )
206
207 args = par s e r . parse_args ( )
208
209 # Parse command l i n e arguments
210 h ive s = args . h ive s
211 apxml f i l e = args . apxml
212
213 t e s t = PathNormEffect iveness ( h ive s = hives ,
214 p r o f i l e = apxml f i l e )
215 t e s t . process_apxml ( )
216 t e s t . proces s_target ( )
217 t e s t . r e s u l t s ( )
Listing D.2: Full source code listing for REGPathDetection.py
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D.3 Hard Drive Read Speed Testing
Listing D.3 displays the full Windows batch scripts used to measure the drive read speed.
1 winsat d i sk −seq −read −drive e −count 10 >> SATA_WDGreen. txt
2 winsat d i sk −seq −read −drive e −count 10 >> SATA_WDGreen. txt
3 winsat d i sk −seq −read −drive e −count 10 >> SATA_WDGreen. txt
4 winsat d i sk −seq −read −drive e −count 10 >> SATA_WDGreen. txt
5 winsat d i sk −seq −read −drive e −count 10 >> SATA_WDGreen. txt
6 winsat d i sk −seq −read −drive e −count 10 >> SATA_WDGreen. txt
7 winsat d i sk −seq −read −drive e −count 10 >> SATA_WDGreen. txt
8 winsat d i sk −seq −read −drive e −count 10 >> SATA_WDGreen. txt
9 winsat d i sk −seq −read −drive e −count 10 >> SATA_WDGreen. txt
10 winsat d i sk −seq −read −drive e −count 10 >> SATA_WDGreen. txt
Listing D.3: Windows batch script to determine hard drive read speed
Listing D.4 displays the results from executing the hard drive read speed test using the
Western Digital Green 2.0 TB desktop 3.5-inch hard drive connected via SATA 3.
1 Windows System Assessment Tool
2 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
3 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
4 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive e −count 10 ’
5 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 4 .16
6 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 119.14 MB/s 7 .2
7 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 5 .01
8
9 Windows System Assessment Tool
10 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
11 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
12 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive e −count 10 ’
13 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 3 .35
14 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 119.26 MB/s 7 .2
15 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 3 .74
16
17 Windows System Assessment Tool
18 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
19 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
20 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive e −count 10 ’
21 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 2 .07
22 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 119.14 MB/s 7 .2
23 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 2 .57
24
25 Windows System Assessment Tool
26 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
27 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
28 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive e −count 10 ’
29 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 1 .70
30 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 120.41 MB/s 7 .2
31 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 2 .18
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32
33 Windows System Assessment Tool
34 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
35 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
36 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive e −count 10 ’
37 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 1 .67
38 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 120.16 MB/s 7 .2
39 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 3 .45
40
41 Windows System Assessment Tool
42 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
43 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
44 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive e −count 10 ’
45 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 2 .43
46 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 120.96 MB/s 7 .2
47 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 3 .12
48
49 Windows System Assessment Tool
50 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
51 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
52 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive e −count 10 ’
53 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 0 .38
54 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 119.66 MB/s 7 .2
55 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 2 .23
56
57 Windows System Assessment Tool
58 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
59 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
60 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive e −count 10 ’
61 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 1 .22
62 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 119.08 MB/s 7 .2
63 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 3 .37
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65 Windows System Assessment Tool
66 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
67 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
68 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive e −count 10 ’
69 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 1 .08
70 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 118.19 MB/s 7 .2
71 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 2 .04
72
73 Windows System Assessment Tool
74 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
75 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
76 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive e −count 10 ’
77 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 2 .43
78 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 120.48 MB/s 7 .2
79 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 4 3 .62
Listing D.4: Results from hard drive read speed testing
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Listing D.5 displays the results from executing the hard drive read speed test using the
Western Digital Green 2.0 TB desktop 3.5-inch hard drive connected via the external HDD
caddy.
1 Windows System Assessment Tool
2 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
3 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
4 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
5 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .58
6 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 31 .88 MB/s 4 .5
7 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .77
8 Windows System Assessment Tool
9 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
10 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
11 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
12 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .30
13 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 31 .91 MB/s 4 .5
14 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .46
15 Windows System Assessment Tool
16 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
17 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
18 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
19 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 6 .93
20 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .16 MB/s 4 .5
21 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 7 .09
22 Windows System Assessment Tool
23 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
24 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
25 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
26 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 4 .79
27 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 31 .71 MB/s 4 .5
28 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 4 .95
29 Windows System Assessment Tool
30 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
31 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
32 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
33 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 4 .83
34 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 31 .99 MB/s 4 .5
35 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .00
36 Windows System Assessment Tool
37 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
38 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
39 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
40 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .87
41 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .01 MB/s 4 .5
42 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 6 .04
43 Windows System Assessment Tool
44 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
45 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
46 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
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47 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .67
48 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 31 .62 MB/s 4 .5
49 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .83
50 Windows System Assessment Tool
51 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
52 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
53 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
54 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .37
55 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 31 .85 MB/s 4 .5
56 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .56
57 Windows System Assessment Tool
58 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
59 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
60 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
61 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 6 .19
62 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .21 MB/s 4 .5
63 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 6 .37
64 Windows System Assessment Tool
65 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
66 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
67 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
68 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .44
69 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 31 .80 MB/s 4 .5
70 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 5 .60
Listing D.5: Results from hard drive read speed testing for the external HDD caddy
Listing D.6 displays the results from executing the hard drive read speed test using the
Western Digital Green 2.0 TB desktop 3.5-inch hard drive connected to the triage field laptop
using the external HDD caddy.
1 Windows System Assessment Tool
2 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
3 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
4 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
5 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .33
6 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .83 MB/s 4 .5
7 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .51
8 Windows System Assessment Tool
9 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
10 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
11 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
12 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .34
13 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .84 MB/s 4 .5
14 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .53
15 Windows System Assessment Tool
16 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
17 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
18 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
19 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .51
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20 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .82 MB/s 4 .5
21 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .67
22 Windows System Assessment Tool
23 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
24 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
25 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
26 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .05
27 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .83 MB/s 4 .5
28 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .22
29 Windows System Assessment Tool
30 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
31 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
32 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
33 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .26
34 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .90 MB/s 4 .5
35 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .44
36 Windows System Assessment Tool
37 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
38 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
39 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
40 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .94
41 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .70 MB/s 4 .5
42 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 9 .11
43 Windows System Assessment Tool
44 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
45 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
46 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
47 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .34
48 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .80 MB/s 4 .5
49 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .53
50 Windows System Assessment Tool
51 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
52 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
53 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
54 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 7 .47
55 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .88 MB/s 4 .5
56 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 7 .64
57 Windows System Assessment Tool
58 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
59 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
60 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
61 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .24
62 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .86 MB/s 4 .5
63 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 8 .41
64 Windows System Assessment Tool
65 > Running: Feature Enumeration ’ ’
66 > Run Time 00 : 0 0 : 0 0 .00
67 > Running: Storage Assessment ’−seq −read −drive d −count 10 ’
68 > Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 9 .22
69 > Disk Sequent i a l 64 .0 Read 32 .92 MB/s 4 .5
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70 > Total Run Time 00 : 0 1 : 3 9 .38
Listing D.6: Results from hard drive read speed testing of the triage field laptop system
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D.4 Additional fiwalk Development
A collection of issues were discovered when performing experimental testing with fiwalk
while attempting to increase system efficiency. Listing D.7 displays the patch file authored to
solve two bugs found in the latest fiwalk release: 1) By default fiwalk prints the input file
name to standard output which means that the DFXML API (Objects.py) will crash due to
an XML error when ingesting; and 2) An error was found in handling command line arguments
and fiwalk was unable to parse only file system metadata and always exported data location
(byte_runs). Both these problems were solved using the simple patch provided.
1 −−− f iwa l k . cpp 2016−06−28 16 :59 :45 .709036128 +1200
2 +++ fiwalk_gw . cpp 2016−06−28 17 :02 :49 .237610527 +1200
3 @@ −460 ,7 +460 ,7 @@
4 return ret_val ;
5 }
6 ∗_opt_arg=opt_arg ;
7 − p r i n t f ( "opt_arg : %s \n" , opt_arg ) ;
8 + // p r i n t f (" opt_arg : %s\n" , opt_arg ) ;
9 return 0 ;
10 }
11 #end i f
12 @@ −472 ,7 +472 ,7 @@
13 const char ∗ text_fn = 0 ;
14 s t r i n g ∗xml_fn = 0 ;
15 const char ∗ aud i t_ f i l e = 0 ;
16 − bool opt_x = f a l s e ;
17 + bool opt_x = true ;
18 s t r i n g command_line = xml : : make_command_line ( argc , argv1 ) ;
19 bool opt_zap = f a l s e ;
20 u_int s e c t o r_s i z e =512; // d e f a u l t s to 512; may be
changed by AFF
21 @@ −597 ,9 +597 ,9 @@
22 i f ( ! f i l ename ) {
23 er rx (1 , "must prov ide f i l ename " ) ;
24 }
25 − i f ( opt_no_data && (opt_md5 | | opt_sha1 | | opt_save | | opt_magic ) ) {
26 − e r rx (1 , "−g c o n f l i c t s with opt ions r e qu i r i n g data ac c e s s (−z may be
needed ) " ) ;
27 − }
28 +// i f ( opt_no_data && (opt_md5 | | opt_sha1 | | opt_magic ) ) {
29 +// errx (1 , "−g c o n f l i c t s wi th op t i ons r e qu i r i n g data acces s (−z may be
needed ) ") ;
30 +// }
31
32 i f ( opt_save ) {
33 i f ( a c c e s s ( save_outdir . c_str ( ) ,F_OK) ) {
Listing D.7: Patch file to fix two fiwalk bugs
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In addition to the discovered programming bugs it was found difficult to cross-compile fiwalk
for Microsoft Windows. Listing D.8 provides a simple overview of how the author cross-
compiled fiwalk for Windows using MinGW.
1 # Download MinGW i n s t a l l e r from
2 https : // s ou r c e f o r g e . net / p r o j e c t s /mingw/ f i l e s / I n s t a l l e r /mingw−get−setup . exe /
download
3
4 # Make sure to i n s t a l l common bu i l d packages
5
6 # REGEX
7 # Manually download and i n s t a l l regex , o ther op t i ons w i l l f a i l
8 # Download from :
9 https : // s ou r c e f o r g e . net / p r o j e c t s /mingw/ f i l e s /MSYS/Base/ regex / regex
−1.20090805−2/
10
11 # Change to d i r e c t o r y
12 C:\msys \1 .0\home\dsb\msys−bui ld−regex
13
14 #Locate the f o l l ow i n g l i n e s ( us ing a ’# ’)
15 i f [ "$MSYSTEM" != "MSYS" ]
16 then




21 # The f i v e l i n e s shou ld l ook l i k e t h i s :
22 #i f [ "$MSYSTEM" != "MSYS" ]
23 #then
24 # echo "You must be in an MSYS s h e l l to use t h i s s c r i p t "
25 # e x i t 1
26 #f i
27
28 # In the MSYS s h e l l , e xecu te the f o l l ow i n g commands :
29 cd /home/dsb
30 . /msys−bui ld−regex regex −20090805. ta r . xz
31 cd /home/dsb/ regex −20090805
32 . / c on f i gu r e −−p r e f i x=/mingw −−with−cu r s e s
33 make
34 make i n s t a l l
35
36
37 # THE SLEUTH KIT (TSK)
38 # Download from GitHub
39 https : // github . com/ s l e u t h k i t / s l e u t h k i t
40
41 # Extrac t then con f i gu r e and i n s t a l l
42 ta r xvf s l e u thk i t−master
43 . / c on f i gu r e −−bu i ld=i586−mingw32msvc −−d i sab l e−java −−without−a f f l i b −−




46 # An error may be encountered wi th c o l l e c t 2 . exe
47 # Locate " tsk_hashdb . c" f i l e ( t s k /hashdb/ tsk_hashdb . c ) and change the
f o l l ow i n g :
48
49 #i f d e f TSK_WIN32
50 i n t fd = 0 ;
51 // i f (_wsopen_s(&fd , f i l e_path , _O_RDONLY | _O_BINARY, _SH_DENYNO, 0) ==
0) {
52 // f i l e = _wfdopen ( fd , L" rb" ) ;
53 // }
54 fd = _wsopen ( f i l e_path , _O_RDONLY | _O_BINARY, _SH_DENYNO, 0) ;
55 i f ( fd == −1)
56 exit (1 ) ;
57 #e l s e
58 f i l e = fopen ( f i l e_path , " rb" ) ;
59 #end i f
60
61
62 # LIBEWF ( op t i ona l )
63 # Download , e x t rac t , compi le and i n s t a l l as per usua l
64 # Version used : l i b ew f −20140608
65
66
67 # AFFLIB ( op t i ona l )
68 # Download , e x t rac t , compi le and i n s t a l l as per usua l
69 # Version used : Git branch ( h t t p s :// g i t hu b . com/simsong/AFFLIBv3)
Listing D.8: Quick Windows cross-compilation guide for fiwalk
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D.5 Real-World Data Set Sourced Hard Drives
Table D.3 displays all second-hand hard drives collected for system evaluation. The naming
convention for each disk is provided with the digital device type, whether the device could be
forensically captured, if the device has a valid file system (Has FS), the file system type (if
applicable) and if the device was found to have a Windows directory in the root file system.
Name Type Imaged Has FS FS Type Has Windows
A_K_1 IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
A_K_2 IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
A_K_3 IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
IDE_39 IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
IDE_40 IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
IDE_41 IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
IDE_42 IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
IDE_43 IDE NO
IDE_44 IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
IDE_45 IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
IDE_46 IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
IDE_47 IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
IDE_48 IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
IDE_49 IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
IDE_50 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_52 IDE YES TRUE fat16 TRUE
IDE_53 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_58 IDE YES TRUE fat16 FALSE
IDE_59 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_60 IDE YES TRUE fat32 TRUE
IDE_61 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_66 IDE YES TRUE fat16 TRUE
IDE_69 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_70 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_71 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_72 IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
IDE_73 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_74 IDE YES TRUE ext4 FALSE
IDE_75 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_76 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_77 IDE YES TRUE hfs FALSE
IDE_78 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_79 IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
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IDE_80 IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
IDE_81 IDE YES TRUE fat32 TRUE
IDE_82 IDE YES TRUE fat32 TRUE
IDE_83 IDE YES TRUE fat32 TRUE
IDE_84 IDE YES TRUE fat32 TRUE
IDE_85 IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
IDE_86 IDE YES TRUE fat12 FALSE
IDE_87 IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
IDE_88 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_89 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_90 IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
IDE_91 IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
IDE_94 IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
SATA_36 SATA YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
SATA_38 SATA YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
SCSI_01 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_02 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_03 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_04 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_05 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_06 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_07 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_08 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_09 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_10 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_15 SCSI YES TRUE ufs1 FALSE
SCSI_16 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_17 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_18 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_19 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_20 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_21 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_22 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_23 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_24 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_25 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_26 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_28 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_29 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
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SCSI_30 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_31 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_32 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_33 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_35 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_56 SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
SCSI_65 SCSI YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0101ST SATA YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0102ID IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0103ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0104ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
TM0105ST SATA NO
TM0106ST SATA YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0107ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0108ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0109ID IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0110ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0111ST SATA NO FALSE None FALSE
TM0112ST SATA NO
TM0113ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0114ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0115ID IDE YES TRUE fat32 TRUE
TM0116ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0117ID IDE NO
TM0118ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0119ID IDE YES TRUE fat32 TRUE
TM0120ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0121ID IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0122ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0123ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0124ID IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
TM0125ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0126ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0127ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0128ID IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0129ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0130ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0131ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0132ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
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TM0133ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0134ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0135ST SATA YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0136ST SATA NO
TM0137ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
TM0138ID IDE YES TRUE fat16 FALSE
TM0139ID IDE YES TRUE hfs FALSE
TM0140ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0141ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0142SC SCSI YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0143SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0144SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0145SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0146SC SCSI NO
TM0147SC SCSI NO
TM0148SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0149SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0150SC SCSI NO
TM0151SC SCSI NO
TM0152SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0153SC SCSI NO
TM0154SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE





TM0160SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0161SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0162SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0163SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0164SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0165SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0166SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0167SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0168SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0169SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0170SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0171SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
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TM0172SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0173SC SCSI NO
TM0174SC SCSI YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0175SC SCSI YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM0201ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
TM0202ID IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0301ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
TM0401ID IDE NO
TM0501ID IDE YES
TM0601ID IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
TM0701ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
TM0801ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
TM0901ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
TM1001ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
TM1101ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs FALSE
TM1102ID IDE YES TRUE fat32 TRUE
TM1103ID IDE YES FALSE None FALSE
TM1201ID IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
TM1202ID IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
TM1203ID IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
TM1401ID IDE NO
TM1501ID IDE YES TRUE fat32 FALSE
TM2001ST SATA YES FALSE None FALSE
TM2101ID IDE YES TRUE ntfs TRUE
Table D.3: Overview of the drives sourced for the real world data set
D.6 Real-World Data Set Contents
Table D.4 displays the complete file system counts for the real-world data set including the
number of hive files, keys, values, allocated entries, unallocated entries and a total count.
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Name Dirs Files Other Alloc Unalloc Total
IDE_50 1,616 9,492 1,073 10,078 2,103 12,181
IDE_52 2,281 19,114 6 15,233 6,168 21,401
IDE_53 10,844 51,957 2,133 34,157 30,777 64,934
IDE_59 10,825 48,678 2,132 38,919 22,716 61,635
IDE_60 1,100 19,251 3 19,604 750 20,354
IDE_61 11,520 55,282 4,265 49,362 21,705 71,067
IDE_66 136 2,012 3 2,002 149 2,151
IDE_69 2,075 8,729 272 10,787 289 11,076
IDE_70 9,612 44,159 1,676 52,773 2,674 55,447
IDE_71 5,679 31,077 2,392 35,922 3,226 39,148
IDE_73 9,205 32,667 1,010 37,485 5,397 42,882
IDE_75 25,466 145,497 14,944 170,346 15,561 185,907
IDE_76 6,248 29,920 1,831 34,544 3,455 37,999
IDE_78 47,740 176,242 10,709 191,906 42,785 234,691
IDE_81 6,205 69,842 6 32,758 43,295 76,053
IDE_82 1,683 17,440 3 15,967 3,159 19,126
IDE_83 2,091 15,156 3 10,659 6,591 17,250
IDE_84 11,076 162,595 6 82,707 90,970 173,677
IDE_88 9,393 34,595 1,566 32,470 13,084 45,554
IDE_89 40,079 125,700 4,866 158,807 11,838 170,645
IDE_91 33,731 118,072 8,553 68,342 92,014 160,356
SATA_38 2,863 18,359 841 15,451 6,612 22,063
SCSI_65 4,817 25,558 899 23,162 8,112 31,274
TM0101ST 434 3,174 36 3,607 37 3,644
TM0103ID 17,209 101,253 7,659 91,513 34,608 126,121
TM0106ST 34,997 228,910 40,799 254,303 50,403 304,706
TM0107ID 10,271 68,424 3,511 78,694 3,512 82,206
TM0108ID 53,366 408,956 8,428 164,191 306,559 470,750
TM0110ID 26,057 118,360 4,244 80,423 68,238 148,661
TM0113ID 2,265 10,242 319 9,822 3,004 12,826
TM0114ID 10,700 39,491 2,677 49,119 3,749 52,868
TM0115ID 5,427 30,812 3 26,309 9,933 36,242
TM0116ID 20,456 96,753 4,410 71,848 49,771 121,619
TM0118ID 11,727 101,337 15,185 77,339 50,910 128,249
TM0119ID 13,907 163,038 6 63,796 113,155 176,951
TM0120ID 13,109 39,559 3,086 48,160 7,594 55,754
TM0122ID 12,611 56,547 5,924 68,504 6,578 75,082
TM0123ID 12,885 61,043 6,274 72,705 7,497 80,202
TM0125ID 1,799 9,351 265 11,123 292 11,415
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TM0126ID 4,196 15,184 744 19,378 746 20,124
TM0127ID 11,996 49,888 4,208 54,981 11,111 66,092
TM0129ID 7,241 31,726 1,198 38,967 1,198 40,165
TM0130ID 25,583 99,367 3,886 124,879 3,957 128,836
TM0131ID 23,772 62,634 3,692 79,110 10,988 90,098
TM0132ID 5,372 18,919 524 24,284 531 24,815
TM0133ID 23,515 92,805 4,644 114,180 6,784 120,964
TM0134ID 33,682 61,916 2,657 92,186 6,069 98,255
TM0135ST 11,861 43,426 3,310 54,915 3,682 58,597
TM0140ID 5,975 40,987 1,588 46,312 2,238 48,550
TM0141ID 431 1,687 61 2,118 61 2,179
TM0142SC 33,229 177,386 7,554 129,505 88,664 218,169
TM0175SC 12,725 61,475 5,752 46,704 33,248 79,952
TM1001ID 335 2,953 33 3,288 33 3,321
TM1102ID 653 10,457 3 3,230 7,883 11,113
TM2101ID 11,828 59,840 2,235 32,557 41,346 73,903
Table D.4: Overview of file system counts for the real-world data set
Table D.5 displays the complete Registry counts for the real-world data data set including the
number of directories (dirs), files, other file system data types, allocated entries, unallocated
entries and a total count.
Name Hives Keys Values Alloc Unalloc Total
IDE_50 12 33,295 62,069 95,363 1 95,364
IDE_52 0 0 0 0 0
IDE_53 24 46,567 107,150 152,301 1,416 153,717
IDE_59 31 52,822 142,598 192,473 2,947 195,420
IDE_60 0 0 0 0 0
IDE_61 28 138,510 275,563 411,783 2,290 414,073
IDE_66 0 0 0 0 0
IDE_69 18 70,268 112,857 183,057 68 183,125
IDE_70 26 141,363 246,348 375,538 12,173 387,711
IDE_71 22 102,136 189,825 291,396 565 291,961
IDE_73 25 39,354 81,582 120,762 174 120,936
IDE_75 36 189,641 397,263 548,006 38,899 586,905
IDE_76 18 40,331 85,318 124,848 801 125,649
IDE_78 39 96,610 205,230 300,904 936 301,840
379
. . . continued
Name Hives Keys Values Alloc Unalloc Total
IDE_81 0 0 0 0 0
IDE_82 0 0 0 0 0
IDE_83 16 79,140 135,184 214,309 15 214,324
IDE_84 12 39,040 80,614 119,063 591 119,654
IDE_88 13 105,545 158,748 264,026 267 264,293
IDE_89 19 185,526 315,685 501,159 52 501,211
IDE_91 95 198,946 486,562 681,570 3,938 685,508
SATA_38 16 97,829 168,763 266,454 138 266,592
SCSI_65 6 3,918 11,533 15,348 103 15,451
TM0101ST 2 3,927 7,175 11,096 6 11,102
TM0103ID 22 160,977 292,371 449,300 4,048 453,348
TM0106ST 71 230,657 586,603 766,837 50,423 817,260
TM0107ID 26 127,499 223,621 350,895 226 351,121
TM0108ID 19 80,848 140,028 220,700 176 220,876
TM0110ID 51 168,164 330,016 475,292 22,888 498,180
TM0113ID 11 52,484 103,987 156,391 80 156,471
TM0114ID 35 137,856 267,784 404,700 940 405,640
TM0115ID 0 0 0 0 0
TM0116ID 47 163,638 323,229 465,733 21,134 486,867
TM0118ID 30 122,634 210,243 328,998 3,879 332,877
TM0119ID 18 146,737 247,912 380,843 13,806 394,649
TM0120ID 24 125,793 241,389 364,269 2,913 367,182
TM0122ID 18 148,955 270,041 417,349 1,649 418,998
TM0123ID 18 201,907 360,764 562,020 651 562,671
TM0125ID 16 79,359 130,920 210,267 12 210,279
TM0126ID 16 133,943 232,472 364,056 2,359 366,415
TM0127ID 0 0 0 0 0
TM0129ID 23 122,857 206,713 329,243 327 329,570
TM0130ID 24 184,445 319,796 503,791 450 504,241
TM0131ID 40 192,576 371,924 554,316 10,184 564,500
TM0132ID 18 114,310 201,197 315,393 114 315,507
TM0133ID 51 219,542 416,122 616,798 18,866 635,664
TM0134ID 49 194,194 366,233 559,037 1,390 560,427
TM0135ST 32 105,872 222,691 309,798 18,765 328,563
TM0140ID 21 138,480 236,286 359,629 15,137 374,766
TM0141ID 0 0 0 0 0
TM0142SC 17 116,154 237,905 324,696 29,363 354,059
TM0175SC 20 277,985 498,076 775,870 191 776,061
TM1001ID 2 3,713 6,940 10,646 7 10,653
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TM1102ID 0 0 0 0 0
TM2101ID 16 156,253 276,061 339,509 92,805 432,314
Table D.5: Overview of Registry counts for the real-world data set
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